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2ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is to show how and explain why the 
relationship between Britain and the Shaikhdom of Bahrain changed 
between 1869 and 1915 and how this changing relationship was expressed 
in legal form. The period from 1869 to 1915 was the formative period 
of the growth of British protection over Bahrain. 1869 was the year 
in which there began the long reign of Shaikh ^ sa b. Ali A1 Khalifa. 
In 1915 the promulgation by the British Government of an Order in 
Council completed a series of pre-war diplomatic and legal arrange­
ments which defined Britain’s relationship with the shaikhdom.
Chapter 1 of this thesis is introductory. It describes Bahrain 
and its political system,and shows the involvement of the Anglo-Indian 
diplomatic structure in the Gulf with Bahrain up to the accession of 
ShaikhCIsa. Chapters 2 and 3 deal with Anglo-Bahraini relations in 
the period from 1869 to 1895«during which the Turkish presence on the 
Arabian mainland near Bahrain was a predominant factor affecting those 
relations. Chapter 2 deals with the period up to and including the 
signing of the Anglo-Bahraini Agreement of December 1880, and Chapter 3> 
with the period from 1881 to 1895* Chapter 4 is concerned with the 
period from 1896 to 1904,when various European Powers were showing a 
greatly increased interest in the Gulf,and when the British were 
searching for a way of putting their relationship with Bahrain on a 
different basis. Chapter 5 discusses certain disturbances which 
occurred in Bahrain in late 1904 and how the British reacted to them 
whilst Chapter 6 deals with the various British proposals for reform 
in Bahrain which were a sequel to the disturbances. Chapter 7 shows
3the evolution of the various diplomatic arrangements through which 
the British brought about changes which they desired in their 
relationship with Bahrain in the years preceding the First World War. 
It also discusses the practical operation of the British system of 
protection over Bahrain in the context of events in the Gulf region 
during the same years. Chapter 8 forms the conclusion.
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5NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION
The system used in the Cambridge History of Islam has been 
adopted for this thesis, except for certain nouns for which a 
particular spelling has become standard for users of the English 
language (e.g. Bahrain). The system of the Encyclopaedia of Islam 
(New Edition) has been followed for the letters *Ain* and ,Kh*.
6PREFACE
This thesis is an historical study of the Shaikhdom of Bahrain 
from 1869 to 19^5- The central issue is the growth of British 
protection over the Shaikhdom. The thesis attempts to show how a 
why the relationship between Britain and Bahrain changed between 18^9 
and 1915 and how this changing relationship was expressed in legal form. 
The first agreement between Britain and the rulers of Bahrain had been 
signed in 1820. This was the Agreement, later known as the 'General 
Treaty*, executed by the Shaikhs of Bahrain engaging not to permit 
the sale in the Shaikhdom of property procured by plunder and piracy. 
However, the period covered by this thesis starts in 1869* the year
Cam m bof the accession to the Shaikhship of Isa b. Ali A1 Khalifa, which 
marked the end of a lengthy period of particularly bloody internal 
conflict in the Shaikhdom. From 1869 onwards, the major challenges 
to the power of the ruling Shaikh of Bahrain were to come from forces 
based outside the island.
By about this time, the British had practically succeeded in 
their prolonged work of imposing a Pax Britannica over the whole of 
the Gulf. Although piracies still occurred, a relatively high degree 
of law and order at sea under British supervision had been established. 
At the same time, the 1870s marked the end of Britain’s exclusive 
control of the waters of the Gulf as first one Power and then another 
began to make its appearance there. The period 1869-1915 in the 
history of Bahrain is, therefore, one in which the Pax Britannica was 
faced with growing challenges. It is the formative period of the 
growth of British protection over Bahrain.
7Bahrain had already received a certain amount of attention from 
historians, particularly J.B. Kelly in his authoritative Britain and 
the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880 (1968). However, none has given 
exclusive attention to this crucial period. Abbas Faroughy has 
written a doctoral thesis entitled The Bahrain Islands. It deals 
with the period 750 A.D. to 1951• Another work in English is 
xFereydoun Adamiyat’s Bahrein Islands which deals with the period 1800- 
1955* Apart from covering a much longer period than the present 
work, Adamiyat’s study is concerned almost exclusively with the 
Persian claim to Bahrain. Briton Cooper Busch’s Britain and the 
Persian Gulf, 1895-191^ 0967) has several sections dealing with 
Bahrain during the last two decades of the forty-five year period 
covered by this thesis.
Two or three books on the history of Bahrain have appeared in 
Arabic. All have been based on volume six of Al-Nabhani’s history of 
Arabia (see Bibliography) which deals with Bahrain. Al-Nabhani 
made some use of the archives of the ruling A1 Khalifa family of 
Bahrain. His work is a chronicle and makes little pretence to be 
an objective study as far as relations between Britain and Bahrain 
are concerned.
The present work is, therefore, the only detailed study dealing 
exclusively with Bahrain in the vital period of the growth of British 
protection over the Shaikhdom. There is, however, another reason why
this work has been undertaken. The British Empire was not comprised
only of colonies ruled directly by Whitehall. A considerable part 
consisted of principalities over whose rulers the British exercised
varying degrees of control and influence. This 'indirect rule1 was 
particularly important in the Gulf. Within this area Bahrain was an 
outstanding example of a principality over which the British 
exercised indirect control. It is, therefore, hoped that the present 
work will provide an instructive case study of the growth of such a 
system of indirect control.
The sources for this work are almost exclusively British since 
the present writer was not able to secure access to the archives of 
the A1 Khalifa of Bahrain. Of course, the British sources contain
a large number of communications written by the A1 Khalifa, mainly to 
British officials serving in the Gulf. By far the most valuable 
sources have been the official records of the India Office. Also 
instructive have been the private papers which have been consulted, 
especially those of Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India from 1899 to 1905, 
a crucial period in the development of British-Bahraini relations.
I wish here to record my thanks to Dr. M.E. Yapp who supervised 
my work for this thesis from 1971 to 1975» and to Professor P.M. Holt 
and Mr. P.M. Burrell who were my supervisors in 1975-76. I am also 
indebted to the following for reading earlier drafts of my work for 
this thesis and/or offering their advice: Elizabeth Monroe of
St. Antony's College, Oxford, Professor J.B. Kelly, Professor B.C. Busch 
of Colgate University, New York, Professor Walid Arafat of Lancaster 
University, Professor A. Duri end Dr. Mustafa Hiyari, both of the 
University of Jordan. A special word of thanks is due to Mr. M.A. Cook 
of the School of Oriental and African Studies for reading the whole 
work and offering me the benefit of his erudition and penetrating
9understanding, I need hardly say that I alone am responsible for
any shortcomings or errors in the present work. The first year of my
work was financed by a grant from the British Council, For
subsequent financial assistance I am indebted to Mr, Elias Farah
and Mr, Issam Faxes. In the collection of material I was helped by
Mr. William Mulligan, Mr. Leslie Lewis and Mr. Majid al-As of ARAMCO;
Mr. Yusuf Shirawi, Mr. Husain Sabbagh, Mr. A. Ulaywat, Mr. A. al-Khalifa
and Mr. Muhammad al-Zamil, all of Bahrain; Dr. A. Khuwaytir and • "
Dr. G. al-Qusaibi of the University of Riyadh; and Mr. A. Alissa of 
Saudi Arabia. I should like to thank for their services 
Dr. Sadeq As ad, Mr. Peter Scragg, Mr. Thomas Tulenko and the staffs 
of the following institutions: the Public Record Office, the British
Museum, the Library of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 
and last, but not least, the India Office Library and Records where 
Mr. Moir, Mrs. Tuson, Mr. fhrrington and the staff counter rendered 
invaluable service. Lastly, I would like to thank Ulrike Tykwer 
for sharing with me for four years the ordeals involved in the 
production of this work.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION; BAHRAIN, BRITAIN & THE GULF BEFORE 1870
The term Bahrain has, in the past, been used to refer to that
part of the Arab coast of the Gulf, known as Hasa, between Qatif and
• •
-  1
Salwa. However, the term is currently understood to refer to the 
Bahrain islands situated off this coast. This name was not the only 
association linking the islands with the mainland. The archipelago 
is formed by the major islands of Bahrain, Muharraq and Sitra, along
0 vwith a number of lesser islands including Umm Na san, Nabi Salih and
• •
Zakhnuniyya. Bahrain, which is approximately fifty kilometers 
long and up to twenty broad, dwarfs the other islands in size. 
Commanding the sea at its north eastern corner, Manama has evolved as 
the commercial capital, whilst Rufa , the summer residence of the 
ruling family, in the interior, and Budayi on the west coast, were 
also notable towns, in addition to several fishing villages and 
agricultural settlements scattered across the fertile landscape.
A couple of kilometers away to the north east, lies Muharraq, the 
second largest island, which could be reached on donkey-back at low 
tide, but not without difficulty. Muharraq town served as the main
1 Yaqut, Mu°jam al Buldan, II, 72-76; Arnold T. Wilson, The
Persian Gulf (London, 1959) 1 P* 2A4n. G. Rentz & W.E. Mulligan, 
•Al-Bahrayn* Encyclopaedia of Islam (London, i960), I, pp. 9^1"^f* 
See also M.B. Sinan, al Bahrayn (Baghdad, 19&3), pp* 1*1—21, for 
several of the numerous interpretations accorded by Islamic 
geographers & biographers to the origin of the name Bahrain.
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residence of the ruling Shaikh and his family and hence became the 
seat of government for the greater part of the year. Otherwise, 
this island offering little land for cultivation, the rest of its 
inhabitants were congregated in a few coastal villages, orientated 
towards the pearl fishing industry. The pattern of settlement 
over the remainder of the islands was dictated by the same factors, 
comprising small agricultural, communities where land was available 
for crops, and the coastlines dotted with fishing villages.
Whilst the archipelago as a whole is closely hemmed in by 
coral reefs, its shores shelve gently into shallow water, and, apart 
from the hill of Jabal Dukhan at the centre of Bahrain, the terrain 
is generally smooth and low lying. The soil is not particularly 
rich and the southern pant of Bahrain island is barren sand, salt 
flats, and scrub. Yet in the north of Bahrain, Muharraq and Sitra 
there rise a number of fresh water springs which provided irrigation 
for cultivation. A number of date groves were planted in these 
parts, alongside gardens bearing such fruits as citrus, melons and
I
figs and a selection of vegetables. Cereals were not grown 
extensively. Some of the lesser islands furnished pasturage
1 A.B. Kemball, 'Memorandum on the Resources, Localities, and 
Relations of the Tribes inhabiting the Arabism Shores of the 
Persian Gulf', 6 January 1845, in Selections from the Records of 
the Bombay Government, Vol. 24, new series (Bombay, 1856), 
pp. 104-5• Henceforth this work will be referred to as 
'Memorandum on the Resources*. J.G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the 
Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia (Calcutta, 1908 and 1915)« 
IIA, 241-2. Henceforth this work will be referred to as 
Lorimer. Admiralty, A Handbook of Arabia (London, 19*16), I, 
314. Henceforth referred to as A Handbook of Arabia.
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during the summer for a few of the migratory tribes who divided their 
time between the Bahrain archipelago, and Qatar and the mainland*
Grazing requirements were not the only factor influencing the 
movements of such tribes to and from the islands. Other than the 
convenience of Bahrain’s proximity to the mainland and the attractions 
of its wealth and agricultural amenities, throughout history it was 
not uncommon for even fairly settled tribes to uproot and transfer to 
another territory.
This was an inherent part of the tribal way of life. The 
Al Khalifa themselves had behaved in this way. They roamed the 
shores of the Gulf seeking new settlements prior to their conquest of 
Bahrain in 1783. In the two decades preceding the conquest they 
established themselves at Zubara on the western coast of Qatar, and 
they were able to wrest control of the islands from the governor of 
the Persian province of Pars, only with the help of neighbouring 
tribesmen,some of whom decided to resettle there with them. Other 
tribes came to join them later, driven by political circumstances and 
the search for a more prosperous living.
The support given to the Al Khalifa and their own kinsmen of
C mthe Utub, in 1?83t came from the major tribal sections of Qatar and
1 J.B. Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers (London, 1964), pp. 17-50, 
has a detailed study of the tribes along the coasts adjacent to 
Bahrain, their life and manners as well as their appreciation of 
the notion of frontiers. For further consideration of the 
tribes of Eastern Arabia see H.R.P. Dickson, Kuwait and Her 
Neighbours (London, 1956), and The Arab of the Desert (London,
13
Hasa, together with a number of the lesser tribes of the region, who
had long since left their ancestral homelands* The most important
_ _
tribe of the Hasa coast was the Bani Khalid , whose power had
extended north to Kuwait, south beyond Qatar and far into the 
Arabian hinterland, before they were reduced by the Wahhabis of Najd, 
towards the end of the eighteenth century. Following their 
suppression by the Wahhabis, the BanI Khalid concentrated in Hasa, 
reluctantly submitting to the new power of Najd, but seizing every 
opportunity to resist, and for this reason they developed friendly 
relations with the Ottoman Turks.
In the Qatar peninsula, where the Al Khalifa*s connections were
-  -  2stronger, the Bani Khalid*s kinsmen the Al Musallam constituted the
most numerous single tribe, in the eighteenth century. They 
exercised control over most of the peninsula, with Huwailah on the 
north eastern coast as their main stronghold. Yet the development
of Zubara in the 1760s, under the Al Khalifa, eroded the importance
of Huwailah and following the conquest of Bahrain, the Al Musallam 
gradually lost their predominance to the Al Khalifa.
1 Carsten Niebtihr, Travels through Arabia (Edinburgh, 1792), II, 
128. Lorimer, IIB, 1010-14 & 1 932-35. See also A.M. Abu 
Hakima, History of Eastern Arabia, 1750-1800 (Beirut, 1965)*
PP» 39-^1• Abu Hakima has also made extensive use of the local 
Arabic sources.
2 Lorimer, IIB, 1282-83. See also Fu*ad Hamzah, Qalb Jazlrat 
al-cArab (Riyadh, 1933), p. 155- ARAMCO, Oman (Cairo, 1932), 
p. 205, Abu Hakima, op. cit., pp. 67, 70 & 115*
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c- _ 1
Another important tribe of Qatar was the Ma adid , who dwelt also at
Huwailah, in addition to the other coastal settlements of Fuwairit • •
c — — »
and Bida (Doha), From this tribe emerged the Al Thani family,
who were to pose a serious threat to the Al Khalifa authority 
following the Turkish expedition to Hasa in 1871, Descended from
«C Qm m h
the Rabi ah, the Ma adid enjoyed the same origins as the Bani Khalid. 
-  -  2
The Bani Hajar , meanwhile, were a sizeable bedouin tribe,
split into two main sections, the Mukhaddabah and the Al Muhammad,
' ' ' • • •
who did not always regard each other amicably. The tribe as a whole 
was spread throughout the Hasa and Qatar regions, though only those 
in Qatar, Mukhaddabah, manifested permanent territorial ties. They 
held themselves independent of all other tribes and Shaikhs, except 
in that they paid Zakat to the Wahhabis on certain occasions.
^  •> 3
Notable amongst the allies of the Ma adid were the Al Sudan 
tribesmen who lived in Qatar. These tribesmen represented but one 
part of a very considerable tribe whose other members dwelt in 
Trucial Oman. In Qatar their base was Bida where they remained an
Zj.
influential community until 1867 when the town was razed. Another
1 Lorimer, IIB, 1112-13; and T.M. Johnstone and J.C. Wilkinson, 
•Some Geographical Aspects of Qatar*, The Geographical Journal, 
Vol. 126 (Dec. 1960), pp. M*2-50.
2 Lorimer, IIA, 6 12-13*
3 Lorimer, IIB, 1842; A Handbook of Arabia, I, 330, 334, 337» 338,
340 , 343 and 596; A3SAMC0, Oman, pp. 169, 204 & 205.
4 Until Bida° was attacked by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi.
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group of coastal dwellers in Qatar, the Al Bu Kuwarah\ claiming 
descent from the Bani Tamim of Najd, but only a small tribe them­
selves, came to be closely allied to the MaCadid through marriage,
w m c 2 c
The Al Bu Ainain tribe founded part of Bida in the early nine­
teenth century, but subsequently moved to Ruwais and Fuwairit, 
finally settling at the port of Wakrah, This tribe belonged to the
Al Subaih section of the Bani Khalid,
•  •  '
When the Al Khalifa invaded Bahrain in 1783 they received
assistance from various groups amongst the tribesmen of the mainland.
These included elements from the Al Musallam, the Al Bu Kuwarah, the
Al b. Ali and the Al Sadah, In addition they were joined by
c msupporters from other less numerous tribes, as the Al Amamirah,
Ziya* inah, Al Mu°awdah, Al Qumrah, Al Jana°at, Al Ban! Yatil, Al
"** m  c  *  3Sulutah, and the nomadic Al Ka ban. Some members of each of these 
tribal groups decided to settle and make a living on the islands 
under the leadership of the Al Khalifa. They were rewarded for
Lorimer, IIB, 1 0 7 7 *  
pp. 1 4 0 - 4 1 .
For the Bani Tamim see Hamzah, op, cit.,
Lorimer, IIA, 48, & IIB, 1 0 1 3 *  Hamzah, op. cit., pp. 1 5 4 - 5 5 ;
ARAMCO, Oman, pp. 2 0 2  8c 2 1 4 - 1 3 .  #
Al °Amamirah:
Al Ziya’inah:
Q m m
Al Mu awdah:
Al Qumrah:
Al Jana°at:
Al Bani Yatil: 
•
Al Sulutah:
Al Ka°ban:
Lorimer IIA, 6 8 ;  Hamzah, op. cit., pp. 1 5 4 - 5 5 *
u IIB, 1 9 4 6 ;  A Handbook of Arabia, I, 3 2 3 *
lf IIB, 1 2 4 4 ;  Hamzah, op. cit., pp. 1 7 8 - 8 6 ,
*
11 IIB, 1 2 7 0  8c 1 5 6 4 .
" IIA, 9 0 0 - 0 1 .
11 IIB, 9 5 5 »  Hamzah, op. cit., pp. 1 4 0 - 4 1 .
" IIB, 1 8 4 3 - 4 ;  ARAMCO, Oman, pp. 2 0 4 - 5 .
" IIA, 963.
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their support with grants of land, and prospered at their customary 
pursuits of pearl fishing and trade.
The pattern of settlement established at the conquest did not 
remain static. The majority of tribesmen retained strong links 
with kinsmen on the mainland, where, in the case of the Al Musallam 
Al Bu Kuwarah and Al Sadah, the bulk of their tribes lived. The Al 
b. Ali, having grown strong and prosperous as merchants and seafarers 
on the islands during the nineteenth century,a large number returned 
to the Qatar peninsula after 1895, as a result of a dispute with the 
Shaikh of Bahrain. In 1883 the Al Sadah also contemplated moving
to Darin at Qatif but were dissuaded by concessions from the Al
- 2 -c-Khalifa ruler. The majority of the Al Jana at moved to Kuwait
during the nineteenth century, leaving just a handful of shopkeepers 
behind. The Al Sulutah, meanwhile, made a temporary move back to 
Qatar, in 1869, having supported the losing faction of Al cAbdallah 
in the Al Khalifa family feud, many of them returning in 1893-^
Members of other tribes arrived and settled on the
— 4
islands after the initial conquest. The Al Dawawdah , the most
1 See Chapter 3* P»1$^ -
2 *Administration Report of the Persian Gulf Political Residency 
and the Muscat Political Agency1, 1883-84, p. ?• Hereafter 
this work is referred to as ’Administration Report*.
3 Lorimer, IIB, 1843-44; ARAMCO, Oman, pp. 204-5*
4 Lorimer, IIA, 1 0 1 0 - 1 0 1 4 ;  A Handbook of Arabia, I, 84-5, & 6 0 8 ; 
Hamzah, pp. 1 5 4 - 5 6 ;  ARAMCO, Oman, pp. 2 1 2 - 1 4 .
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directly connected representatives of the Bani Khalid to live in 
Bahrain, were actually recruited by the Al Khalifa to come as members 
of their official bodyguard, whilst the rest of their tribe remained 
as nomads in Hasa,
_ 1
Some of the nomadic Al Madahika came to settle and the
• •
majority of the small Al b. Maqla tribe migrated from Qatar, as too 
— c 2the Manani ah , of Abu Daluf in north western Qatar, Some of the
3 c-A1 Bu Rumaih , who mostly roamed the mainland with the Na im also 
•
came. Two other small tribal allies of the Na im, the Al Muraikhat
Zj. Q.
and Al Kibisah, also settled on the islands. The Na im tribesmen 
themselves took to spending their summers on the islands and 
wintering near Zubara, Lastly, some of the Dawasir^, a major tribe 
of Central Arabia, made their way to the Gulf coast during the nine­
teenth century and from l8*f5, with the agreement of the Al Khalifa, 
established a virtually autonomous settlement on Bahrain, only to 
uproot and return to the mainland at the beginning of this century.
1 Lorimer, IIB, 1116; ARAMCO, Oman, p. 209.
2 Lorimer, IIB, 1162; ARAMCO, Oman, pp. 205, 207 & 208.
3 Lorimer, IIB, 1600; ARAMCO, Oman, pp. 208 & 212.
k Al Muraikhat: Lorimer, IIB, 127^ 8c 1305; ARAMCO, Oman, p. 209.
Al Kibisah: Lorimer, IIB, 1035-6; A Handbook of Arabia, I,
331-2; ARAMCO, Oman, pp. 205-8.
5 Muhammad b. Khalifa al-Nabhanl, al-Tuhfa al-Nabhaniyya fl
Tarikh al-Jazira al- Arabiyya (Cairo, 192*0, VI, *f2; Hereafter 
referred to as Al-Nabhani. A Handbook of Arabia, I, 325* 
Hamzah, op. cit., pp. 157-8.
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The continual interchange between the tribesmen of the islands 
and those of the mainland, the shifting of allegiances and the 
regrouping of settlements interlocked Bahrain's affairs closely with 
those of the mainland. To retain power and prestige the Al Khalifa 
Shaikhs expected to maintain close contact with all their tribal 
neighbours and when threatened, sought to manipulate the process of 
migration and regrouping. In 1850, for example, the Shaikh of 
Bahrain actually resettled the much depleted Al Musallam of Huwailah 
at BidaC, the power base of the Al Than! in Qatar, to counter the 
predominance of the Al Sudan.
-  -  2The Al Khalifa enhanced the wealth of Bahrain through trade, 
by exploiting the potential of two of the archipelago's natural 
advantages. It was situated at the centre of the richest pearling 
grounds of the Persian gulf, and its geographical location ideally 
placed it to act as an entrepQt for the surrounding area.
The pearl banks of the Gulf, commencing off Ras Tannura, 
stretch eastwards to the north of Qatar*, then follow the coastline 
south and span out into the centre of the Gulf, terminating parallel 
with Sharjah. The richest pearl beds of all occur in the waters off 
Bahrain and Ras Rakan. This gave the inhabitants primary 
opportunity to exploit the resources, whilst, by tradition, the ruler
1 Lorimer, IIB, 1282-83.
2 The origin and accomplishments of this family are discussed in 
Francis Warden's 'Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribe of 
Arabs (Bahrain) from the year 1716 to the year 1817', Bombay 
Selections, Vol. 24, pp. 362-3. Henceforth this work will be 
referred to as 'Historical Sketch'. See also Abu Hakima,
op. cit., pp. 117-8 & 165.
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of Bahrain would expect to collect a tax from all the pearling boats
fishing the banks, whether resident on the islands or making the
journey for the season from other parts of the Gulf. Merchants
eager to purchase the yield would come even from distant places.
Estimates of the annual value to Bahrain of the fishery vary
considerably, but all indicate a steady growth from the end of the
2
eighteenth century into the nineteenth. In 1790 East India 
Company factors valued the annual export of pearls from Bahrain at 
5 lakhs of rupees (£50,000). Drawing upon survey work 
completed in the 1820s, Lieutenant H.H. Whitelock estimated the yield 
throughout the Gulf in one season at 40 lakhs of rupees.
Whitelock attributed 2,450 boats to Bahrain and its 
dependencies out of a total of 3*230 in the whole Gulf, during the
1 G.B. Brucks, *Memoir descriptive of the Navigation of the Gulf 
of Persia*, Bombay Selections, Vol. 24, p. 567* Henceforth 
this work will be referred to as *Memoir*. See also J.S. 
Buckingham, Travels in Assyria, Media, and Persia (London, 1829), 
pp. 454-7. J.R. Wellsted, Travels in Arabia (London, 1838), I, 
p. 265. R. Le Baron Bowen Jr., *Pearl Fisheries of the Persian 
Gulf*, Middle East Journal, Vol. V (1951), p. 179« Henceforth 
this work will be referred to as *Pearl Fisheries*.
2 For an estimate prior to the conquest of Bahrain by the
Al Khalifa see Abraham Parsons, Travels in Asia and Africa 
(London, 1808), p. 202. (Parsons* journey took place in the 
1770s):- u... the annual produce being seldom less than sixty 
thousand Bussora tomans, oftener more; some years it amounts to 
one hundred thousand, at thirty-seven shillings and six-pence 
per toman".
3 See Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 29.
4 H.H. Whitelock, *An Account of the Arabs who inhabit ... the 
Pirate Coast*, Transactions of the Bombay Geographical Society, 
Vol. I (1844), pp. 32-54.
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same period. Available evidence does suggest , however, that 
Bahrain*6 profits from the industry subsequently declined for a 
while, but this is attributed to internal dynastic problems, the 
potential remaining unchanged.
As regards Bahrain's capacity as an entrep&t, S.M. Zwemer wrote:
As Jiddah is the western port, Bahrain is the eastern port 
of Arabia. It is the gateway to the interior, the 
threshhold of which is Hasa. Draw a line from Menama to 
Katif, then on to Hofhoof (or El Hassa) and thence back to 
Menamah and the triangle formed will include every important 
town or village of Eastern Arabia. 2
Half way between the Gulf entrance at the straits of Hormuz and its
head, Bahrain was ideally placed to capture the trade to and from the
central sector of the adjacent Arabian coast. Buckingham noted not
only the large community of wealthy merchants in Manama, but also the
traffic in manufactured goods and foodstuffs from India for
distribution to the mainland, and the return trade in pearls.^ In
the 1820s other commodities came to Bahrain from Persia, Omam, Basra
and Yemen, and the islands exported twice as much as they were
if
importing, though the exports consisted largely of pearls.
Captain Kemball estimated that, in the late 1830s, only one fourth of
5
Bahrain's foreign imports were for internal consumption.
1 A.B. Kemball, 'Statistical & Miscellaneous information connected 
with the possessions, Revenues, Families, etc. ... of the Ruler 
of Bahrain', Bombay Selections, Vol. 24, p. 291 •
2 S.M. Zwemer, Arabia: The Cradle of Islam (New York, 1900),
p. 110.
3 Buckingham, op. cit., pp. 452-3.
4 Brucks, 'Memoir', pp. 568-9. Figures are given in German crowns.
Bahrain's total exports, including pearls: 1,651,900; excluding
pearls: 51*900. Total imports were 807,300.
5 Kemball,'Memorandum on the Resources', p. 105.
21
Offsetting Bahrain’s peculiar merits, visiting Westerners
denounced its climate as humid and debilitating. For the Arabs of
the area Bahrain’s humidity was ameliorated by the convenience and
2quality of its fresh water supply. Harbour facilities on Bahrain,
similarly, had both advantages and disadvantages. Buckingham's
description sums up its physical qualities:
The harbour is thus formed by these two islands, ^Bahrain
and Muharracj/^  one lying north and south, and the other east
and west; and good shelter is afforded by them from all
but north-west winds. Though the approach to the harbour
is rendered difficult by the foul ground, and shoals, yet,
these being of coral, the water is so finely transparent as
to admit of their being seen at a considerable distance
which renders the navigation comparatively easy, requiring
only careful hands stationed to look out aloft, and guide
the vessel through them by the eye._
3
Access was thus easy for small native craft of shallow draught, 
but impossible for large trading or war vessels. Goods and 
passengers were ferried inshore from an anchorage some distance out.
The proximity of the islands to the mainland - to Hasa to the 
south and west, and to the Qatar peninsula to the east - presented the 
inhabitants of Bahrain with a constant problem of defence against 
plundering raids or full-scale invasion. Fortresses protected the
1 Ibid. See also J.T. Bent, ’The Bahrain Islands in the Persian
Gulf*, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society (London, 
1890), Vol. 12, p. 1.
2 James Morier, A Journey through Persia, Armenia, and Asia Minor
(London, 1812), p. 55* Bracks, 'Memoir', p. 567* Buckingham, 
op. cit., p. A-37* In their previous homes at both Kuwait and 
Zubara the Si Khalifa had been accustomed to fetch water outside 
their town, and that of poor quality.
3 Buckingham, op. cit., p. 433. See also Kemball, ’Memorandum on
the Resources', p. 107. A more reliable technical description 
of the harbour can be found in Admiralty, The Persian Gulf Pilot 
(London, 1915)* PP* & 127-8.
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towns of Manama and Muharraq, and the sizeable Al Khalifa fleet was
•  • ”
adaptable for conflict as well as trade. This could not, however,
prevent the landing of forces in small boats from the shallow waters
around the southern coasts of the archipelago, particularly at
night.^ Consequently the Al Khalifa rulers had to handle their
political relations with the mainland with care and foresight. With
resources unmatched on the mainland except at the oases of Hasa and
#
Qatif, sind with its overall control of trade in the area, Bahrain was 
an attractive target. Having themselves invade Bahrain from Zubara
in Qatar, the Al Khalifa had first-hand knowledge of their own
vulnerability, and they maintained close connections with the mainland 
which were not always amicable.
The Al Khalifa were one of the three family groups that
c - 2 - -comprised the Utub , the others being the Al Sabah and the
• •
w *• 3 c * cAl Jalahima. The Utub, in turn, were a branch of the Anazah
tribe, and had made their way to the northern shores of the Gulf at
the beginning of the eighteenth century. Having roamed the area
*f c — 'in search of a place to settle the Utub were finally given sanction
to reside in Kuwait by the powerful Ban! Khalid (of the Rabica tribe)
who were then in overall command of the whole Hasa region. The
1 Brucks, •Memoir*, p. 568; Kemball, *Memorandum on the Resources*, 
p. 107; E.C. Ross, * Administration Report*, 187*+—75* P* *+8.
2 Al-Nabhani, pp. 117-8; ’Abdul CAzIz al-Rashid, Tarikh al-Kuwait 
(Beirut, 1966), pp. 31* 33* 106-7, & 112; Abu Hakima, op. cit., 
pp. *+5-61.
3 Warden, * Historical Sketch*, pp. 362-*f.
*f Al Nabhani, p. 119; Al-Rashid, op. cit., pp. 35-6 & 112.
Sinan, op. cit., pp. 117-26.
5 Abu Hakima, op. cit., pp. 39-*+1.
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Al Sabah section established themselves as the administrators of 
• •
Kuwait, whilst the Al Khalifa, who inclined rather to commerce, set
out anew in 1766 in search of a settlement of their own, nearer the
1 _
pearl fisheries. Led by Khalifa b, Muhammad, they landed at
' ' •
2
Bahrain, but the inhabitants prevented them from staying. The
islands were then under the control of the Abu Shahr Arabs,under
3 — v .Persian suzerainty. Consequently the Al Khalifa settled instead
at Zubara on the north-eastern coast of Qatar.
The Qatar peninsula was desolate and inhospitable, affording
only some sparse grazing and a few fishing villages on the coastline,
notably Huwailah, Fuwairit and Bida0. The Al Khalifa constructed an 
•  «  '
Z4.
independent and fortified settlement , and rapidly developed a
trading community in Zubara to rival those of the other important
ports in the Gulf. The appeal of the new entrepSt to traders was
enhanced by the complete absence of customs duties there, these being
5
charged at varying rates at the other Gulf ports.
The new-born prosperity of Zubara under the Al Khalifa excited 
jealousy and animosity. Prominent among the aggrieved was Shaikh 
Nasr al-Madhkur, who was both governor of Bushire and overlord of
1 Robert Taylor, *Extracts from Brief Notes, containing Historical 
and other information connected with ... the Persian Gulf*,
Bombay Selections, Vol. 24, p. 26. Hereafter this work will be 
referred to as ’Extracts from Brief Notes*. Abu Hakima, op. cit., 
pp. 64-7.
2 Abu Hakima, op. cit., pp. 66-7.
3 NiebUhr, op. cit., II, 153*
4 Abu Hakima, op. cit., pp. 70-1.
5 Lorimer, IB, 789; Abu Hakima, op. cit., pp. 72-3.
2b
q
Bahrain. In sympathy with Nasr were the Ka ab of Arabistan, who
c •were already at variance with the Utub of Kuwait. From 1777 onwards
Zubara became the object of outright attack under their joint
1 c -auspices. The Shi ite inhabitants of Bahrain itself, the Baharina,
also appear to have been unfriendly towards the Sunni traders from 
2Zubara.
3 _
In 1782 the mounting tension came to a head when the Baharina
were implicated in the death of an Al Khalifa tribesman at Sitra.
The tribe took retribution by a raid on the islands. Shaikh Nasr
in turn organised a siege of Zubara. The Al Khalifa drove him back
only with the assistance of some of the Al b. Ali tribesmen of Qatar.
b
Although the Zand dynasty in Shiraz was struggling for its survival , 
it was likely that Shaikh Nasr and his associates, the Ka ab and the
Qawasim (of Has al-Khaima), would rally independently to the attack
5
once more. Meanwhile, after a sortie to the Bahrain islands, the
Al Sabah reported to their Al Khalifa kinsmen that the defences were 
• •
in poor condition.^ The Al Khalifa thereupon seized the opportunity.
c ^They rallied support from their Utubi kinsmen, including the 
Al Jalahima, and such Qatari tribes as chose to link fortunes with them,
1 Lorimer, IB, 788.
2 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 26-7.
3 Warden, 'Historical Sketch*, p. 36*f; Kelly, Britain and the
Persian Gulf, p. 27.
Wilson, The Persian Gulf, p. 188.
5 Abu Hakima, op. cit., pp. 110-11.
6 Warden, 'Historical Sketch', p. 36^; Lorimer, IB, 839;
Abu Hakima, op. cit., p. 108.
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and, after a siege of two months the Persian garrison of Manama 
1
capitulated.
The circumstances of the conquest of Bahrain by the A1 Khalifa 
to some extent conditioned the hostilities which the new rulers had 
to face subsequently, By capturing the islands they had strengthened 
their position in terms of wealth, prestige and self-defence. As 
has been noted, some of the Qatari tribesmen who had lent their 
support in the conquest, committed themselves fully to the A1 Khalifa 
after the victory, and moved over to settle on the islands. Yet, 
by outwitting their enemies from the Persian littoral, the A1 Khalifa 
had by no means eliminated them. As time passed, and their hold on 
the islands became more entrenched and they prospered, the jealousy 
of their neighbours and rivals magnified. Within their own tribe, 
meanwhile, the A1 Jalahima presented an especially irksome problem.
The cooperation between the two families during the conquest of 
Bahrain proved short-lived, and, dissatisfied and resentful, the 
A1 Jalahima retired to Qatar where they settled at Khaur Hasan, north
of Zubara. From this base they harassed and plundered the
2 -
commercial traffic of their relatives. Shaikh Rahmah b, Jabir,
3
their head, became notorious for his daring as a pirate. Furthermore, 
under his leadership, Khaur Hasan became a rallying point for all whoMM* ^
if
sought to reduce the A1 Khalifa,
1 See Lorimer, IB, 839-^ -Of for the locations in Qatar from which 
the various tribal forces were drawn,
2 Warden, *Historical Sketch*, p, 365, Abu Hakima, op, cit,, p, 182.
3 Buckingham, op. cit., pp. 356-8.
Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 27.
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After the conquest the A1 Khalifa did not regard Bahrain as 
their sole base and sphere of influence. Zubara was not suddenly 
evacuated: the change-over to Bahrain as the principal domicile and
base took place over the subsequent decade, the leading Shaikh, Ahmad, 
continuing to spend his winters in Zubara until his death in 1796* 
With time, however, their attention and interests were concentrated 
more exclusively in the islands, and their own form of government and 
administration took shape there.
The administrative requirements of an island community devoted
to commerce and increasingly cosmopolitan, but with strong tribal
elements, were met, not with any carefully structured system, but on
an ad hoc basis. Bahrain*s government was a personal one in the
hands of the leading Shaikh of the A1 Khalifa, yet, as Abu Hakima
describes it: ’’The tribal authority of the shaikhs was strong, but
because of the commercial nature of the Utbi States, the shaikhs were
1
less despotic than might be expected”. The first Shaikh to have
charge of Bahrain was Ahmad b. Khalifa, who, as mentioned, spent much
of his time at Zubara. It appears that his authority was therefore
. c
represented on the islands by his two sons Salman and Abdallah, who 
handled the day-to-day business of government. When, on Ahmad's 
death in 1796, the brothers agreed to rule jointly, they instigated 
a practice of shared responsibility for governmental duties between 
the head of the family and a brother, which was repeated by subsequent 
A1 Khalifa rulers. Also, by continuing to live on the islands
1 Abu Hakima, op. cit., p. 181.
27
after Ahmad*b death, at Rifa and Muharraq, they transferred the 
• •
centre of the A1 Khalifa ehaikhdom permanently to Bahrain,
That Abdallah, the younger brother, and strictly speaking the 
assistant ruler only, outlived Shaikh Salman, led to a complication in 
the hereditary succession to leadership of the A1 Khalifa,
0 ap ■■
Abdallah took over control, allowing his nephew Khalifa b, Salman
to succeed to only half the revenues of the Shaikhdom, After the
latter*s death in 183^, however, cAbdallah*s grand-nephews Muhammad
0
and Ali managed, following a civil war, to supplant Abdallah*s 
leadership with their own: so that the right of primogeniture 
prevailed. It was however Isa b. Ali, the son of the younger 
nephew, who assumed the leadership subsequently, from 1869 to 1923. 
Succession was thus hereditary, but primogeniture did not necessarily 
prevail. Other factors, such as strength of tribal and military 
support, or attainment of an important executive role, also influenced 
the succession.^
The responsibilities and benefits of authority were not 
restricted entirely to the Shaikh and his chosen assistant. Other
1 For genealogies of the A1 Khalifa, see:
i) Kemball, attached to his ‘Memorandum on the Resources*, 
ii) E.C. Ross, P/775* May '18751 P* 371.
iii) E.C. Ross, Appendix B to Part I of ‘Administration Report*
of 1882-3.
. iv) Lorimer, I , Part 3.
2 A useful sources for details on how the A1 Khalifa Shaikhs
organised their administrative duties, with the aid of their 
fraternal assistants, may be found in the biographical file 
prepared by the native agent in Bahrain in 1883, R/15/1/186.
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leading members of the A1 Khalifa family would expect to take charge
of the different territories of the Shaikhdom as "fiefs”t where they
were "almost independent” for life, collecting their own taxes and
1
dictating jurisdiction. It appears that these were not automati-
2cally hereditary, and could be redisposed by the ruler.
The relationship between the Shaikh and the leading tribes
within his shaikhdom was similarly dictated by prevailing circumstances
and by whether or not the interests of both parties coincided on a
particular issue. In particular, the Shaikh's position was less firm 
3
on the mainland. In certain instances the Shaikh could direct 
tribal politics to the extent of ordering the complete resettlement of 
a whole community in a new location. On the other hand, the Shaikh 
could be thwarted in his intentions by the threat of an important 
tribal group to transfer its allegiance elsewhereUnder arrange­
ments similar to those with his family, the Shaikh allotted lands to 
the leaders of tribes settled on the islands.^ The Shaikh also 
distributed "gifts”, or a type of retainer, to the unpredictable and 
shifting bedouin elements in his shaikhdom. Their services in battle 
could be enlised, at a price; though if victory looked doubtful,
bedouin loyalty could not be relied upon whatever the initial inducement 
7
had been.
1 Lorimer, IIA, 248.
2 The term 'fief* was introducted by unqualified British translators 
to render the Arabic term 'al Nakhil1, which means date groves.
3 Lorimer, IB, 794.
4 Warden, »Historical Sketch', p. 377; Kemball, 'Memorandum on the 
Resources', p. 108.
5 Lorimer, IB, 795- See also Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, p. 18.
6 Taylor, 'Extracts from Brief Notes', p. 29.
7 Lorimer, IIA, 252. See also Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers,
p. 18.
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Tribal traditions and usages also contributed a degree of 
continuity to the operation of government in Bahrain, Confusion or 
maladministration were often not due to a seeming lack of organisation, 
but rather to personal factors: a break in the cohesion of the
A1 Khalifa family, or weakness or shortsightedness on the part of the 
Shaikh himself. Captain Kemball reported such a breakdown in the 
1&f0s:
Since /T8397i owing to the increased dissensions, and 
subsequent hostilities between the members and relatives 
of the ruling family, the population, prosperity and 
commerce of the island have gradually declined.
Numbers of the principal and most wealth inhabitants, 
to avoid the effects of increased anarchy and confusion, 
fled upon the commencement of actual hostilities, to 
Koweit on the Arabian, and Lingah and other places on the 
Persian Coast, where they have since temporarily located 
themselves, in order to watch the course of events, and 
return with the first signs of peace and established 
government, and consequent security to life and property.
The leading figures in Bahrain's mercantile community brought
their own particular influence to bear on the style of administration
which rendered it distinct from more strictly tribal governments in
the heart of Arabia, Their primary concern was with efficient and
peaceful trading, and the results of this interest were most visible
in the institutions of the judiciary. Special facilities for all
disputes arising in connection with the pearl fisheries were provided
2by convening the "Salifat-al-Ghaus" or "Diving Court", The 
financial arrangements between all those involved in both investing- 
in and operating pearl-fishing were complex, though there was a
1 Kemball, 'Memorandum on the Resources', p, 106.
2 Lorimer, I, Part 2 , 223^ +; Bowen, 'The Pearl Fisheries', p, 179»
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1
generally accepted procedure. When a dispute over financial 
commitments did arise, it was best resolved by men familiar with the 
workings of the industry and generally respected for their knowledge 
and judgment, and the Salifa was composed of such men.
Over the years of the A1 Khalifa rule in Bahrain, an additional
c - - 2court, the "Majlis-al- Urfi" or "Majlis al-Tijarah" , was devised
and developed, to adjudicate in other mercantile cases, especially 
those involving foreigners. The "Salifat-al-Ghaus” was a feature 
common to all the Arab pearling communities, but the Majlis was 
peculiar to Bahrain. Theories conflict as to whether it was 
originally suggested by the British, who certainly came to play an 
important part in running it, or whether it was a purely indigenous
3
invention. What is important, however, is that it was developed, 
and operated, thereby facilitating easy relations between the 
different nationalities whose presence enhanced the prosperity of 
the islands as a whole.
Very much at the bottom of the social strata under the A1 
Khalifa rule were the Baharina, the indigenous Shicite inhabitants 
who had shown little friendship to the A1 Khalifa traders when they 
first settled at Zubara. They were of mixed Arab origin and
1 Buckingham, op. cit., p. ^55; Lorimer, IB, 2233-^; Bowen, ’The 
Pearl Fisheries*, p. 177; George Rentz, ’Pearling in the 
Persian Gulf*, Semitic and Oriental Studies, ed. E.J. Fischel 
(London, 1951)» p. 399 & n. 3&.
2 Meaning customary or commercial tribunal: See Lorimer, IIA, 250.
3 Lorimer, IIA, 250, n. 2.
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constituted the largest distinguishable group within the total 
1
population. They were relegated to the position of virtual serfs,
2
supplying the agricultural work-force for the Shaikh and his retinue. 
They held the land they worked usually only in return for unpaid 
labour or "Sukhrah11^ , and they were also assessed for service accord­
ing to their possessions, such as boats and animals. There was thus 
little incentive for them to improve their lot and those who did 
manage to purchase their own gardens could not look forward to a more 
prosperous future without living in fear that any day a local magnate, 
including the A1 Khalifa shaikhs themselves, might take it upon himself 
to appropriate the holding. Furthermore, if the bedouin tribesmen
stole the property of the Baharina, the latter could not rely on the
-  k
A1 Khalifa to enforce reparation on their behalf.
Most nineteenth-century observers estimated the population of 
Bahrain at approximately 60,000, although this figure fluctuated
5
somewhat with the political situation and the security of property.
It was commonly asserted that in this population the Baharina equalled 
or outnumbered the Sunni tribesmen and foreign traders.
1 W.G. Palgrave, Narrative of a Year1 s Journey through Central, and
Eastern Arabia (London, 1665), II, 211; Kelly, Britain and the~~
Persian Gulf, p. 29*
2 Palgrave, op. cit., II, 210; also Captain Durand’s ’Note on 
Bahrain’, L/P&s/18/B95i Lorimer, IIA, 2^8.
3 Lorimer, IIA, 2^8.
^ Lorimer, Ibid., 248-9*
5 Brucks, ’Memoir*, p. 566; Kemball, ’Memorandum on the Resources’, 
II, p. 106. See also Palgrave, op. cit., II, 211 & 216; Zwemer, 
op. cit., p. 99*
6 Brucks, when estimating the total population at 60,000 in 1829, 
also calculated that the Baharina constituted 45,000 of the total. 
’Memoir’, p. 566.
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Amongst the foreign communities, the long-established Indian
traders, known as banians or banias, came mainly from the western
1
regions of Gujerat and Cutch. Chiefly interested in the pearl
trade, their numbers would increase during the pearl season, and they
enjoyed the greatest wealth amongst Bahrain's trading community,
alongside the handful of European merchants. The banians enjoyed
an amicable relationship with the A1 Khalifa generally, especially
since they were in a position to advance the Shaikh a loan if necessary.
The British presence in India, meanwhile, led to close cooperation
between them and the banians, the latter operating Indian trade under
2
the protection of the former.
The Persian population, though more numerous, enjoyed more
3
modest prosperity, operating as entrepreneurs and small shopkeepers.
Q
They appear to have practised their Shi ite faith without interference,
c -4their religious leaders and Ulama holding a recognized status in 
the urban community as a whole.
Less fortunate in respect of religious toleration was the small
Jewish community in Bahrain. They were the first to suffer in times
of political upheaval, and were so victimised during the troubled
5
1860s that they temporarily withdrew from the islands. Their
1 Buckingham, op. cit., pp. 379-80; Palgrave, op. cit., II, 211-12.
2 Brucks, 'Memoir*, p. 566.
3 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, No. 421, 17 December 1904, L/P&S/
10/81, p. 2; Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, No. 180, 23 April
1905, Ibid.
4 H.A.R. Gibb & J.H. Kramers, Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam 
(Leiden, 1974), p. 599.
5 Palgrave, op. cit., II, 216. See also: F.B. Prideaux to
S.G. Knox, 4 August 1906» p/15/5/60.
periodic persecution was, however, a problem faced by the Jewish 
traders m  most of the Gulf ports, and not unique to Bahrain.
Two sizeable groups in Bahrain's community complete the picture.
There were in Bahrain, as in the nearby Hasa and Qatar, a large 
2number of Huwala Arabs who had migrated to the Persian shores of 
the Gulf many generations previously, and subsequently returned, 
having lost their tribal identity and organisation. In Bahrain, as 
elsewhere, they tended to avoid political involvement and assimilate 
themselves readily into the general community, devoting themselves 
to earning a modest living from trade.^ Although they constituted
the most numerous single group of Sunnis in the archipelago, they were
seldom in the limelight. Lastly, the Mawalx\ numbered by Lorimer
5
m  the early 1900s at several thousand , were the African slaves and 
liberated slaves who dwelt in Bahrain. They provided large numbers 
of divers during the pearling season. Those that were free usually 
followed the religion and lifestyle of their Arab neighbours.
Clearly the wealth for which the islands were famous was by no 
means evenly distributed throughout the community. Following their 
conquest of Bahrain, the A1 Khalifa appear to have developed a range 
of revenues to tap specific sources of wealth. There was no 
distinction between personal and public money accruing to the Shaikh.
1 Buckingham, op. cit., p. 375.
2 For their origin and distribution see Lorimer, IIA, 75^-5« Also 
Wahbar, op. cit., p. 104; ARAMCO, Oman, pp. 205-6.
3 Lorimer, IIA, 2*t0-1«
k Lorimer, IIB, 1160-1; Al-Nabhani, op. cit., pp. 55-6;
Wahbah, op. cit., p. 10*f.
5 Lorimer, IIA, 2^1.
In the nature of tribal government the needs and expenses of the 
shaikh were synonymous with those of the administration to a large 
degree. As mentioned previously the ruler of Bahrain could expect 
to receive a sizeable income from taxes charged to all boats 
participating in the pearl fishery in return for his protection in 
Bahrain's waters# In addition the Shaikh and his family themselves 
owned a fleet of boats used both for trade and on the pearl fisheries# 
Apart from an experiment in levying regular customs during the
I
1830s , abandoned after seven years, the first system of duties was 
not introduced until i860 , by which time priorities had altered#
Prior to this date it served the interests of the A1 Khalifa better 
to generate wealth in their dominions by enticing traders away from 
other Gulf ports# This wealth could then be drawn upon through
other channels. Accordingly, the A1 Khalifa shaikh would charge
a rental on town lands, shops and khans. Whenever the people of 
Bahrain sought recourse to the courts for the settlement of their 
affairs, the Shaikh charged a judicial fee.^ The agricultural 
land beyond the limits of the towns provided a further source of 
revenue. Agricultural dues were charged to parallel the rents on 
town dwellings and businesses, whilst in the case of the date 
plantations on the islands, the A1 Khalifa took direct possession of 
most of them, regardless of previous ownership, thus transferring all 
the profits to themselves# In those areas where the Shaikh had
1 Kemball, 'Memorandum on the Resources', p. 105#
2 Wilson, op. cit., p. 2*f8.
3 Lorimer, IIA, 231.
b Kemball, 'Memorandum on the Resources', p. 105: and Kemball,
•Statistical', p. 291.
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granted out all fiscal rights and administrative duties to various of 
his relatives or important tribal leaders, the Shaikh was still 
entitled to a succession duty on estates transferred by inheritance.
Potentially these various sources of revenue could produce a
sizeable income. The Shaikh’s requirements were, however, also
-  -  2sizeable. He had to find the administrative costs of his Diwan y
to maintain a large family and their households, and his personal
bodyguard, at least a couple of hundred armed men, were paid and
housed by the Shaikh. Of great importance to the Shaikh in his role
3
as ruler was the capacity to entertain in his Majlis more lavishly 
and grandly than anyone within his following, and the offering of 
hospitality to visitors was a fundamental part of tribal life and 
rule.
Lastly, the Shaikh frequently had to cement the loyalty of the
if
bedouin tribesmen with various shrewd displays of generosity.
The expensive needs of the Shaikh, added to the difficulties he could 
encounter in the collection of his financial entitlements, meant that 
the A1 Khalifa rulers were often short of money. In such instances 
they usually levied forced contributions from the weakest sections of
1 Lorimer, IIA, 251.
2 For the meaning and usage of the term Diwan see: H.L. Gottschalk,
’Diwan*, The Encyclopaedia of Islam (London, 1965)* II* 323-37*
5 For Majlis and its distinction from Diwan see: Ameen Rihani,
Ibn Sa’oud of Arabia (London, 1928), p. 15» n. 1.
This is where the ruler usually held his daily reception and 
occasionally declared his policies. See Kelly, Britain and the 
Persian Gulf, p. *f00.
k Kemball, ’Memorandum on the Resources’, p. 105; Lorimer, IIA, 251.
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the community. In this way were the Jews hounded out of Manama.
The brunt of the burden fell, however, almost always on the Baharina
3first. Only they ever paid a poll tax, the fITaraz", m  Bahrain.
Thus the internal administration of the Bahrain islands took 
shape gradually over a period of years. Furthermore, the effective­
ness and efficiency of the machinery of government, centred as it was 
on the person of the Shaikh and his immediate family, depended on the 
fortunes of the A1 Khalifa shaikhs and the security of the islands 
generally in the wider context of Gulf politics. The protection of 
Bahrain against the covetous encroachments of other powers in the 
Gulf was a constant problem for the A1 Khalifa. In their efforts 
to preserve their autonomy during the first half of the nineteenth 
century, successive shaikhs attempted to capitalize on the 
preoccupation of the British forces in the Gulf with the maintenance 
of peace and order in those waters, while the British were initially 
very reluctant to involve themselves in Bahrain’s problems.
Trade had first brought Englishmen to the Gulf in the sixteenth 
century. Facilitating communication between the Mediterranean and 
the Far East, the Gulf had been used for centuries as a route for 
commercial traffic between distant ports. In addition, the ports 
of the Gulf handled valuable local products, including the pearls of
1 Kemball, 'Memorandum on the Resources', p. 105.
2 Palgrave, op. cit., II, 216.
3 Lorimer, IIA, 252.
k Wilson, op. cit., pp. 9-10*
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Bahrain. Yet the British commercial penetration of the Gulf 
produced unforeseen results. By the middle of the nineteenth century 
the British had become the dominant political power in the Gulf.
This political overlordship took time to evolve. British 
commercial activity in the Gulf was primarily under the auspices of 
the East India Company, which certainly in its early days, undertook 
a political role in the Gulf only with reluctance and as a concern 
secondary to commercial profit.
The political activity of the East India Company in the Gulf
began to expand significantly in the late eighteenth century, as a
2
by-product of its increasing power in the Indian sub-continent.
As the British empire in India expanded, so did the concern to protect
it from possible invasion. The traditional invasion route to India
was from the north-west. Thus Afghanistan, Persia and the Gulf,
were seen as the critical areas, particularly in the period between
1798 and 1807 when Napoleon Bonaparte sought to use the area now
referred to as the "Middle East" as a springboard to invade India.^
From this time it became one of the primary objectives of British
policy in the Gulf to prevent any power using the area as a base for
kthe invasion of their eastern possessions , or disrupting the 
communications between Britain and India which passed through the Gulf.
O' T*1 Abdul Amir Amin, British Interests in the Persian Gulf (Leiden, 
1967), pp. 1 & 23.
2 Robert Geran Landen, Oman since 1856 (Princeton, 1967)1 p. 165;
Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 1.
3 J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (Princeton,
1956), I, xvi.
b Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 62-3.
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Even after Napoleon's death, in 1821, the British continued to fear a
1French attack via the "Middle East".
The increasing political importance of the Gulf was reflected in
a series of changes in the status of the East India Company*s
establishments in the area. In 1?63 the Company founded a trading
2
settlement at Bushire on the Persian coast of the Gulf. In 1812 
this commercial residency was replaced by a political agency. In 
1822 the Company's "factors" and "brokers" in the Gulf were renamed 
"residents" and "native agents" and the whole establishment made a 
change* From this period onwards, the authority to maintain order 
in the Gulf was very largely in the hands of the Resident at Bushire,
•Z
who, from 1862, was known officially as the "Political Resident".
In his role as peacemaker and policeman of the Gulf, the
Resident was acting in accordance with a policy developed primarily
to safeguard India and her communications. In this function the
Resident reported to the Government of Bombay and thence to the
1+
Government of India. There was, however, another function which 
the Resident undertook, that did not necessarily combine readily with 
the first. His appointment as Resident was coupled with that of
1 Gerald S. Graham, Great Britain in the Indian Ocean (Oxford, 1967), 
pp. 2-3.
2 Amin, op. cit., p. 70.
3 Rupert Hay, The Persian Gulf States (Washington, 1959)♦ P* 12*
b After 1873 the Government of Bombay relinquished control of the
Gulf Residency to the Government of India direct.
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Consul-General for Fars and Khuzistan. In this capacity the 
Resident was under the jurisdiction of the British Minister to Persia 
in Tehran, and thence to the Foreign Office. Depending on the issues 
with which the Resident was faced, meanwhile, he might find it 
necessary to make direct contact with the British political agent in 
Basra, who reported to London via a totally separate chain of command, 
through H.M. Consul-General in Baghdad, the Ambassador in Constantinople, 
and thence to the Foreign Office.
That the Gulf Resident should find it difficult to fulfil his 
roles simultaneously, stemmed from the fact that British imperial 
policy towards the Ottoman Empire, or the Egypt of Muhammad Ali, or the 
Shah of Persia was influenced by more considerations than just the 
defence of India: yet Bombay expected him to have this concern
uppermost. When the interests of the Indian government diverged from 
wider imperial policies, the matter had to be settled in Whitehall.
From 1?84 until 1858 Cabinet authority over the East India Company's 
administration and diplomacy was exercised through the Board of Control, 
or India Board. After the Company's responsibilities were assumed 
directly by the Crown in 1858, a Secretary of State succeeded the 
President of the India Board as the representative of India in the 
Cabinet, and the "double government" of Board and Company was 
reconstituted in the new India Office.
Clearly, for issues to receive attention at all levels of the 
various command structures took considerable time, and sometimes led 
to argument. This made the position of the Resident doubly taxing 
when speedy decisions or immediate action were required on the spot. 
Furthermore, the divergence of interests led to repeated wrangles as
*fO
to which of his superiors - the Government of India or the Foreign 
Office - were responsible for financing different aspects of the 
British policy in the Gulf. Thus the development of a comprehensive
British policy on Gulf matters was often impeded by the complexity 
of the structure by which decisions were made.
Acting on fundamentally commercial interests, Britain's 
political involvement in the affairs of the Shaikhdoms of the Arab 
coast originated in an attempt to safeguard their own or Indian 
commercial traffic from disruption or theft. Once the British 
unertook a degree of responsibility for Gulf affairs they discovered 
that it was extremely difficult to prevent that responsibility from 
growing.
Having traded in the Gulf for centuries the British were
familiar with the risks of entanglement with marauders and pirates.
From 1804-5 onwards, however, the East India Company records show an
increase in the number of attacks on shipping at the entrance to the
Gulf, attributed to one particular group of maritime Arabs known
2collectively as the Qawasim. This group came from that part of
Arabia which came to be known as the Trucial Coast (now the U.A.E.),
and designated at the time as the Pirate Coast. Life on these
shores was exceptionally hard at the best of times and plundering
3
shipping was an opportune way of supplementing a meagre income.
1 Niebtlhr, op. cit., II, 383; Abraham Parsons, op. cit., p. 208; 
Morier, op. cit., p. 371; J.E. Wellsted, Travels to the City of 
the Caliphs (London, l8^ f0), I, 127; Low, op. cit., I, Chapters 
^ & 3 ; Amin, op. cit., p. 73; P.J. Marshall, East Indian
Fortunes (Oxford, 1978), p. 61.
2 For background to the formation and location of this group see
Lorimer, IIB, 15^7*
3 Whitelock, loc. cit., p. 32; Wellsted, City of the Caliphs, I,
101.
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At the turn of the century the Qawasim were engaged primarily in
recurrent struggles with their much more prosperous neighbours in 
1
Muscat. During the first two decades of the nineteenth century
they became increasingly daring in their attacks on shipping bearing
British Indian trade as well. The escalation in their piratical
activities stemmed from the influence exercised upon the Qawasim by
the Wahhabi dynasty of central Arabia at this time, and also from
the dilatoriness of the British authorities in formulating an
2
effective response.
The British Indian authorities debated the issue at length with
both their representatives in the Gulf and the Government in Whitehall.^
The guiding principle from 1819 was the suppression of piracy in Gulf
waters, yet without interfering in Arab affairs or adopting
responsibility fro them more than was absolutely necessary to achieve
that end. In 1819-20 an expedition under Major-General Sir William
Grant Keir was sent against the pirate strongholds on the Arabian
4
coast and proved to be effective. As a result, the Shaikhs of
the Trucial Coast were obliged to undertake to abide by the conditions
\
laid down in a General Treaty of Peace in January 1820 for the
5
cessation of ’’plunder and piracy by land and sea forever".
1 S.B. Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf (London, 
1966), p. 275» See also Warden, 'Historical Sketch', p. 301.
2 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 106 & 110; see also 
Low, op. cit., I, p. 317;
H. Moyse-Bartlett, The Pirates of Trucial Oman (London, 1966), 
p. 23-
3 The arguments and proposals mooted in this debate may be found in 
Kelly's summary of the discussions of 1818-20 in Britain and the 
Persian Gulf, pp. 139-^9*
4 For an account of the expedition see:
Low, op. cit.. I, 351-65; Wilson, op. cit., pp. 207-8.
5 Aitchison, op. cit., XI, 245.
The A1 Khalifa of Bahrain were in fact included in this Treaty.
Whilst not actively engaged in piracy themselves, they had acted as
receivers of the property plundered by the Qawasim, gave them free
2access to Bahrain ports and supplied them with provisions. Also, 
as will be seen shortly, the fact that Bahrain suffered intermittent 
invasions and attacks, had contributed to the general turmoil and
3
disorder in the Gulf, which in turn promoted the growth of piracy. 
However, Bahrain*s political circumstances were too complicated for 
the limited scope of British policy at that time, and in the 
development of the Trucial System after the first treaty of 1820, it 
was decided to exclude the A1 Khalifa and their problems.
During the 1820s, it became clear that the General Treaty was
insufficient, in respect of all its signatories, to preserve the
safety of commerce in the Gulf. By Article 2, the General Treaty
was specifically declared not to cover acts of ’’acknowledged war”,
defined as ’’that which is proclaimed, avowed, and ordered by
k
government against government”. In the name of ’’acknowledged war”
many acts of piracy by the vessels of one Arab shaikhdom on those of
another continued to be committed, especially during the pearling 
5season.
1 In 1816, Lieutenant Bruce, then Resident at Bushire, concluded 
with the Shaikh of Bahrain an informal agreement, which was not 
authorized by the British Government, in which the Shaikh was 
assured of ’’the neutrality and even friendship of Britain”. 
Lorimer, IB, p. 8Vf.
2 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 165.
3 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 1^2.
k Wilson, op. cit., p. 209.
3 Wilson, Ibid., p. 209.
^3
In 1835 Captain Hennell, then acting Resident at Bushire, 
inaugurated the "Trucial System" with the Arab shaikhs of the Pirate 
Coast, which sought to contain maritime warfare within strict limits, 
and hence reduce the incidence of piracy and disruption of trade, 
whilst still adhering to the principle of minimum interference in 
the concerns of the Arab states. By the Maritime Truce of 1835 the 
Arab shaikhs undertook to refrain completely from hostilities at 
sea within a period of six months covering the pearling season. In 
the event of a breach in the Truce, the Resident or the Commander of 
the Gulf Squadron was to be notified and he would take the necessary 
steps to obtain redress, the shaikhs themselves relinquishing their 
claims to revenge. In addition no battles or hostilities should 
take place at any time in the main channel of Gulf shipping, namely, 
beyond a "Restrictive Line" demarcating the Arab coastal waters from 
the main traffic route, and the Persian coast.
The benefits thus enjoyed by both parties led to a mutual 
agreement to repeat the Truce annually until l8^ f3» when it was 
prolonged for a period of ten years. The system gradually produced 
a more stable outlook aunongst the Trucial Shaikhs. Aside from 
intermittent skirmishes, they had enjoyed the fruits of peace during 
the pearling seasons, with the knowledge that quarrels could always 
be fought out if necessary on the expiration of the Truce, and often 
the desire to go to war faded with the postponement. Consequently, 
in May 1833* the Trucial Shaikhs and the British made a comprehensive
1 Wilson, op. cit., p. 209; Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf,
pp. 358-9.
commitment and signed a Treaty of Peace in Perpetuity* The "perfect
maritime truce" was to be established "for evermore"* The British,
as previously, would organise the redress of all proven violations,
yet with an additional pledge to supervise maritime peace at all times
2m  the interests of preventing transgressions occurring at all*
If, as its development indicated, the Trucial System operated
reasonably effectively to preserve maritime peace between the Trucial
Shaikhs, it would seem surprising that the Shaikhdom of Bahrain was
not included in the arrangement after the first Treaty of 1820.
This was, however, deliberate policy on the part of the British,
arrived at for a number of complex reasons* Perhaps the key to the
problem was that, in the words of J*B. Kelly, "To have admitted
Bahrain to the Trucial System, then, would have been tantamount to
assuming responsibility for her defence against her enemies, and these 
3
were numerous". Apart from disaffected sheikhs, the list of rival 
claimants to Bahrain during the nineteenth century included the
M  mm
Persian provincial government of Shiraz, the A1 Bu Sa id of Muscat, 
the Wahhabi power of Central Arabia and, on certain occasions, the 
Egyptians and the Turks.
Persia and Muscat had already fought over possession of the 
islands prior to the arrival of the A1 Khalifa. The Shaikhs of 
Bushire on the Persian mainland had driven the Portuguese from Bahrain
1 Wilson, op. cit., p. 209; Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 
pp. 363-V, 367-8 & **0 7-8.
2 Aitchison, op. cit., XI, No. XXIV, p. 253i Article 3*
3 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 380.
in 1602. In 1718 Sultan b. Saif II of Muscat managed to seize and 
hold the islands for a while. Control subsequently passed into the 
hands of the Huwaila Arabs until 1753* when the provincial government 
of Shiraz re-established control until 1783* In the years immediate­
ly following the A1 Khalifa conquest of that date, Persia, although 
not ready to recognize the new dynasty in its own right, did not pose 
a serious threat. The attention of Fath Ali Shah was concentrated on 
the protection of his northern border against Russia: Shiraz
suffered near civil war, and the Persians did not possess a naval 
force capable of effecting a reconquest. This last consideration 
was not, however, a problem for the Sayyids of Muscat. In 1800
Sultan b. Ahmad sent an expedition which overran the islands and forced 
• •
the A1 Khalifa to take flight. They subsequently recovered their 
position only to be ousted again in 1802. On this occasion the 
A1 Khalifa sought the aid of the Wahhabi Amir, °Abdul cAzIz I b. 
Muhammad, to force Sayyid Sultan to withdraw. The A1 Khalifa offered 
submission in the form of a tribute, providing a precedent which 
was exploited by subsequent Wahhabi rulers.
From 1800 on, therefore, the -A1 Khalifa were virtually in a 
trap, preserving their independence only by playing off Oman and the 
warlike Wahhabis against each other. They received a temporary
respite from Wahhabi demands when in 1818, Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt
- c- 2invaded Arabia from the west and subdued the A1 Sa ud dynasty.
1 On the Wahhabi faith and the alliance of M. cAbdul Wahhab with the 
A1 Sa ud dynasty see:- H. St. John Philby, Saudi Arabia (London, 
1955)• George Rentz, *Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia*, in Derek 
Hopwood ed. The Arabian Peninsula (London, 1972), pp. 5^-66.
2 For the 1818 Egyptian occupation of Arabia see:- Abd A1 Hamid 
A1 Batriq, *Turkish and Egyptian Rule in Arabia 1810-^1*, Ph.D. 
thesis (London, 19^7)* Also R. Bayly Winder, Saudi Arabia in 
the Nineteenth Century (London, 19&5)* PP» 16-49.
Yet this meant that they had to find an alternative counterbalance to 
the ambitions of Oman, and they were aware that Persia, though 
powerless to tyrannise Bahrain alone, was taking a keen interest in 
the schemes of the other enemies of the islands*
It was at this juncture (the end of 1819) that the British 
presented the A1 Khalifa with a possible alternative source of 
support. The Governor of Bombay, Mountstuart Elphinstone, was fully 
aware of the claims made to Bahrain by both Persia and Oman, and
wishing to alienate neither, and to preserve maximum freedom of action,
opted for a neutral approach:
... We should abstain from all interference in the 
pretensions which are advanced to the occupation of Bahrain, 
under a distinct explanation to the Shaikh of that island 
that so long as he restrains his tribe from the prosecution 
of acts of aggression on the high seas ... he may rely on 
experiencing from the British Government every degree of
encouragement and of friendly intercourse e../|
Effectively this formula not only excluded support of any of the 
rival claimants to Bahrain against the A1 Khalifa, but also implied 
neutrality towards the incumbent rulers themselves. If the 
A1 Khalifa kept the peace and cooperated with the British, they could 
expect a friendly response, but no guarantee of support against their 
enemies. Until this was spelt out to them, however, the A1 Khalifa 
Shaikhs believed, or certainly maintained, that by signing the Treaty 
of Maritime Peace they had won the protection of British forces in 
the Gulf.
1 Quoted in Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 162-3* For 
the result of Elphinstone1s views see also pp. l6*+-6.
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The issue was further clouded as a result of the embarrassing 
indiscretion of the Political Resident, Cap1 in William Bruce, in 
1822« In complete contravention of the established British policy 
he drew up an agreement with the Governor of Shiraz recognizing 
Persian supremacy over the Bahrain islands, and promising assistance 
to the Persians to bring the A1 Khalifa firmly under their authority.
As soon as the existence of this treaty became known to the authorities 
in India, they emphatically repudiated both the treaty and the 
validity of Persia*s claim, and withdrew Bruce from his post. His 
successor, Lieutenant McLeod, visited Bahrain in 1823, among other
Q
reasons, to assure Shaikh Abdallah that Bruce*s action had been an
2
aberration and that the Government’s policy remained unchanged.
Despite the efforts of the British to explain their neutral 
position in relation to Bahrain's dynastic quarrels, however, the 
A1 Khalifa shaikhs made repeated efforts to involve them. To the 
A1 Khalifa the British presented the most attractive potential guardian 
in the Gulf. They possessed great military power, whilst apparently 
having no designs on the islands themselves. Yet, when the British 
repeatedly refused to give a guarantee for the full protection of the 
islands, the A1 Khalifa shaikhs turned elsewhere for assistance.
1 For a translation of the text of the Treaty of Shiraz see:- 
Fereydoun Adamiyat, Bahrein Islands (New York, 1955), Appendix I, 
pp. 233-55* This author presents the case for the Persian 
claim to the islands.
2 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 190-1, & n. 3*
Kelly has refuted Adamiyat*s contentions in his article
'The Persian Claim to Bahrain', International Affairs, Vol. 33, 
1957, pp* 51-70. For further reading see also Majid Khadduri, 
'Iran's Claim to the Sovereignty of Bahrain', American Journal 
of International Law, Vol. *+5, 1951, PP* 631-4-7*
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The threat to Bahrain from Muscat, having been the greatest 
danger during the early years of A1 Khalifa rule, faded into the 
background after the 1820s. The last serious attempt at an 
invasion by the Sayyid of Muscat was repulsed by the A1 Khalifa in 
1828, and an agreement was eventually reached in December 1829 between 
the two belligerents whereby Sayyid Sa id formally relinquished his 
claim to tribute from the islands. In the course of this episode 
Shaikh Abdallah of Bahrain tried first of all to enlist British 
aid against Sa id, and subsequently, to persuade the British to 
guarantee a peace between himself and Sa id. Both attempts met with 
refusal, the British being prepared to do no more than act as 
« mediators. ^
Threats to Bahrain continued from other quarters. By 1830 the 
Wahhabis had regained their hold in central Arabia and the Amir Turki 
demanded among other things that the A1 Khalifa resume the payment of
mm Q C T*
zakat which they had agreed to pay to Abdul Aziz at the beginning of
the century. Again Shaikh Abdallah asked the British to protect
him, only to be told that British policy in the Gulf was concerned
purely with the suppression of piracy and did not extend to the
internal affairs of Arabia. Consequently, Abdallah submitted to
Amir Turki "in return for a guarantee ... of the territorial integrity 
2
of Bahrain".
This settlement was short lived, however, and by 1831 CAbdallah
1 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 9» 22-3, & 380«,
2 Ibid., pp. 229-30.
^9
was blockading the Wahhabi supply ports of Qatif and °Uqair. In the 
mid-nineteenth century the Wahhabis suffered both internal struggles 
within the A1 SaCud and renewed attacks by the Egyptians, but they 
did intermittently attempt to pursue their claims to Bahrain,
In the l8*f0s the Wahhabi Amir Faisal sided with Shaikh Muhammad
• •
b. Khalifa in his struggle to wrest power from his grand uncle Shaikh
c cAbdallah, The British refused Abdallah help on this occasion
in part because by then they found him uncooperative and unreliable,
and were not averse to seeing him replaced by Muhammad, Later,
in 1851, Muhammad in his turn found himself threatened with an invasion
by the Amir Faisal, who had to raise money to pay zakat to the Sharif 
•  "
2
of Mecca, On this occasion the British did not feel that they
could disassociate themselves completely. They were still not 
prepared to give the A1 Khalifa formal protection and, indeed, refused 
Muhammad*s request that they intervene. Yet this refusal left 
Muhammad in desperate need of assistance and it emerged that he had
m
previously opened negotiations with the Sharif of Mecca, offering to
3
put himself under Ottoman sovereignty.
The Amir Faisal, meanwhile, sent an emissary, Shaikh CAbdul CAziz,
to Captain Hennell. The Resident was ready to encourage friendly
relations between Faisal and Muhammad, but no more than that, since
• •
Zf
Hennell believed that:
1 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p, 381,
2 Ibid., p, 399-
3 Ibid., pp. 399-^ +01-
k Quoted Ibid., p. *f01.
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Of the connection subsisting between Ameer I^sul and the 
Ottoman Porte there can, I think, exist no doubt. Sheikh 
Abdool Azeez, while at Koweit, passed himself off to the 
Sheikh of that place as an envoy of Abbas Pasha of Egypt, 
and he also informed me that messengers from the Viceroy 
were now present with the Ameer,
Then the British squadron took up a position before Qatlf, where it
1remained until Faisal and Muhammad reached a peaceful agreement,
• •
When, in 185 ,^ hostilities flared up anew between Muhammad b.
Khalifa and the Amir Faisal - acting in conjunction with the renegade 
" •
A1 Khalifa shaikh, Muhammad b, CAbdallah, who was based on the mainland
at Dammam - the British were forced to examine their interests in more
detail. Correspondence was exchanged between the British Resident,
Captain Arnold B, Kemball, and Faisal, which clarified the basic
difference in viewpoints, Faisal claimed Bahrain*s subjects as his
own, on the grounds that the Shaikh of Bahrain paid him an annual
tribute. The British regarded Bahrain as an independent shaikhdom
and that was the way they wanted it. They, therefore,considered the
payment of tribute as either a purely religious matter, or else a
levy paid by the Shaikh of Bahrain in respect only of his possessions
in Qatar, It was on these possessions that the Wahhabis could most
easily exert influence, and because of this, and the inability of
British naval power to affect events on the mainland, the British
baulked at taking full responsibility for protecting the independence
of the Bahrain shaikhdom, A peace was concluded between the
belligerents in 1855» which carefull avoided the subject of the
- 2
significance of the zakat.
1 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp, 4^01-2.
2 For a full account of the events and details of the correspondence 
see Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 500-10*
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Renewed Egyptian penetration of Arabia had the British seriously
1 _
worried for a time. In 1838-39 the forces of Khurshid Pasha
reconquered Najd and subjugated the A1 Sa ud once more. Following 
the occupation of the Hasa coast the Egyptians demanded the submission
Q
of Abdallah b. Ahmad of Bahrain and the resumption of the payment he
had made previously to Riyadh. In anticipation of such a demand 
c
Abdallah had offered the British the protection of Bahrain, but they 
preferred to deal with the Egyptians separately, warning that they 
could not stand aside if Khurshid decided to press his claims by force.
Q
Abdallah meanwhile tried to bargain his way out of a corner by 
approaching the Persians for help. The Persians failed to organise
any practical assistance and eventually Abdallah formally signed his
2submission to the Egyptian ruler.
0
The British, annoyed at Abdallah's surrender, foresaw similar 
capitulations from the Trucial Shaikhs as the Egyptians increased their 
power and prestige at the expense of the Ottoman Government. The 
advance of the forces of Ibrahim Pasha into the Ottoman dependencies 
in the Fertile Crescent had, however, reached the proportions of an 
international crisis, climaxing in the Egyptian defeat of the Turkish 
army in Syria, closely followed by the death of Sultan Mahmud II and 
the defection of the Turkish fleet to Muhammad Ali in 1839* The 
international implications of the threat to the very existence of the 
Porte made the whole issue a matter for the Foreign Office rather
1 For Muhammad Ali's ambitions in Arabia about 1840 see:
Kelly, 'Mehmet Ali's Expedition to the Persian Gulf 1837-1840', 
Part I, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. I, pp. 350-81, Part II, in 
Vol. II, pp. 31-83.
2 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 303-5*
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than just the Government of India. Discussions took place at all
levels as to what coercive action the British forces in the Gulf were
capable of, if a major confrontation between them and Khurshid Pasha
could not be avoided. The possibility of occupying Bahrain as a
2
British base was seriously considered. Fortunately for the British
in the Gulf the problem of Muhammad Ali was solved without their
facing a confrontation there. By mid 1840 the Egyptians were
withdrawing their forces from the Arabian peninsula to consolidate,
and by the end of the year they had been decisively defeated by
3
combined Turkish, British and Austrian forces in Syria.
The assertion of a claim to Bahrain by the Porte held for the
British similarly far-reaching implications for the balance of power
in that part of the world. In 1831, under threat by the Amir Faisal,
Shaikh Muhammad b. Khalifa offered to place himself under Turkish 
•  "
sovereignty. This was disturbing news, coming as it did on top of
the Porte*s announcement in 18^9 that a small Turkish squadron was to
take up police duties in the upper Gulf region. The Foreign Office
informed the Porte that the British would not accept the subjection
of Bahrain to Turkish authority. The Resident, Hennell, also sent
the Gulf squadron to blockade the Hasa coast to check the intentions
•
if
of the Amir Faisal. The Turks did not press their claim to Bahrain.
1 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 291-2 & 320.
For a general background on the international implications of the 
crisis see: M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Question (London, 1966),
pp. 88-109.
2 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 316-30.
3 For a general background on the campaigns of Muhammad Ali in Syria 
see: P.M. Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent (London, 1966),
pp. 176-87.
if Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 399-^1.
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Persian covetousness presented less of a problem, as Persia
lacked both a navy and an approach to mainland possessions of the
A1 Khalifa, During the 1820s and *30s the Governor of Shiraz
professed, almost annually, to be gathering an expedition to assert
his claim over Bahrain, These endeavours never materialised into
anything more than a useful excuse for the Prince Governor to raise
levies from his dependencies. The Persian threat became somewhat
more troublesome, however, after the expulsion of Shaikh Abdallah
b, Ahmad from Bahrain in I8*f3» In return for Persian aid to reconquer
the islands, he promised to make them a Persian dependency. The
British responded with emphatic warnings to the Persian Government,
2
In 184^ + the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Aberdeen, wrote:
Unless Persia can show that she has a clear indisputable 
right to the sovereignty of Bahrain, that she has exercised 
it without interruption under the dynasty of the Kajar 
family, and that consequently her present policy is directed 
to the maintenance of her lawful claims, and not to the 
assertion of a pretension not founded in law, Persia must 
be prepared to encounter in any scheme of this kind the 
active opposition of the British Government in India.
The efforts of the Persian Prime Minister, Haji Mirza Aghasi, 
to explain Persia*s right to Bahrain, drew on every possible argument, 
from Bruce*s unauthorised treaty of 1822, to the assertion that the 
British habit of calling the Gulf "the Persian Gulf" implied a 
recognition of Persian sovereignty over all the islands. He failed 
to produce any irrefutable arguments. Despite further protests 
against British activities, not until i860 did the Persians take any 
practical step to implement their claims.^
1 Kelly, *The Persian Claim to Bahrain*, op. cit., p. 59*
2 Quoted Ibid., p. 60.
3 Ibid., p. 61.
When in i860 Muhammad b. Khalifa (irked by British restrictions
on his freedom of action) extended an invitation to Persia to become
his protector, the Persians responded with enthusiasm* A Persian
agent sailed for the islands, and soon after his arrival Muhammad
formally pledged his loyalty to the Governor of Shiraz; the Persian
flag was hoisted over Bahrain. Shaikh Muhammad had, however, taken
the precaution of appealing also to the Turkish government through the
Pasha of Baghdad. Shortly after the Persian flag had been hoisted
an emissary arrived from Baghdad and Shaikh Muhammad, apparently
unperturbed, arranged to put his shaikhdom under Turkish suzerainty,
removed the Persian ensign and hoisted the Ottoman flag in its place.
The fact that the agent from Shiraz refused either to depart, or to
recognise the changed circumstances, could not restore credibility 
1
to Persia's claim.
The accumulated experience of the British in the Gulf during
the first half of the nineteenth century taught them that the
protection of their own interests necessitated participating in local
Gulf politics to a far greater extent than they had initially
envisaged. As regards the lower Gulf region they had developed the
Trucial System with the local Arab shaikhs into a permanent
undertaking. As regards Bahrain they had come to the conclusion
that its independent status had to be preserved, even if they had to
2
use force to protect the islands. They had, however, fought shy of 
becoming involved directly with the internal problems of the 
A1 Khalifa shaikhs because these were so intricately entwined with
1 For a full account of the incident see:-
Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 515-17»
2 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 521.
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tribal and dynastic quarrels on the mainland, where the shaikhs still
retained connections and possessions*. By i860 the British were ready
to revise their views. They could feel satisfied that they had
successfully averted the invasion or acquisition of Bahrain by her
covetous neighbours on various occasions, and could expect to continue
to do so. They concluded, however, that their efforts were wasted
if the Shaikh of Bahrain was insensitive to the requirements of
peaceful trading, courted the friendship of Turkey or Persia, and
tended to aggravate his relations with his neighbours and mistreat
foreign, especially British Indian, traders. This was their verdict
on Shaikh Muhammad b. Khalifa in i860.• —
By this time there was little question of the British
extricating themselves completely and relinquishing their role of the
Gulf police, so they set out to bring the Shaikh of Bahrain to heel.
As soon as Muhammad b. Khalifa began to harass Hasa shipping once more 
• •
in 1861, the British squadron moved in, and the Resident, Commander
Felix Jones, forced Muhammad and his brother Ali to sign a convention
1
which effectively integrated Bahrain into the Trucial System.
2Muhammad promised that:
I agree to abstain from all maritime aggressions of every 
description, from the prosecution of war, piracy, and 
slavery by sea, so long as I receive the support of the 
British Government in the maintenance of the security of 
my possessions against similar aggressions directed 
against them by the chiefs and tribes of this Gulf.
The origins of Muhammad b. Khalifa's entanglement with certain
1 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 525-6.
2 Aitchison, op. cit., XI, 23^ —6.
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of the tribes on the mainland and the festering of dynastic rivalries 
have already been alluded to. Following the death of Shaikh Khalifa 
b. Salman in 183^ +1 his uncle, Shaikh cAbdallah b. Ahmad, did not share 
the tasks of rule again, but wielded authority alone. He could not, 
however, keep his sons and kinsmen under control. They took 
advantage of his weakness to extort crippling levies from the populace 
and to indulge in violent and disruptive behaviour, which not only 
hindered commercial traffic, but caused a number of Bahrain's more
prosperous inhabitants to emigrate. In 1835 the A1 b. Ali and
B m c c
A1 Bu Ainain tribes of Huwailah actually rebelled against Abdallah*s
rule, and led by Shaikh CIsa b. Tarif they emigrated completely to 
Abu Dhabi. The feud thus commenced dragged on unresolved until
4
C M
Abdallah became preoccupied with the Egyptian presence in Hasa, and
concluded peace with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi. Consequently CIsa b.
Tarif and his followers crossed over to the island of Qais, off the 
1
Persian coast.
By 18^2 conditions under cAbdallah's rule had deteriorated even
further. A confederacy was formed by his leading opponents to oust
him. It was led by Muhammad b. Khalifa, his great-nephew, by CIsa
• —
b. Tarif and by Bashir b. Rahmah, son of the notorious freebooter of • •
the A1 Jalahima, Rahmah b. Jabir. These three received the support 
of the Wahhabi Amir, and, as mentioned, the British in the Gulf did not
Q
interfere on this occasion as they had no liking for Abdallah 
themselves. The coup was successful, and Abdallah was forced into 
exile. He received an initially warm welcome from the Persians, but
1 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 361 & 363*
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they were not able to give him sufficient practical aid and gradually 
tired of his disruptive behaviour themselves.
q
With. Abdallah's deposition in 1843 the rule of the Bahrain 
Shaikhdom reverted to the senior branch of the A1 Khalifa family, the
'i
descendants of Shaikh Salman, in the person of Muhammad b. Khalifa.
• —
However, a shaikh held leadership not just by birth but by merit, as
discerned by the leading members of the tribe. The kinsmen of
c *• cAbdallah, who came to be known as the A1 Abdallah faction, as opposed
to the A1 Salman, were not the only subjects of Bahrain to find
Muhammad lacking in the qualities of leadership. His rule proved to
0
be as cruel, arbitrary and grasping as that of Abdallah and his 
unruly sons; and Muhammad's contrastingly far-sighted and charming
brother and assistant, Ali, had great difficulty in moderating Muhammad's
. . .  2 - cactivities. Consequently the supporters of the A1 Abdallah faction
increased with time, out of all proportion to the numbers warranted by 
the unpopularity of its founder. Amongst those who quickly tired of
0  aa as
Muhammad were his erstwhile supporters Isa b. Tarif and his followers,• •
the A1 b. Ali and A1 Bu °Ainain. °Isa himself was to die in an
0 ^ 
attack launched in Qatar in conjunction with Abdallah in 184-7.
Shaikh Muhammad was aware that the first years of his rule as 
Shaikh had not run smoothly and that the island's prosperity was
0  SB M
continuing to decline. After the death of Isa b. Tarif, his rebel 
followers at Qais awaited their opportunity for revenge. Meanwhile, 
Muhammad faced the consequences of the displeasure of the Amir Faisal
1 See the genealogical table at the end.
2 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 501.
3 Ibid., p. 383.
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over disputed territories on the mainland. When in 18A-9 Abdallah
c«*set off for Muscat to muster support from Sayyid Sa id for an 
invasion, Muhammad panicked. In agreement with his leading kinsmen,
m
he approached the British Government to offer them sovereignty of 
1
the islands. The Resident, Hennell, surmised that, believing the
I
prosperity of Kuwait and of Bushire to be due to their subjection to 
the Ottoman Sultan and the Shah respectively, Muhammad deduced that 
Bahrain's fortunes would recover under British sovereignty.
Although the British Government refused his offers Shaikh 
Muhammad was released from the worst of his problems by the death of
C TAbdallah in Muscat, and the conclusion of peace with the Amir Faisal.
Even so, the respite lasted only a few years, and Muhammad himself
invited trouble. Fretting under Faisal's demands after his
agreement of 1851, the Shaikh angered the Amir by seeking an alternative
2alliance with Muscat or Egypt. Faisal had more cooperative vassels 
in the area in the shape of the A1 bc Ali and A1 Bu cAinain tribesmen
C » 0
and Muhammad b. Abdallah, the new leader of the A1 Abdallah line, 
whom he had settled at Dammam. They readily assisted Faisal in his 
raid on Bahrain of 185^.^ From this time on Muhammad b. Khalifa 
learnt that he could expect hostility and interference whenever the 
opportunity presented itself from this rebel stronghold and the efforts 
of mediators, including the British and the Trucial Shaikhs, could not
1 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 38 +^-
2 Ibid., pp. 501-2.
3 Ibid., p. 502.
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effect a lasting reconciliation. It was in desperation at this 
seemingly intractable problem that the British authorities had decided 
to organise the evacuation of the Dammam settlers just when Muhammad 
b. Khalifa altered their priorities with his friendly invitations to 
the Turks and the Persians in 1859-60.
After he was corned into signing the Convention of 1861,
Shaikh Muhammad was bound to keep the peace; yet he was still harassed 
by the rebels of Dammam. Quarrels and disruptions continued, with 
the Resident making vain attempts to discipline his charge. The 
watershed came in October 1867 when Muhammad b. Khalifa and Shaikh
Zaid of Abu Dhabi combined in a devastating assault on the Qatar coast,
c 1razing Bida and Wakra and forcing their inhabitants to flee.
The Resident, Colonel Lewis Pelly, recognised that this blatant 
outrage must be swiftly and drastically punished, or else respect for 
British authority amongst the Gulf shaikhs would be compromised, thus 
undermining the basis of the entire system of maritime peace.
Initially, however, his hands were tied by the absence of a British 
naval force to effect retribution. Now Pelly was uncomfortably aware 
of the Arab tribal shaikhs watching and waiting to see if the British 
could or would rise to the challenge. The Resident formally 
charged Shaikh Zaid with violating the Maritime Truce, and Shaikh
1 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gu? f, p. 673*
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Muhammad with violating the 1861 Convention, and demanded an 
explanation. His demands met with procrastination and defiance.
As the Qa.tar coastal tribes waited in vain for the British to force 
reparation, they took it upon themselves to attack the Bahrain fleet
'I
in June 1868. The ensuing bloodshed and disorder further 
emphasised British loss of control over peace in the Gulf,
In early September 1868, Pelly at last received the naval forces
he needed. The squadron sailed at once for Bahrain, Muhammad b.
Khalifa had left Bahrain for Khor Hassan in Qatar rather than face ' •
Pelly, leaving his brother Ali to handle the situation. When the
Resident had departed Muhammad could return to take up his former
position, having avoided punishment. It was thus with Shaikh Ali
that Colonel Pelly made contact on his arrival at Bahrain, He
did not, however, play into Muhammad's hands. Prior to his
arrival he had received intelligence of Muhammad's intentions to
evade punishment, and he had also received information that Shaikh
Muhammad was much disliked for his tyrannical rule, not only by the
foreign merchants trading in Manama, but by many of the Arab
2
populace of the islands. Consequently, Pelly took the opportunity
offered by Muhammad's absence, and rendered full recognition
1 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p, 67 .^
2 Pelly to Sec, to Govt, of Bombay, no, 111, 25 September 1 8 6 8 ,
para, 7; and Appendix B2, Pelly to Muhammad b. Khalifa and, in
his absence Ali b. Khalifa, 2 September 1 8 6 8 ,  L / jP & S / 5 / 2 6 1 ,
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to his brother Ali as Bahrain*s sole ruler; Muhammad having forfeited
his title by his repeated violations of the peace, and his flight from
Bahrain, On 6th September Ali, together with seven shaikhs and
subjects of Bahrain, accepted the stipulations of a new convention
with the British, promising to hand over Muhammad to the Resident should
he ever return, and to pay a fine for damages to the Government of 
1
Bombay. Pelly then burnt Muhammad*s war fleet and shelled his
2fortress residence.
The Resident went next to Qatar, to try and arrange an end to the 
feud with Bahrain. The leading shaikh of Qatar, Muhammad b. Thani, 
agreed on 12th September by a formal convention not to commit any more 
hostilities at sea and to recognise Shaikh Ali and maintain towards 
him "all the relations which heretofore subsisted between" Muhammad 
b. Thani and the ruler of Bahrain.^ Furthermore, he agreed to 
surrender Muhammad b. Khalifa to the British should he fall into his 
hands, and to refer any future disputes for the mediation of the
Resident. On 13th September Pelly obtained another engagement from
. . 4the remaining shaikhs of Qatar. The annual tribute from Qatar to
Bahrain, over which the Shaikh of BidaC and Muhammad b. Khalifa had 
disagreed, was fixed at 9000 krans; part to be paid to the new ruler
1 For the terms of the Declaration of 6th September 1868 see Ibid., 
Appendix 3« These signatures and seals of Ali and the other 
seven do not appear either in this source or in Aitchison,
pp. 236-7.
2 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 67^-5•
3 Pelly to Sec. to Govt, of Bombay, no. 111, 25 September 1868, 
Appendix 6, L/P&S/5/261.
k Ibid., Appendix 7B.
62
of Bahrain and ultimately to the Wahhabi Amir of Najd, and part direct
to the Na im tribe of Qatar. On this occasion the British Resident
was unequivocal about the significance of the payment:
It is understood that this payment of Tribute does not 
affect the independence of Guttur in relation to Bahrein.
But it is to be considered as a fixed contribution by 
Guttur towards a total sum payable by Bahrein and Guttur 
combined, in view to securing their Frontiers from 
molestation by the Naim and Wahabee Bedouins, more 
particularly during the pearl diving season, when the 
tribes of Guttur and Bahrein, occupied at sea, leave 
their homesteads comparatively unprotected.
Shaikh Zaid of Abu Dhabi proved initially less cooperative, but two
days' argument and a threat of bombardment of his port eventually
brought his agreement to keep the peace, release the prisoners he had
2
taken m  Qatar, and pay compensation.
As was to be expected, the Persian Government reacted unfavourably 
to Pelly's handling of Bahrain's affairs. The Persian Foreign 
Minister complained to the British Minister in Tehran that, as the 
recognised sovereign of Bahrain, his Government should have been given 
prior notice of Pelly's actions, and he expressed a fear that no 
Persian island in the Gulf could now be considered safe from his 
interference.^ Pelly poured scorn on
4
Persia's assertions; he received support at the India Office.
1 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 675* For the terms of 
this agreement see: Pelly to Sec. to Govt, of Bombay, no. 111,
25 September 1868*, Appendix 6 , L/P&S/5/261. It is significant that 
the agreement did not bind the heirs of Muhammad b. Thani, nor did 
it incorporate Qatar into the Trucial System.
2 For the terms of this agreement see: Pelly to Sec. to Govt, of
Bombay, no. 111, 25 September 1868, Appendix 10, L/P&S/5/261.
3 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 676.
4 Ibid., pp. 676-7.
63
To the Foreign Secretary, Lord Clarendon, however, larger 
considerations were involved. He was concerned'with the require­
ments of British diplomacy in the context of Asia as a whole, over 
and above the interests of British India. He sought to promote 
Anglo-Persian friendship as a counter-balance to Russia*s ambitions 
in the area, and to this end he was prepared to humour Persia on the 
subject of Bahrain. It distressed him to find his policy interfered 
with through the independent actions of the Government of India on 
the Arab side of the Gulf.
Clarendon received a second Persian complaint about Pelly*s
behaviour, this time from the Persian charge d*affaires in London,
General Hajji Mohsin Khan. Unclear as to either the details or the
exact reasoning behind the Resident’s actions, Clarendon referred to
the India Office for information. He was sent all the correspondence
which had come through from India on the matter, and on the basis of
this, in January 1869, Clarendon instructed the British Minister in
Tehran to give the Persian Government a full explanation of Pelly *s
actions. He also asked the India Office if it might not, in future,
2
be possible to give the Persians forewarning of their intentions.
The Persian charge d’affaires pestered Clarendon with further 
protestations, threatening to turn the incident into a major breach 
of friendly relations. The response of the India Office was firm.
1 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 677•
2 Ibid., p. 678.
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The validity of Persia*s claim to Bahrain was emphatically refuted.
The advice of the India Office was simply to inform the Persians that 
the British regarded Bahrain as independent and would continue to do 
so. Mohsin Khan was not, however, satisfied with this interpretation, 
and to substantiate his arguments produced the letters written to 
Persia by Muhammad b. Khalifa in April i860, at the time, incidentally, 
when he was also courting the Porte.
The India Office was unshaken, and reiterated the vital Indian
interest which underlay its firmness on the issue. The Secretary of
State for India, the Duke of Argyll, again dismissed the Persian
arguments, and informed Clarendon, in addition, that even if the
2Persian claim were accepted:
To substitute the distant and ineffective authority of 
Persia for the direct responsibility of the local Chief 
to the power which controls the maritime police of the 
Gulf would be fatal to the policy which has so long and 
advantageously been maintained in that part of the world.
None the less Argyll was sensitive to Clarendon*s desire to smooth
over the breach between Persia and Britain. Against the judgment of
the majority of his colleagues at the India Office he came up with the
proposal that, "as a matter of courtesy to the Persian Government",
he should instruct the Resident to make known his actions in respect
of Bahrain, in advance, to the British Minister in Tehran. He, in
turn, could inform the Persian Government of events, though in cases
of emergency, the Resident might have to act so quickly that prior
3
notice would be impossible.
1 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 678-9.
2 Quoted Ibid., p. 679*
3 Ibid., p. 679.
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Clarendon sent a communique to Mohsin Khan which incorporated 
Argyll's proposal, and side-stepped the question of sovereignty by 
asserting that Britain's only reason for disciplining the Shaikh of 
Bahrain in accordance with their joint engagements was to preserve 
the general peace of the Gulf. On this note he even suggested that 
if the Persian Government were ready to take over the policing of the 
Gulf, the British could relinquish an irksome and expensive burden. 
Meanwhile, however, he believed that their interest in the 
preservation of Gulf peace was mutual and had to be provided for.
Mohsin Khan again expressed dissatisfaction. He apparently
sought to manoeuvre the British into conceding, even if in veiled
terms, Persian rights in respect of Bahrain's sovereignty. He
suggested certain alterations to the official communique, including a
statement that, until such time as the Shah possessed sufficient
maritime forces to take over the policing of the Gulf, the British
would not take action over Bahrain, without prior reference to the
Shah. To this loaded statement Clarendon was shrewd enough not to
2
agree, having consulted Argyll on its implications. Yet he did
allow a new introductory sentence which went some way towards meeting
3
Mohsin Khan's suggestionss
The British Government readily admit that the Government 
of the Shah has protested against the Persian right of 
sovereignty over Bahrein being ignored by the British 
authorities, and they have given due consideration to 
that protest.
1 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 680.
2 Kelly, 'The Persian Claim to Bahrain', loc. cit., p. 69.
3 Quoted in Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 681.
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Clarendon also conceded that, when the Resident felt obliged to act 
speedily, without prior recourse to the Persian Government, the Shah 
would receive a full explanation of his actions subsequently.
At no point did the British communique give recognition to
Persia*s claims to sovereignty over Bahrain. Yet the draft was both
sufficiently deferential for Mohsin Khan to accept it, and for the
India Office as a whole to regard it with misgivings. Not
surprisingly the Persian Government were to construct upon this
document assertions that Britain had effectively conceded sovereignty
to Persia. Whilst the British were able on such occasions, which
arose repeatedly after 1869, to refute this, they were made to regret
1
that they had ever drawn up such a courteous, diplomatic letter.
A few months after these diplomatic exchanges in London events 
took an unexpected and decisive turn in Bahrain itself. Following 
his flight from the shaikhdom, Muhammad b. Khalifa had settled at
mm mm Q
Qatif, with the sanction of his erstwhile enemy, Amir Abdallah b. 
Faisal. Whether the Wahhabi Amir was prepared actively to support
m
the cause of the deposed shaikh is unclear, but he was not likely to
have looked favourably upon the intervention of Colonel Pelly in
2
Bahrain*s internal affairs. Certainly he did not interfere when 
Muhammad b. Khalifa rallied a force, partly from his kinsmen the
1 Kelly, *The Persian Claim to Bahrain*, loc. cit., pp. 65-70.
The status of Bahrain was not to be defined clearly by Britain 
until the implementation of the Order in Council for Bahrain in 
1919, and Persia did not finally abandon its claim until 1971.
2 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 682. See also Way to 
Pelly, 23 September 1869, L/P&S/5/263, pp. 1 ^-8^-88.
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A1 CAbdallah under the leadership of Nasir b. Mubarak, and partly from
amongst the Bani Hajir bedouin, with whom Nasir was connected by
marriage and through his mother. This was the nucleus of the force,
joined by various other disaffected tribesmen of Qatar, with which
Muhammad b. Khalifa launched a surprise attack on Bahrain in
September 1869. Ali was caught unawares and hastily mustered
support, largely from amongst other bedouin of the same Ban! Hajir
tribe. He also sent for Muhammad b. Abdallah, the erstwhile exile,
who had been permitted to resettle on the island, but whose commitment
to Ali was by no means assured. He answered the summons and was
duly sent by Ali to treat with his brother and learn his terms.
cHowever, Muhammad b. Abdallah merely transferred his allegiance to 
the invaders and encouraged their advance. The rival forces met 
in battle, the Bani Hajir all united under Nasir b. Mubarak, and both 
Shaikh Ali and his son Ibrahim were killed.^
The satisfaction of Muhammad b. Khalifa at the success of his
• —
Q
invasion was shortlived. Muhammad b. Abdallah. declared himself
the new ruler and threw Muhammad b. Khalifa into prison. Meanwhile
the Bani Hajir ran riot, ransacking the town of Manama and
terrorising its inhabitants. Some distance out from the harbour,
Captain A.C. Way, the Assistant Political Resident, observed events
2from the steamer "Dalhousie". He gained the impression that the 
Arabs of Muharraq refrained from intervening to halt the sacking of 
Manama and, indeed, the invasion in the first place, because of their
1 Way to Pelly, 23 September 1869, L/P8eS/5/263, pp. 1^ -84-88.
2 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 682-3.
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uncertainty as to whether the Wahhabi Amir had given the venture his 
blessing and would intervene on the invaders* behalf. Some of these 
Arabs declared a willingness to take action if the British would 
guarantee them support.
Colonel Pelly reacted by submitting to the Government of Bombay 
a plan to blockade the islands, take all the rebel leaders into
custody, and forcibly to install, as sole ruler, the eldest son of
c- - 1the late Shaikh Ali, Isa, who had acted as Ali*s governor in Qatar,
The island property of all the other shaikhs should be distributed
amongst the victims of the destruction of Manama, and the mainland
tribal supporters of the revolt, notably the Bani Hajir, should be
pressured by a blockade of the Hasa coast, until all plundered property
was restored. The Government of India allowed Pelly to proceed,
except that he was forbidden to confiscate property on the island or
to blockade the coast, as the first would render the position of the
new shaikh less tenable, and the second could not be carried on
2
without a greater number of naval vessels than were available,
Pelly arrived at Bahrain in November, three months after the
q
invasion and the seizure of power by Shaikh Muhammad b, Abdallah,
Q M
After a short blockade, Muhammad b, Abdallah and Muhammad b. Khalifa 
surrendered, though Nasir b, Mubarak managed to escape to Hasa,
1 Way to Pelly, 23 September 1869, L/P&S/5/263, pp. 1^8^88,
This letter explains that Isa had been allowed to return to 
Qatar after the invasion, and there enjoyed the support of the 
Na im tribe, in opposition to Shaikh Muhammad b, Abdallah, 
and Muhammad b. Khalifa.
2 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p, 682.
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Q w  mm
Pelly then summoned Isa and recognised him as the new Shaikh of 
Bahrain, Furthermore, despite his instructions, Pelly made the
Q .  mm
proviso that Isa agree to confiscate the property of the prisoners
and redistribute it as compensation to the citizens and merchants
of Manama. Then, when an emissary of Persia arrived, expecting to
deliver Persia's recognition of Shaikh Muhammad b. Abdallah, he was
permitted to deliver his despatches to Muhammad, only for them to be
confiscated by Pelly immediately afterwards and sent for the attention
1
of the Government of India.
The diplomatic repercussions of Pelly's reorganisation of
Bahrain's internal affairs were not long in coming. In January 1870
the Ottoman Ambassador in London made a formal complaint to the
Foreign Office, alleging that ’'L'lle de Bahrein n'ayant jamais cess£,
2
que nous sachions, de faire partie des Possessions Ottomanes”•
The Foreign Office rejected the protest, basing its decision upon that 
of Lord Palmerston in 1851.
Not surprisingly, in January and March 1870 Mohsin Khan duly 
filed his official Persian protests. Not only had Pelly taken a 
decisive stand in Bahrain affairs without previously informing the 
Persian Government of his intentions, but his treatment of the 
Persian emissary to the island had been offensive. Clarendon was
1 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 683-
2 E. Hertslet, 'Memorandum on the Separate Claims of Turkey and 
Persia to Sovereignty over the Island of Bahrein', F.O., 23 March 
187^ , L/P&S/18/B9, p. 20.
3 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 683.
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exasperated, especially with Pelly himself, whose behaviour he regarded 
as "of a very high-handed character". By now, however, the India 
Office firmly held a different view of these events. The Government 
of India had learnt both of Persia's intention to recognise the 
assumption of power by the rebel Muhammad b, CAbdallah, and of 
Clarendon's misconstrued statement that the Shah might one day prefer 
to relieve the British of their police duties. Both attitudes 
appeared in India as unwarranted disregard for the requirements of 
peace and stability in the Gulf. The Viceroy fully supported 
Pelly*s actions and the general policy on which they were based, a 
view endorsed by Argyll at the India Office, with regard to both the 
independent status of Bahrain, and the whole substance of the Persian 
complaint.
So far as the Government of India was concerned the matter was 
closed. The prisoner shaikhs were taken into their custody and never 
returned to Bahrain. The installation of Shaikh CIsa in the 
archipelago by Colonel Pelly meanwhile heralded the beginning of a new 
era in Anglo-Bahraini relations.
The British became doubly responsible for the protection of the 
new ruler. Since 1861 the British Government had been under an 
obligation to uphold the ruler's independence, but after 1869 they 
guaranteed his position. Shaikh CIsa ruled for a long period 
and the forcible expulsion of his rivals did not resolve the
1 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 683-5*
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inter-dynastic feud; it merely transformed the terms of the conflict. 
The British maritime policy decreed that British power would oppose 
those who had fled the islands if they tried to fight their way back 
in. But it could not prevent their trying. The challenge to the 
new ruler of Bahrain would be a major issue in Gulf affairs for the 
next quarter of a century.
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CHAPTER 2
THE CHALLENGE TO SHAIKH °ISA, 1869-95: PART I, 1869-81
^  Ml Mi M
The way in which Shaikh Isa b. Ali A1 Khalifa had come to power 
in Bahrain in November 1869 made it likely that his rule in the
Q a  mm
Shaikhdom would be faced with external challenges. Shaikh Isa had 
been placed in power by the Resident at Bushire after a British naval 
squadron had intervened to end a bloody period of civil war between 
rival branches of the ruling family. A number of the leading
mm Q
members of the defeated branch, the A1 Abdallah, had been imprisoned
. c
by the British. On the other hand, other leading A1 Abdallah had, 
in November 1869, escaped from Bahrain to the Hasa mainland. The 
most important of these being the cousin of Shaikh CIsa, Nasir b. 
Mubarak. These exiles repeatedly threatened the rule of Shaikh °Isa 
for more than two and a half decades after their flight from Bahrain.
M C
The sense of grievance of the exiled A1 Abdallah had been made
Q .  mm
worse by the fact that the placing of Shaikh Isa in power in Bahrain
had been brought about in defiance of the Arab tradition of the right
of conquest. They were always careful to make this point whenever
1
the opportunity arose.
— cThe most important source of the resentment of the A1 Abdallah, 
however, was one condition that Pelly, contrary to Government orders,
1 See for example report of Agha Muhammad Rahim, Residency Agent, 
Bahrain, on his secret meeting with Nasir b. Mubarak in Qatar, 
no date, but some time in March 1881, L/P & S/7/28, p. 935»
7^
had laid down at the time of the installation of Shaikh Isa as ruler
■* cof Bahrain; the confiscation of the property of the A1 Abdallah.
By doing this it became possible to compensate those who had suffered 
losses as a result of the disturbances of 1868-69, for which the
M Q Q m m  mm
British blamed the A1 Abdallah. In this way Shaikh Isa made
- c 1certain of the irreconcilable hostility of the A1 Abdallah.
M  C
The A1 Abdallah did have certain resources on which they could
Cm m
call in order to cause trouble for Shaikh Isa. In the first place, 
the Bani Hajir tribe who migrated every year between their lands in
Qatar and Basra, provided manpower for a number of attempts to
c- - 2 - -overthrow Shaikh Isa. The Bani Hajir were connected with the
A1 CAbdallah through Nasir b. Mubarak, who was the son of a woman of
- - 3the tribe and had also married a Bani Hajir woman.
In 1871 a major new development complicated the politics of the 
Gulf, from which the A1 °Abdallah gained another source of support.
In that year, taking the opportunity to intervene in the dispute between 
the rival factions of the A1 SaCud in Najd, a Turkish expeditionary
force occupied the Hasa coast to the west of Bahrain, and the whole
k
Arab littoral of the Gulf was claimed for the Ottoman Empire. The
1 See comment of E.C. Ross, Resident, Bushire, to Sec. to Govt, of
India, F.D. ^Foreign Department/^ , ^ March 1881, L/P 8c S/7/28, 
pp. 939-2*0.
2 See for example S.B. Miles, Officiating Resident, Bushire, to
Political Resident, Baghdad, 15 October 1886, L/P & S/7/^ -8, p. 1083.
3 Residency Agent, Bahrain, to Resident, Bushire, 20 July 1881,
No. 99, L/P 8c S/9/66A, pp. 491A-92. See also Kelly, Britain 
and the Persian Gulf, p. 759*
k See the proclamation of 20 April 1871 b£ the commander of the
Turkish expedition to the people of Hasa, L/P 8c S/9/18, pp. 67-68. 
A detailed account of this Turkish expedition is given in *Nejd 
Expedition Precis1 by 'P.D.H.* 6 March 1882, L/P 8c S/18/B99.
See also Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 717-51.
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organiser of the expedition wan Midhat Pasha, the vigorous new Wall 
1
of Baghdad. The Turkish advance and the rumours surrounding it 
aroused British concern about Turkish intentions toward all the 
Trucial Shaikhdoras, and particularly toward Bahrain, because of its 
proximity to the scene of operations. The British Consul-General
in Baghdad strongly suspected that Midhat wished to make use of the
2expedition to promote the Turkish claims to Bahrain. In spite of
the Porte's denials that maritime operations against Bahrain were not 
3
contemplated , Pelly for one was not convinced that such an attempt 
4
might not be made.
British apprehensions that Midhat intended such an attempt were
increased in July 1871 when the wali referred to Bahrain as "one of
5
the dependencies of Nejd". Since the avowed object of the 
expedition was to uphold what the Ottomans claimed to be their 
sovereignty over Najd, Midhat's statement suggested a potential threat 
to Bahrain. In fact it was not impossible to make out a case that 
Bahrain had in the past been in some way a 'dependency of Najd'.
The Shaikhs of Bahrain had, albeit irregularly, paid zakat to the 
Wahhabi rulers in Riyadh, on account of certain lands the A1 Khalifa
1 For a biographical sketch of Midhat, especially during his time 
at Baghdad, see Stephen Hemsley tongrigg, Four Centuries of 
Modern Iraq (Beirut, 1925), pp. 298-501.
2 Herbert, Consul-General, Baghdad, to Sir Henry Elliot, British
Ambassador, Constantinople, 2k March 1871, L/P & S/3/78, p. 522.
The Turks had periodically pressed claims to sovereignty over 
Bahrain ever since 1847: E. Hertslet, 'Separate Claims Memorandum',
p. 8. See also Lorimer, IB, p. 881; and Chapter I, p. SI, above.
3 Elliot to Foreign Office, 3 April 18?1, No. 142, L/P & S/3/78, 
p. 422.
k Pelly to Sec. to Govt, of Bombay, Political Dept., 6 May 1871*
L/P & S/9/17, Po 716.
5 Midhat to Herbert, 18 July 1871, No. 85, L/P & S/5/268, p. 418.
See*also Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 731*
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had held in Qatar, As far as this territory was concerned, the 
Government of India had, in 1867, conceded that the Shaikh of Bahrain 
owed fealty to the Wahhabi Government,
The military success of Midhat's expedition, at least in its
•
early stages, was a threat to the prestige on which British supremacy
in the Gulf partly depended. In the course of 1871, reports reached
Bushire that Arab opinion in the Gulf had concluded that the Turks
were strong and that they intended "to take possession of the whole 
2
Gulf". Further, it was reported that for several weeks a leading 
figure of a tribe of the Basra area, had been residing with Shaikh 
°Isa and making speeches of a disturbing kind. Outside Shaikh CIsa's 
house this man had been asking everyone "why the English are constantly 
here, does the Island belong to them or is Sheikh Esau paying the 
English to look after Bahrain", At daily congregations at Shaikh 
Isa's house the tribal leader had also turned "the conversations oh 
the doings of the Turks, that they must be all powerful, that it would 
be best to make terms with them and such little sayings",^
There was much justification for British apprehensions about the 
intentions of Midhat Pasha towards Bahrain. In December 1871 Pelly 
discovered that the wall had been scheming to get up a petition from 
leading Bahraini merchants asking for the establishment of Turkish rule
1 Sec, to Govt, of India to Sec. to Govt, of Bombay, 22 March 1867, 
No. 274, 3/15/2/29, p. 12.
2 William Guthrie, Commanding H.M.S. Hugh Rose, to Pelly, 26 
September 1871, L/P & S/9/19» P* 99.
3 Ibid., pp. 101-02.
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1
over the Shaikhdom. Midhat had, indeed, made an attempt at this 
time to land in Bahrain but had been prevented by the presence of
„  2
British gunboats in the straits between Bahrain and Hasa. Even
«  Q m
Midhat’s adversary, the Amir Sa ud ibn Faisal, sought to involve
the coastal tribes in his struggle in ways which would disturb the
delicate balance of the British system of maintaining the maritime
peace, Sa ud asked Pelly for permission to allow Isa and the other
Trucial shaikhs to fight the Turks at sea on his behalf, but this
3
understandably came to nothing.
In July 1871 the Assistant Political Eesident reported that
along the Qatar coast the idea was ’’more or less prevalent that we
4
are not to, or cannot, interfere with the Turkish Flag". Among 
those who calculated that the introduction of Turkish power on the 
mainland so close to Bahrain might prove to be to their advantage
M C M
were the A1 Abdallah exiles. As Pelly noted at the time, Nasir 
b. Mubarak for one would ’’gladly avail” himself of "any flag or
pretext which might appear to promise /him7  a chance for an attack
5
... on Bahrain". Nor were the Turks slow to try to make use of the 
M C
A1 Abdallah to further their own interests. Very soon after the
1 Pelly to Sec. to Govt, of Bombay, Political Dept., 29 December
1871, L/P & S/9/19, P. 493.
2 Ibid., pp. 491-96.
3 Pelly to Sec. to Govt, of Bombay, 15 June 1871, L/P & S/9/17, p. 
1001. For the debate on the implications of the Turkish 
expedition for the naval basis of the Trucial system, see Kelly, 
Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 721 ff.
4 Smith to Pelly, 20 July 1871, L/P & S/9/18, p. 381.
5 Pelly to Sec. to Govt, of Bombay, Political Dept., 31 July 1871,
L/P & S/9/18, p. 377.
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Turks had entered Hasa in 1871, Nasir b. Mubarak had been recruited by
• •
them as an agent through whom contact could be made with important
Arabs in the area. Later, the British discovered that Nasir was in
receipt of a monthly pension of sixty Maria-Theresa dollars from the 
1
Ottoman treasury.
The threat to Shaikh Isa*s rule in Bahrain in the period
— 2 — — —1869-95 involved a third element, Shaikh Qasim b. Muhammad A1 Thani
Q  mm mm mm Q
of Bida • While the A1 Thani of Bida were the most powerful 
shaikhs in Qatar, the A1 Khalifa rulers of Bahrain had a long-standing 
claim to sovereignty in the peninsula. Whenever the opportunity 
presented itself, the Shaikhs of Bahrain liked to point out that
3
"all the dependencies of Katr" had "previously belonged to Bahrain". 
These pretensions of the A1 Khalifa to sovereignty in Qatar had been 
recognised by the father of Shaikh Qasim, Shaikh Muhammad b. Thani. 
During his period of rule over Bida° since 18^4, he had regularly paid 
a tribute to the A1 Khalifa, an arrangement confirmed by Pelly in
-ises.1*
The British too, had generally found Shaikh Muhammad to be 
willing to take a favourable attitude to their demands. The 1868 
agreement between Pelly and Shaikh Muhammad b. Thani, as a result of 
the disturbances involving Bahrain and Qatar in that year, brought the
1 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 2 April 1881, L/P & S/7/28, 
p..931* A Maria-Theresa dollar was a silver coin worth nearly 
one and a half rupees.
2 In the records the Shaikh is often referred to as *Jasim*, because 
of the peculiar pronunciation of the Arabic language by the 
Qataris (and others on the Arab coast). The classical spelling 
•Qasim* will be used in this work throughout.
3 Shaikh of Bahrain to Ross, 24 February 1884, L/P & S/7/3&, P» 4-04.
4 See Chapter I, pp. 6f.
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cShaikh of Bida into a relationship with Britain very similar to that
1
created in 1853 with the Trucial rulers. Indeed, in August 1869, 
Shaikh Muhammad had attempted to claim that he was ’’now a subject of
2
the British Government” and that his duty was ”to obey that Government”. 
The British were not at that time prepared to assume such a 
responsibility for Qatar, and Pelly replied that Shaikh Muhammad was
m
not a British subject ’’but an Arab Chieftain in friendly communications
3
with Her Majesty’s Indian Government”.
The British were to discover, however, that Shaikh Muhammad*s 
son and successor, Shaikh Qasim, who by the end of the 1860s was 
already prominent in Qatari affairs, was by no means as pliable as his 
father, nor as favourably disposed to the A1 Khalifa or their British 
protectors. During the disturbances of 1868, Shaikh Qasim had been 
sent to Bahrain as a peace emissary representing Qatar. For his pains 
he had been temporarily imprisoned by the A1 Khalifa rulers of the 
island. Possibly this was one reason for the hostility to the 
A1 Khalifa which Qasim was later to show. At the same time, it: seems 
probable that Shaikh Qasim, who was more ambitious than his father, 
was not as prepared as Shaikh Muhammad to submit to the claims of the 
A1 Khalifa to sovereignty over Qatar.
1 Aitchison in fact classified the 1868 agreement with Shaikh 
Muhammad under ’Treaties relating to the Trucial Arab Shaikhs of 
Oman*•
2 ’Translated purport of a letter from Mahomed-bin-Sani, 5 August
1869 to the Political Resident’, L/P & S/5/263, p. 1151*
3 Pelly to Shaikh Muhammad b. Thani, 5 August 1869, L/P &
S/5/263, p. 1151. *
k Al-Nabhani, op. cit., p. 183.
80
After the flight of the A1 CAbdallah in 1869, Nasir b. Mubarak 
and Shaikh Qasim were quick to appreciate the common interest they 
shared in challenging the rule of Shaikh Isa in Bahrain, and an
-j _
alliance was formed. Later, in 1880, Nasir married one of Shaikh
_ 2
Qasim's daughters. Even in 1871, however, the relationship was
close and, when Nasir b, Mubarak threw in his lot with the Turks,
Shaikh Qasim was quick to follow his example.
By the time of the Turkish invasion of Hasa, Shaikh Muhammad b,
• • 
mm mm X  M  Q
Thani was old and infirm , and Shaikh Qasim*s influence at Bida was
now dominant. Major Smith, the Assistant Resident, discovered on 
c —*a visit to Bida that. Shaikh Qasim was flying the Turkish flag over 
his house. Shaikh Muhammad, apparently not enthusiastic about his
Q
son's acceptance of Turkish sovereignty at Bida , continued to fly
4 —
the '*Arab flag”. It would appear that Shaikh Qasim had dared to 
accept the Turkish flag because, whilst the British were unchallengable 
at sea, on land it was a different matter. Shaikh Qasim stated to 
Smith that '"We are people on the mainland and that their (Turks) 
Forces are moving by land'".^ Pelly noted that Shaikh Muhammad,m
though "well-disposed and peaceful”, knew that the British concerned
1 Sidney Smith to Pelly, 20 July 1871, L/P & S/9/18, p. 381.
2 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of .India, F.D., 26 February 1881, L/P &
S/7/28, p. 928.
3 He died in 1878. See register Z/P/1373 part B; also Lorimer, 
IA, 8C&.
Smith to Pelly, 20 July 1871, L/P & S/9/18 p. 381. Smith did
not make it clear what precisely this "Arab flag" consisted of.
Most likely it was the A1 Thanx family flag.
5 Ibid.
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themselves only with the maritime peace. If he showed resistance
Q
to flying of the Turkish flag at Bida he would probably be coerced
1
by the Ottoman forces.
The British relationship with Bahrain was first tested by the
Turks over an affair in 18?1 in which a Turkish messenger was murdered
2 - - - .m  the Shaikhdom. A Bani Hajir tribesman was employed by Nasir
•
b. Mubarak to take letters to Shaikh Qasim. Imprudently, the 
messenger made use of a boat which put into a small port on the coast 
of Bahrain. Whilst the vessel was at anchor, it came to the 
knowledge of certain relatives of the late ruler of Bahrain, Ali b. 
Khalifa, that the messenger had participated in the killing of that 
Shaikh in 1869. In accordance with contemporary local customs 
relating to vengeance, the relatives of Shaikh Ali seized and killed 
the messenger.^ On his body were found letters addressed to Shaikh 
Qasim by Nasir b. Mubarak and others of the A1 °Abdallah as well as 
other letters from Ferik Pasha, the Turkish commandant in Hasa.
One of the letters, written by a son of Nasir b. Mubarak, contained 
the passage:
The news is such as you would wish, and the Exalted 
Government are trying for Bahrain, Guttur, and other places 
to the detriment of the enemy and the rejoicing of friends.
In shallah ^ 3od willing you will shortly receive news 
which will gladden you.^
1 Pelly to Sec. to Govt, of Bombay, Political Dept., 31 July 1871, 
L/P & S/9/18, p. 377.
2 This affair is discussed in detail in Kelly, Britain and the 
Persian Gulf, p. 732 ff.
3 Pelly to Sec. to Govt, of Bombay, Political Dept., 12 September
1871, L/P & s/9/18, pp. 751-5 2.
4 Quoted in Shaikh °Isa to Midhat Pasha, 25 November 1871, L/P & 
S/9/19, PP. ^35-38.
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The letter of the Turkish commandant was apparently passed on 
to Shaikh Qasim unopened. Even so, when news of the incident reached 
Midhat Pasha in Baghdad, he informed Herbert that he intended to 
visit Bahrain to obtain reparation for the murder. Herbert was 
suspicious about the reasons why Midhat had decided on this course of 
action rather than applying to Pelly for redress. The Baghdad Consul 
considered that Midhat did not wish to admit that the British 
Resident in the Gulf might represent the interests of Bahrain as far 
as other powers were concerned.^
Midhat’s threat to go to Bahrain to deal with the Shaikh
directly was certainly a defiance of the connection with Bahrain
which the British Government had built up through successive
agreements, and entailed a high risk of armed conflict between the
Turks and the British. Pelly was ordered by the Government of India
to proceed to Bahrain and the Government of Bombay suggested that he
should, by means of the two warships at his disposal, prevent a
2Turkish occupation of the Shaikhdom. If the forces at Pelly*s
disposal were inadequate for the task, he should offer his good
3
offices so that a peaceful settlement could be arranged. The 
Government of India and the India Office wanted Pelly to try and 
induce Midhat to refer the question of reparation to Constantinople
1 Herbert to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 15 and 2k October 1871 
(tels.), L/P 8c S/5/268, pp. 389-90* See also Kelly, Britain 
and the Persian Gulf, p. 733.
2 Govt, of Bombay to Govt, of India, 5 November 1871 (tel.), L/P 
8c S/5/268, p. 600. See also Kelly, Britain and the Persian 
Gulf, p. 73^.
3 Ibid.
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for settlement through diplomatic exchanges with London. No matter 
how a solution was to be reached, the British objective was to 
interpose themselves between Midhat and Shaikh Isa and thereby assert 
their right to protect Bahrain.
Before instructions could reach Pelly he had, on 11 November
2
18?1, arrived in Bahrain. On 22 November, a Turkish Commodore,
Q m  m
Arif Bey, arrived in the harbour at Manama with two gunboats to
C“demand reparation for the killing of the messenger. Arif also 
stated that Midhat Pasha himself intended to come to Bahrain because 
of the incident.^
At first Pelly decided to try and manage the situation
Q m m  mm
indirectly through Shaikh Isa. This, of course, was in conformity
with the relationship between the British Government and the ruler
of Bahrain as defined in the convention of 1861. By this convention
the British, whilst taking a responsibility for the protection of
Bahrain from maritime aggressions, recognised the Shaikh as an
4
"independent ruler". As such, he was clearly entitled to deal with 
the approaches of foreign powers directly. Nothing in the agreements 
which the rulers of Baghdad had reached with the British Government 
prohibited, or even limited, such direct communication. Thus Shaikh 
CIsa, under the advice of Pelly, answered the representatives of
1 Govt, of India to India Office, 8 November 1871, tel. No. 17 C.P.,
L/P 8c S/5/268, p. 601; Govt, of India to Govt, of Bombay, 8
November 1871, tel. No. 18 C.P., ibid.; Sec. of State to Viceroy,
20 November 18?1, ibid., p. 602.
2 For Kelly*s account of this incident, see Britain and the Persian 
Gulf, p. 735.
3 Shaikh °Isa to Midhat Pasha, 23 November 1871, L/P & S/9/19* P* 433*
4 Aitchison, op. cit., XI, 235*
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Arif Bey with a letter to Midhat Pasha, which was conciliatory, but
which at the same time regretted that a messenger, claimed by the
Turks themselves to have been sent by them to Qatar, should have been
found to be the bearer of a letter intimating the desire of the
Ottoman Government to seize Bahrain, On 4 December 1871 Midhat, who
was now on the Hasa coast, wrote back not only demanding that Shaikh
°Isa should pay blood-raoney to Shaikh Qasim, but also hinting that he
2
was empowered to use force should this demand be rejected. In the
event Midhat*s threats came to nothing. On 16 December he left
Hasa for Basra, Even so, the affair of the murdered Turkish 
•
messenger had shown the complications which could arise for the 
British from insistence by foreign powers on their right to have direct 
contact with the Shaikh of Bahrain. Because of these complications, 
the British authorities in London and India considered ways of 
preventing such direct contact. One possible method would have been
Q m m  a
to induce Shaikh Isa to agree that any direct communications from 
foreign powers which he might receive should be passed on to the 
Resident to be dealt with. This was, in fact, a feature of later
C »  mm J
agreements between Shaikh Isa and the British Government. As a 
result of the messenger incident, Colonel Pelly took a step towards 
anticipating these later agreements. The Government of India 
instructed him to inform the Turks that the murder case could be 
settled satisfactorily only by diplomacy and, if necessary, by
1 Shaikh CIsa to Midhat Pasha, 25 November 1871, L/P & S/9/19* 
pp. ^35-38.
2 Midhat Pasha to Shaikh CIsa, 4 December 1871, L/P & S/9/20, p. 121.
3 See below, pp. 122 & in.
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arbitration. At the end of January 1872, the Resident advised
Shaikh Isa to reply to Midhat Pasha suggesting that the matter should
be arranged between the British and Turkish Governments, by whose
2
joint decision he would abide.
c** mDirect negotiation between the Turks and Shaikh Isa presented
the former with opportunities for bringing pressure to bear on the
Shaikhdom to an extent incompatible with British interests. The
Porte, however, was not prepared to deal with Shaikh Isa through
the British Government but stated its preference that the affair
3
should be settled between agents of Turkey and Bahrain. In fact,
since Turkish pressure over the messenger affair had by now relaxed,
both the Government of India and the British Government were prepared
to agree to the Turkish proposal, though on condition that there
k
should be no resort to force or the threat of force.
It should be noted here that there was another probable reason 
why Pelly*s superiors were prepared to accede to Turkish wishes over 
the settlement of the messenger affair. It is known that, at this 
time, both the Home Government and the Government of India were 
concerned that deteriorating relations between Britain and Turkey
1 Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Pelly, 30 November 1871 (tel.), 
L/P & S/9/19, p. 517.
2 Pelly to Govt, of Bombay, 27 January 1872, quoted in J.A. Saldanha, 
•Precis of Turkish Expansion on the Arab Littoral of the Persian 
Gulf, and Hasa and Katif Affairs*, L/P 8c S/20/C238, p. *f0.
3 Ibid.
Ibid.
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were tending to encourage the latter to cultivate better relations 
*1
with Russia. CeU. Aitchison, the Secretary of the Foreign 
Department of the Government of India, noted the main new reason:
”the opening of the Suez Canal has made it ten times more our interest 
to be on good and intimate terms with Turkey than it ever was before” 
In the event, no further steps were taken by the Turks over the 
messenger issue.
Turkish connections continued to raise the question of British
control over Shaikh Isa’s correspondence with foreign powers. In
February 1873 Captain Charles Grant, the Assistant Resident in the
w c
Gulf, reported from Bahrain that Ahmad bc Nasir b. Abdallah, one of
• •
a  C 0
the exiled A1 Abdallah in Qatif, was trying to obtain papers making 
him a Turkish subject. If he succeeded he intended to go to
a  Q
Bahrain to try and recover the A1 Abdallah estates to which he was 
the heir. Grant reported that it was the general impression in the 
Shaikhdom that the Turkish Government would try ”to establish a 
right to interfere in the affairs of Bahrein” by supporting the claims 
of the A1 CAbdallah. 5
In reply the Acting Resident at Bushire told Grant that there 
seemed no immediate cause for apprehension. If Ahmad should in fact
1 Note by Aitchison on Najd Expedition, July 1872, ’Precis on 
Muscat Affairs, 1869-92’, L/P & S/20/C229, folio Nos. 38 and 36a.
2 Ibid.
3 Charles Grant, Remarks on News-gleanings from Bahrain from 14 to 
28 February 1873, P/?69, July 1873, No. 102, p. 71.
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arrive in Bahrain as a Turkish subject, "this would in no wise impair 
the Chief*s right as an independent Ruler to dispose of the claims”*
mm
The way in which Shaikh Isa handled such an approach was, however, a
matter of some importance* It would be necessary for the Sheikh
to be "most careful and guarded, so as to avoid making any admission
to the Turkish authorities, and at the same time to avoid giving
unnecessary offence". Appeal to the British authorities would not
be necessary. On the other hand, any attempt by the Turkish
authorities "to interfere actively" in Bahrain in support of the 
M C
A1 Abdallah would raise the question of sovereignty. In this
event Shaikh Isa "would doubtless count, as hitherto, on the mediation 
of the British Government". For the present, the Acting Resident 
emphasized, the Shaikh should be "both guarded and courteous in his 
communications with Turkish authorities, which he should invariably 
bring to the knowledge of Government".
It seems clear that although the British were not averse in 
1873 to direct contact between Shaikh CIsa and foreign powers, they 
wanted to exercise a degree of control and supervision over such 
contacts. In March 1873 this was apparently required by the 
Acting Resident more as a check on any tendency to rashness by the 
Shaikh rather than for reasons of suspicion of his motives. It was 
not long, however, before the British came to have more reason to
Q m m  M
distrust the ruler of Bahrain. This distrust grew up as Shaikh Isa
1 Acting Resident, Bushire, to Grant, 8 March 18?3i P/769* July
1873, No. 103. These instructions were approved by the
Government of India in June 1873. Under Sec. to Govt, of India,
F.D., to Acting Resident, 3 June 1873, P/769* July 1873, No. 10^.
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became increasingly disenchanted about the nature of the protection 
the British were extending to him and to the possessions he claimed.
By the Convention of 1861 between the Shaikh of Bahrain and
the British Government, the former had agreed to abstain from acts
of maritime aggression only on condition that he received the support
of the latter in maintaining the security of his "own possessions"
1
from similar aggression. Among the "possessions" which successive
c** «Shaikhs of Bahrain, including Isa b. Ali, considered to be theirs 
were certain mainland territories in Qatar. The appearance of the 
Turkish flag in Qatar in 1871 now raised the question of the exact 
nature of the "possessions" of the Shaikh of Bahrain which the 
British had contracted to protect. Any conflict between the Turks 
and Bahrain over sovereignty in Qatar threatened to entangle Britain 
on the mainland of Arabia with a power of considerable significance 
in world diplomacy.
On 16 August 1873 Charles Grant reported from Bahrain to 
Pelly*s successor as Resident, Colonel E.C. Ross, that Hussain
Effendi, a Turkish official, with an escort of 100 men had sailed from
-  2Qatif to Zubara on the north-western coast of Qatar* • As the
original mainland settlement of the A1 Khalifa, Zubara was regarded 
by them with special sentiment. Zubara was, moreover, of more 
practical concern: lying only about twenty miles and four hours
1 Aitchison, XI, p. 235*
2 Grant to Ross, 16 August 1873* P/770, December 1873* No. **12.
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sailing time from the southern tip of Bahrain, it was a most convenient 
place from which an invasion of the island could be launched, as the
A1 Khalifa themselves had proved in 1783.
The news of Hussain Effendi*s move against Zubara in August 18?3i
Cw ■■was, therefore, naturally of much concern to Shaikh Isa. In
conversation with Grant, the Shaikh claimed that the chief tribe of
M 'I
the Zubara area, the Na im, were his subjects. Later he even
claimed that the agreement of 1861 had laid down that Zubara was a
2
dependency of Bahrain. This was, as Grant pointed out, not correct.
Q  ^  as
The agreement did not even mention either the Na xm or Zubara,
3
neither did it specify what the dependencies of Bahrain were. It 
was discovered that the intention of Hussain Effendi in going to 
Zubara was to induce the chief of the Na xm to acknowledge Turkish
4
rule. This threatened clash of sovereignty in Qatar between the
Turks and Bahrain gave rise to discussions as to what rights, if any,
Qn M
Britain should recognise Shaikh Isa as having on the mainland.
1 Precis of a conversation between Grant and Shaikh °Isa on 16 
August 1873, P/770, December 1873» No. 414.
2 Statement of Shaikh cIsa, 2 September 1873, L/P & S/9/23»
p. 1315.
3 Grant to Ross, 11 September 1873* P/770, December 1873» No. 423.
4 Translation of an extract from a report of Abdul Karim, Govt.
Contractor at Bahrain, 16 August 1873* P/770, December 1873*
Noi. 417. This man had just returned from Qatar with 
intelligence of the proceedings of Hussein Effendi .
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Grant was of the opinion that the authority of the Shaikhs of 
Bahrain in Qatar had, in the past, "varied in proportion to the power 
of coercion those rulers possessed; if the Chief of Bahrein was 
strong the tribes acknowledged his supremacy; if he was weak they 
denied it". "Some years ago" the Na 1m and many other Qatari tribes 
had been "in certain ways dependencies of Bahrein". "Of late
years", however, any power exercised by the Shaikhs of Bahrain over
c- 2the Na im had been "merely nominal, if it had existed at all".
The Resident informed Grant that Pelly had always advised the
Shaikh of Bahrain to keep aloof from all complications on the
mainland with such powers as the Wahhabis and the Turks'^  and that
he, Ross, considered this to be sound advice. This, of course,
was not a definite statement of precisely what Ross considered
Shaikh Isa*s rights in Qatar to be. In fact, Ross advised the
Government of India that the question of "sovereign and feudal rights
over places and tribes on the Mainland of Arabia, opposite the
Island of Bahrein" was "a complicated one and probably Government
would not decide it practicable or expedient to enter into its 
5
merits". At the same time, although the question
of sovereignty in Qatar had never been formally decided, the fact was,
1 Grant to Ross, 11 September 1873» P/770, December 1873, No. *f23.
2 Grant to Ross, 16 August 1873, P/770, December 1873, No. *f12.
3 This was correct. See for example, Pelly to Shaikh CIsa, 19
February 1872, L/P & S/9/20, p. 629.
k Ross to Grant, 28 August 1873, L/P & S/9/23, p. 12^5*
5 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., b September 1873, L/P &
S/9/23, p. 1229.
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in his opinion, that the Turks had "established an influence over 
all the Guttur Coast as far as the Odeyd boundary". In such
QM M
circumstances it appeared to him that Shaikh Isa did not have the
power to protect tribes in Qatar and that this ruler "certainly could
not expect the British Government to interfere in a matter where the
1
rights even are involved in doubt and uncertainty". It would 
appear that Ross, like Grant, considered that sovereignty in Qatar 
would, in the last analysis, devolve upon whoever was able and willing 
to make his power felt there.
Pelly himself did not consider the time opportune to be drawn
into statements of opinion about the precise limits of Bahraini rights
in Qatar. He had ceased to be Resident in 1872, but, since he was
in Simla in the latter half of 1873, the Government of India
presented the relevant papers to him for remarks. On 27 October
1873 he gave his opinion that the British should "avoid as far as
possible for the present mooting questions of territorial sovereignty".
The time for dealing effectively with questions of boundaries and
supremacy would be when Turkish aggression had taken a permanent
2
form or had been abandoned.
The Government of India stated its views on 17 December 
1873. Ross was told that the Government
1 Ross to Grant, 28 August 1873* D/P 8c S/9/23» P* 1243.
2 Pelly to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 27 October 1873? P/770, 
December 1873$ No. 420.
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’’approved of the tenor” of his letter of 28 August to Grant, and that
they concurred generally in the views expressed by Pelly on 27
October. It was ’’desirable” that the Shaikh of Bahrain ’’should
abstain as far as practicable from interfering in complications on
1
the mainland”. It was to become clear, in the course of
the following year, that this coincidence of opinion was not as close 
as it appeared. The Government of India was to reveal itself as
mm
more anxious than either Ross or Pelly to ensure that Shaikh Isa
should not become involved in ’’complications" on the mainland with
the Turks.
In the course of the summer of 187^ Shaikh Isa became 
apprehensive about the possibility of an attack on Bahrain from Qatar.'
In fact, in August, Nasir b. Mubarak, accompanied by 500-^00 Bani
. c 3
Hajir, attempted to obtain boats at Bida for an invasion of Bahrain.
It was later reported that the Ottoman Mutasarrif of Hasa, Barrak
• •
c If _
b. Arair, had connived at this threat to Bahrain. Shaikh Qasim
was also said to have secretly played a prominent part in encouraging
5 cthe affair. The old pro-British ruler of Bida , Shaikh Muhammad
b. Thani, though failing, was still a power in Qatar, however. He
1 Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Ross, 17 December 1873* P/770, 
December 1873y No. ^26.
2 Ahmad b. Abdul Rasul, News Writer, Bahrain, to Ross, 12 May 187 ,^ 
L/P & s/9 /?A , p. 995.
3 Ross to Sec, to Govt, of India, F,D,, 3 September 187 ,^ L/P & 
S/9/25, pp. 233-37,
4 Precis of intelligence received from the News Writer, Bahrain, 
enclosure in Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 7 October 
187^, L/P & S/9/25, p. ^9.
5 Rasul to Ross, 2 September 187 ,^ P/773, November 187 ,^ No. 191*
p. 111.
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was able to prevent Nasir obtaining more than a few dhows. With 
these the Bani Hajir were able to do no more than plunder a Bahraini
vessel off the coast of Qatar, Moreover, the appearance of the
Residency vessel May Frere, sent by Ross as a precautionary measure, 
forced a further change of plan. Nasir now launched a surprise
M  Q m m
attack on Zubara whilst most of the Na im were fishing on the pearl 
banks. The settlement would certainly have fallen to the Ban!
Hajir had their attack not been thwarted by warning shots from the
British gunboat Hugh Rose. On their return from the pearl-fishing
c- - - 2grounds, the Na im were able to drive off the Bani Hajir band.
By his decisive action in sending gunboats to the Qatar coast, 
Ross had thwarted Nasir b. Mubarak’s attempt to invade Bahrain. He 
had also been able to protect the Shaikhdom by confining British 
action to naval methods alone. At the same time, the fact that the
Hugh Rose had gone into action to prevent Zubara falling into the
Q m  mm
hands of Shaikh Isa's enemies was a tacit admission of the importance 
of the settlement in the defence of Bahrain. Further, the threat 
to Zubara was not defeated by the Hugh Rose alone. Before the 
gunboat could arrive off Zubara it had been necessary for its small 
summer garrison of Na°im to hold off the Bani Hajir attack. Moreover, 
after this attack had been halted by gunfire from the Hugh Rose, the 
Bani Hajir had only finally been dispersed by the return of the main
Q m m  mm
body of the Na im from the pearl banks. If Zubara was to be kept
1 Rasul to Ross, 8 August 187 ,^ L/P 8c S/9/25, pp. 2^5-50.
2 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 12 September 187 ,^ L/P 8c 
S/9/25, PP. 238-92.
9*f
out of the hands of the enemies of Bahrain it would seem that it was 
vital for Shaikh Isa to cultivate the friendship of the Na im. In
C*- >fact it was the practice of Shaikh Isa to make yearly presents to
c — ^
the Na im , to the considerable detriment of the finances of his 
2
Shaikhdom.
The episode of the Bani Hajir attack pointed to a practical
Q m m  mm
reason why Shaikh Isa was to maintain so tenaciously an interpretation
of his connections with Qatar and the Na im, at variance with the
Government of India*s altered views on his position. In the
Shaikh’s mind the vital considerations were the probable form such an
assault would take, and the possibility that the naval protection as
then provided by the British might not prevent it from succeeding,
thus making it essential to preserve an effective traditional means
of defence, which the Indian government was attempting to deny him.
Everyone in Bahrain feared a repitition of the type of attack in which
Shaikh Ali had been killed and the islands plundered in 1869. In
the absence of many of Shaikh Isa’s men during the pearling season,
the Bani Hajir or others could seize several large boats on the pearl
banks, use them to cross over from the mainland, and loot Bahrain
3
without necessarily intending to retain possession of it. In any
C~"event Shaikh Isa himself would probably not survive. It seemed 
unlikely, moreover,that British assistance would be available to repel
1 Residency Agent, Bahrain, to Resident, Bushire, 7 May 1886, 
L/P & S/7A7, p. 1117.
2 ’Administration Reports’, 1877-78 and 1886-87.
5 Guthrie to Ross, 25 August 187 ,^ L/P&S/9/25* PP* 265-71*
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such a hit-and-run descent. British naval vessels had been
continuously stationed off Bahrain during the initial stages of the
Turkish occupation of Hasa, but by 187^ this presence had been reduced
to the normal level of occasional visits. The Resident stated the
general policy of naval protection in May 187 :^
... the continuous presence of a ship of war at Bahrein
for the protection of the Sheikh cannot be conveniently 
afforded, and besides it is I think highly desirable the 
Chief of Bahrain should learn to rely on his own resources 
for the maintenance of his position. So long as he 
thinks he can count on the constant presence of his 
foreign support he will surely remain careless and 
apathetic and adequate efforts will not be made to 
strengthen his position by good administration and a 
conciliatory policy towards his people.
To Shaikh Isa such occasional visits were obviously not a sufficient
security. By the time a gunboat ,in another part of thp Gulf could
respond to news of a threatened attack, the assault would already have 
2been made. Therefore the continuation of traditional relations 
with the Na im of Qatar was of crucial importance to the Shaikh's own 
safety, not only in order to cover likely points of departure such as 
Zubara, but also to furnish an additional source of manpower which 
could be moved rapidly to Bahrain itself in emergencies. Helping 
the Na im to defend Zubara was a necessary form of insurance in case 
British protection proved inadequate or arrived too late.
The interest which the Shaikh of Bahrain had in Zubara and the 
Na im was given further recognition by Ross during a visit to Bahrain
1 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 29 May 187 ,^ L/P&S/9/2*f, 
p. 995.
2 It was even possible that a naval vessel actually at Bahrain would 
be physically unable to stop a swift landing by boats approaching 
Bahrain through certain shallow and unsurveyed waters to the 
south of the island.
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in November 187^ -. On being asked by Shaikh cIsa whether he might
reinforce the Na im at Zubara with additional men, Ross had replied
1
that he would not oppose this as a purely defensive measure. Ross 
in the previous year had written of the need for the Shaikh of Bahrain 
to keep aloof from all complications on the mainland with the Turks*
mm
By allowing £>haikh Isa to take action to secure his position on a 
part of the mainland in which the Turks had already shown interest, 
Ross was certainly not restraining the Shaikh from becoming involved 
in any "complications’1. The attempt of Nasir b. Mubarak to capture 
Zubara during the summer had impressed Ross with the importance of 
taking precautions against allowing the settlement to become a base 
for the invasion of Bahrain.
The Hugh Rose*s defence of Zubara had, however, already brought
a diplomatic attack on the Home Government by the Turks. In October
187^ , the Ottoman Ambassador in London, lodged a protest about the
shelling of Bani Hajir tribesmen by a British gunboat "dans les
Parages de Ned.jd". The Porte had added that if the commander of the
gunboat had had any complaints he should have applied to the Ottoman
2
authorities for satisfaction. This note represented the first
open Ottoman claim to sovereignty over any part of the Arab coast of 
the Gulf east of Hasa. With both the Turks and Shaikh CIsa now
1 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 10 November 187 ,^ L/P &
s/9/25, pp. 5^1-w.
2 Ottoman Foreign Minister to Muslims Pasha, 10 October 18?V, 
(tel.), enclosure in Foreign Office to India Office, 13 October 
1874, I/P & S/3/92, pp. 309-11.
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openly claiming sovereignty over Zubara, the chances of the British 
becoming embroiled in Qatar affairs had increased*
When the Government of India discovered that Ross had given
Shaikh CIsa permission to reinforce Zubara, they censured the
Resident for his action* Ross's despatches of 4 and 19 September
1873 about the rights of the Shaikh of Bahrain in Qatar had
"shown that the Chief of Bahrein had no possessions on the mainland
of Gutter, and that his rights there were of a very uncertain 
1
character"• Accordingly, the Government of India stated, they
had told Ross on 17 December 1873 that it was desirable that Shaikh
Isa should "abstain, as far as practicable, from interfering in
complications on the mainland". He should not, therefore, have
been encouraged to send troops to the mainland to reinforce the
Na im. On the contrary, he should be advised to rely on the
British Government for support which would, if necessary, be given
him "either to repel attacks by sea, or to frustrate a threatening
2
movement from the mainland".
The claim of the Government of India that the Resident's
1 Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Ross, 10 December 187 ,^ P/77^ +, 
February 1875, No. 303, p. 266 (stress in original).
2 Ibid.
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despatches of 4 and 19 September 1873 bad shown that Shaikh °Isa had 
no possessions in Qatar does not seem easy to support. It is true 
that Ross, in his letter to Grant of 28 August 1873, had spoken of 
the Turks having established "an influence" over the whole Qatar
C« M
coast and of the inability of Shaikh Isa to protect tribes residing
in Qatar, Even so, in the same letter, Ross had stated quite
definitely that "the subject of the sovereignty over Guttur appears
1
never to have been formally decided". In the two despatches
2actually mentioned by the Government of India the Resident certainly 
did not go to the lengths of declaring that the Shaikh of Bahrain had 
no possessions in Qatar, Indeed, in his letter of 4 September 1873, 
Ross had suggested that the question of sovereign and feudal rights
over places and tribes on the mainland was one which the Government
3
of India might profitably shelve. The statement of the Government
**of India that Shaikh Isa had "no possessions" in Qatar also ran 
counter to the advice of ex-Resident Pelly that questions of 
territorial sovereignty on the Arab side of the Gulf ought to be 
avoided.^
The Government of India were therefore, in their despatch of 
10 December 1874, taking a firm line against Shaikh Isa*s claims in 
Qatar, in spite of the advice they had received in September and 
October 1873 from both Ross and Pelly, both of whom had advised a
1 Ross to Grant, 28 August 1873, P/770, December 1873, No, 415,
2 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D,, 4 September 1873, P/770,
December 1873, No. 411, p. 305; and Ross to Sec. to Govt, of 
India, F.D., December 1873, 19 September 1873, P/770, No. 421.
5 See above, p. 90.
4 See above, p, 91.
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policy of caution and procrastination. In December 1873 India had 
been prepared to accept this advice. Between December 1873 and 
December 187 -^, however, there had occurred the Hugh Rose's defence 
of Zubara and the consequent Turkish claim to the settlement. The 
result had been not only the firm ruling by the Government of India
C —  M
that Shaikh Isa had no possessions in Qatar but also their most 
dubious attempt to claim that this ruling dated from Ross's letters 
to them of September 1873 on this issue. If the Government of 
India had indeed come to this decision as early as 1873» there is 
no real evidence of it in their letter to Ross of 17 December in that 
year. Their decision to set their faces against Shaikh CIsa's 
claims in Qatar dates not from their receipt of the opinions of Ross 
and Pelly in late 1873 but, probably, from late 187 ,^ with the news 
that the action of the Hugh Rose had given the Turks the opportunity 
to lay claim to Zubara.
With regard to Shaikh cisa's claims in Qatar, the 
British were faced with a dilemma. They could either countenance 
these claims and thereby involve themselves in friction with the
Turks, or disallow them and thereby make the A1 Khalifa dissatisfied
/
with British protection. A decision as to which course to take could 
only be shelved as long as events in the Zubara area permitted such a 
policy of procrastination. When, in the summer of 187 ,^ Zubara 
came under pressure from the A1 CAbdallah, the British who were 
actually in the Gulf had to decide how they would act: to intervene
in defence of Zubara or not. Whatever the decision, the policy of
1 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 7^1, apparently accepts 
this claim at face value, citing only the Government of India's 
letter of 10 December 187*U
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procrastination would, in practice, break down. Action in defence 
of Zubara would be implicit recognition that Shaikh °Isa had, indeed, 
a legitimate interest in Zubara, whereas to take no action would, in 
practice, mean that the British had ruled that the A1 Khalifa had no 
rights in the area. It is not surprising that the British officials 
in the Gulf, like Ross, were, in the absence of a clear-cut ruling by 
the Government of India, drawn into the countenancing of intervention 
in Qatar. It is also understandable that the Government of India
Q m  mm
should have been less concerned with the claims of Shaikh Isa and 
more concerned with avoiding friction with the Turks than Ross*
Where the Government of India appear to have done less than justice to 
Ross was in censuring him in December 187^ for failing to act in 
accordance with a clear-cut policy decision which had not apparently 
been made until then.
When Ross communicated the feelings of the Government of India
'I
to the Shaikh , the latter proved most stubborn over what he considered 
to be his rights in Qatar. In March 1875 he informed Ross that 
it was necessary for him to intervene on the mainland as far as 
Zubara was concerned. The settlement was his property, its
C“ ainhabitants were dependent on him and, Shaikh Isa added pointedly,
2
"we are all dependent on the British Government'1.
1 Ross to Shaikh °Isa, 12 December 187^ -, R/15/2/29, p. 36. The
Government of India had sent a telegram to Ross on 10 December 
outlining the contents of their letter of the same date. See
Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Ross, 10 December 187^ » tel. 
No. 2722P, ibid., p. 35.
2 Shaikh cIsa to Ross, h March 1875» F/15/2/29, p. 2^.
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When Ross reported to the Government of India that Shaikh cIsa
was still stubbornly clinging to the rights which he claimed in Qatar,
the Resident was told to inform the Shaikh that action might be taken
1
against him should he ignore the advice he had already been given.
At the India Office the Secretary of the Political and Secret
Department, Owen Tudor Burne, had to concede that the claim of the
Shaikh of Bahrain over the mainland was "perfectly legitimate".
At the same time he felt that, from the British point of view, the
orders that the Government of India had issued on Zubara had much 
2
justification. In the event, neither the India Office nor the
Foreign Office chose to overrule these orders.
mm
Shaikh Isa's view of the justice of the way his claims to 
Zubara had been treated by the Government of India may be surmised from 
the fact that, even after 187 ,^ he continued to cultivate relations 
with the Na lm. Information to this effect was, in fact, received 
in September 1877 by Grant, at that time the Officiating Resident in 
the Gulf. He told Shaikh cIsa that he had been informed that he had
c «
entered into "intimate and friendly relations" with the Na im of 
Zubara whom he was subsidising and allowing to frequent his islands.
^  mm ••
Further, Shaikh Isa was said to have recruited one hundred Na im 
into his army in Bahrain and to have been making it a practice to
1 Viceroy to Sec. of State for India, 13 May 1875, No. 98, L/P & 
S/7/3, PP. 959-70.
2 Minute by Burne, 8 June 1875, quoted in Kelly, Britain and the
Persian Gulf, p. 790. This minute may be found in l/p &
s/5/191, pp. 763-64. Lieutenant E.A. Fraser, of Ross's own
staff at Bushire, was of the same opinion, see Fraser to Ross, 
18 December 187 ,^ L/P & S/9/2*f, p. 706.
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send them to Zubara when that settlement was threatened by bedouin
tribes. In this way, Grant told the Shaikh, he* had shown no regard
for the advice he had been given not to interfere in mainland affairs.
By sending armed men by sea to Zubara he had also broken his trucial
1
engagements with the British Government.
Q a  mm
Shaikh Isa denied that he had sent armed men to the mainland.
Q"**
The Na im who had gone back to the mainland from Bahrain had done so 
of their own accord when they had heard that Zubara was threatened 
by their enemies. It was true that he allowed men of the Na im 
to frequent Bahrain but this was necessary to defend the island when 
the native inhabitants were away at the pearl fishery. As for the 
presents he was in the habit of giving to the Na im, this was also
necessary to prevent them from "doing mischief" and joining such
-  2enemies of his as Nasir b. Mubarak.
When reporting his proceedings to the Government of India on
3 November 1877* Grant showed something of the same tendency to take
an understanding attitude to Shaikh Isa*s cultivations of the Na im
as Ross had shown in November l8?^ f. Grant conceded that the Shaikh
deserved censure for not "adhering more closely to the advice of
Government" to avoid entanglement in mainland affairs. At the same
3
time he suggested that
1 Grant to Shaikh cIsa, 17 September 1877* P/1036, December 1877* 
No. 191, p. 1^1.
2 Shaikh cIsa to Grant, 12 October 1877* P/1036, December 1877* 
No. 192, pp. lVl-*f2.
3 Grant to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 3 November 1877* P/1036, 
December 1877* No. 190, p. 1*t1.
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the extreme difficulty of the position in which he is 
placed may justly be urged in extenuation of his conduct*
The propinquity of Zobarah to Bahrein makes it a constant 
source of danger to Sheikh Eesa, and were he to offend the 
Naim tribe, who live there, by closing his islands against 
them, they would certainly coalesce with the Beni Hajer, 
in which case it would probably not be long before an 
invasion of Bahrein would be attempted.
On this occasion the Government of India concurred in the views
of Grant and took no further action in the matter. They were now
c_ _
showing greater willingness to permit Shaikh Isa to risk Ottoman
displeasure by cultivating his links with a tribe which, since
October 187 ,^ the Turks had openly claimed to be under their
jurisdiction. It is not impossible that this was the result of a
change of Viceroy. In April 1876 Lord Northbrook had been replaced
by Lord Lytton, a man with a greater taste for bold action than his 
2
predecessor. As far as Gulf policy was concerned, Lytton was
’’disposed to take a more positive line” than Northbrook towards the 
3
Turks.
On the other hand, there were wider diplomatic considerations 
which, in the period 1877-78, made it unlikely that the Home 
Government would be willing to allow the Government of India to 
provoke the Turks in the Gulf area. The reverses of the Turkish
1 Saldanha, *Precis of Bahrein Affairs, 185*1—190^* 1 P* 50*
2 Anil Seal, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism (Cambridge 1971)» 
p. 132.
3 Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 768.
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forces in Europe at the hands of the Russians at this time had made 
the British Government even more determined than previously to
1
maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Elnpire, at least in Asia.
The effect of these considerations on British policy in the Gulf was
noted by Owen Tudor Burne in October 1878.
Up to the present time the Government of India have looked 
upon the extension of Turkish influence in ^ Arabia^ (and 
therefore indirectly into the Persian Gulf) with disfavour; 
indeed in India it has been deemed to be a danger to our 
interests, and not many years ago the Foreign Office here 
was hotly engaged in challenging diplomatically the right 
of the Porte to any portion of the Coast. Now matters 
are temporarily altered. We sure at present open friends 
with the Porte, and if that friendship is to be lasting it 
may possibly be to our interests to as openly acknowledge 
her sovereignty over that portion of the Coast, over which 
it is absolute and unmistakeable, or even to permit an 
extension.
Clearly, no policy decision on the lines of Burne*s suggestion 
could be taken without further, careful consideration. Even so the 
events of 1878 were to show that the policy towards Zubara of the 
Government of India under Lord Lytton was not so radically different 
from that of the Northbrook administration.
C t  “In the course of this year, the Na im of Zubara had made them­
selves obnoxious to their neighbours by a series of piracies. In 
reporting the piracies, Ross pointed out that the claims of 
the Shaikh of Bahrain to Zubara had been disallowed by the Government
1 See Benjamin Disraeli, then Prime Minister, to Sir Henry Layard, 
British Ambassador, Constantinople, 6 August 1877 (secret), 
quoted in H.M.V. Temperley and L.M. Penson, Foundations of British 
Foreign Policy, 1792-1902 (London, 1966), p. 360. See also ”” 
Robert Taylor, Lord Salisbury (London, 1975)* P» 63.
2 Minute of Burne, 10 October 1878, L/P & S/3/214, p. 177
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of India, Under such circumstances, they could hardly demand
c— —retribution from Shaikh Isa, even though this ruler had implicated 
himself in the piracy of a Qatari vessel in September by shortly 
afterwards giving hospitality to the chief of the Na im of Zubara,
On the other hand, in October 187 ,^ the Turks had indicated that they
q t
felt themselves to be responsible for the Na im. In view of
these Turkish pretensions to sovereignty over Zubara, Ross suggested 
to the Government of India that, should they sanction any direct action
c«
against the Na im, it might be "necessary and expedient that it should
2
be taken with the acquiescence of the Turkish Government", The
Government of India directed Ross to ask the Turkish authorities in
the Gulf to have Zubara punished, and to offer British naval
3
assistance for the purpose.
Before anything of the kind could be accomplished, Zubara was 
punished by a different agency. On 1 November the commander of 
H.M.S, Arab, which was on guard duty at Bahrain, heard that one 
thousand BanI Hajir and other tribesmen were beseiging Zubara.
On crossing to the Qatar coast the following day, however, he found 
all was quiet and returned to Bahrain. Within a few days news was 
received that Nasir b. Mubarak and Shaikh Qasim of BidaC had arrived 
at Zubara. Shaikh cIsa asked the commander of H.M.S. Arab to return
1 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, 20 & 2k September 1878, (tels.),
P/1219, November 1878, Nos. 108 & 112, pp. k9 & 50.
2 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, 1 October 1878, P/1219, December
1878, No. 26, p. 8.
3 Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Ross, 5 October 1878, tel. No.
2170P, P/1219, November 1878, No. 115, p. 51.
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to the settlement. The latter, however, refused on the grounds
1
that his standing orders were to protect Bahrain and no more. In 
the absence of British naval action, Nasir and Shaikh Qasim were able 
to succeed where the Bani Hajir had failed when confronted by the 
Hugh Rose in the summer of 1874. Two thousand men, under the command
M Q C
of the A1 Abdallah exile and the Shaikh of Bida , launched an attack
2on Zubara and destroyed it.
When Ross heard the news he immediately set sail in H.M.S.
Teazer and reached Bahrain on 17 November 1878. Shaikh cIsa begged
c —
Ross to go to the assistance of the Na im. The Resident refused but,
in order to ascertain the real state of affairs for himself, went to
Zubara the next day. Ross found the settlement was indeed completely
destroyed and five hundred Na im were closely besieged in an outlying
fort. In accordance with the current British policy of regarding
Zubara as an area outside their concern, Ross decided not to intervene
in the conflict on the mainland. He warned Shaikh Qasim, however,
that any attack on Bahrain by him or Nasir b. Mubarak would be
3
repulsed by British naval power.
Ross then sailed back to Bahrain where he received a telegram 
from the Governor of Basra, with whom he had previously been in contact 
about the question of the proposed punishment of Zubara. The message
1 Commander F.R. Dicken of H.M.S. Arab to Ross, 18 November 1878, 
P/1387, January 1879i No. 242, pp. 202-03; News-Agent, Bahrain 
to Ross, 11 November 1878, P/1387, January 1879* No. 247,
pp. 204-05*
2 For Kelly's account of the destruction of Zubara, see Britain and 
the Persian Gulf, pp. 791-92.
3 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 26 November 1878, P/1387i 
January 1879* No. 238, p. 199«
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asked Ross to arrange for the Turkish gunboat, the Iskanderia, which
was in the area, to be sent to Zubara to restore peace and to warn
Shaikh Qasim not to attack Bahrain* Ross found the Iskanderia
1
anchored at Ras Tanura and delivered the message. The Turkish 
commander arranged a truce between the Na im and their attackers.
C •Most of the Na im now decided to remove to Bida with Shaikh Qasim
2whilst the rest migrated to Bahrain.
Ross observed that, whilst the destruction of Zubara could not 
be condoned, the events of the preceding weeks might in the end be for 
the best as far as Bahrain was concerned. The establishment of a 
Turkish post in the vicinity of Zubara, he considered, ’’would now be 
the best means of finally terminating the panics to which Bahrein has 
for years been periodically subject” because of the plotting of the 
A1 CAbdallah. 3
That Ross should have considered that the establishment of a
Turkish base in the Zubara area would be of assistance in allaying
the fear of Shaikh Isa of invasion from Qatar seems, on the face of
it, most surprising. It is true that, in August 1873* he had
stated his opinion that the Turks had established "an influence" over
if
the whole Qatar coast. Even so Ross also knew that the Turks had 
a long-standing claim to Bahrain. The explanation for the somewhat
1 Ibid.
2 News Agent, Bahrain, to Ross, 9 December 1878, P/1387* January 
1879, No. 239, p. 211.
3 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 26 November 1878, P/1387* 
January 1879* No. 238, p. 200.
if See above p. 9l.
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puzzling attitude of Ross to the significance of Turkish influence on
the west coast of Qatar may be sought in a letter he wrote to the
Government of India in January 1879* in. response to a request Ross had
to give his opinions on the extent of Turkish jurisdiction on the
1Arab coast of the Gulf, As far as the section of coast between
C C “Uqair and Bida (the stretch which included the Zubara area) was 
concerned, Ross believed that the Turks might ’’with some reason argue 
that their present actual position” was one of virtual domination 
over the entire tract. The Resident also pointed out how this had 
come about
We have, in fact, rather prepared the way for recognition 
of the eventual establishment of Turkish rule by gradually 
withdrawing from active supervision and control over this 
portion of the mainland coast.
Although Ross did not say so, this withdrawal had come about through
the initiative of the Government of India in their desire to avoid
diplomatic embarrassment with the Turks, Ross also refrained from
noting that, until checked by the Government of India, the tendency
of the actions of both himself and Grant with regard to the west
coast of Qatar had been towards greater involvement in the affairs of
the area, either by direct British agency or through the Shaikh of
Bahrain, Ross did, however, recommend that, since the Government
of India had refused to recognise Shaikh cIsa*s claim to Zubara and
had warned him against interfering in the affairs of the mainland,
the establishment of Turkish sovereignty along the Qatar coast as far
1 Sec, to Govt, of India, F.D., to Ross, 17 December 1878,
No. 255 C.P., L/P & S/7/22, p. 902.
2 Ross to Sec, to Govt, of India, F.D., 20 January 1879* No. 30, 
L/P & S/7/22, p. 905.
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c 1as Bida should not be opposed. His reasoning was as follows:
The territory ^ /the cUqair-Bida° stretch of coast^ has ••• 
been for some years in what may be termed a transition 
state, the exercise of British coercion having been 
abandoned, and no other control of a similar nature 
substituted. This is obviously an unsatisfactory 
condition and one that could not be long permitted 
without evil results. Some definite responsibility is 
very requisite.
In other words, Ross was advocating a Turkish presence on the 
mainland close to Bahrain because, in view of the Government of 
India’s disinclination to assume the responsibility for policing the 
area, the only other alternative was chaos. He cautioned, however, 
that he could "find no instance recorded in which appeals to the 
Turkish authorities through Political Officers in Turkish Arabia’1, 
with regard to pirate attacks launched from Territory claimed by the
Ottomans, had "elicited any satisfactory result11.^ /
/
It would be interesting to know if Ross had deliberately framed 
his letter to. the Government of India in such a way as to try to show 
them the hazards entailed in their policy towards the west coast of 
Qatar, but to do this without directly attacking that policy. In 
other words, it may be suspected that Ross was deliberately trying to 
induce a reconsideration of British policy on the west coast of Qatar, 
Whatever Ross’s real intentions, after Lord Lytton’s Government had 
considered the Resident’s letter, this policy was indeed reconsidered.
In response to one of the other problems in the region, the
1 Ibid.
2  Ibid., p .  9 0 9 .
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« ^ C
dispute between the shaiks of Abu Dhabi and Qatar over Udaid at the
eastern foot of the Qatar peninsula, the Government of India produced
a major review of its entire Gulf policy with regard to the limits of
Turkish jurisdiction on the Arab littoral, and the resulting Turkish
responsibilities for the maintenance of order. Its despatch of
22 May 1879 noted that, should it be left to the Turks to deal with
maritime aggressions from territories which they claimed, it was not
likely that they would prove to be effective policemen as far as the
British were concerned. Moreover, as the history in the Gulf of
the British themselves had shown, one result of accepting the charge
of policing these waters was the acquisition of naval supremacy there,
nAny policy which encourages the extension and predominance in the
Persian Gulf of the Turkish power, must tend proportionately to modify
1
the distribution of power and influence throughout those waters,"
In view of considerations such as these, the Government of India were
not inclined to admit or recognise Turkish jurisdiction on the Arab
coast of the Gulf except wherever it then practically existed. In 
2particular*, they
should be averse to enter into any discussions which might 
appear to countenance claims by the Turkish Government to 
recognition of its authority beyond Ojair, or upon any 
part of the coast of the El Katr promontory, except at 
El Bidaa, where the Turks appear to have some real 
influence and representation.
The Turks were not, after all, to be encouraged to establish 
themselves at Zubara, Nevertheless, the Government of India would not
1 Govt, of India, F.D., to Sec, of State, 22 May 1879, Secret
No. 127, L/P & S/7/22, p, 879* The same point had in fact been 
made by the Government of India in their Letter No. 255 C,P, of 
17 December 1878, to Ross (L/P & S/7/22, p, 902)*
2 Ibid.
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reconsider its prohibition on the Shaikh of Bahrain intervening in
mainland affairs to pre-empt any threat to his Shaikhdom. The Shaikh
should still abstain "from all interference with the mainland’1. At
the same time, "in the event of attack upon his territories", he,
"acting under the sanction of the Resident in the Persian Gulf, should
be permitted to take such defensive measures as may be necessary, even
to the extent of following up his assailants into Turkish jurisdiction".
This was considered to be justifiable because Bahrain was situated so
close to the mainland that it might be subject to aggression by
1
attackers who could easily escape into Turkish jurisdiction. Shaikh
QM mm
Isa, in other words, was to be granted the right of "hot pursuit" into 
areas claimed by the Turks, but anything in the way of his traditional 
"forward policy" with regard to the west coast of Qatar was still frowned 
upon.
In fact, at the time Lord Lytton was formulating this policy, 
relations between the Shaikh of Bahrain and his British protectors were 
strained. He was reported in 1878 to be "much dissatisfied" when the
British had not only stood aside and allowed Zubara to be destroyed by
his enemies, but had also prevented him from going to the assistance of 
his NaCIm allies himself.^ At the same time, Shaikh cIsa could not 
claim that the British had not acted strictly in accordance with their 
obligations to Bahrain under the 1861 convention. It is true that, 
by Article 2 of that agreement^, the British had undertaken to maintain
the security of the Shaikh’s possessions, which, despite the ruling
1 Ibid.
2 Journal of political events beyond the Indian frontier for 
December 1878, 17 January 1879, L/P 8c S/7/21.
3 Aitchison, op. cit., XI, 235*
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of the Government of India in December 187^ , be still considered 
to include parts of Qatar such as Zubara. On the other hand, the 
1861 convention only bound the British Government to defend the 
Shaikh’s possessions from maritime aggressions, and, in 1878 Zubara 
had been attacked only by land. However, whilst the British could 
claim that, in refusing to take action to defend Zubara, they were 
not in breach Gf the 1861 convention, this claim could not be advanced 
as far as another grievance of Shaikh CIsa's in 1878-79 was concerned.
In this period, the inhabitants of Bahrain suffered from the 
depredations 0f piratical bands of Bani Hajir and other bedouins 
operating from the mainland. In about ten instances, vessels belong­
ing to Bahrain were seized and plundered, and communication with 
Qatlf was interrupted for a time.2 On 11 February 1879 a 
particularly daring outrage was committed when thirty Bani Hajir 
from Dhahran on the Hasa mainland crossed to Bahrain, raided a 
settlement oijiy ten miles from Manama, killed one may and escaped with 
200 sheep loaded into two boats.5 By the 1861 convention, the 
British had Undertaken to protect Bahrain and its inhabitants from 
just such aggressions by sea. In December 1879* however, it had to 
be admitted by Lord Cranbrook, the Secretary of State for India, that 
Britain’s obligations to preserve law and order at sea in the Gulf had
1 See above f p. 97.
2 ’Administration Report*, 1878-79, P- Bahrainis were not the
only victims- Vessels belonging to inhabitants of Persia, Ras 
A1 Khaimafr. Qatar, Qatlf, and elsewhere were also taken: Ross to
Sec. to Govt. of India, No. 205, 21 September 1878, P/1387,
January 1879, PP* 231-32.
3 Resident, Bushire, to Govt, of India, F.D., 15 February 1879, T a U
No. 63, 1/P & S/9/65, p. 163.
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"of late years, owing to the position assumed by the Turkish
Government on the Coast, been very imperfectly fulfilled, and it is
not to be expected that, under such circumstances, the injured parties
1
will continue to abstain from reprisals on the aggressors"* In
^ mm C“ 9m
fact, very soon after the Bani Hajir raid of February 1879* Shaikh Isa
had asked the Resident for permission to take punitive action of his
own against the Dhahran pirates, whom he considered to be in league
2with Nasir b. Mubarak* He was, however, strictly forbidden to do 
so and was told that the British would "look after his interests" and 
prevent such piratical attacks."^
In fact, Shaikh Isa*s British protectors were not as good as 
their word. Piracies by bedouins from the interior posed a difficult 
problem for the British, because the offenders did not actually live 
on the coast. If not caught in pursuit, the classic coast-dwelling 
pirates of the early decades of the century could still be punished 
in reprisal by seizure of their boats, or by shelling their boats and 
houses. On the other hand, bedouins who stole a boat on the coast, 
put to sea on raids, and then escaped inland could not be coerced by 
gunboats* The only effective solution wsis action by authorities on 
the mainland. Thus the British were unable to obtain restitution 
for the property stolen and, moreover, the acts of piracy continued.
1 Cranbrook to Foreign Office, 29 December 1879, No. 98 ,^ L/P & 
S/3/223, pp. 839,^
2 Shaikh °Isa to Ross, 11 February 1879, P/1390, September 1879, 
No. 198, p. 16*U
3 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 31 March 1879, D/P & 
S/9/65, P. 391.
Ibid.
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The Turkish occupation of Hasa in 1871 had placed the British in a 
dilemma as to how to carry out their obligation to preserve the peace 
of the seas in this general area. The problem was that the Turks, 
whilst claiming jurisdiction over the waters off the Hasa and Qatarm
coasts, did little or nothing to prevent the use of these waters, or
indeed, the mainland itself, as a base for pirates. To some extent
this seems to have been because of the general ineffectiveness of
Turkish administration in this area. At the same time, as Ross
observed in July 1879* it was quite possible that "the annoyance to
Bahrein commerce is not wholly displeasing to officials who hope
eventually to see British influence and authority displayed by
1
Turkish m  those coveted islands".
Ross was not alone in his estimate. The officiating Resident 
and Consul-General at Baghdad, Colonel S.B. Miles, stated his opinion
2that the Turks would prefer the continuance of the piratical disorders
in order that they may with more colour put forth the pretext 
that Bahrein is the cause of them, and that they cannot put 
them down until Bahrein is in their hands. They are 
seeking, in short, for a cause of quarrel and a pretext to 
interfere and conquer.
Miles went on to claim that the Turkish authorities at Basra hoped
that the Sheikh and people of Bahrein, finding the British 
Resident no longer able to protect their ships at sea as 
heretofore, and unable to ensure them redress and reparation 
for losses at the hands of Turkish pirates, will turn at 
last to him and accept the sovereignty of the Sultan as the 
price of future peace and security.
1 Ross to Govt, of India, 16 July 1879* No. 249, L/P & S/7/23, P« 367.
2 Miles to Sir Henry Layard, British Ambassador, Constantinople,
5 August 1879, No. 88, L/P & S/3/221, p. 1023.
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If Ross and Miles were right about Turkish motives, then a
policy of relying on the Turks to act decisively to help prevent
piracies in the seas near Bahrain did not hold out much hope of success.
At this time, however, Lord Salisbury, the Foreign Secretary, was
continuing the policy of conciliation towards the Porte which had
been such a feature of the period 1877 to 1878. He was therefore
reluctant to permit warships of either the Shaikh of Bahrain or the
Royal Navy to intervene without Turkish permission in waters claimed
by the Turks. Salisbury recognised that the measures taken against
piracy in the Gulf by the Turks in the past had been inadequate.
They had, however, promised "further exertions and fresh naval
reinforcements”. In view of this, "having settled for ourselves
the limits within which Turkish jurisdiction may be admitted" in the
Gulf "we should as a general rule look to the Turkish authorities to
2exercise a proper police m  those limits".
In the course of 18?9» it became increasingly clear that, at 
least as far as Bahrain was concerned, the Turkish authorities were 
in little mood to act in a conciliatory fashion themselves. In 
April 1879 P.J.C. Robertson, the Assistant Political Agent at Basra,
C ■■ vlearned that Abdallah Pasha, the Turkish wall of Basra, intended to 
establish a coaling depBt on Bahrain, in the charge of an agent who 
would be virtually a Political Agent. The task of this person would
1 See above pp. i03-H , and Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf,
p. 807. In 1879 Salisbury was particularly concerned about the
integrity of the Ottoman Empire in Asia in the face of Russian
encroachments in the Caucasus. Kenneth Bourne, The Foreign 
Policy of Victorian England, 1830-19Q2 (Oxford, 1970), p. 135*
2 Foreign Office to India Office, 23 August 1879* & S/3/221,
p. 293.
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be to excite discontent and a desire for annexation to Turkey among
1the inhabitants of the Shaikhdom.
2 3
Both the India Office and the Government of India agreed
that the Turks should be prevented from establishing a coal depot on
Bahrain, In the event, the Resident acted before any instructions
could reach him. In May 1879 he had already stated his opinion that
the wall of Basra, in pressing this scheme, had "political motives in 
4
view". In June Ross had therefore secured a promise from Shaikh
CIsa that he would take no steps in the matter without first referring
5
to him, and that he would act on his advice.
During 1879, Ross had become increasingly concerned about British 
relations with Bahrain, In March he had visited Shaikh Isa and 
discovered that both he and his brother Shaikh Ahmad were in "a state 
of considerable irritation" because of being restrained from 
punishing the Bani Hajir pirates when the British were unable to 
obtain restitution for Bahrain from the Turks.^ Even earlier, in 
February 1879, he had been taken aback when Shaikh Isa had made a 
request to be allowed to "‘make arrangements ••• with the Turks*" to 
deal with Nasir b, Mubarak and his provocations against Bahrain,
1 Robertson to Col, J.P, Nixon, British Resident and Consul-General, 
Baghdad, 23 April 1879, No. 143, L/P & S/3/219, p. 707.
2 India Office to Foreign Office, 30 May 1879, No. 23, L/P &
S/3/219, P. 699.
3 Govt, of India to Sec. of State for India, 25 June 1879, No, 151* 
L/P & S/7/22, p. 1333.
4 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F,D., 3 May 1879, No. 163, L/P 
8c S/7/22, p. 1358.
5 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 13 June 1879, P/1390,
September 1879, No. 351, p. 243.
6 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 31 March 1879, L/P &
S/9/65, p. 391.
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1
The answer of Ross had been an emphatic 'no*. In fact at this 
time the British tried to discourage direct contacts between Shaikh 
Isa and the Turks. On a visit to Bahrain from 11 to 18 March 1879, 
Ross discovered that Shaikh Isa wanted the island of Zakhnuniyah, off 
the Hasa coast, which had become a resort of pirates, either to be kept 
uninhabited or handed over to himself for occupation. The Resident,
c« M
with a view to preventing Shaikh Isa from approaching the Turks
2
directly, told him that his wishes would be made known to them. Later
in 18791 at a time when the Turkish authorities in Hasa were in
correspondence with Shaikh Isa on the subject of the mutual 
extradition of offenders'^ , the Government of India instructed that
the Shaikh should be encouraged always to refer to the Resident "to
k
act for him in matters in which the Turks are concerned”. Some
Cw **months later, Ross reported that he had advised Shaikh Isa that, when
questions arose between him and the Turkish authorities, he should
5
,fwhen possible" refer to him.
Of course, the Turks were well aware that there was nothing in 
the formal relationship between the British Government and the Shaikh 
of Bahrain, as laid down in the 1861 convention, preventing direct
0 .  mm
contact between Shaikh Isa and themselves. Not only did they
1 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 27 February 1879i I»/P 
& S/9/65, p. 261.
2 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 31 March 1879, L/P &
S/9/65, PP. 591-97.
3 See for example mutasarrif of Hasa to Shaikh CIsa, 28 August 1879,
P/1391, November 187$, No. 5$5^ p. 329.
k Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Ross, 15 November 1879, P/1391,
November 1879, No. 588, p. 331.
5 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 1*f June 1880, P/1553, July
1880, No. 215, p. 205.
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continue to communicate directly with Shaikh Isa by letter , but 
they also increased British apprehensions by sending a Turkish 
despatch boat to Bahrain in March 1880.
The commander of the vessel asked Shaikh cIsa to place a 
warehouse at his disposal for the storage of coal* The Shaikh 
avoided giving a direct answer by replying that he would give his
decision on the Turkish request if and when the commander,s superior,
-  2
the mutasarrif of Hasa, made such a demand. On hearing of theV ' •
Q m  mm
incident, Boss had ordered that Shaikh Isa should be reminded of the
undertaking he had given in June 1879 not to permit the establishment
of a Turkish coal depSt on Bahrain without first asking the advice of 
3 c- -the British. Shaikh Isa had replied that he intended to keep his
4
word. But despite such assurances of fidelity, Ross*s suspicions 
about the bona fide nature of the dealings of the A1 Khalifa with the 
Turks were not allayed.
These suspicions were increased by a despatch of 5 November 1880 
from the News Agent in Bahrain. The Agent reported that it was common 
talk on the island that the Ottoman Government intended appointing an 
Agent in Bahrain and setting up a coaling dep8t there. Although 
Shaikh cIsa had stated that he disapproved of such talk, the News Agent 
reported more suspicious facts, concerning a Turkish subject, Mujbil 
al-Dhukhair, who had lived in Bahrain for the last two years,
1 See for example, SaCid Pasha mutasarrif of Najd to Shaikh Cfsa,
14 July 1879, I/P 8c S/9/65, p. 755.
2 News Agent, Bahrain, to Ross, 3 March 1880, No. 29» L/P &
S/3/226, p. 215.
3 Ross to News Agent, Bahrain, 9 March 1880, P/1552, April 1880,
No. 271, p. 265.
k News Agent, Bahrain, to Ross, 19 March 1880, P/1332, April 1882,
No. 176, p. 267. See also Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf,
p. 822.
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ostensibly as a trader, Mujbil was ’’treated with respect” by the 
A1 Khalifa, especially Shaikh CIsa*s brother, Shaikh Ahmad, whom he
o
visited frequently. It was also said that Shaikh Ahmad ’’gives his
1
money in deposit” to Mujbil,
At the time the News Agent reported on Mujbil al-Dhukhair,
Bahrain was yet again under the threat of attack by Nasir b, Mubarak.
As early as June 1880, the News Agent had reported to Ross that Nasir
was at Khaur Shaqlq on the east coast of Qatar and that it was rumoured
2
that he intended to make an attack on Bahrain, In fact the attempt 
was not made until December 1880. On b December a British gunboat, 
H.M.S. Beacon, was sent to patrol the Qatar coast. It was not this 
precautionary action by the British however, but measures taken by the 
A1 Khalifa themselves which were largely instrumental in the thwarting 
of Nasir b. Mubarak. In November Shaikh °Isa had sent a party of
cT
Na imi fighting men to Fuwairit on the Qatar coast to try and thwart 
Nasir. Shaikh cIsa was also receiving a constant supply of information 
on Nasir*s movements from Na imi spies working in Qatar. Moreover, when 
Nasir did, at last, attempt to secure boats for the invasion of Bahrain, 
he was thwarted by those inhabitants of western Qatar whose loyalties
qm m
had been so carefully cultivated by Shaikh Isa for so many years 
previously. Thus, when Nasir arrived at the settlements of Ruwais 
and Abu Duluf in early December to demand that their inhabitants 
surrender their boats to him, he discovered that they had scuttled them
1 News Agent, Bahrain, to Ross, 5 November 1880, L/P & S/7/27» p* 1063.
2 News Agent, Bahrain, to Ross, 22 June 1880, L/P & S/9/b, p. 1115*
3 See for example, statement of Hamad b. Rashid, Na imi inhabitant
of Bahrain, 1 December 1880, L^P & S/9/65» P- 119^»
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already. Nasir retired with his followers into the interior of 
Qatar.
In the face of what appeared to be an increasing threat to the 
status quo in Bahrain from the Turks and their proteges, Ross himself 
visited the Shaikhdora on 21 December 1880* On the following day he 
took a decisive step in the development of British relations with
Q m  mm
Bahrain by concluding a new agreement with Shaikh Isa. The 
Shaikh bound himself, his heirs and his successors in the Government 
of Bahrain, to abstain from entering into negotiations or making 
treaties of any sort with any foreign power without the consent of 
the British Government. Further, he undertook to refuse permission 
to foreign powers to establish diplomatic or consular agencies or 
coaling depSts in Bahrain without British consent. The agreement 
specifically exempted from its provisions "the customary friendly 
correspondence with the local authorities of neighbouring States 
on business of minor importance". Lastly, since Ross had made
Q m  mm
the agreement with Shaikh Isa on his own initiative, it was stated
that the agreement was subject to the approval and acceptance of the
2Government of India.
1 Statement of Muhammad b. Mahanna, inhabitant of Bahrain,
1 December 1880* L/P & S/9/65, P* 1191; Residency Agent, 
Bahrain, to Resident, Bushire, 9 December 1880, L/P & S/7/28, 
p. 922. See map at the end.
2 ‘Translation of Agreement signed by the Chief of Bahrain,
22 December 1880*, Aitchison, op. cit., XI, 237.
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In his report to the Government of India, Ross explained
the reasons for his action. He pointed out that* it had been ’’the
settled policy” of the Government of India ”to exclude the
interference of other foreign Powers” in the affairs of Bahrain.
Its Shaikh had been ’’desired to avoid direct communication on
political, matters” with the Turks who were also to be refused permission
to establish a coaling dep&t on the island. However, the fact that,
in declining to permit the establishment of agencies or coal dep8ts,
the Shaikh was not able to refer to any formal engagement prohibiting
such action, had proved to be a source of embarrassment. It was for
this reason, Ross claimed, that he had acted ”to formalize the
1
actually existing understanding with the Chief of Bahrein”.
In March 1881, Ross was informed by the Government of India, now
under a new Viceroy, Lord Ripon, that, as a general rule, it was
inexpedient for Political officers to enter into negotiations of this
2
kind without special instructions. Even so, the Resident's letter
had been forwarded to the India Office with the recommendation that
the agreement should be accepted and ratified since it did not
’’materially increase or alter” Britain's existing responsibilities
3
with regard to Bahrain. The India Office and the Foreign
1 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 2k December 1880, P/17V1, 
March 1881, No. 17, pp» 7-8.
2 Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Ross, 7 March 1881, P/17^1,
No. 20, p. 10. See also Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf,
p. 826.
3 Govt, of India to Sec. of State for India, 'Ik February 1881, 
P/17^1, March 1881, No. 19, p. 9.
122
Office agreed with the Government of India and the agreement was 
duly ratified.
The origins of the 1880 agreement can be traced to the rising 
challenges to the rule of Shaikh °Isa in Bahrain during the 1870s.
When Boss, in his letter of 2k December 1880, had given his reasons 
for his initiative in signing the agreement he had indicated the 
dangers of the Turkish attempt to set up an agency in Bahrain in the 
guise of a coal dep&t. Moreover, although Ross did not specifically 
mention this in his letter, it is clear* that another reason for his 
action had been the Turkish-backed attempt on Bahrain by Nasir b. 
Mubarak in December 1880. It is significant, however, that the 1880 
agreement was not only directed against the establishment of diplomatic 
agencies and coaling depots in Bahrain. It was also meant to prevent 
direct negotiations between the Shaikh and foreign powers unless 
authorised by the British. It is true that, in his letter of 
2k December 1880, Ross had been diplomatic enough to justify this 
measure in terms of the •convenience* and 'advantage* which it would
C «  M
afford to Shaikh Isa by giving him "a reason for declining the
overtures of other foreign Powers which would be unanswerable and need 
2
give no offence”. Even so, it is clear that, for some time before 
the signing of the agreement, the Resident had been carefully watching 
the contacts of the A1 Khalifa with the Turks. Ross was well aware
1 India Office to Foreign Office, 18 March 1881, L/P & S/3/232,
pp* 357-60; Foreign Office to India Office, 30 March 1881, ibid.,
p. 726.
2 Ross to Govt, of India, 2k December 1880, P/17^1» March 1881,
No. 17, p. 8.
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of the dissatisfaction of Shaikh Isa with the quality of the 
protection he had been receiving from the British. This dis­
satisfaction had centred around two issues: the impunity with which
pirates were making use of Turkish territorial waters, and the advance 
of the power of Turkey's protege, Shaikh Qasim, in Qatar. In both
Q m m  mm
instances, the harm done to Shaikh Isa's interests was not merely a 
result of the rising challenges to his rule during the 1870s. It 
was also due to British reluctance, for reasons of their own imperial 
strategy, to act in a way which would bring them into collision with
Q a  mm
the Turks on Shaikh Isa's behalf. It was because of the dis­
affection on the part of the A1 Khali la to which such a policy could 
give rise that Ross had had to take an initiative which had the effect 
of formally binding the Shaikh of Bahrain more tightly to Britain.
12^ +
CHAPTER 3
THE CHALLENGE TO SHAIKH CISA, 1869-95; PART II, 1881-93
In the period after the signing of the 1880 agreement, the 
British began to take a stronger line over the two issues which were 
giving the A1 Khalifa grounds for dissatisfaction with the standard 
of British protection: the advance of the power of the A1 Khalifa's
enemies in Qatar and the associated problem of the periodical 
attempts at launching invasions of Bahrain from the mainland; and, 
the plunder of Bahraini shipping by pirates operating from Turkish- 
claimed territory.
On 26 February 1881, Ross recommended to the. Government of
India that, in view of the record of the Shaikh of Bida in
instigating attacks on Bahrain, Shaikh Qasim "should be specially and
distinctly warned that any hostile attempts headed by Nasir against
1
Bahrein would be attributed to him". Further, the Ottoman
authorities should be asked to watch the activities of Nasir b.
2Mubarak. T.J.C. Plowden, the Consul-General at Baghdad, commented 
that past experience suggested that "no practical result" would come 
of such a request for the Turks to supervise Nasir. If the
1 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 26 February 1881^ L/P & 
S/7/28, p. 928. Ross had in fact just warned Shaikh Qasim that 
should Nasir "find means to disturb the peace from your neighbour­
hood the consequences would be disastrous to you". Ross to 
Qasim, 25 February 1881, L/P & S/7/28, p. 930*
2 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 26 February 1881, L/P 8c 
S/7/28, p. 928.
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A1 Abdallah and Shaikh Qasim made yet another move against Bahrain
"they should be dealt .with under the orders of the Resident in the
Persian Gulf in such manner as the circumstances of the case may seem 
1
to require". The Government of India accepted Plowden's advice,
and in May 1881 instructed Ross to warn Shaikh Qasim that, if he was
"in any manner accessory to an attack upon Bahrein Island", he would
2
be "held directly responsible". At the same time Plowden was
asked to tell the Turkish authorities in Baghdad that, unless they
could undertake to prevent and punish any attack on Bahrain from the
territories they claimed, the Government of India might have to take
3the matter into its own hands. The British Ambassador m
Constantinople, G.J. Goschen, also concluded that it was pointless to
pursue the subject with the Turks any further. The British officers
in the Gulf should "receive instructions based on the view that it is
hopeless to expect the authority from the Porte to follow the Pirates
if
within Turkish territorial waters".
In February 1881, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Asim Pasha, 
claimed that there was no piracy along the Hasa coast. Further, 
he warned, no British naval action was required in the area because, 
purely as a precautionary measure, a Turkish gunboat had been sent
1 Plowden to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 10 March 1881, L/P & 
S/7/28, p. 935.
2 Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Ross, 7 May 1881, (tel.), L/P 
& S/7/28, p. 936.
3 Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Plowden, 7 May 1881, tel. No. 
9^8 E.P., L/P & S/7/28.
4 Goschen to Granville, 6 December 1880, No. 6^3» L/P & S/3/232,
pp. 265-66.
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1
to patrol there. The India Office suggested that there now 
remained no alternative to taking measures to put a stop to piracy 
in the Gulf without reference to the territorial claims of the Turks. 
The Secretary of State for India, Lord Hartington, therefore proposed 
that the commanders of British gunboats operating in the Gulf should 
be given a more or less free hand to suppress piracy along the Arab 
coast, ’’collision with Turkish Cruizers or troops being, of course, 
scrupulously avoided”. On 11 July 1881, the Foreign Office sent 
instructions to the Admiralty that British naval officers in the Gulf 
should in the future not "allow themselves ... to be too much 
hampered by the ^Ottoman7 three mile limit in pursuing and capturing 
pirates". At the same time, in doing so, they were to avoid clashes 
with the Turks, hand over to them all captives taken in Turkish 
jurisdiction and report all operations within the three mile limit 
to the British Consul-General in Baghdad for communication to the 
Ambassador m  Constantinople.
At about the same time an opportunity presented itself to put 
the state of affairs in Qatar on a more satisfactory footing.
Although Shaikh Qasim had accepted the Turkish flag, and had later 
been appointed a qa’im-maqam, in May 1881 Ross reported that the Shaikh
1 cAsim Pasha to British Charge d*Affaires, Constantinople, 8 
February 1881 (in French), L/P & S/3/232, pp. 273-7^.
2 India Office to Foreign Office, 2k March 1881, L/P & S/3/232, 
pp. 233-57.
3 Foreign Office to Admiralty, 11 July 1881, L/P & S/3/23^ -» pp. 
777-79* For the transmission of these instructions to the 
Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, see E.N. Swainson, Admiralty to 
W. Gore, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, 19 July 1881, No. 199* 
Adm. 127/31.
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was uneasy about his position with the Ottoman Government, He was
willing to place himself under British protection if a way could be
found to do this, possibly by renewing the agreement which his father
Shaikh Muhammad had signed in 1868, In October 1881, the Government
of India observed that the 1868 agreement with Shaikh Muhammad had had
"something of a personal character". As its force could be "held to
have been weakened, if not annulled" by the Turkish occupation of Bida •
it had been thought better for the time being "not to lay any stress
on it". Even so, if, as seemed possible, Shaikh Qasim could be
persuaded to admit that the 1868 agreement was binding to him, "the
result may be to contribute materially to the security of Bahrein and
2the neighbouring seas".
In late 1881, however, Shaikh Qasim*s harassment of the Indian
c3trading community of Bida , dimmed prospects of better relations.
These Indian traders, or banians, had for some time been causing a
great deal of annoyance to Shaikh Qasim by their trading operations.
They had become very successful competitors in the pearl trade of Bida
which had previously been monopolised by the Shaikh. When the banians
chad first come to Bida , they had only made purchases of pearls through
4
Shaikh Qasim*s father. Later, they began to purchase pearls direct,
1 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 19 May 1881, P/17^ -2, June 
1881, No. V 19, p. 273; Shaikh Qasim to Ross, 9 March 1881, L/P 
& S/7/28, p. 93^.
2 Under Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Ross, 26 October 1881,
No. 2557 E.P., L/P 8c S/7/30, p. 369.
M c
3 This was not the first time that Qasim hadjiarassed the Bida
banians. See, for example Ahmad Abdul Rasul, News Writer, Bahrain 
Resident, Bushire, 2b-August 187 ,^ P/773, November 187 +^, No. 182; 
Lieut. E.A. Fraser, Acting Second Asst. Resident to Ross, 3 June 
1875, P/776, September 1875, No. 62, p. 97; Ross to Sec. to Govt, 
of India, 2b December 1873, P/1031, March 1876, No. 193, p. 177.
b Answers of Qasim b. Muhammad b. Thani in the discussions with Mirza 
Abu al-Qasim, Residency Munshi, operating in the Gulf, 2 July 1882, 
L/P 8c S/9/67, p. 283.
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and became more attractive partners than Shaikh Qasim himself for those
with pearls to sell. The banians were more willing to pay high prices,
and more prepared to give ready cash than Shaikh Qasim, who preferred to
1
give credit notes if he could. In order to get rid of the banians. 
Shaikh Qasim instigated a number of provocations against them. The 
Shaikh ordered the shops of the banians to be closed. The levies 
which the banians had had to pay him were increased stage by stage with
the idea of squeezing his trading rivals so much that they would decide
c ■»
to leave Bida • Finally, Shaikh Qasim had ordered his subjects to
2
default in the repayment of debts owed to these traders.
Ross stressed in his report that there had been no misbehaviour on
the part of the banians to provoke such treatment. However, in the
opinion of Ross, Shaikh Qasim had not been motivated in his actions
solely by greed. It was significant that he had chosen a time when the
question of his relationship to the British was under consideration.
In the Resident's view, the Shaikh was using the banians issue as a
3test case. Ross observed that:
He does not feel sure what his position is now in relation 
to the British Government, and, no doubt, wishes to draw 
conclusions from observing the course adopted by British 
authority with reference to his proceedings. If he 
perceives that we abstain from direct action, he will 
consider himself secure of impunity through Turkish prestige 
and indifference, and will probably proceed to greater 
lengths against our subjects, said may disregard our interests 
and wishes in other still more important respects. It is a 
question (and Jasim is quite sdive to this) of whether this 
Sheikh is to be considered as an independent Sheikh, or merely 
a Turkish Governor, or sub something between the two.
1 Residency Agent, Bahrain, to Political Resident, Bushire, 26 
October 1881, L/P & S/7/31, p. 27.
2 Captain J.P. Nesham, Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, to Ross,
6 November 1881, L/P 8c S/7/31, p. 29.
3 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 12 November 1881, L/P 8c
S/7/31, p. 27.
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Ross pointed out further than an appeal to the Turks would be
tacit admission of the suzerain status the Turkish authorities claimed 
c 1at Bida • The Government of India agreed, and proposed to inform
Shaikh Qasim that the arbitrary treatment of British Indian subjects
could not be permitted and that, in the future, he would be held
"directly responsible for any act inconsistent with the friendly
relations which have hitherto existed between him and the British 
2
Government"•
On the face of it, this was no different from the Indian proposal
of May 1881. At that time, however, the Government of India was
referring to the possibility of direct dealings with the Shaikh in the
event of an attempted assault on Bahrain, This would have to be a
surprise attack and would therefore have had to be launched from the
western coast of Qatar, This coast, although openly claimed by the
Turks ever since 187^, had no Turkish garrison presence whatever.
This was not the case of Bida0, Moreover, the January 1882 proposal
clearly entailed the possibility that force might have to be used
against Shaikh Qasim, which might bring about a collision with the
cgarrison the Turks maintained at the fort of Bida • British policy 
had changed considerably since the time, only four years previously,
1 Ibid.
2 Govt, of India to Sec, of State for India, 9 January 1882, No, 3, 
L/P & S/7/31, p. 25.
3 See above, p, 12s:
k Commentary by Owen Tudor Burne, Sec, of Political and Secret Dept, 
of India Office, on letter from Govt, of India, 9 January 1882,
L/P & S/3/238, pp. 5-9.
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when both Ross and the Government of India were prepared to approach
c_ - 1
the Turks for punishment of the Na im of Zubara for piracy. Now, in 
1882, they were proposing the sanctioning of the possibility of direct 
action against a Turkish da1 im-maqam over an issue which, although it 
concerned the treatment of British subjects, was really a matter of 
his internal administration.
The proposal occasioned debate at the India Office, Sir
Frederick J, Halliday, the Chairman of the Council of India, objected,
not only on the grounds that Bida had been repeatedly recognised as
Turkish but also that the proposal would involve a departure from
Britain*s policy of declining to interfere on land with the Shaikhs of
the Arab coast, Halliday was opposed to a policy which involved
following !Iour British Indian subjects all over the world", and
redressing "their grievances everywhere great and small, with fire and
sword". He was, in fact, in favour of the old policy of attempting
2to secure redress for the banians from the Turks,
The Secretary of State for India, Lord Hartington, on the other
hand, considered that it might very well be expedient to continue the
policy of "non-interference on land" with the Arab Shaikhs as far as
their territory disputes were concerned. It was, however, quite a
different matter when they proceeded to ill-treat British subjects.
To fail to take decisive action to prevent this would fatally weaken
3British influence in the Gulf.
1 See Chapter 2, pp. lOM-y.
2 Halliday, note of 23 February 1882, L/P & S/3/238, pp. 11-l^ f.
3 Lord Hartington, note of 2 March 1882, L/P & S/3/238* PP® 22-23.
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Hartington's estimate of the likely consequences of any failure
Q
to take effective action to protect the banians of Bida seems 
judicious. It is known that, at this time, there were other places 
on the Arab coast of the Gulf where, if Qasim had gone unchecked in
Q
his harassment of the Bida banians,this would have been taken as a
signal to deal similarly with the local British Indian traders. On
11 September 1882 the Residency Agent at Bahrain had reported to Ross
that, like Shaikh Qasim, the merchants of Bahrain were suffering from
the competition of banians and were only deterred from injuring them
1
out of fear of the British Government. The consequences to British
Indian commercial interests of the spread of harassment of banians
throughout the Gulf would be very great. The greatest part of the
external trade of the Gulf, totalling more than Rs. 52 million, was
2
at this time in the hands of British Indian subjects. Lord
Hartington's views prevailed and the Foreign Office concurred in
sanctioning the procedures recommended by the Government of India.^
Even so, the India Office felt it necessary to advise the Viceroy and
his Council that Shaikh Qasim's relations with the Porte made it
desirable to avoid coercive measures against him for "as long as 
kpossible".
1 Residency Agent, Bahrain, to Ross, 11 September 1882, L/P 8c 
S/7/35* PP* ^50-51• See also Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India,
F.D., 22 August 1882, L/P 8c S/7/35, p. Wf.
2 This was noted by Owen Tudor Burne in a note, n.d., but some time 
in February or March 1882, L /P  8c S /3 /2 3 8 , p. 15• The Rs. 52 
million was the total value of the import and export trade of the 
Gulf ports excluding Muscat. About a half was with India direct. 
Burne quoted these figures from the Persian Gulf Administration 
Report for 1880-81.
3 Foreign Office to India Office, 13 March 1882, L/P 8e S/3/238,
pp. 279-80.
k Sec. of State for India to Govt, of India, 2k March 1882, secret
No. 19, L/P 8c S /7 /3 2 7 , pp. 67- 69.
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Meanwhile, in January 1882, Ross sent Captain Nesham, of H.M.S.
c «Woodlark, to visit Bida to see whether Shaikh Qasim was willing to
consider the 1868 agreement as still binding. The Shaikh declared
himself strongly in favour of renewing the agreement, modified to meet
the circumstances of the time, in particular "the different relations
he now held with Bahrein". He also professed himself anxious to get
c 2rid of the Turks, whom he regretted ever having allowed into Bida .
Ross recommended that the 1868 agreement with the deceased Shaikh
-  T  - 3Muhammad b. Thani should be formally renewed with his son Shaikh Qasim.
Once more, however, Ross*s superiors proved to be a good deal 
less willing than the Resident to risk collision with the Turks. On 
28 April 1882, Ross was informed by the Government of India that they 
considered it undesirable to risk complications with the Turks by 
entering into formal relations with Shaikh Qasim. Since the agreement 
had been signed with Shaikh Muhammad in 1868, the jurisdiction of the 
Ottoman Sultan had been established de facto at Bida • Although the 
British Government had never formally recognised this jurisdiction, 
its existence had not been contested by the Government of India or its 
officers. Moreover, it seemed likely that Shaikh Qasim would not be 
willing to enter into an agreement of the kind suggested with the 
British Government unless they engaged to protect him against the Turks 
"in any measures which he might find necessary for the due execution of 
his obligations". Under these circumstances, the Government of India
1 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 17 February 1882, No. 3^» 
L/P & S/7/32, p. 517.
2 Nesham to Ross, 7 February 1882, L/P & S/7/32, pp. 517-18.
3 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 17 February 1882, No. 3^* 
L/P & S/7/32, p. 517.
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suggested that Ross should merely obtain from the Shaikh a verbal 
assurance that he would, as far as possible, observe the terms of the
"I
agreement of 1868.
By the time the Government of India had sent their instructions 
to Ross, the policy of caution and delay which they and the Home 
Government had counselled him to take towards Shaikh Qasim was 
beginning to produce unfortunate effects. Finding that his harassment 
of the banians had met merely with admonitions, the Shaikh increased
his pressure on them. On 22 July, the banians were in fact forced,
c 2under protest, to leave Bida in H.M.S. Woodlark. With them went
Mirza Abul Qasim, Ross's Residency Munshi, who had been treated
discourteously by Shaikh Qasim and against whom threats of violence had 
3
been made. This further blow to British prestige certainly did not 
go unnoticed on the Arab coast of the Gulf. In September 1882 it was 
claimed that the inhabitants of Bahrain were "at a loss to understand 
why Qasim's acts should have been allowed to go on for such a long
if _
period". On 22 August, Ross reported that Shaikh Qasim's recalcitrant
5
attitude had come as a surprise to him. However, the fact was that, 
as the Residency Agent at Bahrain had noted a few weeks earlier, Shaikh 
Qasim fancied that his connection with the Turks would secure him from 
punishment. 6
1 Officiating Junior Under Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Ross,
28 April 1882, L/P & S/7/32, pp. 519-20.
2 Nesham to Captain I. Maclvor, Asst. Resident, Bushire, in charge
of the Residency, 25 July 1882, L/P & S/9/67, p. 331 •
3 Mirza Abul Qasim to Maclvor, 2k July 1882, L/P & S/9/67, p. 321.
k Residency Agent, Bahrain, to Ross, 11 September 1882, L/P &
S/7/35, pp. 450-51.
5 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 22 August 1882, L/P &
S/9/67, P. 313.
6 Residency Agent, Bahrain, to Maclvor, 27 July 1882, L/P &
S/9/67, P. 335.
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In view of these unwelcome developments, Ross felt that he had
no alternative but to recommend that "more active measures, involving
the use of British gunboats, should be taken against Shaikh Qasim."
The objective should be to secure from the Shaikh compensation for the
0
losses which the banians had suffered, free admission to Bida for 
the traders in the future, and an apology for the treatment they and 
Mirza Abul Qasim had suffered. At the same time Ross warned that, 
in the event of action being taken to enforce these demands, the
Q
Turkish flag would be flown at Bida . Moreover, Ross stated that he 
was aware that "passing events elsewhere may involve delicate 
considerations" in coming to a decision on his recommendations.
It is important to note that at this time British relations
with Turkey were going through one of their periodic sensitive stages.
On 11 July 1882 there had occurred the British bombardment of
Alexandria which was followed by the landing of British troops in
Egypt. The summer of 1882 was not therefore the most opportune time
to take yet further action which would inevitably antagonise the 
2Sultan. Thus, although there seemed no alternative to sanctioning 
Ross's proposals if British prestige in the Gulf was not to suffer 
dangerously, the sanction was not quick in coming. On 13 October the 
India Office requested the Government of India to take no action until
1 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 22 August 1882, L/P &
S/9/67, P. 313.
2 Adolphus W. Moore, Asst. Sec., Political and Secret Dept, of India 
Office, 'Persian Gulf: Turkish Jurisdiction along the Arabian 
Coast', Part IV, 12 February 1884, L/P & S/18/B19, p. 8 ; Kenneth 
Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England, 1830-1902 (Oxford, 
1970), p. 139; A.W. Ward and G.P. Gooch (eds.)The Cambridge 
History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919 (Westport, 197'0,
III, 174.
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they received a further message from London. At the same time, they
were asked what was the latest period to which naval operations could 
1
be postponed. The reply was that operations could take place at
2any time in the cold season. The question of action against Shaikh
- . 3Qasim was even taken before the Cabinet for their consideration.
The outcome was that, on 6 November, the Government of India was
informed by telegram that both the India Office and the Foreign Office
k
were prepared to sanction Ross*s proposals.
The Resident found that, although Shaikh Qasim was prepared to
apologise and permit the banians to return to Bida , he adamantly
5
refused to pay any compensation. On 1 December Ross himself 
arrived at BidaC with H.M.S. Woodlark and H.M.S. Arab. The Turkish 
flag was immediately raised both on the Shaikh*s house and on the 
Turkish-occupied premises. This, however, was of no avail. Under 
threat of bombardment, a sum of Rs. 8,000 was paid over by Shaikh 
Qasim as compensation for the losses which the banians had incurred.^ 
In the aftermath of this display of British force at Bida , a certain 
number of the banians returned to the town.
1 Sec. of State for India to Viceroy, 13 October 1882 (tel.),
L /P  & S /3 /2 4 1 , p. 499.
2 Viceroy to Sec. of State for India, 23 October 1882 (tel.), L/P
8c S /3 /2 4 1 , p. 501.
3 See note by Owen Tudor Burne, n.d., L/P 8c S/3 /2 4 1 , p. 605.
4 Sec. of State for India to Viceroy, 6 November 1882 (tel.),
L/P 8c S/3/241, p. 128. For the sanction of the Foreign Office, 
see Foreign Office to India Office, 4 November 1882, No. 679» 
secret and immediate, L/P 8c s/3/241, p. 607.
5 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F .D .,  29 November 1882, L /P  8c
S/9 /6 7 , p. 399.
6 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 7 December 1882, L /P  8c
S /9 /6 7 , p. 449; Ross to Shaikh Qasim, 4 December 1882, enclosure
No. 3 in ibid., p. 461.
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The inevitable Ottoman reaction was not long in coming. On
10 February 1883, G,H, Wyndham, the British Charge d* Affaires at
Constantinople, received a note verbale from the Porte protesting at
Ross*s action and demanding the return of the indemnity extracted from
_  1
their "Sous-Gouvemeur" of Qatar, Shaikh Qasim, To this, and
further Turkish protests of a similar kind, Lord Grenville, the
Foreign Secretary, formally replied on 7 May 1883. Not only were
the protests rejected, but Granville also informed the Turkish
authorities that their claim to "rights of sovereignty" over the
2Qatar coast had never been admitted by the British Government,
The significance for the development of British policy of the 
Resident*s coercive measures against Shaikh Qasim in December 1882 was 
that the British had been forced to take a bold initiative in Qatar 
without reference to Turkish claims to jurisdiction. For some time 
both the Government of India and the Home Government had been coming 
to see the need for direct action in Turkish-claimed territory, in 
the interests both of Bahrain and of British prestige in the Gulf, 
December 1882 was the first occasion on which such direct action was 
taken. At the same time, British prestige in the Gulf had only been 
vindicated at the expense of the feelings of Shaikh Qasim, In 
taking the action of December 1882, one British intention was to make 
it less likely that challenges to Shaikh Isa would be mounted from 
Qatar with the connivance of Shaikh Qasim, In actuality, in the
1 Note verbale from the Sublime Porte to the British Charge
d*Affaires at Constantinople, 10 February 1883, L/P & S/3/2*f2, 
pp, 1161-63,
2 Granville to Musurus Pasha, Turkish Ambassador in London, 7 May
1883, L/P & S/3/2^3, pp. 771-63.
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Q
course of the next few years, relations between the Shaikh of Bida 
and the A1 Khalifa were checkered.
In 1881 a certain amount of distrust had arisen between Shaikh 
Qasim and the A1 Khalifa, because of the supposed intention of Shaikh
Q .  mm Q m m  mm
Isa to establish the Na im of Zubara at ihwairit, another settlement 
on the north-west coast of Qatar. In December 1881, however, this 
distrust appeared to be removed after a meeting between Shaikh Qasim
Q m  mm
and Ahmad b. Ali, the brother of Shaikh Isa. Shaikh Ahmad landed 
• •
in western Qatar with 200 followers on a sporting expedition. On 
his insistance, Shaikh Qasim went in person to greet him, thus paying 
him the deference due to a superior from an inferior. Moreover,
Shaikh Qasim gave him an undertaking that he would not give aid to
-  2
Nasir b. Mubarak m  the future.
9
These gestures of reconciliation between Shaikh Qasim and the
A1 Khalifa did not prove to be of much substance. Even at the time,
the Residency Agent at Bahrain did not believe that the reconciliation
3
was cordial and sincere. Although in the following few years presents 
and friendly letters were exchanged between Shaikh Qasim and Shaikh CIsa,
1 'Administration Report', 1880-81, p. 6 .
2 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 13 January 1882, No. 15» 
L/P & S/9/67* P» 25; Residency Agent, Bahrain, to Ross, 29 
December 1881, No. 19*+1 Ibid., p. 26.
5 Residency Agent, Bahrain, to Ross, 28 December 1881, L/P & 
S/9/66A, pp. 5-7.
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rivalry between them in Qatar broke out once more in 1886. On 
31 March Shaikh Qasim wrote to the Resident at Bushire complaining
that Shaikh Isa was interfering with the bedouin tribes of Qatar in
1 c- -order to cause him trouble. The trouble was that Shaikh Isa was
encouraging one Muhammad b. Abdul Wahab in his political rivalry with 
Shaikh Qasim.
Muhammad b.^bdul Wahab was a Shaikh and pearl merchant of
Qatar. He had formerly been a friend and wazir of Shaikh Qasim.
During the banian affair of 1881-82 it was considered by the British
side that Muhammad b. cAbdul Wahab was encouraging the actions of 
2Shaikh Qasim. Certainly, as a pearl trader himself, Muhammad
was an enemy of the banians. ^y early 1886, however, he had begun
to develop ambitions of his own in rivalry to Shaikh Qasim. At the 
instigation of Muhammad, a part of the A1 Bu°Ainain tribe living near
Q
Bida migrated to Bahrain preliminary to their going to live at
the settlement of al-Ghareeyat in Qatar. The A1 Bu CAinain had
_ If
recently been under the jurisdiction of Shaikh Qasim. Their
migration was, therefore, a challenge to his power. Moreover, the
/
migration was brought about by Muhammad through a secret understanding
1 Shaikh Qasim to Ross, 31 March 1886, L/P & S/7/47» P» 936.
See also Residency Agent, Bahrain, to Resident, Bushire, 6 April
1886, L/P & S/7/47, P. 933.
2 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 3 October 1882, L/P 8c 
S/9/67, p. 365; report of Agha Muhammad Rahim, 22 November 1882, 
L/P & S/9/67, p. 417; Ross to SecI to Govt, of India, F.D.,
7 December 1882, L/P 8c S/9/&7» p* 452.
3 Mirza Abul Qasim to Ross, 3 July 1882, L/P 8c S/9/67» p- 279;
Mirza Abul Qasim to Maclvor, 24 July 1882, L /P  8c S /9/67» p- 322.
4 For previous references to the A1 Bu °Ainain in relation to 
Bahrain and Qatar affairs see above, Chapter I, pp. I5> 8.
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with Shaikh Isa. Also as a result of this secret understanding,
the people of the settlement of Fuwairit, on the north-eastern coast
1
of Qatar, were induced to rebel against Shaikh Qasim. Muhammad
b. Abdul Wahab then became Shaikh over the people of Fuwairit and 
2
al-Ghareeyat , much to the apprehension of Shaikh Qasim.
Shaikh Isa was not the only party involved in the rivalry 
between Muhammad and Shaikh Qasim. On 22 April 1886, a news report 
of the Residency Agent in Bahrain revealed that Muhammad had decided 
to try to have Qasim removed from his position as Ottoman qa* im-maqam
C M
of Bida • The Turks had never found Shaikh Qasim an easy person 
to work with. In particular, he had always been firm in his
c 3opposition to the establishment of a Turkish custom post at Bida . 
This gave Muhammad b. Abdul Wahab the opportunity he wanted to 
exploit Turkish dissatisfaction with Qasim for his own advantage. 
Muhammad made approaches to the mutasarrif of Hasa, Shaikh Qasim*s 
immediate Ottoman superior, about the advantages to the Turks of 
establishing a customs post at Bida which, Muhammad claimed, would
m
bring the Turks large revenues. He, Muhammad, would be willing to 
contract for the customs, but a Turkish official should be appointed
1 Residency Agent, Bahrain, to Resident, Bushire, 7 May 1886, No. 
3^, L/P & S /7 A 7 , p. 1117.
2 News Report by the Residency Agent, Bahrain, 29 July 1886,
L/P & S/7A8, p. 2V7.
3 See for example Muggoo Banian to Kokul Banian, 30 March 1883, 
No. 39, L/P & S /9 /6 7 .
1^ +0
Cat Bida and should be supported by a detachment of Turkish soldiers
in place of Qasim. By May 1886 reports were being received in
Bahrain that a Turkish vessel, the Murrikh, was at Bida and its
commander was engaed in noting down information regarding the taxes
which the boats and pearl divers paid to Shaikh Qasim. The
response of Shaikh Qasim was to retreat into the interior where he was
2
reported to be engaged in building a fort for himself.
The conflict between Qasim and Muhammad b. Abdul Wahab became
Q
even more acute when the Shaikh of Bida discovered that Muhammad had 
been appointed qg^im-maqam of al-Ghareeyat by the Turks. Qasim
declared that two rulers could not live in one and the same district 
and that if the Turks wanted him to be in control in Qatar that they 
must also give him authority over al-Ghareeyat. He also alleged 
publicly that Muhammad had bribed Turkish officials to gain his 
position as qa'im-maqam of al-Ghareeyat.^
Although the rivalry between Shaikh Qasim and Muhammad b. Abdul
Wahab during 1886 became very bitter, with armed clashes occurring
k
between their supporters in the period April to July , the conflict was
1 News Report by Residency Agent, Bahrain, 22 April 1886, L/P & 
S /7A 7 , p. 938.
2 News Report by Residency Agent, Bahrain, 6 May 1886, L/P &
S /7A 7 , p. 9Vl.
3 News Report by Residency Agent, Bahrain, 19 May 1886, L/P & 
S /7A 7 , p. 1118.
k See for example News Report by Residency Agent, Bahrain, 22 April 
1886, L/P & S /7A 7 , pp. 938-39.
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eventually settled. In July, Muhammad recognised that Qasim was
•
still a powerful force in Qatar and that further hostilities could 
only be harmful to his own interests. In particular, Shaikh Qasim 
was able to cause Muhammad financial loss by threatening al-Ghareeyat 
and al Fuwairit with bedouin raids whilst the inhabitants were away 
at the pearl fishery. Muhammad therefore went to the house of
M Q
Shaikh Qasim in Bida to beg for pardon and place himself once more
2under the Shaikh's jurisdiction.
Shaikh CIsa's instigation of Muhammad b. Abdul Wahab in 1886 
demonstrated that, despite the gestures of reconciliation between 
Shaikh Qasim and the Al Khalifa in 1881-82, nothing had fundamentally 
changed in relations between Bahrain and Bida . In particular,
Shaikh Isa was continuing to ignore British warnings, which were 
repeated in the course of the events of 1886 , that he should refrain 
from concerning himself with the Qatar mainland.
Matters became much more complicated in the following five years, 
and the relationship between Bahrain and its British protectors was 
altered significantly. The complications were not confined merely
1 News Report by Residency Agent, Bahrain, 29 June 1886, L/P & 
S/7/48, p. 24?.
2 Residency Agent, Bahrain, to Resident, Bushire, 30 July 1886, 
No. 58* L/P & S/7/48, p. 248; News Report by Residency Agent, 
Bahrain, 8 August 1886, I/P & S/7/48, p. 268; Shaikh Qasim to 
Residency Agent, Bahrain, 1 August 1886, L/P & S/7/48, p. 271.
3 See S.B. Miles, Officiating Resident, Bushire, to Shaikh cIsa, 
29 April 1886, L/P & S/7/47, p. 939.
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to the Qatar and Hasa coasts, but involved a series of political 
developments from the Persian coast to central Arabia, which seemed 
to threaten the Trucial System at many points. This resulted in the 
conclusion of new agreements with all the Trucial Shaikhs as a 
supplement to the traditional diplomatic and naval defences of the 
British position.
The problems began to arise in the summer of 1887, first with
Shaikh Qasim and the Turks, then with the Persians. Relations
between Shaikh Qasim and his Ottoman overlords were els unsatisfactory
as ever, with the Shaikh wishing to have as little constraint on his
affairs as possible. From the latter part of 1886 onwards reports
were received in Bushire that the Shaikh wanted to be rid of the Turks
completely emd to secure the protection and friendship of the British
Government. In a new attempt at getting free, the Shaikh, alarmed
0
at the new Turkish proposal to establish a customs house at Bida ,
0
withdrew to Zayen from his chief town, declaring that he no longer
exercised any authority there. It would appear that his aim was to
diminish the importance of Bida , in hopes that his withdrawal into
the interior, a decline in commercial activity, and a general
depopulation would cause the Turks to evacuate the town, thereby
2
restoring his independence. One method adopted to this end was an
1 Hakim to Miles, 24 September 1886, L/P & S/7/50, p. 300; Hakim
to Ross, 12 December 1887, L/P & S/3/53, p. 396.
2 Shaikh Qasim to Ross, 24 May 1887, P/3275, March 1888, No. 159, 
p. 123; Qasim to Ross, 3 June 1887, P/3275, March 1888, No. 165, 
p. 126; Residency Agent to Ross, 3 June 1887, P/3275, March 1888,
No. 166, pp. 126-27; Residency Agent to Ross, 20 June 1887,
P/3275, March 1888, No. 164, pp. 125-26; Residency Agent to Ross, 
3 July 1887, P/3275, March 1888, No. 184, p. 139.
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attempt to drive all foreign traders, including the banians, from the 
port by encouraging bedouins to make attacks upon them. Shaikh Qasim
Q
was able to do this because, despite his abandonment of Bida , his
influence in his capital was still paramount. Thus, in August 1887,
c 1two banians were cruelly wounded by bedouins in Bida . Immediately 
afterwards, acts of piracy began off the Qatar coast, some of the
CM **victims being Bahraini vessels. At this, Shaikh Isa asked Ross that
2he might be allowed to take punitive measures of his own.
On this occasion, however, the British were able to deal with
Shaikh Qasim without the use of gunboats. It was discovered that a
consignment of specie and pearls worth Rs. 20,000 belonging to Shaikh
Qasim was in Bahrain. At Rossfs request, Shaikh °Isa agreed to place
an embargo on the consignment.^ Shaikh Qasim, on being informed of
these proceedings, had the piracy stopped and recovered the plundered
property from the Bani Hajir pirates who had been responsible.
Eventually, more than Rs. 6,000 was paid by him to those banians and
Bahrainis who had suffered at the hands of his agents, and his
4
sequestered property was accordingly released.
Although the British had been able to bring about a satisfactory 
outcome to the latest difficulty with Shaikh Qasim without the use of 
gunboats, the Kutasarrif of Hasa lodged another protest about Ross’s
1 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 5 August 1887 (tel.),
P/3275, March 1888, No. 162, p. 124.
2 :cIsa to Ross, 11 August 1887, P/3275, March 1888, No. 181, p. 136.
3 Ross to cIsa, 19 August 1887; CIsa to Ross, 19 August 1887, P/3275,
March 1888, Nos. 221 and 222, p. 156.
4 °Isa to Ross, 27 September 1887, L/P & S/7/5% P« 1182;
W.L. Morrison, Commander H.M.S. Sphinx, to Commander C.E. Gissing, 
Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, 29 October 1887, Adm. 127/32, 
p. 14.
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treatment of his official 
sovereignty over Bahrain, 
island. The Foreign Office and the India Office therefore agreed 
on a reply which rejected both the protest and the claim to 
sovereignty.^
At the same time, a vigorous outburst of Persian political 
activity accompanied the appointment of the Amin as-Sultan to the 
Persian governorship of the Gulf Ports.^ His representative,
General Haji Ahmad Khan, visited Abu Dhabi and Dubai in August 1887. 
The Resident eventually learned that Haji Ahmad Khan had proposed that 
the Shaikh of Dubai accept a Persian agent in his territory. As a 
precaution, Ross in December obtained assurances from the six Trucial 
Shaikhs, stipulating that they would not correspond or enter into any 
agreement with any government whatever except the British Government, 
nor allow an agent of any other government to reside in their
4territory without British permission.
1 Muhammad Salih Pasha, mutagarrif of Najd, to Shaikh_CIsa, 18 
September 1887, Adm. 127/32, pp. 1*+-33j Muhammad Salih Pasha to 
Shaikh CIsa, 30 October 1887, L/P & S/7/53, p. 392.
2 Foreign Office to India Office, 17 April 1888; India Office to 
Foreign Office, 18 April 1888, L/P & S/3/287, pp. 1351-53.
3 In an unrelated episode in 1886, the Shah had unexpectedly raised 
the subject of the Persian claim to Bahrain, based on the 1869 
exchange of letters with Lord Clarendon. The Foreign Office 
determined to resist any arguments, but the matter was not pressed 
by the Persians. See Nicolson to Iddesleigh, 22 December 1886, 
L/P & S/3/279* p. 1339, and previous correspondence, L/P & S/3/276, 
pp. 95-103, 361, & 1^ 26; L/P & S/3/278, pp. ^09-15. For an 
account of the imposition of Persian authority over the Arabs at 
Lingah and the Persian occupation of Sirri Island as a background 
to the visits to the Trucial Coast, see Muhammad Morsy Abdullah,
The United Arab Emirates: A Modern History (London, 1978),
pp. 2^-25, 229-31, & 238-43.
'Intrigues of Persian Officials on the Arab Coast, 1888-9^*» k/15/1 
/188. Memorandum by Captain Ravenshaw, R.I.M.S. Lawrence, 27 
August 1887, P/3275, March 1888, No. 229, p. 161; Ross to Sec. to 
Govt, of India, F.D., 13 January 1888, and enclosures, P/3276, 
August 1888, Nos. 611-17, pp. 356-57.
(Qasim), reiterated Turkish claims to 
and threatened to appoint an agent on the
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In February 1888 Haji Ahmad Khan returned to the Arab coast with 
the Governor of Qishm Island and an armed escort. Reports reached 
British officials that one of his objects was to secure a site for a 
Russian naval station, which would help Persia assert its position 
in a struggle against the British. At Ras Mussandam and Umm 
Al-Qaiwain he failed to convince the inhabitants to accept the Persian 
flag. Rumours from Persian ports at the same time suggested that 
another Persian official, Malik al-Tujar, was collecting troops in 
the Persian government steamer Persepolis for an attack on Bahrain. 
Disappointed by his reception on the western shores of the Gulf,
Haji Ahmad Khan returned to Bandar Abbas. The Persian Government 
subsequently disavowed the proceedings of both men, and the British 
attributed their actions to a scheme by the Amin as-Sultan.
The British were nonetheless extremely suspicious of the intent 
behind Turkish and Persian activities. By January 1888 it was felt 
necessary to back up diplomatic warnings with a show of naval force. 
British complaints about the increase of piracy near areas under 
Turkish jurisdiction in Hasa and Qatar had produced one undesirable 
effect: Turkish officials soon saw in them a convenient justification
for strengthening the Turkish presence on the Arab coast. To 
Consul Robertson at Basra, the remarks of the Mutasarrif of Hasa 
about Bahrain being a Turkish possession were a symptom of a general
1 Commander Gissing, H.M.S. Osprey, to Rear-Admiral Richards, Naval 
Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, 19 March 1888, P/3276, August 
1888, No. 261, pp. 178-82; Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D.,
6 February 1888, P/3276, August 1888, No. 485, P* 271. Nicolson 
to Foreign Office, 22 February 1888 (tel.), and Viceroy to India 
Office, 23 February 1888 (tel.), L/P 8c S/3/286, pp. 1451 8c 1473.
Sir H.D. Wolff to Salisbury, 12 May 1888; Amin-es-Sultan to 
Malik-et-Toojar, 28 December 1887 8c 26 January 1888, L/P 8c S/3/288, 
pp. 1383-89.
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intention to increase Turkish influence throughout the Gulf, When 
discussing the inefficiency of Turkish naval forces, he observed that 
"any increase in Turkish naval power in these waters, which might 
result from pressure in connection with robberies of boats off the
Katif coast, would be almost more undesirable than the robberies
1 .themselves, ..." Robertson suspected that the visit of Nafiz Pasha,
the wali of Basra, to Hasa in February would have among its purposes
the furtherance of Turkish claims to Bahrain, possibly by means of a
2
landing by him and his retinue. So seriously was this possible
threat taken that two gunboats were despatched to Bahrain with
instructions to resist by force any attempt at a landing by the Turks
While the wall was on the Hasa coast, Ross became worried about the 
~ •
movements of the Persian vessel Persepolis and Haji Ahmad Khan’s
second journey. He sent one of the gunboats at Bahrain to visit
the Trucial Coast, but informed his superiors that he had ordered the
other to ’’prevent any hostile attempt to land at Bahrain by Arabs,
4
Persians, or Turks”. On the arrival off Bahrain on February 19 of 
the Zohaff flying the flag of the wali of Basra, H,M.S. Ranger closed
1 P.J.C. Robertson, to Political Resident, Turkish Arabia, 6 December 
1887, P/3276, August 1888, No. 440, p. 205.
2 Robertson to Ross, 12 January 1888, P/3276, August 1888, No. 620, 
pp. 358-59; Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 12 January 1888 
(tel.), P/3276, August 1888, No. 605, p. 35^.
3 Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 10 January 1888 (tel.),
P/3276, August 1888, No. 5971 p- 3^9; Viceroy to Sec. of State 
for India, 17 January 1888 (tel.), P/3276, August 1888, No. 606, 
p« 35^; India Office to Foreign Office, 18 January 1888, P/3276, 
August 1888, No. 624, p. 360; Foreign Office to India Office, 26 
January 1888, P/3276, August 1888, No. 663, p. 378.
4 Gissing to Richards, 19 March 1888, P/3276, August 1888, No. 261, 
pp. 178-82, quoting Ross’s orders of 8 and 15 February. The 
mention of Arabs in the orders was probably a reference to a 
threat made in December 1887 by Nasir b. Mubarak to enter Bahrain: 
Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 13 February 1888, P/3276,
August 1888, No. 627, p. 360.
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with her and her commander was informed that Bahrain was under British 
protection. The following day the Turkish corvette departed for
Q
Bida without having advanced Turkish claims to the Shaikhdom in any 
1way.
Upon his return to Basra, Nafiz Pasha did however order 
reinforcements to the Hasa coast, and despatched supplies of coal to
a  C
Ras Tanura and Bida for the first time. In the interval between the
wall’s tour and June 1888 it was also reported that the Turkish
authorities of Hasa intended rebuilding Zubara and establishing a
military post there. It was feared that Nasir b. Mubarak and
Shaikh Qasim would be chosen as the agents for this purpose. The
Government of India therefore instructed Ross to inform both Nasir and
his father-in-law, that a settlement at Zubara would not be permitted.
2In the event, no actual attempt to re-occupy the site was made.
At this time a major influence upon the conduct of the internal 
and external affairs of Bahrain was removed from the scene. The 
death in October 1888 of Shaikh Ahmad b. Ali, one of the ruler’s 
brothers, had a significant effect upon the character of Al Khalifa
Q m m  w
rule. Shaikh Isa was a very different personality from the active
and vigorous Ahmad, upon whom he had relied greatly in governing the 
islands. The Residency Agent described their relationship, and the
1 Commander Johnson, H.M.S. Ranger, to Ross, 23 February 1889, 
P/3276, August 1888, No. 65 ,^ p. 371.
2 News reports by Residency Agent, Bahrain, 6 and 28 March 1888, 
P/3276, August 1888, Nos. 493 & 502, pp. 374 & 277; Residency 
Agent to Ross, 27 June 1888, P/3276, August 1888, No. 107, p» 59;
Isa to Residency Agent, 28 June 1888, P/3276, August 1888, No. 
108, p. 60; Robertson to Political Resident, Turkish Arabia, 12 
March 1888, P/3276, August 1888, No. 669, p. 380.
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impact of Ahmad*s death:
As regards your enquiry as to whether this event will weaken 
or strengthen the power of Shaikh Esau in external and 
internal affairs, I beg to say that Shaikh Esau*s power will 
be weakened in every way, because Shaikh Ahmed was of great 
help to Shaikh Esau, in giving his counsel and views in all 
matters, whether internal or foreign, and he was in fact 
Shaikh Esau's sword. The two brothers were loyal and 
sincere to each other. People used to fear, in secret, 
Shaikh Ahmed, particularly so all their other brothers and 
relatives, and Shaikh Ahmed was a strong support to Shaikh 
Esau. Shaikh Esau is now single-handed, and he feels very 
much the loss of Shaikh Ahmed; and there is no one who can 
take the place of Shaikh Ahmed. After the death of Shaikh 
Ahmed I visited Shaikh Esau on two or three occasions, and 
I found that his thoughts were unsettled, because he is now 
left alone; ... Shaikh Esau is very slow in conducting 
affairs and carrying out matters.
From 1888 to 1890 Shaikh Qasim*s attention was occupied to the
south, as the long-standing dispute with Shaikh Zaid b. Khalifa of
c 2Abu Dhabi over Udaid broke out into open warfare. British concern
for the stability of the whole region grew as Qasim tried to enlist
allies, and technically violated the maritime truce on a few occasions.
Shaikh Qasim sought support from the Ottomans while still trying to
evade their direct control, which thus practically confined their
assistance to the defence of Bida • He urged several of the Trucial
Shaikhs to assist his raids against Abu Dhabi. Finally, he caused
great uneasiness in Muscat and Trucial Oman by suggesting that the
new conqueror of Najd, Muhammad b. Rashid of Shammar, would come from
1 Residency Agent, Bahrain, to Resident, 10 November 1888, P/35011 
January 1889, No. 23, pp. 25-27. See also Meade to Sec. to Govt, 
of India, F.D. 12 March 1899, P/3724, May 1899, p. 9^; Arabic 
biographical sketch of Ahmad (1883) in R/15/1/186; Lorimer, IB, 
912.
2 See Residency files *Hostilities between the Shaikh of Qatar and 
the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi*, R/15/1/189i and 'Threatened Invasion of 
Oman by Ibn Rashid', R/15/1/^90; Abdullah, op. cit., pp. 16^ +-68.
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central Arabia with a large expedition, which would subjugate all the
territories previously claimed by the Al-SaCud. Bahrain was not
directly involved in these developments, only providing a refuge for
Na im and other tribesmen of Abu Duluf and Ruwais in norther Qatar,
who crossed over to the island to avoid being moved southwards to
1fight for Shaikh Qasim. The British on the other hand were
cextremely concerned that none of the Shaikh of Bida *s schemes should 
succeed, because all of them seemed inevitably to involve the
* - 2.extension of Turkish influence and jurisdiction into Trucial Oman.
The next alarm over Zubara fitted into what seemed to be a more
ambitious programme of increased Turkish activity in the area generally.
In May 189O Shaikh °Isa received reports that the new mutasarrif of
•  "
Hasa, Akif Pasha, intended to order Shaikh Qasim to rebuild both
M  C «
Zubara and Udaid; to appoint mudirs to both places, and four
“ cdeputies to Shaikh Qasim in Bida because of his continued neglect of 
affairs; to raise a camel patrol force in Hasa; and to attempt 
once again to establish a coal dep8t at Bahrain. Muhammad b. Abdul 
Wahab declined the offer of Zubara, but in September it was reported
c»
that a person by the name of Asif Beg had been nominated at Basra as 
mudir of Zubara. On this occasion, Shaikh Qasim, suspicious of the 
intentions of his Ottoman nominal overlords, came out in opposition to'
1 Residency Agent, Bahrain, to Resident, 2 April 1890, P/37391
May 1890, No. 126, p. 107.
2 See for example, Ross to Govt, of India, F.D., 19 June 1888,
L/P 8c S/7/5^1 pp. 3^7-^9j India Office to Foreign Office, 12 
July 1888, L/P 8c S/3/289, p. ^13; Ross to Sec. to Govt, of 
India, F.D. 23 August 1888, L/P 8c S /7 /3 6 , p. 397; India Office 
to Foreign Office, 3 July l8 8 9 f L/P 8c S /3 /2 9 6 , p. ^91.
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this project. Moreover, Akif Pasha*s measures were disliked in 
Hasa for their haste and expense. Towards the end of 1890, the
m
mutasarrif was compelled by ill-health to leave Hasa and in fact died 
• •
soon after. As a result, Asif Beg seems never to have taken up 
his post of mudir of Zubara.^
Developments on the Trucial Coast involving another European 
power led to the closure of the remaining gap in the formal basis of 
the British system of protection in the Gulf, and brought the status 
of the other Trucial Shaikhdoms into line with that of Bahrain. In 
September 1891 the Residency Agent at Lingah noted that one of two 
suspected French agents then on the Trucial Coast had been granted a 
piece of land by the Shaikh of Umm al-Qaiwain. The Resident,
Lieutenant-Colonel A.C. Talbot, noted that the engagements taken by 
Ross in December 1887 did not quite cover such a situation, nor had 
the Government of India specifically indicated that they considered 
the agreements as formally binding. In order to forestall possible 
French intrigues, he recommended concluding fresh agreements, with an 
added ,fno alienation” clause similar to the one signed by the Sultan 
of Muscat earlier in the year. The final "Exclusive Agreements” 
were signed in early March 1892. They reiterated the pledges not to 
enter into agreements or correspondence with foreign powers other 
than the British Government, nor to allow agents of other governments
1 ‘Administration Report*, 1890-91, p. 7. Ross to Sec. to Govt, of 
India, F.D., 18 and 26 May 1890; Residency Agent, Bahrain, to 
Resident, 14, 18 and 22 May 1890, P/3739, June 1890, Nos. 2^2-^, 
pp. 23-32. Residency Agent, Bahrain, to Resident, 5 suid 18 June 
1890, P/3739, August 1890, Nos. 82 and 88, pp. 111 & 279. 
Residency Agent, Bahrain, to Resident, 3 December 1890, P/39^3, 
January 1891, No. 9^, p. 71.
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to reside in their territories without British permission. They under­
took further not to cede, sell, mortgage, or otherwise give for occupation
1
any part of their territories, except to the British Government,
The 1880 agreement with Bahrain contained no provisions regarding 
disposal of territory, so Talbot went to Bahrain to complete the series
C** Mof documents, Talbot offered Shaikh Isa a declaration in a single
article, but the Shaikh preferred a three-article form identical to the
2
agreements which the other six shaikhs had signed. Interestingly, 
the 1880 agreement referred to not "entering into negotiations or 
making treaties of any sort with any State or Government other than the 
British" without the previous consent of the British Government, and 
permitted friendly correspondence with local rulers on matters of minor 
importance. The 1892 agreements prohibited all correspondence with 
other powers on any account.
The period since 1880 had been one in which the alliance between
C*» mm
the enemies of Shaikh Isa had been riven with dissension. Even so, 
the antagonism between Shaikh Qasim and the Turks had not prevented the 
mounting of challenges to the rule of the Shaikh of Bahrain and his 
British protectors. Indeed, the latter had shown some signs of
1 Talbot to H.M, Durand, Indian Foreign Secretary, 29 September 1891, 
^15/1/191♦ ‘Agreements with Trucial Shaikhs and Bahrain*,
’Exclusive Agreement of the Chief of Abu Dhabi with the British 
Government, dated the 6th March 1892* and *Exclusive Agreement of 
the Shaikh of Bahrain with the British Government, dated the 13th 
March 1892*, Aitchison, XI, 238 & 256-57* Briton Cooper Busch, 
Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1892-191*+ (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
19^7)* P* 2^ f. J.B. Kelly, ’The Legal and Historical Basis of the 
British Position in the Persian Gulf*, St, Anthony’s Papers, No, 4, 
1958, p. 134.
2 Talbot to Sec, to Govt, of India, F.D., 15 March 1892, H/15/1/191*
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recognising the need to act with more decision to safeguard what the
A1 Khalifa considered to be their own interests. The most important
formal outcome had been the signing of the Exclusive Agreement of March
1892. It was considered by the British authorities that the protection
of Britain over Bahrain was now, as a result of this agreement, formally
declared. On 11 November 1892, the Porte was informed in a note verbale
that, ’’Bahrein being now under the protection of Her Majesty the Queen of
England ... no interference by the Ottoman authorities with the natives
1
of that island can be admitted”.
M  mm Q
However, neither Shaikh Qasim, nor the A1 Abdallah, nor even the
' Qot mm
Turks, were likely to cease their plottings against Shaikh Isa in the
face of a merely formal demonstration like the.Exclusive Agreement of
1892. In August 1892, within a few months of the signing of the
agreement, reports reached Bahrain that Shaikh Qasim and Nasir b.
Mubarak were collecting forces in northern Qatar for yet another attempt
2
at invading the island. The alarm became so great that the banians
of Bahrain loaded their property into boats in Manama harbour in readi-
3 - •ness for flight. Letters of warning were sent both to Qasim and
Nasir, and an undertaking was obtained from the Turkish authorities at
Basra that they would instruct their local authorities to prevent any
Zf
invasion of Bahrain from the mainland. In the event, this latest 
attempt on Bahrain, if indeed that is what was intended, came to nothing.
1 Note verbale of 11 November 1892 from Clare Ford, British
Ambassador, Constsuitinople, to Porte, L/P & S/3/321, pp. 337-38.
2 Residency Agent, Bahrain to Talbot, 1 August 1892, P/4185,
October 1892, No. 118, p. 130.
3 Talbot to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 21 August 1892, P/^185,
October 1892, No. 1251 p. 132.
Acting wali of Basra to British Consul, Basra, 13 August 1892,
P/VI85, October.1892, No. 129, p. 133.
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In October 1892, the wall of Basra arrived at Qatif and, for
reasons unknown, arrested the ga*im magam. His successor began to
press Turkish claims in the area more vigorously. In November 1892,
Talbot was so concerned about a possible coup de main by Turkish
forces in Hasa against Bahrain that he had a British gunboat sent to
1
the island as a precaution. The Resident*s instructions, that any
attempted Turkish landing on Bahrain should be resisted, were approved
2by his superiors m  India and London.
Although this latest Turkish threat to Bahrain did not in fact
materialise, in January 1893, the new ga*im-magam ordered it to be
proclaimed that Bahrain and Oman had 1 reverted* to Ottoman jurisdiction.
3
Bahraini vessels at Qatif were ordered to fly the Turkish flag.
A few months later, in August 1893, the ga*im-magam of Qatif once more
had notices posted up in the bazaar there asserting Turkish sovereignty 
Zf
over Bahrain. British representations to the Porte resulted in
professions, in November and December 1893, that orders had been issued
5
for the withdrawal of the notification.
1 Talbot to H.H. Ityke, Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division, 
Commanding H.M.S. Sphinx, 30 November 1892, L/P & S/3/323, p. 69.
2 Viceroy to India Office, 6 December 1892 (tel.), L/P & S/3/321, p. 
393; India Office to Foreign Office, 8 December 1892, L/P 8c 
S/3/321, pp. 391-92; Foreign Office to India Office, 13 December
1892, L/P & S/3/321, pp. 551-52.
3 Govt, of India to Sec. of State for India, 14 January 1893, L/P 
8c S/7/69, p. 1133.
Translation of proclamation made by ga*im-magam of Qatif, 20 August
1893, L/P 8c S/7/72, p. 209; news report received thrSugh an agent 
01 the Residency, Bushire, 10 September 1893, L/P & S/7/22.
5 Ford to Foreign Office, 25 November 1893, No. 5^7, L/P 8c S/3/332, 
p. 897; Sir A. Nicolson, British Charge d*Affaires, Constantinople 
to Foreign Office, 10 December 1893, No. 573, L/P & S/3/332, 
pp. 1173-76; Nicolson to Foreign Office, 26 December 1893, No.
568, L/P 8c S/3/332, pp. ^87-89.
The various mainland adversaries of the A1 Khalifa had many
other matters to occupy their attention - indeed in- March 1893 Turkish
• ctroops fought and lost a battle against Qasim, who then blockaded Bida •
Local hostility towards Bahrain might therefore have remained in the 
form of verbal threats and petty annoyances, had not a new factor 
suddenly been added in 1895* Twenty-five years of plotting against 
Shaikh °Isa now reached a climax with the unexpected migration of an 
alienated Bahrain tribe to Qatar. This incident was the result of
Q m m  m
a quarrel which had arisen in March between Shaikh Isa and the
A1 b. Ali owing to an act of violence which had been committed by
Shaikh Isa*s brother, and an affray which took place two days later, 
in which four men were killed. Shaikh Sultan b. Salama, leader of the 
A1 b. Ali since 1893* removed his tribe to Ruwais in northern Qatar.
He soon entered into close relations with Shaikh Qasim, who made a show 
of trying to reconcile Shaikh Sultan and Shaikh CIsa. These efforts 
failed, no doubt partly because they were never intended to succeed.
At this point the Shaikh of Bida took his opportunity and invited the
-  2A1 b. All to establish a settlement at Zubara.
The Resident at Bushire, Colonel F.A. Wilson, shared Shaikh
CIsa's alarm at this development. A successful settlement would now
3
be a menace m  several ways:
1 The principal source for the "Zubara Incident" in the Residency 
file *Zubara Affairs, April-September 1895*» R/15/1/31^«
2 Wilson to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., k May_l895i No. *f2, 
R/15/1/31^. For the earlier history of the A1 b. Ali see Chapter 
I, pp. IS, 2% 5L-SB
3 Ibid., para. 7.
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Bahrein trade has increased, and to this fact may probably 
be attributed the movement with regard to Zob'arah, which now 
threatens to assume more importance, A settlement there 
fostered by Jasim*s machinations, with possibly higher 
support, is regarded by Sheikh Esa as fatal to the well-being 
of Bahrein, It would, I consider, lead to grave 
complications, besides furnishing a base for actual aggression. 
The Albin-Ali who have gone there are said to number some 
1,500f including women and children; and should success be 
permitted to attend their movement, it is to be feared that 
the Naeem, Chaban and Dawasir tribes might be seduced from 
their allegiance to Bahrein and be led to abandon it and join 
the seceders to its entire ruin.
Shaikh Sultan b, Salama rapidly became too entangled in Shaikh Qasimfs
arrangements to consider returning to Bahrain, even when faced with
orders and warnings delivered by Residency staff, that the settlement
could not be allowed to consolidate, and that A1 b. Ali boats might be
seized during the pearling season. The Ottoman mutasarrif of Hasa,111 4 1 ■ — m
Ibrahim FawzI Pasha, visited Shaikh Qasim at Zubara for a week in May.
He then sent the mudir of CUqair to Zubara with soldiers and masons, 
and summoned Nasir b. Mubarak and his Ban! Hajir tribesmen to camp
W  *
The Government of India endorsed Wilson*s suggestion of seizing 
the A1 b. Ali*s boats if the tribe refused to abandon Zubara, even 
though this now involved the risk of raising once again the question 
of Turkish jurisdiction in Qatar. The India Office and the Foreign 
Office authorised the action after allowing time for warning the
1 Wilson to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 11, 18 and 24 May 1895* 
Nos. 44, 46 & 52, R/15/V314. Ibrahim Fawzi Pasha was, 
apparently, not supported by his immediate superior in Basra, 
though the Turkish authorities in Baghdad were encouraging the 
venture: Captain J.S. Whyte, Asst. Political Agent, Basra,
to Ambassador, Constantinople, 1 June 1896, L/P 8c S/7/87, P* 136.
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Turkish Government in Constantinople. Ignoring the mudir1s
assertion that Zubara was under Turkish protection, Commander J.H. Pelly
of H.M.S. Sphinx on 8 and 15 July seized a total of sixteen A1 b. Ali
boats and towed them to Bahrain. The Turks reacted by detaining
some Bahrain boats sent to Zubara to bring off the family of one
of the shaikhs of the A1 b. Ali, who had been captured by the Sphinx,
and who became reconciled with Shaikh Isa. The Turkish warship
Zohaff arrived off Zubara at the end of July. Shaikh Qasim was
reported to be gathering tribesmen and calling in Qatar boats from the
pearl banks. The local Turkish authorities openly threatened to
overthrow A1 Khalifa rule in Bahrain, possibly adding their own
forces to a Qatar fleet. Pelly believed that there was a serious
possibility of attack, requested naval and possibly military
reinforcements, and noted that certain waters between Bahrain and Qatar
were unsurveyed, so that warships could not follow native craft there.
The Resident was much less convinced of the probability of an attack,
partly because the Ottoman Government could be held fully responsible
2for it after the warning which they had received.
Wilson soon recognised, however, that Shaikh Qasim's active 
intrigues could cause an outbreak in Bahrain itself, and the 
irresponsible local Turkish officials would not restrain him. On
1 Viceroy to Sec. of State for India, 15 May 1895 (tel.); India 
Office to Foreign Office, 22 May 1893; Foreign Office to India 
Office, 31 May 1895; Foreign Secretary, Simla, to Resident,
3 July 1895 (tel.),
2 Pelly to Wilson, 14, 17, 23 and 30 July, 6 and 1^f August 1895j 
Mudir of °Uqair to Pelly, 26 July 1895; Wilson to Sec. to Govt, 
of India, F.D., 27 July, 3 and 10 August 1893» Nos. 73» 77 & 81, 
R /1 3 /V 3 1 ^ .
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16 August the Resident warned the Government of India of the increasingly
menacing situation which Bahrain faced. He informed them that
Commander Pelly had asked if he should open fire on meeting any
apparently hostile fleet under Turkish colours either inside or outside
Bahrain*s territorial waters. He, the Resident, urged that "stronger
action" than that already taken was now required. The Government of
India proposed to instruct him that any demonstration against Bahrain
should be resisted by gunfire if Commander Pelly was satisfied that
the advancing fleet was hostile. If the fleet flew the Turkish flag
then an explanation should be demanded and, if this was not satisfactory,
a warning should be given that advance within Bahrain*s three-mile
limit would be resisted by force. Authorisation was telegraphed to
1
Wilson on 22 August.
The mutasarrif of Hasa increased the tension by declaring on 19
August that he could no longer restrain the tribes of Qatar, who had
been provoked by British aggressions. Continued detention of A1 b.
Ali boats would result in an attack on Bahrain at the end of seventeen 
2days. On the last day of this ultimatum Commander Pelly at Bahrain 
received word that an attack was imminent and that the Turks might 
participate. Upon arriving at Zubara on 6 September, he found a 
fleet of boats in the harbour, apparently armed in readiness for a raid 
on Bahrain. On his own responsibility he therefore ordered the two
1 Resident to Foreign Secretary, Simla, 16 August 1895 (tel.);
Viceroy to Sec. of State for India, 18 August 1895 (tel.); Foreign 
Secretary, Simla, to Resident, 22 August 1895 (tel.), R/15/1/31^*
2 Resident to Foreign Secretary, Simla, 26 August 1895 (tel.), 
R/15/1/31^.
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British warships under his command to bombard the invasion fleet.
Forty-four boats were estimated to have been destroyed by shelling
or burning. Shaikh Qasim offered to surrender, at the same time
begging for pardon. The British laid down terms that, before this
submission by Shaikh Qasim could be accepted, the A1 b. Ali should
evacuate Zubara, return to Bahrain and place themselves once more
under Shaikh CIsa*s authority. Shaikh Qasim was obliged to accept by
1
the seizure of 120 of the remaining boats. The A1 b. Ali returned 
as a body to Bahrain, resuming their residence there under Shaikh
CIsa*s assurance of the maintenance of the conditions they had
2 3formerly enjoyed. Zubara was abandoned by the Turks.
Commander Pelly*s action received the approval of the Resident,
4
the Government of India and the authorities in London. The 
Government of India also instructed the Resident, Colonel Wilson, to 
demand a fine of Rs. 30,000 from Shaikh Qasim as punishment for being
1 Pelly to Wilson, 7 September 1895, R /1 5 /1 /31 4 ; Pelly to Drummond, 
12 September 1895 (tel.), L/P & S /3 /3 4 8 , p. 1009; Viceroy to Sec. 
of State for India, 14 September 1895, L/P 8c S /3 /3 48 , pp. 429-32 .
2 Wilson to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 28 September 1895* No. 103, 
R/15/V314. Shaikh Sultan b. Salama was permitted not to return 
with the others. He was murdered off Ras Tannura in November by 
members of the Amanirah tribe of Bahrain. See Administration 
Report*, 1895-98, p. 4.
3 Viceroy to Sec. of State for India, 11 March 1896, No. 44, L/P 8c 
S/7/85, p. 136.
4 Wilson to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 15 September 1895, No. 98, 
R/15/V314; Viceroy to Sec. of State for India, 11 March 1896,
No. 44, L/P 8c S/7/85, p. 136; India Office to Foreign Office,
15 April 1896, L/P 8c S /3 /3 5 1 , PP. 1195-96; Foreign Office to 
India Office, 28 April 1896, L/P £c S /3 /3 52 , p. 761.
159
the main instigator of the disturbances. If Qasim failed to pay,
the boats captured at Zubara would be destroyed. In the event,
2
the Shaikh refused to pay and most of the boats were burnt on 6 April 
1896 as they lay off Bahrain.
This decisive British action in ending the Zubara crisis of 1895» 
involving spectacular naval action against the forces of an ostensible 
Turkish qafim-maqam, was a turning point in British relations with
Q m m  mm
Bahrain. Ever since the earliest period of the rule of Shaikh Isa
in Bahrain, when Turkish power was first established on the nearby
mainland, British action in protection of the Shaikhdom had been
hampered by diplomatic considerations. Appeasement of the Turks had
led to a serious undermining of the confidence of the confidence of
the A1 Khalifa in their protectors. By 1878-79 Anglo-Bahraini
relations had reached a low ebb with the destruction of Zubara and
British failure to take effective action against an outbreak of piracy
against Bahraini commerce organised from Turkish-claimed territory.
The situation had only begun to improve in 1879i after Ross*s letter
4
to the Government of India in January of that year had, apparently, 
forced a reconsideration of British policy towards the Turks in the 
area of the Arab coast of the Gulf. This new departure in British
1 Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Wilson, 10 January 1896, No.
68-E, L/P & s/7/85f p. 13.
2 A number were returned to certain tribes of Qatar after their head 
men had paid ransoms. See Commander R.H. Story, Senior Naval 
Officer, Persian Gulf to Resident, Bushire, 1 April 1896, No. 24, 
L/P & S/7/87, p. 331.
3 Viceroy to Sec. of State for India, 30 June 1896, No. 124, L/P 
& S/7/87, p. 331.
4 See Chapter 2, pp. |O-0^9li
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policy had resulted in the ratification of the first Exclusive 
Agreement with the Shaikh of Bahrain after Ross had once more taken
Qa M
the initiative in securing Shaikh Isa's signature to the engagement 
in December 1880.
From the time of the signing of this Agreement, the British
showed greater decisiveness than in 1878-79 in taking action to
protect Bahrain, By the summer of 1882, the consequences of failing
to curb directly the excesses of Shaikh Qasim against British Indian
subjects were threatening to prove disastrous to British interests.
In particular, it had become necessary to demonstrate that it was the
protection of the British, not that of the Ottomans, which was
decisive for the well-being of the rulers of the Arab side of the Gulf,
This issue had been in doubt ever since the Ottoman invasion of Hasa
in 1871 had resulted in talk in the area to the effect that it was
the Turks who were now all-powerful there and it would be wise to make 
1
terms with them. Against this background, the show of naval force
before the 'Turkish* port of Bida in December 1882 provided a
convincing demonstration of British determination that Turkish 
pretensions would not be allowed to interfere with the safeguarding of 
the interests of those whom the British Government had an obligation 
to protect.
This demonstration, was meant, at least by Ross, to be a 
declaration of British intentions to act decisively to protect not 
only the banians but also Bahrain, The new British resolve to warn
1 See Chapter 2, p.76*
off those who coveted the Shaikhdom blended a few years later with a 
general concern to reinforce the British position on the Arab side of 
the Gulf, Apprehensions about the significance for the Trucial 
System of various Turkish, Arab, Persian, and French activities between 
1887 and 1892 led to the establishment of closer formal relations 
between Britain, Bahrain and the shaikhdoms of the Trucial Coast,
In 1895 the tangled political affairs of Bahrain and Qatar produced a 
crisis which conclusively showed the extent of British willingness to 
employ force to back up their agreements0 In 1878, at the time of 
the destruction of Zubara, the British had seemed willing to contemplate 
the recognition of Turkish sovereignty on the west coast of Qatar,
It was a measure of how far British policy had changed in the 
intervening seventeen years that no objection at any official level 
was raised when, in 1895» a hostile fleet incited by Turkish officials 
was blown to pieces in Zubara harbour by British gunboats. Moreover, 
although the statement of the Government of India of September 1873
mm
that Shaikh Isa had no possessions in Qatar was not over-ruled, the
Turks were also, in the aftermath of the 1895 Zubara crisis, told once
more that the British Government was not prepared to recognise Ottoman
claims to ’'the portion of the coast of the Persian Gulf in which Zobara 
1
is situated”.
The signing of the final Exclusive Agreement of March 1892 and 
the decisive action of September 1895 in defence of Bahrain may be seen
1 Lord Salisbury, Foreign Secretary to Anthopoulos Pasha, Ottoman 
Ambassador, London, late November 1896, draft submitted to India 
Office for approval (which was given), Register No, 887,
L/P & S/3/355t p. 755.
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as the culmination of the tendency of British policy towards bold 
action in defence of the Shaikhdom, a tendency which had been evident 
ever since 1879* With the aftermath of the Zubara crisis in 1896, 
however, there began a new stage in Anglo-Bahraini relations.
Between 1871 and 1896 these relations had been very strongly affected
by the presence on the Arabian coast of the Gulf of one Power of world
importance - Turkey. From around 1896 other world Powers were
beginning to increase their presence in the area.
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CHAPTER k
BAHRAIN AND EUROPEAN RIVALRY IN THE GULF: 1896-190^
From the time of the Zubara incident onwards Turkish designs on
Bahrain ceased to cause the same degree of concern as in the period
from 1871 to 1895» Apart from minor annoyances over matters such as
quarantine, or further rumours about mudirs in Qatar, the only
troublesome issue was the denial by Turkish officials of the right of
British consular officers to protect Bahrainis travelling or residing
•\
in Ottoman territory. On many occasions after 1895 British
2
representations on behalf of aggrieved Bahrainis came to nothing.
From the mid-l890s onwards, the British had to give increasing 
attention to the possible threat to their whole position in the Gulf 
arising from the growing interest shown in the area by other European 
powers. Russia and France were at first viewed with most suspicion.
The Russian Tsars had been extending their territories towards
3
Persia and the Gulf ever since the sixteenth century. This advance 
accelerated during the nineteenth century with large territorial 
acquisitions in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. By l88*f only
1 See Saldanha, ’Precis of Bahrein Affairs’, pp. 89-92.
2 See note by Salisbury headed ’Attack on Bahrein vessel by alleged
Turkish subjects. Proposed representation to wali of Basra. 
Question of British protection of Bahreinese’, n.d., but sometime 
in May 1900, L/P & S/3/376.
3 Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 186^19^^- (New 
Haven and London, 1968), p. 4.
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Afghanistan and the rickety Persian Empire separated Russia from India 
and the Gulf, The British were concerned that the objectives of 
this Russian advance were access to the warra-water ports of the Gulf 
and pressure on the Indian Empire,
French interest was partly commercial and partly connected with
2a wish to strengthen France*s imperial interests in the Indian Ocean,
In 1862 France had become, with Britain, a co-guarantor of the
3
independence of Oman , and thereby took an important step towards
establishing an interest at the entrance to the Gulf, In the late
1880s, British concern about French designs in this area was one of the
reasons for the signing of the Exclusive Agreements of 1892 between
4the British Government and the rulers of the Trucial Coast, Two 
years later France established a Vice Consulate at Muscat and there 
began a particularly intense period of imperial rivalry with the 
British in the Gulf,^
British concern was intensified by the knowledge that, during 
this period, these two world wide rivals of Britain were moving steadily 
towards an entente,^  Indeed, in the winter of 1893-9^* the Dual
1 Rose Louise Greaves, Persia and the Defence of India, 1884-1892 
(London, 1959)» p. 3.
2 Landen, op. cit,, pp. 242-3.
3 See 'Declaration respecting the Independence of Muscat and 
Zanzibar, 1862', item No. X, Aitchison, op. cit., XI, 304-05,
4 See Chapter 3» p. I SO, and also Landen, op. cit., p. 220.
5 Landen, op, cit., p. 243. For British suspicions of French activity 
in the Oman area at this time see for example Colonel F.A. Wilson, 
Resident, Bushire to Officiating Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D.,
26 April 1896, L/P & S/7/87.
6 A.W. Ward and G.P. Gooch (eds.), op. cit., Ill, 245,
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Alliance between the French and the Russians was formally launched. 
Britain's naval strength was great enough in the first half of the 
1890s to rival any single power. However, a combination of such 
rivals might prove too much, with fatal results in an area like the 
Gulf, where British power was based on a local predominance of naval 
force.^
Of course, Britain's position at Bahrain was more secure, in the 
face of the challenges of Russia and France, than it was in either 
Persia or Oman. Russian power was already a reality in northern 
Persia. In Oman the French could point to the joint declaration of 
1862 as a legal basis for their interest in the area. Even so, the 
Shaikhdom was not unaffected by the developing interest of European 
powers in other parts of the Gulf area, and Britain's corresponding 
increase in its own hold. There could not be entirely separate 
British policies for the different parts of the Gulf: "for security
the whole had to be controlled".^
In this context, attention turned to the question of the adequacy 
of British representation in Bahrain. The issue was first raised by 
Major Malcolm John Meade, who had replaced Colonel Wilson as Resident 
in June 1897. On 2 October Meade reported that, when he took charge 
of the Residency, Wilson had told him that Bahrain affairs "were not
C«a «
altogether in a satisfactory state" and that Shaikh Isa was being
1 Greaves, op. cit., p. 2.
2 Landen, op. cit., p. 2^5-
3 Busch, op. cit., p. 385*
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"badly advised by those who wished to extend Turkish influence along 
1the Arab coast". At the same time, there were many signs that 
British representation at Manama was unsatisfactory.
Up to 1879, the First Assistant Resident in the Gulf, an 
Englishman, had resided part of the year in Bahrain. However, after 
a reduction in Residency staff in 1879 f the Shaikh and his people saw 
the Resident, or his Assistant, only occasionally. The only resident 
British representative in Bahrain after 1879 was a low-ranking 1 Native
■7.
Agent'. In 1897 this Agent was an Ottoman subject of Persian origin
called Agha Muhammad Rahim Saffar. On the basis of the reports he 
• • •
received from Bahrain, including those of Rahim himself, Meade quickly
came to the conclusion that the position of Britain's Agent in the
if
Shaikhdom was "not a proper or satisfactory one". Rahim's reports
showed that he and Shaikh Isa were not on good terms. Rahim himself 
had admitted that he had been unable to secure justice for British 
subjects involved in disputes in the Shaikhdom. Moreover, the Agent 
was not at all popular with the British Indian traders of Bahrain.
In September 1897 a number of these banians had visited Bushire to
1 Meade to Cuningham, 2 October 1897 (demi-official, confidential), 
register 711-12 , L /P  & S /7 /1 0 4 . Wilson had, in fact, warned 
Shaikh Isa, in a valedictory message to him on 5 June 1897« not 
to listen to "ill advisers" but to conform to the views of the 
Government of India. See Wilson to Shaikh Isa, 5 June 1897» 
R /1 5 /1 /31 5 * The influence of such advisers had of course 
increased since the death of Shaikh Ahmad in 1888, noted above,
pp.
2 For details of this reduction see Ross to Sec. to Govt, of India, 
F.D., Ik June 1879, No. 209, L /P  8c S /7 /3 1 , p. 639; Meade to Sec.
to Govt, of India, F.D., 2k September 1899» No. 128, L /P  & S/7/13^«
3 'Colonel Meade's Instructions /to his Solicitor^1» enclosure No. 2
in Meade to India Office, 22 August 1900, L/P 8c S/3/378.
k Meade to Cuningham, 2 October 1897» L /P  8c S /7 /1 0 ^ , register
711-12.
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complain that Rahim was abusing his position as Agent to advance his
own interests. Rahim was, in fact, himself a big trader in Bahrain.
A firm of Hindu traders who were farming the Customs of Bahrain from
Shaikh CIsa complained that Rahim would only give three per cent
ad valorem on the goods he imported, instead of the four per cent paid
by other merchants. Moreover, the banians alleged, Rahim had
" 1 1 " •
extended this privilege to certain firms, both European and Native, in 
which he was interested, thereby causing loss to the Customs. When 
confronted with these allegations, Rahim practically admitted their
C «  mm
correctness, but had claimed that Shaikh Isa had given him the right 
to import his goods at three per cent and to extend the privilege to 
anyone he wished.^
It seemed clear to Meade that Rahim merely regarded his position 
as Agent as a convenience for advancing his own private interests.
For his official duties he received a mere Rs. 100 per month, whereas 
he obtained a far larger income from his commercial ventures. In 
view of this, Meade thought that Rahim had better be retired. The 
problem would then be with whom to replace him. One of the clerks 
at the Residency could be sent as a newswriter, but would not possess 
the considerable standing which Rahim commanded in Bahrain and Britain 
would thereby lose much of her influence in the Shaikhdom. On the 
other hand, Meade claimed, there was no chance of the Government of 
India increasing the pay attached to the post. However, the funds 
to provide na really efficient Agent” in Bahrain might be forthcoming 
if Shaikh cIsa could be induced to ask the British to manage his
1 Ibid
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Customs, Over the previous decade, the trade of Bahrain had increased 
very greatly and had reached about 8 million rupees-. At four per 
cent this should yield more than Rs. 300,000, far more than the amount
c» •— -|
for which Shaikh Isa farmed the Customs, Although the First
Assistant Resident, Prideaux, had found Shaikh Isa to be guarded and
disposed to procrastinate on the subject of the customs, Meade reported
that he himself intended to broach the matter. The Resident was
aware that the Shaikh was anxious that the British should acknowledge
the right of his son Hamad to succeed him and this "opportunity*1 might
#
be a "good one to place our position at Bahrein on a satisfactory 
footing".^
The Indian Foreign Secretary, Cuningham, agreed that, if Rahim 
had to be replaced, a mere newswriter would be "of little use as 
Agent, especially when called upon to protect British interests against
outside influence". There would certainly be no harm in sounding
c*" ■■ 3Shaikh Isa about the customs. In fact the whole question Meade
had raised was by no means as simple and innocuous as Cuningham 
believed. The question of British representation in Bahrain, and 
the control of the Customs, which Meade had linked with it, were bound 
up with the issue of gun-running to Afghanistan via the Gulf ports 
and Persia.
1 On 31 October 1897 Shaikh cIsa signed an agreement farming out 
the Customs to the firm of banians for a further term of two years 
starting in April 1900. cIsa was to be paid Rs, -^,800 per month, 
i.e. Rs. 115,200 over the two-year period, plus another Rs,
36,000, making a total of Rs. 151,200. A copy of this agreement 
may be found in L/P & S/7/138, register No, 1318a.
2 Meade to Cuningham, 2 October 1897, L/P & S/7/104, register No. 
711-12.
3 Cuningham to Meade, 8 November 1897, L/P & S/7/10*f, register No, 
711-12.
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Action had been taken by the Government of India to put a stop 
to this traffic at least as early as 1880. By 1891, common action 
was being taken by the Governments of India, Persia and Muscat. After 
the Government of Persia, in April 1895* had taken fresh measures to 
confiscate arms imported into its ports, one of the arms firms,
Fracis Times and Co., turned its attention to the establishment of a 
depot in Bahrain. This firm was a partnership between a Parsi and 
an Englishman. In 1896 they asked the Assistant Resident at Bushire 
for a letter of introduction to the Shaikh of Bahrain for commercial 
purposes. The Residency required them to give an assurance that 
they did not intend to deal in arms there. Fracis Times were able to 
get round this difficulty by exploiting the commercial interests of 
the British Agent in Bahrain, Agha Muhammad Rahim.^
At the beginning of 1896, Shaikh °Isa had published a notification
forbidding the introduction of arms into the islands since he feared
that they might be used against himself. However, he had also given
a concession to his wazir to import arms for re-export on condition
that they were not to be sold on the islands. This concession was
obtained from the wazir by Rahim who, in turn, made it over to Fracis
~ •
Times. This firm made Rahim their Agent and relied on him to make 
the retail sales of the quantities of arms and ammunition they now 
began to send to Bahrain. Fracis Times was one of those firms in
1 India Office to Foreign Office, 9 August 1898, register No. 711-12, 
L/P & S/V/IO^ f; memorandum by Fracis Times and Co., 7 March 1898,
L/P 8c S/3/363, p. 369.
2 Meade*s confidential observations on protests made by merchants 
against seizure of their arms in places under the British Resident 
in the Persian Gulf, 16 May 1898, enclosure in Meade to Sec. to 
Govt, of India, F.D., 16 May 1898, No. 3^ i register No. 711-12,
L/P 8c S/7/1 O^ f.
3 India Office to Foreign Office, 9 August 1898, L/P 8c S/7/10^, 
register No. 711-12.
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which Rahim was interested to which he had extended the privilege of 
paying only three per cent import duty instead of the four per cent 
normally paid to the Customs in Bahrain. Thus, when, in September 
1897* those banians who were farmers of the Customs complained to 
Meade about Rahim*s actions in reducing their Customs revenue, the
Resident had, for the first time, discovered the connection between his
/1
Agent in Bahrain and Fracis Times.
When Rahim discovered that Meade was opposed to his trading
ventures and was enquiring into the arms traffic, he had tried to get
out of the business. He induced the Shaikh, through his wazir, to
demand the return of the concession. However, Fracis Times refused to
give it back and, eventually, on 20 January 1898 or thereabouts the
2
Shaikh had the firm’s stocks in Bahrain seized. This occurred at 
a moment when the British and Indian Governments were taking firm action 
against the arms trade of the Gulf. During the British military 
operations on the North-West Frontier of India in 1897-98, the traffic 
in arms, chiefly of Belgian manufacture, exported from Manchester and 
other British ports, had increased to such an extent that special 
enquiries began to be made. Arms and cartridges, exactly like those 
exported from England by British and other firms to the Gulf ports, 
had been discovered by British troops at Pasni, Tirah and other places 
on the Indian frontier."^  In December 1897, pressure from the
1 Meade’s confidential observations of 16 May 1898, No. 3^ , L/P & 
S/7/104, register No. 711-12.
2 Ibid.
3 Salisbury to Charles Hardinge, Her Majesty’s Minister, Tehran,
8 December 1897, tel. No. 31, L/P & S/3/361, p. 1016; Sec. of 
State for India to Govt, of India, 12 January 1900 (Secret)
L/P & S/3/375.
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British Government resulted in the seizure of arms consignments at 
1
Bushire. A month later, a declaration, initiated and sponsored by 
the British Government, prohibiting the trade in arms, had been issued 
by the Sultan of Muscat. In April 1898 the British succeeded in
Q m  mm
obtaining from Shaikh Isa a proclamation absolutely prohibiting the 
import of arms into, or the export of arms from, Bahrain."^
Meanwhile, in March 1898, Fracis Times had written to the 
Foreign Office about the confiscation in the previous January of the 
arms they had deposited in Bahrain. The firm alleged that it was the 
"British Consul at Bahrain", in other words Rahim, who had ordered the
m
seizure. In fact when Meade had visited Bahrain in February 1898, 
a few weeks after the seizure, he apparently "heard", it is not said 
from whom, that Shaikh Isa had ordered the confiscation at the
1 Hardinge to Foreign Office, 16 December 1897 (tel.), ’Selection 
from Correspondence relative to the Traffic in Arms in the Persian 
Gulf, 1897-98*, Part I, L/P & S/18/C87, p. 8.
2 Sec. of State for India to Viceroy, 17 December 1897 (tel.), L/P
& S/3/361, pp. 1007-08 and notification by Faisal b. Turki,
Sultan of Muscat, 13 January 1898, ’Selection from Correspondence 
relative to the Traffic in Arms in the Persian Gulf, 1897-98*,
Part I, p. 22.
3 Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Resident, Bushire, 26 April 1898,
tel. No. 710 E.A., register 711-12, L/P & S/7/10^; Meade to
Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 30 May 1898, No. 39, L/P &
S/7/104; ’Agreement with the Shaikh of Bahrain for the 
suppression of Trade in Arms’, 30 April 1898, item No. XIV, 
Aitchison, op. cit., XI, 238.
b Fracis Times to Foreign Office, 7 March 1898, ’Selection from
Correspondence relative to the Traffic in Arms in the Persian Gulf, 
1897-98’, Part I, pp. ^2-^3. In 1900 Fracis Times sued Meade for 
damages in respect of the seizure of their arms at Bahrain and 
elsewhere in the Gulf in 1897-98. See Messrs. Hollams, Sons, 
Coward, and Hawksley, Solicitors to Meade, 23 July 1900, enclosure 
in Meade to India Office, 25 July 1900, L/P & S/3/378. Judgment 
was given in favour of Meade in 1901. See Sec. of State for India 
to Viceroy, 23 May 1901, L/P & S/3/352, register No. 2011a.
172
suggestion of Rahim*^ At the same time, Meade claimed, Rahim had acted 
• •
entirely in a private capacity and without reference to the Residency
2 c__at Bushire. Meade alleged that he had been told by Shaikh Isa,
in February 1898, that he, the Shaikh, had become anxious to stop the
import of arms into Bahrain since "he knew his enemies were being
rapidly armed by them". It was also Meade*s claim that "the Shaikh
3
also had no intimation that the Government wanted the arms seized".
This may well have been true. However, on 17 November l897f Meade
had personally told Hamad b. Isa, the Shaikh's eldest son, who was on
a visit to Bushire, that it was "highly necessary" that the storage of
arms in Bahrain should be prevented and that this message should be
if
passed on to his father.
Shaikh Hamad visited Bushire in November 1897 with a view to 
securing British acquiescence to his right to succeed his father as
C«» m  Q a  mm
Shaikh of Bahrain when Isa b. Ali died. Shaikh Isa was at this
time most anxious to ensure the unchallenged succession to the rulership
5
of Bahrain of his favourite and eldest surviving son Hamad. Shaikh
a
Isa's concern for Hamad's future was largely a result of the 
discontent and ambition of CIsa's nephew, Ali b. Ahmad. Shaikh Ali 
was the son of °Isa's brother Ahmad, who, until his death in 1888, had
1 'Colonel Meade's Instructions /to his Solicitors/*» enclosure No. 2
in Meade to India Office, 22 August 1900, L/P & S/3/378.
2 Ibid.; Meade's confidential observations of 16 May 1898, No. 3^ »
l7p ’& S/7/1cy+, register No. 711-12.
3 'Colonel Meade's Instructions /to his Solicitors/** enclosure No. 2
in Meade to India Office, 22 August 1900, L/P & S/3/378*
k Memorandum by J.C. Gaskin, 2 December 1897» R/15/1/315*
5 The death of his older son, Salman, had been reported in
'Administration Report', 1893-9**» P- 7»
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played an important part in the administration of Bahrain alongside
C“ “ 1 c«* “•Shaikh Isa. Shaikh Ali felt that Shaikh Isa was preventing him from
inheriting both his father's estates and his position in the
administration of Bahrain. Ali was a powerful rival to Shaikh Hamad
for the rulership of Bahrain. He was known to be much more capable
than Hamad. Moreover, Ali was also strongly supported by his forceful
c** ~ 2mother, who had married Shaikh Isa after the death of Ali's father.
Shaikh Hamad could best be protected by obtaining the approval of
the British Government for his claim to the succession. Thus, in
October 1897, Shaikh Isa formally nominated Hamad as his successor and
asked the Resident to secure the recognition of the Government of India 
3
for this act. The staff at the Residency were well aware that such a
recognition would be contrary to established policy and without
precedent.** During Shaikh Hamad's visit to Bushire, in November 1897*
#
he was told by Meade that he had reason to believe that, as a rule, 
there existed in Bahrain a system of appointing a ruler, or a successor 
to a deceased ruler, by "the tribal voice". Meade, conveyed to the 
Government of India Shaikh Hamad's request for recognition, stating that 
he had told Hamad that he was "aware of the advantages which an
1 See above, pp. , and references cited there for Shaikh
Ahmad's share of the revenues of Bahrain, and the disposition of his 
property after his death.
2 Meade to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 12 March 1899* No. 6 8,
P/5724, May 1899, pp. 49-52.
3 Will of CIsa b. Ali, October 1897, enclosure in Shaikh CIsa to 
Meade, 7 February 1898, R/15/1/315, PP* 84-85; 'Administration 
Report, 1897-98', p. 7.
4 Minute by an unidentified Asst, at the Bushire Residency, 8 
February 1897, 1^15/1/315* memorandum by Gaskin, 26 August 1897, 
1^15/1/315* Meade to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 5 December 1897, 
No. 124, 1^/15/1/315.
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undisputed succession would bring to the Island”.
On 23 March 1898, Meade prepared a minute on the subject. When
0 a  mm
Shaikh Isa had, on an earlier occasion, in 1890, indicated a wish that 
his eldest son should be recognised, Colonel Ross had been of the 
opinion that a previous recognition would “create jealousies”. Meade
Q m m  m
also observed that, if the Government agreed to Shaikh Isa*s request, 
this would bind them to maintain Hamad in rulership. He wished to 
have more information about the customs and practice of the Gulf Arabs 
with regard to succession. If Hamad was given recognition, what would 
be the probable reaction of the people of Bahrain and the surrounding 
tribes? Would it strengthen British influence without increasing 
their responsibilities ”to any undue extent"? Would such a 
recognition ensure a peaceful succession and thereby benefit British 
trade?^
The Residents minute was forwarded for comment to various 
British officials in the Gulf area who had special knowledge relating 
to the issues Meade had raised. Surveying the traditions of the Arabs 
of Oman, Bahrain, and Muhammara the officials observed that the 
succession to the Shaikhship in important Arab tribes to a great extent 
rested with the elders of the tribe. The eldest and most capable 
member of the ruling family usually succeeded independently of any 
nomination by the late Shaikh. However, when a son had acted as his
1 Meade to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 5 December 1897* No. 124, 
R /15 /V 315.
2 Minute by Meade, 23 March 1898, R/15/V315*
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father*s deputy and proved his capability, it was likely that he would 
succeed rather than an untried uncle. In such a case, the people 
necessarily regarded the Shaikh's favourite as their future ruler.
As far as Bahrain itself was concerned, in view of its previous history, 
the recognition of a particular individual as a successor before
Q .  mm
Shaikh Isa's death occurred should have the beneficial effect of 
deterring any of the rivals from resorting to violence to secure their 
ends. Where tribes were tributary to another power, the nomination 
of a successor by that paramount power was accepted practice. The
case of tribes subject to or under the protection of Turkey was one 
example.1
Meade's First Assistant at the Residency, Captain Prideaux,
emphasized the political aspects of the proposal in an influential
and significant minute. He asserted that the British agent in
Bahrain was not a consular but "a Residency (political) Agent", and it
seemed to him to be "a pity that Government will not declare once and
for all that the status of Bahrein towards the Government of India is
the same as that of the native states in India, by reason of our
2
treaties with the island, and more recent closer relations".
By the terms of the Convention which the British Government had
signed in 1861, the Shaikh of Bahrain had been recognised as an
3
"independent ruler". Since that time, by means of the Exclusive
1 W.M. Donally, Vice-Consul, Muhammara, to Meade, 1*f April 1898, No.
Surgeon Lieutenant-Colonel Jayakar, Muscat, to Fagan, 17 May 
1898, No. 6 ; Memorandum by J.C. Gaskin, 30 April 1898, R/15/1/315*
2 Minute by Prideaux, 2 June 1898, R/15/1/315» PP* 92-93*
3 Item No. X, Aitchison, op. cit., XI, 23^35*
176
Agreements of 1880 and 1892, the British had curtailed the powers of
the Shaikh to act freely in foreign relations. According to Prideaux,
the Exclusive Agreement of 1892 had brought Bahrain "entirely within
/th e British sphere of influence and exclud/[ecf7 that of all other 
1
powers". In short, by this interpretation, Bahrain was no longer 
an "independent state".
The Resident now had what he wanted. Meade stated that the
opinions he had received on the question of succession in Bahrain had
confirmed him in his original opinion that "the time has come to take a
more decided position in Bahrein" than formerly. Closely following
the text of Prideaux*s minute, Meade added that
the treaty engagements entered into between the British 
Government and the Sheikhs of Bahrein, followed by more 
recent closer relations, appear to justify an intimation by 
the British Government that the status of Bahrein towards 
the Government of India is identical with that of protected 
Native states in India.^
Should such a step be taken, the recognition of Shaikh Hamad 
would be merely following the precedent frequently adopted in India.
On the other hand, it would not be opposed to Arab ideas, because
Shaikh °Isa had been able to obtain the approval of many of the leading
- 3men of the A1 Khalifa to his succession arrangements. Meade then
pointed out the advantages for Britain which might be obtained by the
1 Note by Prideaux to Meade, 11 June 1898,
2 Meade to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 13 June 1898, No. 37-S.A.,
L/P & S/7/108.
3 See the forty-four signatures and seals of the principal men of 
the A1 Khalifa and others in Bahrain appended to the will of
Shaikh Isa, October 1897, declaring Shaikh Hamad to be his
successor, R/15/'l/3'>3, PP- 86-88.
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Q m  mm
exploitation of Shaikh Isa’s anxiety about Hamad’s future. The
Shaikh should be called on, flas a condition of ^ Hamad's^ recognition,
to enter into even closer political relations with us than at present
exist1'. Meade suggested that "advantage may be taken of the
recognition of his son to urge Sheikh Esa to place the control of the
customs in our hands". This would not only solve the Shaikh's
financial problems, it would also "immensely improve our position not
only in Bahrein itself, but also generally throughout the Persian Gulf".
Another "not unimportant" reason for recommending the recognition of
Shaikh Hamad was that it ought effectually to put an end to Turkish
pretensions with regard to Bahrain. Meade suggested that the Turks
should be told, in connection with their protest about the alleged
British intention to send a Vice-Consul to Bahrain, that the
representative the British maintained in the Shaikhdom was not a
consular officer but "a Residency (Political) Agent under the
Government of India". Meade strongly recommended that a Political, and
not a consular, officer of higher rank than Agha Muhammad Rahim should• •
be appointed. 1
 ^ The agent in question soon provided material to reinforce these 
views. On 2 July 1898 Rahim sent Meade a long list of oppressions
Q m m  m
which, the Agent claimed, Shaikh Isa was perpetrating on his subjects 
in order to raise revenue. As a result, discontent was increasing 
among the inhabitants of Bahrain, including members of the ruling 
A1 Khalifa. There was even a possibility, as a result of this 
discontent, of some of the leading A1 Khalifa seeking asylum in the
1 Meade to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 13 June 1898, No. 37-S.A., 
L/P 8c S/7/108.
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territories of another Government, with all the ensuing complications 
which that would create for the British. But the British Agent openly
Q m  mm
confessed his total ineffectiveness in influencing Shaikh Isa to change
his ways. Rahim admitted that, when he gave the Shaikh advice ’’for the
good of his dignity and his subjects, he does not listen but acts
1
contrarily”.
On receipt of this letter at the Residency, Gaskin recorded his
suspicion that anti-British elements, ’’mostly Turkish subjects and
Anglophobes of loose character", were behind these developments. The
c **chief among this group was Muhammad b. Abdul Wahab, who had played such
m
a notorious role in events in Qatar in the 1880s. Since then he had
settled in Darin, a village on an island off Qatif, where he had founded
a settlement. He had further been recognised as Governor of Darin by
the Turks, who had also given him a decoration. Muhammad sheltered
absconding debtors and bankrupts from Bahrain and was trying to attract
people from Bahrain to settle at Darin and thereby increase the
2
importance of the latter.
Muhammad b.°Abdul Wahab and the others in this anti-British group 
were, Gaskin believed, giving Shaikh CIsa bad advice. They were 
pointing out to him methods of raising money by which, they claimed, he 
would be able to meet the many demands made upon him, but their true 
objective was to create discontent in Bahrain for the benefit of Turkey. 
These intriguers were telling Shaikh °Isa that the British had no right 
to interfere in the internal affairs of Bahrain and that he was
1 Rahim to Meade (in Arabic), 2 July 1898, R/15/1/315* PP* 120-26
2 Minute by Gaskin, 11 July 1898, R/15/1/315* PP* 126-3^.
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independent and could act as he pleased. No doubt, added Gaskin, they 
were also feeding Shaikh Isa's suspicions that the British might not 
support the succession to the Shaikhship of his son Hamad. Shaikh
Q .  mm
Isa was trying to secure the support for Hamad's succession of "alien 
tribes", which spent the summer in Bahrain and wintered in Qatar, by 
paying them liberally. Since the Shaikh's revenues were insufficient 
to meet the demands both of the members of the various branches of the 
ruling family and of the tribesmen, he was proving receptive to the 
suggestions of the intriguers for money-raising ventures. Those who 
were being hardest hit by these oppressions were those who were the 
"backbone" of the island's economy, the traders. If, as a result, 
the trade of Bahrain was dislocated, it would have a disastrous effect, 
especially since nearly all the imports into the islands came from 
India. Moreover, there was a political danger in the deteriorating 
situation in Bahrain. The members of the ruling family, knowing that
Q m m  mm
Shaikh Isa was in practice dependent on British goodwill, considered
that the Government of India was "more or less responsible for the
state of affairs" obtaining in the Shaikhdom. Gaskin considered that
it was only just that the British should protect the people of Bahrain
1
from the oppressions they were suffering at the hands of the Shaikh.
The response of Prideaux to this new intelligence from Bahrain was
that the influence there of Agha Muhammad Rahim seemed to have
• •
2 . . "considerably decreased" , whilst Meade himself noted the hostility
c  3
towards Shaikh Isa which the Agent's letter betrayed.
1 Minute by Gaskin, 11 July 1898, R/15/1/315* PP* 126-3^*
2 Minute by Prideaux, k August 1898, R/15/1/315* P* 135*
3 Minute by Meade, 15 August 1898, R/15/1/515* P* 135*
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In a despatch of October 1898 regarding the question of Shaikh
Hamad's succession and the associated issues of the Customs and the
improvement of British representation in Bahrain, the Government of
India, unlike Meade, considered that the British position in respect
to Bahrain did not need revision. Also, it was a principle of British
policy generally "to avoid interference in the internal affairs of a
Chiefship and particularly in dynastic disputes". However, to avoid
the risk of disturbances and continued intrigue over the succession
issue in Bahrain, the Government of India was disposed to recognise 
1
Shaikh Hamad.
On the question of the control of Bahrain's Customs by Britain, 
the Government of India observed that such a measure "should secure an 
effective check on the trade in arms". If Meade was authorised to 
recognise Shaikh Hamad as successor to the Shaikhship, the Government 
of India thought that the Resident "might, perhaps, simultaneously 
inform the present Shaikh, in general terms, that we should welcome some 
improved arrangement in respect to the customs". The authorities in 
India had, deliberately or otherwise, overlooked Meade's recommendation 
that recognition of Hamad's succession should only be given in return 
for control of the Customs. They would be prepared to lend Shaikh
Q m m  wm
Isa the services of a qualified officer to manage his Customs, and 
Meade might be able at the same time to "devise some more suitable 
arrangement than that now in force for the discharge of local political 
duties in Bahrain". However, it was considered that Meade's suggestion 
for the appointment to Bahrain of a Political Officer of higher rank than
1 Govt, of India, F.D., to Sec. of State for India, 27 October 1898, 
No. 19^ » L/P & S/7/108, register No. 10V+.
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Agha Muhammad Rahim was too vague for the Government of India to base • •
any recommendation on it and Meade had been asked to report again on 
1
this question. This move clearly reflects the lack of any real 
interest, at this time, on the part of the Government of India in a 
forward policy in the Gulf.
The attitude of the India Office was quite different.
Sir William Lee-Warner, the Secretary of the Political & Secret 
Department, noted, in November 1898, that, in view of the commercial and 
strategic importance of Bahrain, it would be wise "to tighten our hold 
on the place". The arrangement by which a local trader was given "a 
few rupees" to represent British interests in the Shaikhdom had, not
Q m m  m
surprisingly, proved obnoxious to Shaikh Isa and others in Bahrain.
Lee-Wamer clearly favoured Meade*s proposal for a change in the existing
form of British representation. It was true that, in the past,
Bahrain had been recognised by Britain as having an independent
Government. Even so, in Lee-Wamer*s view, "we must mean
independent of all Governments except our own, because we have two
treaties of 1861 and 1880 ... which are of a protective character".
Further, Lee-Wamer observed, the 1880 agreement had actually omitted
2reference to Bahrain's independence.
Even so, no action could be taken in pursuance of Lee-Warner's 
suggestion until the further report, which the Government of India had 
asked Meade to make, had been received. Therefore, the India Office,
1 Ibid.
2 Minute by W. Lee-Warner, n.d. but some time in November 1898, 
L/P & S/7/108, register No. 10Vf.
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in December 1898, merely secured the approval of the Foreign Office
1
to the recognition of Hamad,
Meade soon pressed for instructions about the recognition issue. 
The matter had become urgent because the Resident intended visiting 
Bahrain personally in the near future, Meade added that it would 
probably be desirable, if Shaikh Hamad was recognised, "to declare our
m
protectorate over Bahrein, and thus put an end to all pretensions on
the part of other powers”. Shaikh Isa ought to fly the British flag
and "it should be formally notified that Bahrein is under our 
2
protection"•
There was nothing essentially new about this pressure from Meade
for Bahrain to be brought into a position of greater dependence on
Britain, It came, however, just at the moment when the Government of
India received a new head. On 6 January 1899* Lord Elgin had been
replaced by Lord Curzon as Viceroy of India, Curzon was an unashamed 
3
imperialist. His great ambition in life was to safeguard the 
British Empire and, especially, British rule in India which he regarded 
as the cornerstone of Britain's imperial greatness. Curzon's view of 
the defence of India was cast in terms of the seige. He regarded 
India's position as "like a fortress with the vast moat of the sea on 
two of her faces, and with mountains for her walls on the remainder".
1 India Office to Foreign Office, 2k November 1898; Foreign Office 
to India Office, 9 December 1898; Sec. of State for India to 
Viceroy, 16 December 1898, Secret No, 44, L/P & S/7/108, register 
No. 1044.
2 Meade to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 10 January 1899* No. 2, 
R/15/V315, pp. 137-38.
3 Curzon to Lord George Hamilton, Sec. of State for India, 9 July 
1903» Curzon papers, F.111/162, quoted in David Dilks, Curzon in 
India (London, 1970), I, 237.
183
Beyond those walls extended "a glacis’1, Curzon's strategy in respect of
which was described in the following terms:
We do not want to occupy it, but we also cannot afford to 
see it occupied by our foes. We are quite content to let 
it remain in the hands of our allies and friends, but if 
rivalry and unfriendly influences creep up to it and lodge 
themselves right under our walls, we are compelled to 
intervene, because a danger would thereby grow up that 
might one day menace our security.^
For Curzon, there was no more important part of this 'glacis*,
which he considered vital to the defence of India, than Persia and the
Gulf. Already, before he became Viceroy, he had built up a reputation
as an expert on Persian and Gulf affairs. In 1892 he had published
his classic Persia and the Persian Question. Moreover, Curzon had a
great sense of personal mission with regard to the Gulf. In a letter
of 8 January 1900, he had told St. John Brodrick, who was then occupying
Curzon's old post of Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that
he, Curzon, "who had worked for 10 years to get my countrymen to
understand the question and its importance" had been "fated to be"
Viceroy of India, "the very place where I have the opportunity to save
2
the position for England".
In reply to his letter of 10 January, the Resident was informed
Q m m  mm
by the new Viceroy's Government that he might tell Shaikh Isa that they 
recognised Shaikh Hamad as successor-designate to the rulership of
Q m m  mm
Bahrain. Whilst giving Shaikh Isa this news, Meade should try to
1 Curzon's speech in the Budget debate in the Indian Assembly, 190*f, 
quoted in 'Confidential Summary of the Principal Events and Measures 
of the Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon in the Foreign Department',
Vol. IV, Persia and the Persian Gulf, Curzon Papers, F.111/531*
2 Curzon to Brodrick, 8 January 1900, Midleton Papers, Add. 50073* 
pp. 283-90.
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induce him to reform his Customs administration, preferably by applying
to the Government of India for the loan of a "qualified officer" to
control the Customs* With reference to Meade's proposal for the
formal declaration of a British protectorate over Bahrain, however,
Lord Curzon's government was unwilling to go so far at this time,
although their reply indicated that they certainly had it in mind as a
possible course of action in the future* The appointment of an
officer to superintend the Customs might afford a suitable means of
improving Britain's political representation in Bahrain and the
1
Resident was asked to submit proposals on this as well*
Meade visited the Shaikhdom in Febi*uary-March 1899* Although he 
had been given no specific sanction to do so, Meade delayed telling
Q m m  mm
Shaikh Isa that the Government of India was prepared to accede to his 
request, in the hope that recognition could be used as a bargaining 
counter to win concessions from the Shaikh on the Customs and
Q a  mm
representation issues* Meade stressed that Shaikh Isa's hopes lay
only in obedience to the wishes of the British Government, one of
which was that his Customs administration should be reformed, preferably
2 c- -by an officer loaned from India* Shaikh Isa told Meade that the 
amount he was receiving from the banians for the Customs was about
3
Rs* 110,000 a year. This, Meade pointed out, was only about a third
1 Sec* to Govt, of India, F.D., to Meade, 7 February 1899* No. 
205-E.A., H/15/V315, P- 141.
2 Note by Gaskin on Meade's visit to Bahrain, 10 March 1899* 
H/15/V315, pp. 152-60.
3 Meade was incorrect. It has been shown above (p. 168) that, in 
fact, cIsa, by an agreement of 1897* was to receive only
Rs. 151*200 for a two-year period in 1900-02.
185
of what the Shaikh ought to receive for his Customs. Therefore, if a
reform could be effected, the Shaikh could put his financial affairs
in order and thereby flbe able to defy his enemies more successfully"•
By recommending the reform of the Customs of Bahrain, the British
Government, claimed Meade, "did in no way intend to interfere in the
administration of Bahrein, nor did they wish to take any portion of the 
1
Customs revenue". In making this statement, Meade was, once more,
mm
being less than fully honest with Shaikh Isa. In his demi-official
letter to Sir William Cuningham on 2 October 1897* the Resident had
suggested that control of the Customs would provide funds for better
2
British representation in Bahrain.
The Shaikh responded warily that he wanted time to think the
matter over and to consult his relations before giving a reply.
However, at a subsequent interview during the same visit, Meade
discovered that, about six months previously, Shaikh Isa had extended
the banians1 lease of the Customs farm for a further period of two years.
The Resident told the Shaikh that he was very displeased with his action,
that he expected to be consulted before such measures were resorted to,
that the Government "would not view his action with favour" and that,
by this action, the Shaikh was "hindering the consummation of his
3 c— **wishes in regard to his son Hamed". Shaikh Isa promised to consider 
the British proposals for reform of the Customs and to contact the
4
Resident before the expiry of the current contract with the banians.
1 Note by Gaskin on Meade*s visit to Bahrain, 10 March 1899*
R/15/1/315, pp. 152-60.
2 See above, p. 16?.
3 Note by Gaskin, 10 March 1899* R/15/1/315* PP* 157-58.
Ibid.
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Meade reported to the Government of India that, in view of Shaikh 
CIsa*6 unsatisfactory attitude with regard to the Customs question, he 
had decided to refer to the Government before informing the Shaikh of 
their decision on the succession issue. Meade pointed out that there
Qn  mm
would be no obstacle to at once communicating to Shaikh Isa the 
Governments decision to recognise Hamad should that be thought
Q m m  mm
advisable. However, once this was done, Shaikh Isa would consider 
himself secure. On the other hand, as long as the information was 
withheld from him, the Government would have "a certain means of 
pressing him to improve his affairs in the hope of obtaining the 
recognition".^
Meade was convinced that the Shaikh*s attitude to the disposal
of the Customs was due to the difficulty he was experiencing in obtaining
sufficient ready money to meet all the calls which were made on him.
The Resident therefore suggested that, if the Government were able to
offer Shaikh Isa a sum of money in the way of an advance with which
he could clear off his debts to those who were farming the Customs on
condition that he entrusted their charge to a Government official,
2then the matter could easily be settled.
The Government of India characteristically replied that Meade’s 
suggestion of a loan could not be proceeded with unless it was presented
1 Meade to Sec. of Govt, of India, F.D., 12 March 1899» No. 27, 
R/15/1/315, PP. 162-69.
2 Ibid. pg. 169-71. This suggestion for a Government loan to enable 
Shaikh Isa to pay off his debts to the banians had, apparently, 
originally been made by Prideaux. See minute by Prideaus to Meade, 
10 March 1899, R/15/1/3151 p. 160. Indeed, Prideaux had drafted 
Meade's reply to the Government of India; see minute by Meade to 
Prideaux, 11 March 1899, %/15/1/315, p. 161.
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in a more definite form. In particular, the size of the loan required
and the terms of repayment needed to be reported. However, Meade*s
letter had been yet another piece of evidence of the desirability of
early measures being taken "to secure better representation and more
continuous influence /[in Bahrain^ them can be looked for from occasional
visits by the Political Resident". In the meemtime, Meade was allowed
discretion as to making known or withholding the orders of the
1
Government respecting the succession issue.
A new inconvenience for the logic of the British position soon
developed. In May 1899 Shaikh °Isa complained to Meade about the
2activities of an American missionary, S.M. Zwemer. The Shaikh 
enclosed a petition which had, apparently, been submitted to him by 
eighteen inhabitants of Bahrain alleging that Zwemer had been "openly
3
interfering in religious matters, and denouncing our Prophet Muhammad".
Six months before, in November 1898, the Shaikh had informed a British
agent in Bahrain that Zwemer was attacking Islam and causing annoyance
kto the inhabitants of the Shaikhdom. At that time, Meade had contacted
Zwemer to caution him against causing trouble in Bahrain. Now Meade
recommended that it would "probably be safer" if the American was
5
advised to leave Bahrain.
1 Deputy Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Meade, 2h April 1899*
No. 616-E.A., H/15/V315, pp. 176-77.
2 Shaikh CIsa to Meade, 10 May 1899» L/P & S/7/11^, register No. 657.
Zwemer had previously been in Basra and Muscat. Whilst in Bahrain
he wrote Arabia: The Cradle of Islam (New York, 1900). Later he
founded the journal The Moslem World in the U.S.A.
3 *Petition from inhabitants of Bahrein, to Sheikh /^ ls a 7 t Chief of 
Bahrein*, 9 May 1899» L/p & S/7/11^» register No. 637.
4 Shaikh °Isa to Abdul Rahman b. Ali Taqi (the agent of Agha Muhammad
Rahim), 2 1  November 1898, L/P & S/7^11^* register No. 657.
5 Meade to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 29 May 1899$ No. 76, L/P & 
S/7/11^ * register No. 657.
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The Government of India agreed with Meade, but the matter was not
1quite as simply as they presented it to the Home Government. As the
India Office pointed out, by the Exclusive Agreement of 1880 the
British government had required the Shaikh of Bahrain to abstain from
negotiating with foreign powers other than Britain and to refuse
permission for these powers to establish consular agencies in the 
2
island. Since foreign powers were debarred from representing the 
interests of their own nationals to the Shaikh of Bahrain, this 
responsibility had passed to the protecting power. This incident, in 
fact, was an early example of an issue which was to become even more 
important as the interest in Bahrain of European powers other than 
Britain continued to grow in the following period.
Lee-Warner had been surprised at India’s stand on Zwemer since 
there was no evidence to show that the missionary had behaved improperly. 
The official stated that Bahrain was "a British protectorate" and that, 
therefore, the United States Government would expect Britain to secure 
for her subjects proper rights and privileges". These certainly 
included religious freedom, and the British Government "could not go to
3
America and ask it to recall Mr. Zwemer on the evidence now before us". 
Nevertheless, on 28 July 1899* the India Office told the Foreign
1 Govt, of India, F.D., to Sec. of State for India, 22 June 1899i
Secret No. 118, L/P & S/7/1'1^ * register No. 657*
2 India Office to Foreign Office, 28 July 18991 L/P & S/7/1
register No. 657*
3 Minute by Sir William Lee-Wamer, n.d., L/P & S/7/n^»
register No. 637-
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Office that they agreed with the Government of India that Zwemer should
1not be allowed to stay in Bahrain against the wishes of the Shaikh.
From the minutes written on the question at the India Office it is
evident that the Government of India’s recommendation was endorsed because
it was considered that the danger to British interests which would arise
from an attempt to allow Zwemer to remain in Bahrain against Shaikh 
c— —Isa's wishes over-rode the sense of obligation to defend the right of
foreign missionaries to proselytise on the island. Sir Alfred Lyall of
the Council of India noted that, if Britain insisted that Shaikh Isa
should tolerate Zwemer's mission "our protectorate will become
2
unpalatable to the people of Bahrain". Another member of the Council,
Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, minuted that "a row about a matter of this sort"
3
in the Gulf might prove most damaging to British interests just then.
Lyall observed that there was a danger that the presence of Zwemer in 
Bahrain could become some kind of a precedent. If one missionary was 
encouraged to operate in the Shaikhdom, others "of different nationalities" 
were likely to establish themselves. Moreover, it was not just a matter 
of missionaries. Lyall noted that Meade had recently reported that 
"certain Frenchmen wanted to enter Bahrain and that there were "Russians 
and Germans travelling about the shores of the Persian Gulf". If the
C~ *■British Government failed to support Shaikh Isa when he wanted to get 
Europeans out of Bahrain, it could not be expected that he would defer 
to British wishes whenever objection was raised to others who might want
1 India Office to Foreign Office, 28 July 1899» L/P & S/7/1 
register No. 657.
2 Minute by Lyall, n.d., L/P & S/7/11^» register No. 657*
3 Minute by Fitzpatrick, ^  July 1899* L/P & S/7/1register No.
657.
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to gain a footing there.
The report by Meade to which Lyall had referred was a secret
communication to the Government of India on 28 May 1899* The Resident
was most concerned about the activities in the Gulf of certain foreign
nationals whom Meade considered to be agents of their respective
governments. One in particular, a Frenchman named Goguyer, had arrived
c «in Bahrain where he had been received by Muhammad b. Abdul Wahab. 
Muhammad had arranged for Goguyer to meet the Shaikh and to have ’’every 
facility for enquiring into the trade of the place”. It was rumoured 
that Goguyer had told various people in Bahrain that they might easily 
obtain French protection and that, for a small sum, he would give them 
certificates of naturalization. Meade reminded the Government of India 
that the French had for some time been trying to ’’gain subjects and 
protegSs”. Bahrain was a particularly fruitful area for such an 
attempt since many of those living on the island, both Arabs and non-
Q m m  mm
Arabs, did not profess to be subjects of Shaikh Isa and might consider 
that they were free to take any nationality they liked. As far as 
Goguyer himself was concerned, the Resident thought it was probable that 
he was to some extent supported by his Government, or, at any rate, by 
the French consular authorities at Muscat and Bushire, and that he would 
try to advance French political interests as well as his own commercial 
concerns. Also, Meade warned, Goguyer was thought to be interested in 
the arms traffic so that there was a danger that ’’the French name and
1 Minute by Lyall, n.d., L/P & S/7/11^ , register No. 657-
In fact, Zwemer was not asked to leave Bahrain. After the American
Board of Arabian Missions had enjoined on Zwemer ’’the duty of 
exercising the utmost caution compatible with the performance of his
mission" the matter was dropped. See India Office to Viceroy,
5 January 1900 (secret), L/P & S/3/373.
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flag1' would be employed to bring arms into the Gulf.
In the same letter, Meade had stated his belief that, before long, 
there would be ’’considerable activity displayed by various European 
powers or their subjects in these regions”. The only way to meet their 
efforts would be to increase Britain’s own consular representation in 
the Gulf and to help British merchants to establish themselves there.
The Resident proposed specifically that consular representatives ought, 
as a matter of urgency, to be established at Bahrain and Bandar Abbas 
and that they should be encouraged to move about and visit the country 
in their neighbourhood. These representatives, Meade was convinced, 
should be ’’Englishmen of good position and standing”. It was important 
that the British authorities responsible for Gulf affairs should encourage 
British trade more than they had done in the past. In particular, if 
Britain had ”a proper official at Bahrain”, foreign traders would find 
it difficult to obtain a footing there and British interests would 
benefit.^
At this time, Meade also linked growing foreign influence in 
Bahrain with the issue of quarantine. Meade had directed his First 
Assistant, Captain Prideaux, to try, whilst on a visit to Bahrain, to 
induce Shaikh CIsa to agree to the appointment of a quarantine doctor 
from India. The Shaikh at first appeared willing to consider this 
suggestion but later said he was ’’entirely opposed to any arrangement 
worked by /the British/"- Meade concluded that this obstructive
1 Meade to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 28 May 1899* No. 75»
L/P & S/7/1register No. 665. For the later activities of 
Goguyer see Busch, op. cit., pp. 270-303•
2 Meade to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 28 May 1899i No. 75i 
L/P & S/7/11^-, register No. 665.
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attitude on the part of Shaikh Isa was due to the advice of those 
Turkish subjects under whose influence, the Resident believed, the 
Shaikh had fallen. Since the British Government had objected to 
Turkish plans for establishing a quarantine station in Bahrain, the 
Turks wanted to prevent the British from themselves managing quarantine 
arrangements on the island. In Meade’s opinion, if the idea of 
effective quarantine arrangements for Bahrain was not to be abandoned, 
they would have to be operated without the Shaikh’s assistance.
Q m m  mm
Therefore Shaikh Isa’s objections should be disregarded and that an
Assistant Surgeon should be deputed from India to enforce a quarantine.
Perhaps a gunboat might be necessary for a time to support the quarantine
1
officer in discharging his duties. However, at this time the 
Government of India did not feel that such bold action was advisable,
and informed Meade that they were not anxious to impose a quarantine
c_ a 2
officer on Shaikh Isa.
In July 1899* Lieutenant Commander Lambert of H.M.S. Lapwing 
ascertained some facts which tended to explain why Shaikh Isa was so 
obstructive about the quarantine issue. The Shaikh had made his own 
arrangements to prevent plague being brought into Bahrain. These 
involved arrivals in so much inconvenience and expense that they were
Q m  mm
glad to pay bribes in order to evade them. Shaikh Isa therefore 
stood to lose as much an four or five hundred rupees a month if an
Q m m  a
English doctor was appointed. Apart from this, Shaikh Isa was,
Lambert believed, "completely in the hands of his chief clerk", Sherida,
1 Meade to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 21 May 1899* No. 66,
L/P & S/7/115.
2 Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Meade, 16 June 1899* tel. No. 
867-E.A., L/P & S/7/115.
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c *and of Muhammad b. Abdul Wahab. These two were in daily contact
with Goguyer who was certainly in Bahrain "for political purposes’1.
An agent whom Goguyer had brought with him from Muscat, an Arab by the
name of Ali Dabab, had been telling the Bahrainis that, if an English
doctor came to Bahrain, he would interfere with their women; that, if
the Shaikh acceded to the quarantine proposal, the British would "only
ask for something more"; and that there would soon be other gunboats
in the Gulf besides those of Britain. Agha Muhammad Rahim told
• •
Lambert that Goguyer had certainly come to Bahrain with the Shaikh's 
previous knowledge and consent, if not at his invitation. Rahim also 
said that he had noticed a marked difference in Shaikh Isa's 
attitude during the previous month and that it was difficult to get a 
reply from the Shaikh at all in answer to requests made to him.
The Resident concluded that the answer to the problem was not to 
send to Bahrain a quarantine officer, who would have to be imposed by 
force, or at least the threat of force, but urgently to replace Rahim
Qa. M
with a higher and more influential official. Shaikh Isa could have 
no pretext for opposing a British move to improve their political 
representation in Bahrain. Meade therefore urged that "an English 
Political Officer", accompanied by "a small escort", should be posted 
to Bahrain without delay. Until this was done, and he had "gained some 
personal influence over the Shaikh", it would "not be expedient" to send 
a quarantine officer. It was "in the public interest" that the 
Shaikh's quarantine arrangements, with all their accompanying extortions,
1 Meade to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 16 July 1899* tel; Lieutenant 
Commander Lambert of H.M.S. Lapwing to Commander H.Q. Phillipps, 
Senior Naval Officer in the Gulf, 15 July 1899* L/P & S/7/115* 
Phillipps had passed on Lambert's letter to Meade two days later.
See Phillipps to Meade, 17 July 1899* L/P & S/7/115-
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should be done away with as soon as possible. However, there was
every reason to believe that a medical officer sent by the Government
of India would meet with opposition from ’’the ignorant Arabs, among
whom ridiculous stories of the measures taken by our doctors for dealing
1
with the plague in India have been freely circulated”. Meade had
received a petition purporting to have been drawn up by the subjects of
c- — 2Shaikh Isa and objecting to having British doctors in Bahrain. This
petition, the Resident was convinced, was ”a got-up document, prepared 
by people who wish to keep us out of Bahrein”. Even so, it had to be
admitted that there was "undoubtedly a bona fide distrust" of British
plague measures which was based on reports which had come from India. 
This distrust could only be overcome by tact and time. But the
situation in Bahrain, as fax as the British were concerned, was
deteriorating so rapidly that no time could be wasted before taking 
action. However, it would not be an easy task to induce Shaikh Isa 
to dismiss the two evil counsellors who, Lambert considered, had the 
Shaikh under their influence. If it could be proved that Muhammad b.
C WAbdul Wahab was, as Meade believed, "an accredited Agent of the Turkish
Qa H
Government", it might be possible to press Shaikh Isa not to allow him 
to reside in Bahrain since the Shaikh was bound, by the engagements he 
had entered into, not to receive the representatives of other powers 
without British consent
In another review of the Customs issue, the Resident proposed,
1 Meade to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 17 July 1899* No. 108, 
L/P & S/7/115.
2 Petition to Shaikh °Isa from "about 90 persons of Bahrein", 
enclosure in Shaikh °Isa to Meade, 10 July 1899» L/P & S/7/115.
3 Meade to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 17 July 18991 No. 108, 
L/P 8c S/7/115.
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whilst reform of the Customs could wait, no time should be lost in 
arranging for the appointment of a suitable officer to carry out 
political duties in Bahrain in place of Rahim. The present native 
Agent was over fifty-five years old and was not in good health. He 
should be retired as soon as the appointment of an English officer had 
been finalized. The stubborn attitude taken up by Shaikh CIsa of late 
and his undoubted leanings towards the Turks had been due to the ill 
feelings which had developed between the Shaikh and Rahim. The latter 
had misused his political status to further his commercial interests
CM m yin the island and had made Shaikh Isa feel that he was in his (Rahim's)
. •
power by letting it be known that, as Agent, he could report
1
unfavourably about him to the British authorities.
After receiving this letter and Meade's other communication of
17 July 1899 on the quarantine question, the Government of India were in
2no doubt that Britain's position in Bahrain was unsatisfactory. In a 
private letter of 26 July Curzon had already noted that Meade's letters 
had shown that Shaikh cIsa, who had fallen under the "control11 of
c — 3
Goguyer and Muhammad b. Abdul Wahab, was "rapidly getting out of hand". 
However, the Viceroy considered that the position in Persia and the Gulf 
generally also left much to be desired. For this he clearly considered 
that the British officials on the spot were not entirely without blame.
It was his intention, he told Hamilton, to "send am officer to reside
1 Meade to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 5 June 1899? No. 81,
L/P & S/7/138, register No. 1318.
2 Govt, of India, F.D., to Sec. of State for India, 10 August 1899i 
Secret No. 153, L/P 8c S/7/115* By this time the question of proper 
quarantine arrangements for Bahrain had become much less urgent, 
since the plague had died out at Bushire and was at a low ebb in 
India.
3 Curzon to Lord George Hamilton, 26 July 1899* Curzon Papers, F.111/ 
158, pp. 143-50.
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permanently at Bahrein before long11. Before the end of 1899 he might
well replace Meade by "the very best man among our Residents whom I can 
1
procure". Not long after he had assumed his post as Viceroy, Curzon
had found himself disappointed with the general quality of the officers
of the Indian Political Department whom he described as "a very 
2inadequate lot". As far* as Meade himself was concerned, both 
Salisbury and Hamilton felt that the Resident was a man who was inclined
to "outrun his instructions".^ In fact there had for long been a
tendency for Residents to *outrun their instructions* by taking 
initiatives in the Gulf (as with the signing of the 1880 and 1892 agree­
ments with Bahrain) so that Meade was merely acting in conformity with
a long tradition. # However, the growth of the interest of European 
powers in the Gulf in the later 1890s had evidently made the authorities 
in London more insistent that Residents should adhere strictly to their 
instructions. On 21 September 1899» Curzon’s government took the 
opportunity presented by a request by the India Office for opinions 
on a despatch to the Foreign Office from Sir Mortimer Durand, the British 
Minister at Tehran, to expound at length their attitude to the question 
of the maintenance of British influence in the area. As far as the 
Gulf itself was concerned, the Government of India gave a detailed account
of the commercial, political and other interests which Britain had
k
acquired in the area over the years. These interests were threatened
1 Ibid. In fact Meade was replaced in April 1900, see below, p. 203, 
Later, in March 1904, Curzon was to express himself as even more 
dissatisfied with the man with whom he replaced Meade. See below,
pp. 2 22.
2 Curzon to Sir Arthur Godley, Permanent Under Sec. of State for India, 
24 May 1899» Curzon Papers, F.111/158, p. 92c.
3 Hamilton to Curzon, 16 February 1899» Curzon Papers, F.111/13 8,
pp. 18-20.
4 Govt, of India to Sec. of State for India, 21 September 1899* No. 173» 
L/P & S/7/116, paragraphs 22-26. This despatch is reproduced in
J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary 
Record; 1333-T91h- (Princeton. 1936), I, 219-49*
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by the intrigues of other powers, particularly Russia, France, Germany 
and Turkey. At Bahrain, such "machinations" would need to be counter­
acted "by a more strict enforcement of the conditions to which the
1 . .Sheikh is by treaty bound". Trouble was brewing in Bahrain, similar
2to that which had already been encountered at Muscat. Here, the
French Government had, over the last six months, been trying to obtain
a position which would provide them with "an independent pied k terre
3in the neighbourhood of the Persian Gulf". The French had no large-
scale interests of a legitimate kind in the Gulf and it seemed that
their proceedings in the area could only be construed as "an attempt to
cause trouble and annoyance to a possible rival and to lend an
independent assistance to the plans of a European ally". The
Government of India, in fact, were sure that there was "a Franco-Russian
k
entente in Persia and in the Persian Gulf".
At Muscat the French had some legal basis for their attempt to 
gain influence at the expense of Britain. This was not the case in 
Bahrain, where, the Government of India observed, "treaty engagements 
... with Her Majesty*s Government provide^d7 no legitimate excuse for 
such complications". Even so, it was necessary to take pre-emptive 
action against such ’complications* "by placing a British officer 
permanently in the island". Meade’s definite proposals on this matter 
were still awaited, but the Government of India thought that it would
1 Ibid., paragraph 26.
2 Ibid., paragraph 83.
3 Ibid., paragraph 41.
4 Ibid. Curzon had made the same point privately to Salisbury on
16 March 1899» see Curzon Papers, F. 111/158, pp. 42a-43.
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probably be sufficient to nominate for the post "an officer of a 
subordinate clans".
The Resident sent his long-awaited report a few days later,
Meade reviewed the great increase in British interests which had occurred 
there in recent years. Virtually the entire external trade of Bahrain 
was British, The returns showed that imports had risen from a 
value of Rs, 2,229,177 in 1878 to Rs. 8,827,650, whilst exports had 
risen from Rs. 2,181,995 to Rs. 7,9^,880. Bahrain, observed Meade, 
"being generally regarded as under British protection", was increasingly 
becoming the emporium for the trade of the nearby Arab coast, British 
interests in the Gulf were far more important than they had been in the 
past, and other nations were "gradually waking up to the importance 
of the place". The time was now ripe for strengthening Britain*s
C —  mm
position in the island. Shaikh Isa, who, in the past, used to act in 
conformity with the advice Residents gave him, was now old, was under 
the influence of Turkish and French advisers, and was not on good terms 
with the British Agent. If an "English officer" could be appointed in 
his place, this would attract more British firms to Bahrain. The 
presence of such an officer should also "inspire the Chief with greater 
confidence" than he had at present in "the motives and actions" of the
mm
representative of the Government of India. As a result, Shaikh Isa 
would be "obliged to attend more to the wishes and advice of the British 
Government" than he had done of late. Further, there would be an end 
to "the squeezing of British subjects by the Shaikh and his officers" and 
to the "intrigues" which went on between the banians and Shaikh Isa,
1 Govt, of India, F.D., to Sec. of State for India, 21 September 1899, 
No. 175, L/P & S/7/116, paragraph 83.
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for example over the Customs. Among the duties which Meade considered
that the new political officer would have to undertake was to give
’’authorised assistance”, in commercial and other matters, to British
subjects, as well as to subjects of other powers ”so as to avoid the
interference of their own Governments on their own behalf". In view
c** »of the assurance Meade gave to Shaikh Isa in March 1899 that the
British had no intention of interfering in the administration of 
2
Bahrain , it is noteworthy that the Resident now advised the Government 
of India that the new political officer should be invested with judicial 
powers, both civil and criminal, subordinate to those of the Resident.
If the dependence of the Shaikh of Bahrain on the British Government was 
accepted, recommended Meade, the new officer might also endorse passports 
issued by the Shaikh to his subjects, and might authenticate other 
documents if asked to do so. Other duties for the officer to perform 
at Bahrain would be those carried on in all seaport towns in connection 
with shipping, including the completion of trade returns and other 
notarial records. Finally, the Resident recommended that the appoint­
ment should be held by a Second Class Political Assistant on Rs. 600
a month, with a local allowance of Rs. 250. The man appointed should
3
be familiar with Arabic.
However, further delays occurred. The Government of India was 
not as anxious as Meade to have a high-level officer posted to Manama. 
They asked the Resident if he thought it worthwhile to try
1 Meade to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 2k September 1899* No. 128, 
R/15/V330.
2 See above, p. 185.
3 Meade to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 2k September 1899* No. 128, 
R/15/V330.
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J. Calcott Gaskin, his extra Assistant at the Residency, as the new 
Agent in Bahrain. The Government of India said that it was proving 
difficult to find an officer with the requisite qualifications in their 
own Political Department. Moreover Gaskin would be much cheaper: he
would not require such great expenditure either in pay or in respect of 
his accommodation. In the opinion of the Government of India, Gaskin 
would probably stay in Bahrain indefinitely on Rs. *+00 a month.
However, Meade had quickly replied that he did not consider that, at 
that time, Gaskin was suitable for Bahrain. He was not, said the 
Resident, "pure European'1, was "disposed to intrigue" and had "already 
been mixed up in Bahrein affairs". Moreover, he was not believed to
be liked by Shaikh °Isa. Meade was "strongly in favour of /a n /
2English gentleman".
Meanwhile Meade, on a visit to Manama, found out from the 
syndicate which farmed the Customs that, on 7 October 1899* Shaikh Isa 
had signed a fresh agreement extending the lease for a further two years 
starting on 10 March 1902. The banians had added that the Shaikh had 
taken this action in consideration of receiving a further loan from them, 
and that his account with them was greatly overdrawn. On being 
questioned the Shaikh at first attempted to deny what the banians had 
told the Resident. However, Shaikh Isa had eventually admitted that 
Meade*s information was correct and confessed that he was unable to give 
any satisfactory explanation of his conduct. Meade had told the Shaikh
1 Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Meade, 18 October 1899* tel. No.
1605-E.A., P/59*+8, May 1900, No. 93, p. 129.
2 Meade to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 19 October 1899, tel.,
P/59^8, May 1900, No. 9*+, p. 131.
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that he would report what had occurred to the Government of India who
might, as a result, be doubtful about the advisability of complying with
• c— — 1Shaikh Isa's request for Hamad to be recognised as successor-designate.
Even Meade*s weapon of withholding the decision of the Government 
of India to recognise Hamad seemed to have failed to induce Shaikh Isa 
to reform his Customs arrangements. The Resident could only weakly tell 
the Government of India that nothing further could, for the moment, be 
done about the Customs issue. Meade hoped that, later the Shaikh 
might, perhaps see that he had made a mistake and want to ’’set aside” 
this new agreement into which he had entered. If this happened, the 
Government of India would be advised to support the Shaikh against the
banians who, claimed Meade, had taken advantage of Shaikh Isa*s
. . 2necessities ”to induce him to break his promise”.
Q b  mm
Meade went on to try and explain why he thought Shaikh Isa was so 
stubbornly opposed to yielding to the wishes of the Government of India 
to send an official to manage the Customs. One reason was the Shaikh's 
’’ignorant dread that we will make it an excuse to interfere gradually, 
more and more, in the internal affairs of his Chief ship”. Also the
representations of the banians had had an effect. They had told him 
that, unless they had the Customs, he would not only get no more 
advances from them, but he would also have to pay up what he already owed 
them. Lastly, the Shaikh was well aware that, if a regular system was 
introduced, ’’the irregular exactions” which he was in the habit of
1 Meade to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 8 January 1900, L/P
& S/7/138, register No. 1318a.
2 Ibid.
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making when it suited him would have to cease. In view of all this,
the Resident was doubtful if Shaikh Isa would ever ask for the loan of
an official to work his Customs. However, the Sultan of Muscat had
recently taken action for the direct working of his own Customs and, if
that proved successful, Shaikh Isa might decide to follow this example
1
and take the Bahrain Customs into his own hands.
Although Meade's use of the succession weapon to secure a Customs
reform in Bahrain seemed to have failed, smother csune to hand through
an unexpected opportunity to upgrade British political representation in
Bahrain. On 18 January 1900, Agha Muhammad Rsthim, the British Agent in
• •
Bahrain, arrived terminally ill in Bushire. The Resident suggested
sending Gaskin immediately as the only available temporary replacement.
The Government of India sanctioned Gaskin's appointment els Assistant
2Political Agent at Bsdirain as a purely temporary arrangement.
In the years since 1897 Europesm penetration of the Gulf region 
had increased at the same time that Shaikh Isa was becoming less
amenable to British control than formerly. In May 1900, it was
3
observed at the India Office that
At the present moment, with Germans at Koweit and Russians 
knocking at the Persian ports it is essential that we should 
not shrink from asserting our rights at Bahrein, especially 
as the Shaikh is getting a little out of hand.
1 Meade to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 8 January 1900, L/P 
& S/7/1381 register No. 1318a.
2 Meade to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 18 January 1900 (tel.), 
L/P  & s/7/120, p. 289; Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Meade, 
2 February 1900, tel. No. 3 3 5 -E .A ., L /P  8c S/7/13^•
3 Minute by Lee-Warner, 10 May 1900, L/P 8c S /3 /3 7 6 » 
register No. 206*f.
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The reference to the Russians was in connection with the news that
a Russian vessel, the Gilyak, had visited Bandar Abbas with a view to
securing coaling stations on the Persian coast, German interest in
Kuwait had developed out of their activity in the establishment of
railways in the Asiatic part of the Ottoman Empire, dating back to the
late 1 8 8 0 s , '  In their despatch of 2 1  September 1 8 9 9 ,  the Government
of India had noted that the extension of these "Turko-German railways”
to Baghdad and the Gulf was then under discussion. Whilst they did
”not question the bona fide commercial enterprise" which was carrying
German trade to the shores of the Gulf, the Government of India had
noted that German interest in the Gulf added to "the complexities of an
already sufficiently difficult situation" there. It was observed that
German interests had "a tendency to grow with some rapidity, and by any
steps which /y e r e / not always acceptable to their neighbours",^ Thus,
when, in January 1900, news had been received that a German Commission
intended to visit Kuwait with a view to obtaining a concession for a
railway terminus at the harbour there, the interest and concern of the
k
authorities in London had been aroused.
In these circumstances of increasing European activity in the Gulf, 
Meade himself was replaced by Major Charles Arnold Kemball, who became 
Acting Resident in April 19OO. Kemball*s views differed from Meade*s
1 Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, Bombay, to Admiralty, 16 February 
1900, tel. No. 12, L/P & S/3/375, register No. 1805.
2 Edward Mead Earle, Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Baghdad 
Railway (New York, 1966), P» 50.
3 Govt, of India to Sec. of State for India, 21 September 1899,
No. 175, L/P 8c S/7/116, paragraphs 43 and 44.
4 See telegrams of Sir Nicolas 0*Conor, British Ambassador at
Constantinople to Salisbury, 5 January 1900 , 7 January 1900 and
15 January 1900 and Salisbury to 0*Conor, 19 January 1900 (secret 
tel.), L/P 8c S/3/375, register No. 1856.
20^ +
on a number of issues, including representation at Bahrain. Kemball 
was doubtful if British interests at Bahrain were f1of such importance 
as to necessitate the expenditure which /would7  result from the 
appointment of an officer of the rank11 Meade had suggested, that is a 
Second Class Political Assistant. It seemed to Kemball that, both from 
the commercial and the political points of view, an officer of the 
uncovenanted service would suffice for the permanent appointment.
Kemball felt that as Bushire was "within easy reach of Bahrein11, the
1
Resident himself could visit the Shaikhdom at short notice if required.
Gaskin*s appointment was therefore confirmed, subject to revision if it
2
was found to work unsatisfactorily.
Kemball soon made another important change in Meade*s policies 
towards Bahrain. On 2k December 1900 he recommended the abandonment 
of Meade *s strategy of withholding the news of the Government of India*s 
recognition of Hamad until Shaikh CIsa showed signs of yielding to 
British pressure on the Customs issue. The new Resident was doubtful
Q w m  w  3
if any change would be introduced during the lifetime of Shaikh Isa.
The Government of India concurred, and Gaskin officially notified
Qmm M
Shaikh Isa on 12 February 1901 that the Government of India had
krecognised Hamad as his successor.
1 Kemball to Sec. to Govt, of India, 2 July 1900, No. 185,
L/P & S/7/13^, register No. 751*
2 Under Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Kemball, 17 September 1900, 
No. 1851, E.A., L/P 8c S/7/13^, register No. 751.
3 Kemball to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 2k December 1900, L/P
8c S/7/129, register No. 21^ -.
^ Under Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Kemball, 17 January 1901,
I/P & S/7/129, register No. 21 *f.
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The British representatives in the Gulf were soon faced with a 
problem which threatened to worsen Anglo-Bahraini relations by 
increasing the dissatisfaction of Shaikh Isa with British protection for 
his subjects, involving once again the unwillingness of the Turks to 
respond to British representations on behalf of Bahrainis who had 
suffered injury at the hands of those who were supposedly under 
Ottoman jurisdiction.
rnm C
On 3 December 1900, Shaikh Salman b. Du ai j, a cousin of Shaikh
Q m m  mm
Isa and a person of influence in Bahrain, with his son, his nephew and
23 followers, were attacked and murdered by bedouins belonging to the
Bahaih section of the Al Murra tribe. The reason for this attack 
• •
was that the Al Khalifa of Bahrain had given protection to a fugitive
who had a blood feud with the Al Murra. The murders took place on
territory under Turkish jurisdiction, the Hasa mainland, where Salman
and his followers had gone, in accordance with his usual custom at this
1
time of year, on a hunting expedition. This incident created a
sensation in Bahrain and was naturally a matter of great concern to
Shaikh CIsa who was bound by Arab custom to seek retribution on behalf 
2of his relatives.
In June 1901 the Shaikh asked for permission "to arrange with some
friendly Arabs on the mainland" to attack a party of Bahaih opportunely
• •
nearby so that the murder of Shaikh Salman could thereby be avenged.
1 Memorandum by A.C. Wratislaw, British Consul, Basra, 28 December 
1900, L/P & S/10/91, register No. 1511, P« 59; 'Administration 
Report', 1900-01, p. 5; M.A. Daud, 'British Relations with the 
Persian Gulf, 1890-1902', Ph.D. (London, 1957), II, 502.
2 Shaikh °Isa to the Commandant and Agent to the mutasarrif of Najd,
3 March 1901, L/P & S/10/91, register No. 1511.
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Gaskin replied that such proceedings would be "most displeasing to the 
Government of India" and would jeopardize the negotiations which were 
going on with the Turks about this question. The Shaikh of Bahrain 
was "strictly prohibited from undertaking operations beyond the limits 
of his own territory".
Gaskin had to admit that the Turkish authorities in Hasa had
taken no steps towards bringing the murderers of Shaikh Salman to
justice though they appeared to be within reach of these authorities.
In fact, reported the Agent, the inactivity of the Turks in the affair
was creating "a bad impression abroad" and Shaikh cIsa was therefore
anxious that further pressure should be brought to bear by the British
2
Government on the Porte.
When news of the massacre had first reached Bushire, the wall of
Basra had been approached for redress by A.C. Wratislaw, the British
Consul. The wall had been quite "nonchalant" about the matter,
remarking that "after all the matter was merely an act of reprisal for
a previous crime committed by natives of Bahrain". Wratislaw had had
to explain to the wali that this was not the case since the previous
murder had been paid for in the customary manner by Shaikh Isa and
could not be quoted as justification for the assassination of Shaikh 
3
Salman. The Consul "observed with regret an entire inability on the 
part of the Ottoman authorities" to realise the importance of the affair.
1 Gaskin to Kemball, 30 June 1901, L/P & S/7/135» register No. 9^-
2 Gaskin to Kemball, 30 June 1901, L/P & S/7/^35* register No. 9b6.
3 Wratislaw to 0*Conor, 13 June 1901, L/P & S/3/38^, register No.
2203.
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The British Government would not let pass unpunished the wholesale
murder of persons under their protection and the Turks would have no
grounds for complaint if others were "forced to intervene to perform
1
a duty which they themselves have neglected”. The British seemed
to be impotent in this matter. The wall of Basra had standing orders
to consider Bahrain a Turkish possession and to ignore the right of
c- - 2British representatives to speak on behalf of Shaikh Isa. A direct
approach to the Ottoman authorities at Constantinople also produced
3
no satisfactory result.
An alternative suggestion by Kemball to send a gunboat to Qatif
was accordingly accepted. The commander was instructed to inform the
Turkish official in charge that he had come to enquire what steps were
being taken to arrest the murderers. If the official replied that he
knew nothing of the matter, he should be asked to refer it to the
mutasarrif of Hasa whose reply the commander would await. Kemball
believed that no British warship had visited Qatif for many years.
Such a visit might therefore at that time have "a very beneficial 
b
effect”.
This show of strength failed miserably. The Ottoman officials 
at Qatif treated the commander of the gunboat, H.M.S. Sphinx, and Gaskin, 
who accompanied him, with "marked discourtesy", and no satisfactory reply
1 Wratislaw to the wall of Basra, 16 July 1901, L/P & S/7/13&i
register No. 1040.
2 Wratislaw to 0 *Conor, 29 July 1901i L/P & S/3/385» register No© 2*f31*
3 0*Conor to Foreign Sec., 27 July 1901, L/P & S/3/38^ -.
b Kemball to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 12 August 1901, L/P &
S/7/136, register No. 109^.
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was received.
Apparently the Al Khalifa never received any satisfaction in this 
2
matter. In March 1906 the Home Government finally decided not to
"pursue the matter any further so far els the Turkish Government /pere7
directly concerned”. Instead Shaikh °Isa should be advised that the
remedy lay in his own hsinds by the exclusion from Bsdirain of members
of any tribes which were "in a position to exercise pressure upon the
3Bahiah to induce them to come to a settlement" , a reference to a 
suggestion made in August 1905 by the British Agent in Bahrain at the 
time, Captain F.B. Prideaux. Prideaux had pointed out that the
mm
attitude of Shaikh Isa to the bedouin tribes of the mainlEuid was "most
weak and unsatisfactory". Every year hundreds of these bedouins crossed
over to Bahrain to collect subsidies and ‘presents' from the Shaikh.
If such visitors were banned from visiting Bahrain "until some suitable
treatment had been meted out to the members of their tribes and the
other persons whom they harboured, who were known to be Sheikh Esa's
enemies, a much more satisfactory condition of affairs would be
if
inaugurated for Bsihrein". However, this line of action did not
appeal to the Shaikh, nor was he likely to be able to enforce such a 
prohibition since his permanent armed followers were so few in number.
Thus the British had once more shown that they were unable to 
honour their obligation to protect the subjects of Bahrain when they
1 Lansdowne, to O'Conor, 8 April 1902, L/P & S/3/390, register No. 
21^9.
2 Lorimer, IB, 998.
3 India Office to Govt, of India, 16 March 1906, Secret No. 10,
L/P & S/10/91, register No. 952, p.
k Prideaux to Resident, Bushire, 21 August 1905* No. 279* L/P &
S/10/91, register No. 263, p. 23.
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ventured into territory claimed by the Turks. The effect on Shaikh
Q m m  mm
Isa was predictable: the affair would "inevitably continue to rankle
in Sheikh Esa's mind" and would be "periodically brought up by him as
a grievance whenever he is in need of an excuse for showing disinclination
2
of his own to act upon our advice in some other matter".
The prospects for Customs reform in Bahrain made scant progress in 
1900 and 1901. Late in 190% on information from Gaskin ±hat Shaikh 
°Isa was "in great financial straits" and intended making some change 
with a view to increasing his income from the Customs, Kemball went to 
Bahrain with a view to securing acceptance of a British Director of
C«» mm
Customs. The Resident found Shaikh Isa as obstructive as ever.
He told Kemball he intended to take over the management of the Customs 
from the banian syndicate, but the Resident had his doubts. As far as
0 .  mm
the Resident could see, Shaikh Isa's financial position would only go
from bad to worse since there was no one in Bahrain "sufficiently honest
3
and capable" to manage the Customs in a satisfactory manner. Kemball's
Q m m  mm
misgivings proved correct: Shaikh Isa, far from taking control of the
Customs himself, once more extended the banians* lease which would now 
run to February 1906.
Whilst these continuing problems were being experienced with the 
Shaikh of Bahrain, the increasing numbers of foreign nationals in the
1 The issue was resolved by the Anglo-Turkish convention of 1913*
2 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 3 March 1906, No. ^97»
L/P & S/10/91, register No. 952, p. 3«
33 Kemball to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 8 November 1901, No. 201,
L/P 8c S/7/1^% register No. 1?0*
k Govt, of India, F.D. to Sec. of State for India, 2 January 1902,
L/P 8c S/7/1^+% register No. 170.
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Shaikhdoms were presenting the British with issues which demanded
decisions. One was the question of whether foreigners should be allowed
to obtain property in Bahrain. As early as January 1899» Zwemer, the
American missionary, had attempted to obtain in Bahrain "a fit dwelling-
1
place for the use of the missionaries and their families”. At that
time, because of the controversy caused by allegations that he had been 
2
abusing Islam , Zwemer had agreed to make no further attempt to purchase
land.^ However, in April 1901, Zwemer again raised the issue. He
had enquired whether there were any clauses or provisions in the
treaties between the Government of India and the Shaikh of Bahrain which
would prevent the sale of property to the mission for a hospital.
Kemball replied that he was not aware of the existence of any such
clauses or provisions. The position of the Government of India in a
matter of this kind between Shaikh Isa and the mission would, he
kconsidered, be one of "absolute neutrality".
The Government of India were astonished by Kemball's reply. The 
Resident's indication that there was no treaty precluding the transfer 
of property to Zwemer's mission was "clearly incorrect" and that it was 
therefore "not understood" why he had replied as he did. The 
Government of India pointed out that, under the agreement of 1892, the 
Shaikh of Bahrain had bound himself not to transfer any part of his 
territory save to the British Government. There was, in fact, no
1 Zwemer to Meade, 16 January 1899* L/P & S/7/11^, register No. 657.
2 See above, p. 187.
3 Govt, of India, to Sec. of State for India, 22 June 18991
No. 118, L/P & S/7/1'1^ , register No. 657*
k Kemball to Zwemer, 11 May 1901, No. 9^ » L/P & S/7/133, Register
No. 700.
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objection to the sale to the mission of a site for a house or hospital 
if the Shaikh was willing to allow it. However, it would be as well 
to give publicity to the fact that, under the terms of the 1892 
agreement, the Shaikh was prohibited from disposing of any part of 
his territory to foreigners without the express consent of the British 
Government. 1
The caution shown by the Government of India received support at
the India Office. Sir Alfred Lyall noted that, in his opinion, no
general exception to the 1892 agreement could be made in the case of
private sales or mortgages such as that proposed in the case of Zwemer*s
mission, since the British authorities might thereby be obliged, at
some time in the future, to permit the penetration into Bahrain of more 
2
foreign companies. The Foreign Office also considered that care
needed to be exercised to prevent a precedent being created which would
allow foreign interests to gain a foothold in Bahrain. On 19 August
1901, they informed the India Office that, whilst in Zwemer*s case,
there could be no suspicion of the transfer of sovereignty or
administrative rights, as a matter of principle it was desirable that
the 1892 agreement should be held to cover all cases in which there
3
existed a suspicion.
The attention which the India Office paid to the question of the 
penetration of foreign commercial interests into the Shaikhdom was 
justified. At about this time there was established in Bahrain a
1 Under Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Kemball, 3 July 1901, 
L/P & S/7/135* register No. 861.
2 Note by Lyall, 29 July 1901, L/P 8c S/7/135» register No. 861.
3 Foreign Office to India Office, 19 August 1901, L/P 8c S/3/38*f, 
register No. 2232.
212
German firm which was soon to play an important part in political 
events in the island. The firm was that of Robert Wonckhaus, a 
trader who, in 1897i had established himself in the mother-of-pearl 
traffic in the Gulf and who resided at Lingah. Gradually his interests 
had extended to general export and import trade between the Gulf and 
Germany. 1
In December 1900, Kemball informed the Government of India that 
Wonckhaus intended opening a branch of his business at Bahrain. The 
Resident suggested that, in the event of any mercantile or other cases 
arising between subjects of Shaikh Isa and Wonckhaus or his agent at 
Bahrain, Gaskin should be asked to deal with these cases as if they 
were cases between British subjects and Bahrainis. The Government of 
India, pointed out that, since Wonckhaus was a foreigner and not a 
protected person, Gaskin could not claim any jurisdiction in such cases. 
Foreigners who were not protected persons "must be regarded as liable, 
in such cases, to the jurisdiction of the Sheikh”. Having stated the 
strict legal position, however, the Government of India hastened to add 
that the Shaikh was "bound under treaty” not to admit the consular 
agencies of other nations without the consent of the British Government. 
It was therefore expedient that the British Agent should, ”as a matter 
of courtesy", extend his good offices to European foreigners in any 
disputes between them and the subjects of the Shaikh. Moreover, if 
necessary, the Agent should "claim to protect all such foreigners as he
1 For Wonckhaus*s commercial activities in the Gulf see Busch, op. cit., 
pp. 353-5^» also Jens B. Plass, England zwischen Russland und 
Deutschland, 1899-1907 (Hamburg, 1966), pp. 395-^10 and 
report of C.E. Akers of the Board of Trade, March 1909* L/P &
S/3/^9i register No. 3285.
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1
would a British subject11.
Evidently the Government of India were being forced to manoeuvre
in a situation which was made difficult for them by their weak legal
position regarding internal jurisdiction in Bahrain. In reporting
their proceedings to the India Office on 9 May 1901, they observed that
matters as they stood were unsatisfactory and the arrangements were not
likely to prove permanent. The Government of India accurately predicted
that, "in proportion as the subjects of foreign Powers settle in Bahrein
for purposes of trade, so will cases that raise the question of the
nature and extent of the British protectorate become frequent and
perhaps troublesome1'. It should accordingly be considered "whether
some steps should not be taken at an early date to place our position
2m  Bahrein upon a more assured and definite footing".
The India Office was not as ready as Lord Curzon to take such 
pre-emptive action. Whilst approving of the action taken by the 
Government of India on the specific question of Wonckhaus, the India 
Office considered that no diplomatic steps needed to be taken to place 
Britain1 s position in Bahrain on a more definite footing. The India 
Office, in justification of their attitude, referred to the terms of 
the Exclusive Agreement of 1880, the British recognition of Shaikh Hamad 
and the number of occasions on which the Turks and others had been told
1 Under Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Kemball, k May 1901, L/P & 
S/7/133, register No. 614. Both the India Office and the Foreign 
Office approved these instructions. See Foreign Office to India 
Office, 13 June 1901, L/P & S/3/383 and Sec. of State for India to 
Viceroy, 21 June 1901, Secret No. 16, L/P & S/3/383*
2 Govt, of India, to Sec. of State for India, 9 May 1901, No. 72, 
Curzon Papers, F.111/331? item 43.
21*+
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that Shaikh Isa was under British protection. In their reply to
the Government of India, the India Office merely referred to the
deadlocked issue of Customs reform as a means of strengthening the
2
authority of the Government of India in Bahrain.
Only a few months later the Customs arrangements of Bahrain 
became an object of attention from quite smother quarter. In August 
1901 a steamer belonging to the Persian Government arrived at Manama.
On board was a Belgian director of the Persian Customs, which were 
undergoing reform as a mesms of relieving financial pressure on the 
Persian Treasury, under the guidance of Belgian experts.^ This was of 
particular concern to Lord Curzon who always considered the Belgians to
if
be Britain*s ’’most dangerous opponents in Persia”. Curzon, in fact,
felt so strongly about the dangers created by control over the Customs
of Gulf ports by foreign powers that he told Brodrick in March 1900,
"we cannot allow the customs of any Gulf port to be handed over to or
5
collected by any agent of a foreign power”.
The Belgian expert, Monsieur Simais, had informed Shaikh CIsa 
that he had been deputed by the Shah to obtain his consent to the 
placing of two Persian officials in Bahrain. These officials would 
examine the seals placed on cargoes in the hatches of steamers at the
1 India Office to Foreign Office, 7 June 1901, L/P & S/10/28, 
register No. 2063.
2 India Office to Govt, of India, 21 June 1901, Secret No. 16,
L/P & S/3/383.
3 See Percy Sykes, A History of Persia (3rd Edition) (London, 1969), 
II, 376-77.
k Curzon to Brodrick, 21 November 1903, Midleton Papers, Add 50073, 
pp. 39-^8. It was considered that the Belgian customs management 
facilitated the advancement of Russian interests.
5 Curzon to Brodrick, 29 March 1900, Midleton Papers, Add 50073, 
pp. 30^-11.
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last Persian port and re-seal them when the steamers left Bahrain.
Simais told Gaskin that, if Shaikh Isa refused the Shah’s request,
ships calling at Bahrain would be repelled from Persian ports. Kemball
told Gaskin that there was no need for the Shaikh to send any reply to
the Belgian and that Persian officials must not be allowed into Bahrain.
The Resident proposed that the British Minister at Tehran, Sir Arthur
Hardinge, should be asked to protest strongly against communication
having been made by Simais directly to Shaikh CIsa. The status of
Bahrain, said Kemball, was well known and any communication the Persian
Government wished to make with the Shaikh should be made through the
British Minister at Tehran. The question of sealing cargo holds at
Bahrain also affected British interests and the British Government had a
right to demand to be consulted before any new arrangement was introduced.
Lastly, Kemball observed, great secrecy had been observed with regard to
1
the visit of the Persian vessel to Bahrain.
After Hardinge had delivered his protest against this attempt to
induce Shaikh CIsa "to accept Persian Customs House", he reported
that both the Grand Vizier and the Minister of Customs at Tehran,
Mr. Naus, had expressed astonishment at the report of the visit, of
which they claimed to know nothing. The Grand Vizier had expressed
2his regret at the incident.
In the following year, the attention of the Government of India
1 Kemball to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 2 September 1901, L/P
& S/7/1371 register No. 1121; Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to
Kemball, 4 September 1901 (tel.), L/P & S/7/137.
2 Hardinge to Govt, of India and Bushire, 6 September 1901, tel. 
No. 47, L/P & S/3/385.
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was drawn to a more subtle attempt by a European power to infiltrate
Britain*s position at Bahrain through the presence there of one of its
nationals. On 7 July 1902, Kemball reported that a Russian professor
named Bogayavlensky, who was said to be interested in research into
marine zoology, had visited Bahrain in May. Whilst there he had been
provided with accommodation by Muhammad b.°Abdul Wahab. On his
departure, Bogayavlensky had been presented with a blood mane by one of
the Al Khalifa Shaikhs.^ During the following year, the Acting
Russian Consul-General at Bushire, M. Gabriel Owseenko, wrote a
"friendly letter" to Shaikh °Isa thanking him for the hospitality which
2
the Shaikh had extended to the professor during his stay in Bahrain.
When this communication was passed on to Gaskin, he observed that, in 
his opinion, "the real reason" for the letter had been "a desire to 
establish a friendly correspondence with the Chief which he may consider 
would be of use to his Government hereafter".^
This incident is instructive not only in illustrating the 
sensitivity of the British with regard to direct contact between Shaikh 
Isa and foreign Powers, but also because of the scrutiny to which the 
increasing numbers of European nationals visiting Bahrain were subject. 
In 1902 one of these foreign nationals, the German trader Robert 
Wonckhaus, became the object of the particular attention of the 
Government of India. In July Wonckhaus leased a building in Bahrain 
for a term of five years. Wonckhaus informed Gaskin that there was a
1 Kemball to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 7 July 1902, L/P & S/7/1^7, 
register No. 1123.
2 Owseenko to Shaikh CIsa, 18 May 1903* (translation), L/P & S/7/156, 
register No. 1168.
3 Gaskin to Captain Vere de V. Hunt, First Asst, to the Resident, 
Bushire, b July 1903i L/P & S/7/156» register No. 1168.
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clause in the contract to the effect that, in the event of the landlord
wishing to dispose of the house at the end of the lease, the trader had
the option of buying it. The building occupied the best site in
Bahrain for commercial purposes and Gaskin considered that, if
Wonckhaus’s business transactions proved successful, there was every
reason to believe that he would try to acquire the property. Gaskin
reported that Wonckhaus had told him that, in the event of his buying
property in Bahrain, such property "would come under the extra-territorial
rights usually exercised by ^ the German/7 Government in the dominions of
Muhammadan rulers11. What this meant was that, if Wonckhaus secured
the property, he would be claiming that it would be outside the
jurisdiction of the Shaikh of Bahrain. Gaskin told the trader in reply
that Shaikh Isa had Ha treaty11 with the British Government to the effect
that he was not to sell land to foreigners without British consent.
Moreover, when permission was given, it was "understood that such lands
or property shall remain under the local law". Wonckhaus, however,
retorted that Persian and Turkish subjects had acquired land in Bahrain
without any reference having been made to the British Government.
Gaskin had pointed out that, such persons being amenable to Muslim law
in their own countries, they were bound to come under the same law by
which immovable property was governed in Bahrain. It was possible that,
as a result of this exchange, Wonckhaus, who had gone to Bushire, would
1
raise the question with the German Consul there.
As if this were not enough Mr. S. Dods, an Assistant of Messrs.
Hotz and Co. of Bushire, a concern which enjoyed Russian protection,
1 Gaskin to Kemball, 30 November 1902, No. 2^6, L/P & S/7/15^ »
register No. 845.
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informed Gaskin that his firm would probably start business in Bahrain 
in early 1903« The Government of India had already directed that 
British good offices should be extended to European traders and their 
employees in Bahrain, but this appeared to be insufficient to prevent 
foreign consuls from intervening on behalf of their subjects in the 
Shaikhdom, In view of the desire of the Russian Government to obtain 
a footing in the Gulf and their policy of harming British prestige 
wherever they could, Gaskin suggested, it was possible that the 
Government might attempt to make the presence of this firm an excuse for 
interfering in the affairs of Bahrain, In order to prevent the 
possibility of such embarrassments occurring in the future, it would be 
desirable to adopt "some definite policy" regarding the question of the
1
relations of the subjects of European powers with the Shaikh of Bahrain,
Kemball observed that no reasonable objection could be taken to
Germans or other foreigners hiring premises in Bahrain for legitimate
business purposes. However, the British authorities certainly could
not "view with equanimity the establishment of direct dealings between
foreign Consular officers and the Chief of Bahrein", Kemball therefore
suggested taking the opportunity of impressing this on Shaikh cIsa who
could also be warned that, if a foreign Consul attempted to correspond
directly with him, it was expected that he would decline to enter into
such correspondence and would refer the Consul to the British
authorities. As far as the firm of Messrs, Hotz and Co. was concerned,
Kemball observed that whilst they might be under Russian protection in
Persia, this could not give them the right to enjoy Russian protection
2in Bahrain, which was not under Persian jurisdiction.
1 Ibid.
2 Kemball to Sec. to Govt, of India, 13 December 1902, No, 175*
L/P & S/7/15^ , register No. 84-5.
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On 2 June 1903, the Government of India concurred with the 
Resident*s proposals, and instructed Kemball to have it explained to 
Wonckhaus that, as the proposed purchase was "a case of private 
ownership pure and simple by a private party”, there was no objection 
to it. However, Wonckhaus should certainly be informed that there 
were no German courts with local jurisdiction in Bahrain, and his 
property would be amenable to local law. Lastly, the Government of 
India asked Kemball to report immediately any attempt by Messrs. Hotz 
and Co. to establish a branch of their business in Bahrain.
The wary attitude of the Government of India to penetration of
foreign business interests in Bahrain should be seen as part of the
larger patterns of activity of Britain*s imperial rivals in the Gulf
area and elsewhere in the previous few years. From 1900 to 1902 Britain
was greatly embarrassed by the failure to achieve an easy victory over
the Boers in South Africa, and France, Russia and Germany had taken 
2
advantage of this. In and around the Gulf, the French were active 
particularly in Muscat, while the Russians appeared to be attempting 
to acquire a naval base or fortified port and railway terminus, with a 
view to challenging British naval supremacy in partnership with the 
French. French and Russian warships called at Gulf ports, and the 
visit of the Russian professor to Bahrain was merely one of several made 
by Russians to other coastal towns, from Kuwait to the southern Persian 
islands. But by 1903 conditions had changed for the British, and this
1 Under Sec. to Govt, of India, to Kemball, 2 June 1903, L/P &
S/7/154, register No. 845.
2 Lord Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon (London, 1928), II, 310;
Ward and Gooch, op. cit., Ill, 320; Kazemzadeh, op. cit.,
pp. 438-40 and 441•
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year produced two important public demonstrations of British resolve
to defend their position in the Gulf against such manoeuvres* The
Prime Minister, Balfour, and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne,
were more disposed to the necessity for active measures than Lord
Salisbury had been. Moreover, the end of the South African was and the
conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 had restored some
freedom of diplomatic action. A Franco-Russian visit to Kuwait in
March 1903 coincided with the Turkish incorporation of the Baghdad
Railway Company, presenting the British with the future prospect of a
base at the head of the Gulf under German or Russian control. On
5 May, Lansdowne declared in the House of Lords that Britain would not
exclude the legitimate trade of other powers from the Gulf, but
... we should regard the establishment of a naval base, or of 
a fortified port, in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as 
a very grave menace to British interests, and we should 
certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal.^
This warning to Britain*s rivals delighted Curzon, who soon secured 
approval for a bold move of his own. In November 1903 the Viceroy 
made a tour of the Gulf. His main object, he subsequently declared, 
was to show by his own presence nthe intention of His Majesty*s 
Government to maintain their political and commercial ascendency in 
those waters’1. Part of the Viceroy's programme involved Bahrain.
He spent two days in the harbour at Manama. Curzon afterwards 
reported to the Secretary of State for India that the ’’increasing 
prosperity” of Bahrain, which appeared to be "capable of very 
considerable further development", was due "exclusively to the British
1 Gooch and Temperley, IV, 371; G.W. Mouger, The End of Isolation 
(London, 19&3), PP- 118-23; Busch, op. cit., pp. 222, 233-7;
C.J. Lowe and M.L. Dockrill, The Mirage of Power (London and Boston, 
1972), I, 1-4; Landen, op. cit., pp. 260-66.
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Protectorate". This had on many occasions been asserted by the
1British Government and "admits of no dispute".
Whilst at Manama, Curzon had an interview with Shaikh cIsa.
The most important matter raised was the question of the administration
mm
of the Customs. At first, Shaikh Isa dismissed the question with the 
observation that it was a private matter which, he trusted, the
Viceroy would leave him to manage in his own way. When Curzon persisted,
the Shaikh became very obstinate but "could not when pressed offer any 
reason against the reform". When he asked for the matter to be 
postponed during his lifetime, Curzon had pointed out that he was only 
fifty-seven years of age and that his uncle and predecessor, Shaikh
mm
Muhammad, had lived to be over eighty. Eventually, Shaikh Isa
said that he would consider the subject with his sons and brother.
Curzon, however, warned that the matter could not be dropped and that
Kemball would be instructed to report, after consulting the Shaikh, on
what action he would recommend to secure the execution of the reform.
The Shaikh, added Curzon finally, "could not enjoy all the advantages
of the British Protectorate, to which he owed his position and security,
2
without discharging the obligations which it involved" 0
C— M m
Having intimated to Shaikh Isa that the indefinite postponement 
of the reform of the Customs could not be permitted, Curzon wan left 
with the problem of finding a means of overcoming the obstinacy of the
1 Govt, of India, to Sec. of State for India, 17 December 1903* Secret 
No. 196, L/P 8c S/3/^Ok, register No. 1762/63*
2 Note on interview between Viceroy and Shaikh of Bahrain, 27 November 
1903» Curzon Papers, F.111/531•
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Shaikh over the issue. The instrument which had been chosen for this 
task had been a change in the standard of British political 
representation in Bahrain, However, J. Calcott Gaskin had had more
Q m m  mm
than three years to make his influence felt with Shaikh Isa, 
apparently with no positive effect as far as Customs reform was 
concerned. 1
Not long after returning to India,Curzon also indicated his 
dissatisfaction with the performance of Gaskin*s superior, Colonel 
Kemball, The Viceroy minuted that the failure to overcome Shaikh CIsa*s 
obstinacy over the Customs issue was "attributable to the weakness of 
Colonel Kemball". It was he who had "foolishly advised us to drop 
the Customs question at the time we were recognizing the son",
Kemball*s "repeated interviews with the Sheikh were fraught with no 
consequences: nor indeed ^ as7  it conceivable that they should have
any other result". It was Curzon*s opinion that ITWe shall do nothing 
at Bahrein until we have different men at Bahrein ^ sic, presumably 
Bushire^ and Manama", It was necessary first to appoint a "Political 
Officer" to replace Gaskin, Once the new man was firmly established,
"he must take the Customs question in hand. The Chief will know what 
it means".^
In the event, Kemball was replaced first, in April 190*!-, by Major 
Percy Zachariah Cox, who had previously been Political Agent at Muscat. 
Cox had, in fact, been Curzon*s choice when, in 1900, he had been
1 Gaskin had also made an extremely bad impression while acting as 
interpreter fcr Curzon*s official address to the rulers of the Trueial 
Coast: Curzon to Brodrick, 21 November 1903» Midleton Papers,
Add 50075, pp. 39-^8.
2 Minute by Curzon, 19 March 190^ f, from *Notes in Secret E., May 190*!-, 
Nos. 72-7*!-*, quoted in Saldanha, 'Precis of Bahrein Affairs',
op. cit., p. 1*+5,
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posted to Muscat. When Cox took up his appointment at Bushire, he 
was convinced of the correctness of Curzon*s policy of boldly 
confronting the challenge by other European powers to British 
ascendency in the Gulf.
Kemball submitted a final despatch on the Customs issue in 
February 190*f. Since Curzon*s visit to Bahrain in November 1903> 
Kemball had interviewed Shaikh Isa about the Customs. Obstinate as
C«- mm
ever, Shaikh Isa had informed Kemball that he had definitely made up 
his mind, that he and his family did not approve of any change being 
made. Kemball considered that his attitude was ’’probably due to his 
ignorant dread that his submission in the matter will mean, or will at 
least be considered by his subjects and neighbours to mean, the end of 
his independence”. It was also, thought Kemball, due to the Shaikh*s 
’’reluctance to abolish a system whereby he can always obtain advances 
in time of need”.
Kemball had expected that the Shaikh would not give way. If 
it was decided that, even so, the existing system of Customs management 
was to be abolished, it would be necessary to obtain the services of 
some officials trained in Customs work, as no Bahraini was capable of 
doing the job efficiently. If the leases of the banians were 
cancelled then the Government of India should pay off the Shaikh*s debts 
to the syndicate, a sum of about Rs. 212,000. This amount might then 
be treated as a loan to the Shaikh and paid off from the Customs 
revenue. Kemball advocated warning the banians that they must not
1 Lovat Fraser, India under Curzon and After (London, 1911)* 
p. 89.
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make any further advances to the Shaikh or make any further contracts
for the lease of the Customs beyond the period of their existing
leases, Kemball said that, although he did not anticipate any active
opposition when the new system of Customs management was introduced,
nevertheless a warship should be stationed at Bahrain when the change
was made and for some time afterwards. Further, it might be advisable
to provide a guard of about twenty-five sepoys as an escort for the
1
Assistant Political Agent at Bahrain,
After more than six years of discussion, customs reform at 
Bahrain seemed at last to be moving towards a decisive phase. On 
21 April 1904, the Government of India wrote to the Secretary of State 
on the affairs of Bahrain and the arrangements for British 
representation at Manama, The situation, they declared, was “peculiar” • 
British protection had made of the Shaikhdom "a peaceful and flourishing 
centre of industry and commerce”. The stability of the rule of
Q a  mm
Shaikh Isa had been secured by Britain, Yet, ”we have never declared
a formal protectorate; we have demanded no tribute; and we have
abstained from interference in domestic affairs, except at the Sheikh*s
c** >■request”. Unfortunately, security had bred in Shaikh Isa no sense of 
gratitude to his British protectors, British ”moderation” seemed to 
have “induced the belief in the Chief*s mind that his relations with the 
British Government” were ”of a kind that involve no corresponding 
obligations on his own part”. The “incorrectness of the Sheikh’s 
attitude" had been “conspicuously noticeable in connection with the 
question of his Customs revenues”. This had become “a test case of
1 Kemball to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 18 February 1904, No. 38, 
L/P & S/7/164, register No. 871.
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the nature and degree of the influence which the British Government 
may reasonably claim to exercise over the ruler of those islands”•
It would be a simple matter to coerce the Shaikh, However, "forcible 
measures would be liable to arouse unnecessary suspicion and alarm as 
to our intentions in the Gulf", It was therefore preferable to 
effect the British objective by other, admittedly slower, means. The 
Government of India therefore proposed that an officer of the graded list 
of their Political Department should replace Gaskin, To "emphasise 
the change", a small guard of sepoys should be sent as permanent escort
Q m m  «
to the new Agent, Shaikh Isa would "probably not be slow to recognise
the significance of the action" and it would "not be long before a
suitable officer" was able to secure "a proper influence over the Sheikh
and to find an opportunity of bringing pressure to bear on him in
connection with the Customs question or any other matter". The
Government of India concluded that the need for "a more definite
assertion of our position has recently come into greater prominence
owing to the establishment of a German trader on the island" and
because of "the growing interest in this quarter displayed by foreigners
1
of other nationalities".
At this time, a renewal of French interest in Bahrain was
apparent. On 6 and 14 September 1903» a certain M, Jouanin had visited
Shaikh °Isa to ascertain his feelings about the establishment of a
French bank in Bahrain. On the latter occasion Jouanin had been
accompanied by the notorious Goguyer, whom Lord Curzon regarded as a 
2 c**"blackguard". Shaikh Isa told Gaskin that he had told the
1 Govt, of India, F.D., to Sec. of State for India, 21 April 1904,
No. 85, Curzon Papers, F. 111/531* item 46.
2 Curzon to Brodrick, 21 November 1903i Midieton Papers, Add 50075»
PP- 39-48.
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Frenchmen that there was no need for a bank in Bahrain. Later, Gaskin 
had discovered from Jouanin himself that the concession he was hoping 
to obtain in Bahrain included permission to administer the Customs of 
the Island. Gaskin declared that it was "obvious that if such a 
charter were to be given to Monsieur Jouanin it would be disastrous 
to our policy, trade and the future, of Bahrein". The Resident
instructed Gaskin to tell Jouanin, if he referred to it again, that he
c- — 2understood that Shaikh Isa did not wish a bank opened at Bahrain.
A few months later the French Government proposed to the British 
Government that Bahrain should be included within the area of the French 
Vice-Consulate at Bushire. The reason given was that French subjects 
had come to Bahrain to establish themselves and to carry on pearl 
fishing. Secretary of State Brodrick was willing to agree on 
condition that any representations by the French Vice-Consul would be
Q m m  mm
addressed not to Shaikh Isa, who had placed his foreign relations in 
British hands, but to the British Agent on the island.^
However, the new Resident at Bushire, Cox, reacted quite 
differently. The participation of French merchants in the pearl 
fisheries and the proposed jurisdiction of the French Vice-Consul would 
mean the presence of a French warship on the pearl banks to protect the 
vessels and equipment of French subjects. Cox was in favour of 
informing the French Government that the foreign relations of Bahrain
1 Gaskin to Captain Vere de V. Hunt, Bushire, 21 September 1903, No. 
212, L/P 8c S/7/159, register No. 1571.
2 Kemball to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 2 October 1903, No. 180, 
L/P 8c S /7 /1 5 9 , register No. 1571.
3 Brodrick to Lord Ampthill, Viceroy, 17 August 190*f, tel. No. 265, 
Curzon Papers, F.111/17^+, item 265.
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were in British hands and that the good offices of the Political Agent 
and equality of treatment with British subjects could be offered to 
French subjects. Moreover, in view of the engagements of the Shaikh 
of Bahrain with the British Government and the fact that the French had 
never previously had any commercial treaty with Bahrain, the French 
Government should be told that there were objections to bringing the 
Shaikhdom within the sphere of a French consulate. Cox also pointed 
out that it had always been a fundamental principle of British policy 
in the Gulf that Arab pearling rights should be immune from foreign 
intrusion, even from British firms using modem methods. Various 
other unwelcome developments might follow. For one thing, 
acquiescence in the placing, by the French, of Bahrain under the 
jurisdiction of Bushire might ’’indirectly cause the Persian Government 
to revive their old claim to right over the island”. Moreover, any 
concessions granted to the French would forthwith be claimed by the 
German Consul in favour of Herr Wonckhaus and, doubtless, the Russian 
Consul would follow suit. Cox ended his telegram by recommending 
that, if a resolute line of action was decided on by the British 
Government, Shaikh Isa should be informed about French aspirations and 
should be told that the only way he could be ’’effectively helped by us 
is by the establishment of a formal British protectorate which must 
include control over his Customs, which must be forthwith taken over 
by us'O
The Government of India hoped that the French Government would 
soon drop their proposal. However, if the India Office insisted on
1 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 25 August 190^ - (tel.), 
L/P & S/7/169, register No. 175^-
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immediate action the Government of India recommended that recognition
of the French Vice-Consul at Manama should only be agreed to on certain
conditions: he should obtain his exequatur from the British Government;
he should have dealings only with the British Agent; and, he should
acquire no extra-territorial jurisdiction, but, that, as had been
contemplated in the case of Wonckhaus, the British Agent should exercise 
1
his good offices.
It seems possible that the greater willingness of the authorities
in London to accommodate French pretensions in the Gulf may hav,e been
connected with the British Governments move at this time towards the
Entente with France, The agreement over outstanding worldwide An^lo-
French Colonial differences in April 1904 also reinforced the desire to
2
come to a similar* accommodation with Russia, This would have to
await the outcome of the war which had broken out early in 1904 between
Russia and Japan, but prospects of such developments would obviously
affect the position of the Gulf in international diplomacy. The British
had increased their watchfulness at Bahrain since 1896 as a result of
European rivalries in the area, and now the rivalries were gradually
changing. Against this uncertain background, the India Office
sanctioned the appointment of an officer of the graded list of the
Political Department to replace Gaskin, with a permanent escort of 
3
sepoys. Could the new Agent accomplish the customs reform which had 
eluded Gaskin? Just before the new Agent took up his post, there
1 Viceroy to Sec, of State for India, 1 September 1904 (tel,) ,
L/P & s/7/168 , register No, 1754,
2 Ward and Gooch, op, cit,, III, 305-18; Monger, op, cit,, pp, 104—96; 
Lowe and Dockrill, op, cit,. I, 1-28,
3 Sec, of State for India, to Viceroy, 5 August 1904, Secret No, 33» 
Curzon Papers, F.111/5311 item 53,
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occurred a crisis at Bahrain involving another issue, the responsibility 
for jurisdiction over non-British foreigners. This brought Anglo- 
Bahraini relations to a turning point in the course of 1904-05*
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CHAPTER 3 
THE DISTURBANCES OF 1904-05 IN BAHRAIN
The disturbances of 1904-05 in Bahrain involved acts of violence 
committed by Bahraini citizens against foreign nationals residing in 
the Shaikhdom. If the incidents had occurred even ten years earlier 
it is almost certain that they would have been regarded by the British 
as relatively trivial. However, since they occurred at a time when 
the issue of British control over the Shaikhdom was coming to a 
critical stage, they proved to be very far from unimportant.
As explained above, the British were by 1904-03 extremely 
sensitive about the extent to which their position of dominance in the 
Gulf had come to be challenged by one European Power after another.
As the British had become more anxious about the extent to which the 
Gulf was becoming an arena of international rivalry, they had also 
become more watchful for opportunities to increase their control over 
protected Shaikhs like Isa of Bahrain. This was especially so in 
Shaikh Isa's case. Isa had become aware of British designs on his 
Shaikhdom and had shown a tendency to engage in manoeuvres with the 
aim of holding onto his customary freedom of action. This manoeuvring 
in turn had only made the British more intent on seizing any opportunity 
to tighten their control. When the disturbances of 1904-05 presented 
such an opportunity, the British took it, though not without careful 
consideration of the consequences.
The disturbances of 1904-05 were a result of the actions of the
Q w m  w
followers of Shaikh Ali b. Ahmad, the nephew of Shaikh Isa. As
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explained above, Shaikh Ali, who was Governor of Manama, had ambitions 
to become ruler of Bahrain* He was therefore viewed with great 
suspicion and disfavour by Shaikh Isa* Shaikh Isa's fear of his 
nephew was by no means entirely removed by British recognition of his
son Hamad as successor, Ali was still a powerful figure in Bahrain,
• !fi
having inherited valuable trading interests from his father. He also j 
had a number of followers and sympathisers, including two Sunni mullahs I 
of Manama.
In 1899 the quarrel between Ali and his uncle had been
temporarily settled by means of a family council. However, at the
beginning of 190*f, after the formal recognition of Shaikh Hamad as
successor-designate had taken place, the quarrel broke out afresh.
Manama became the scene of all kinds of excesses committed by ruffians
1
whom Shaikh All had collected*
The Assistant Political Agent in Bahrain, Gaskin, was well aware
Q a .  «a
of the tension existing between Shaikh Ali and Shaikh Isa. Early
in May 190*f Gaskin suggested that the Government of India should
0H M
declare its support for Shaikh Isa at a durbar in Bahrain, as a means 
of counteracting the annoyances Ali and his partisans were continually 
causing. The Resident, Major Cox, supported Gaskin's idea, knowing 
that sooner or later another attempt would be made to coerce Shaikh
Isa over the Customs issue and that Gaskin's suggestion might make
c— — 2Shaikh Isa more amenable. The Government of India felt that the
1 Summary of the Principal Events and Measures of the Vice-royalty
of Lord Curzon, Part I - The Persian Gulf, Confidential (Simla,
1906), p. 63, Curzon Papers, F.111/390*
2 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F*D*, 19 May 190*f, No, 136,
L/P 8c s/7/166, register No* 1299*
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matter was not urgent, and could await "a decision on the question of 
the arrangements for our future representation at Bahrein11, Within 
three months of these instructions, Shaikh Ali*s supporters had caused 
an embarrassing incident involving the German trading community of 
Bahrain.
The chief figure in this community was Robert Wonckhaus, who had 
established a branch of his business in Bahrain in 1901. Apparently 
Wonckhaus had failed to secure the good will of the A1 Khalifa, 
probably because he had no intention of satisfying financial demands 
which he regarded as illegitimate. Wonckhaus had particularly made 
an enemy of Shaikh Ali: since Wonckhaus possessed his own fleet of
cargo boats, Ali was not included in any of the German*s business 
transactions.
In these circumstances it was natural for Wonckhaus to look to
the British authorities for protection. One of his most frequent
complaints to the Assistant Political Agent had concerned the Bahraini 
2
practice of sukhra , the system of forced labour or corvee. It had
long been the custom of the A1 Khalifa shaikhs to levy sukhra from
3
those of their subjects who belonged to the lower classes. On 
British instructions the Shaikh had banned its application to coolies 
employed by Europeans. Even so, it is clear that there was a real
1 Under Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Cox, 30 June 190^ -, No.
2067 E.A., L/t 8c S/7/166.
2 Wonckhaus to F.B. Prideaux, Asst. Political Agent, Bahrain,
30 October 190*f, L/P 8c S/10/81.
3 Prideaux to Wonckhaus, 28 October 190*f, No. 2^ -8, L/P 8c S/10/81.
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clash of opinion between Bahrainis and Europeans on the island about
. 1 the legitimacy of the use of sukhra. The bad relations between
Wonckhaus and Shaikh Ali reached a crisis over this question, in an
incident on 29 September 1904, when a coolie employed by Wonckhaus*s ■
firm refused to work sukhra to unload a boat belonging to Shaikh Ali. I
cThe coolie fled to the firm’s house for protection. Abdallah, a 
native clerk employed by Wonckhaus, informed a servant of Shaikh Ali 
where the coolie was taking refuge, adding that if Shaikh Ali needed 
help he could himself ask Herr Wonckhaus. Ali's servant considered 
the clerk's reply to be an insult. Apparently, Shaikh Ali was in 
the habit of taking rather than asking for what he wanted. Soon the 
servant and the clerk were exchanging blows, but they were quickly 
separated by a German assistant of Wonckhaus called Bahnson.
Shaikh Ali came quickly to Wonckhaus's premises with a number of 
his followers. Saying that Abdallah had beaten his servant, Shaikh
Ali began, with the assistance of his followers, to beat the unresisting
c cAbdallah. In an attempt to protect Abdallah, Bahnson himself was
injured although Shaikh Ali pretended to offer his protection.
Wonckhaus, who was absent at the time of the incident, hurried 
back on receiving news of it. Finding Shaikh Ali still on the 
premises, Wonckhaus immediately sent for Gaskin, asking Shaikh Ali to 
wait. However, Shaikh Ali decided to leave, informing Wonckhaus 
that, if Gaskin needed him, he would be at home.
1 Gaskin to C.A. Kemball, Resident, Bushire, 30 November 1902,
L/P & S/7/154, register No. 845; C.E. Akers to Board of Trade, 
London, March 1909* L/P & S/3/449, register No. 3285; Plass, 
England zwischen Russlsmd und Deutschland, 1899-1907, (pp* 395-410); 
Busch, op. cit., p. l48; Lorimer, IB, pp. 958-42; Graves, 
op. cit., p. 98.
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The German merchant considered the incident to be a very serious 
one. He impressed on Gaskin that the British authorities should 
ensure that such incidents did not recur, and stipulated that certain 
conditions should be met before a settlement could be acceptable.
Firstly, the assailants should be publicly beaten with Bahnson present 
as a witness. Secondly, those responsible for the assault should pay 
Bahnson Rs. 1,000 in compensation. Thirdly, sukhra should be entirely 
prohibited for employees of Europeans,
Gaskin conducted an enquiry into the affair. After interviewing 
both parties he became convinced that Shaikh Ali and his followers 
were to blame for the injury caused to Bahnson, Nevertheless, he felt 
that the real responsibility for the incident rested on the deterioration 
of law and order in Bahrain; the corrupt practice of sukhra; and the
Cm m
weakness of the ruler, Shaikh Isa, In his view, there would have
2
been no such trouble if Bahrain had been under a better administration. 
Gaskin clearly had in mind the idea that the unsatisfactory state of 
internal administration could easily be taken by foreign Powers as an 
indictment of British supervision of the Shaikhdom,
Although he was about to leave Bahrain, Gaskin protested
Q m  m
strongly to Shaikh Isa and demanded the punishment and expulsion of 
the assailants as well as the payment of the Rs. 1,000 compensation.
Cm m
Shaikh Isa was by no means disinclined to see Shaikh Ali and his 
followers punished. However matters were not so simple. Shaikh
1 Wonckhaus to Gaskin, 29 September 1904; Shaikh Ali to Shaikh CIsa,
29 September 1904, L/P & S/10/81.
2 Gaskin to Cox, 1 October 1904, No. 225, L/P & S/10/81.
235
Qm m
Isa was known by the British authorities in Bahrain to be "a little
• • . 1 Q g  a
afraid" of Shaikh Ali. Moreover, Shaikh Isa had to take into
account the likely reaction of the other members of the A1 Khalifa 
ruling family to the indignity of such punishment. Finally, on
matters such as sukhra, Shaikh CIsa*s views were the same as Shaikh
2 c- -Ali*s. Shaikh Isa might wish to take advantage of any
embarrassment of Shaikh Ali, but sukhra was not the best issue to 
exploit.
Gaskin's complaint was dismissed with the reply that the Shaikh, 
in his good time, would have an enquiry conducted into the case. 
However, on 1 October 1904, Shaikh CIsa wrote to Major Cox concerning 
the incident, enclosing a petition from Ali presenting his version of
C «  mm
the incident. It is significant that Shaikh Isa was handing over 
the case to the Resident at Bushire to deal with. In the past,
mm
British Residents had trusted Shaikh Isa's rulings in such local 
incidents and such a departure from custom was a sign of the extent to 
which the British had increased their power over the Shaikhdom*^
The acting Resident, Captain A.P. Trevor, Cox's First Assistant 
at Bushire, wired the information to the new Assistant Political Agent 
who was en route to Bahrain to replace Gaskin. The replacement,
1 Ibid. See also Summary of the Principal Events and Measures of 
the Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon, Part I, The Persian Gulf, 
Confidential (Simla, 1906), p. 65, Curzon Papers, F.111/390.
2 Prideaux to Cox, 31 October 1904, No. 252, L/P & S/10/81. In 
fact in November 1904, a servant of Shaikh Hamad, Shaikh cIsa's 
eldest son, attempted to abduct one of Wonckhaus's coolies for 
sukhra. Wonckhaus to Prideaux, 5 November 1904, L/P & S/10/81.
3 °Isa to Cox, 1 October 1904, L/P & S/10/81.
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F.B. Prideaux, was to try and effect a settlement with the help of
0a M
Shaikh Isa. If he was unable to do so, he should- report his findings
and state whether or not he concurred with Gaskin*s recommendations
1 c___
for punishment. At the same time, Trevor urged Shaikh Isa, **in
the interests of all concerned”, to consult with Britain*s new
representative in his Shaikhdom and endeavour to bring about a speedy 
2settlement•
The new Assistant Political Agent was in a most difficult position.
Prideaux was responsible for settling a case involving an incident which
had occurred before he had arrived in Bahrain. Naturally, he was
obliged to rely on second-hand information. It was not until later
that Prideaux fully appreciated how biased was the information on which
he relied for his judgment. Because of this, in October 1904 he
arrived at conclusions quite different to those of Gaskin and less
3
unfavourable to Shaikh Ali.
In the course of his investigation, Prideaux gained the impression
that Shaikh Ali was "disloyal” to his uncle. Ali had, for example, !
!
offered to solve the Customs issue, on condition that the British
i
!
Government would help him to recover his father*s share in the I
il
Government of Bahrain. Acknowledging that it was a grave offence 
for an Asian to assault a European "without just provocation”,
Prideaux nevertheless claimed that there had been "errors of judgment
1 Trevor to Prideaux, 7 October 1904 (tel.), L/P & S/10/81.
2 Trevor to Shaikh °Isa, 11 October 1904, No. 342, L/P & S/10/81.
3 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 1? December 1904, No. 420,
L/t & S/10/81.
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and improper actions on both sides11. Therefore, he pronounced 
Gaskin’s terms of punishment "unreasonably severe". Prideaux |
explained to Wonckhaus that sukhra was a long-established feature of 
life in Bahrain, as in neighbouring Arab states. The practice could ;
i
not be abolished overnight. To get rid of it needed self-restraint j 
and the "exercise of a good deal of diplomacy". Thus, he suggested j
to Wonckhaus that an apology from Shaikh Ali and a month’s imprisonment
for those of his servants involved should suffice. It would appear 
that Prideaux, at this time under the influence of Shaikh CTsa, was
reluctant to stir up trouble among his subjects by antagonising Ali
and conceding the extreme demands of Wonckhaus.
Wonckhaus was extremely displeased by Prideaux*s approach. He
resented the suggestion that there was blame on both sides, and
rejected Prideaux’s proposals for a settlement. The German merchant
reiterated his argument about the over-bearing manner of the A1 Khalifa
Shaikhs and their servants. If Europeans were to conduct profitable
business in Bahrain, Wonckhaus declared, then they needed proper
protection. He warned Prideaux that if Shaikh Ali was not fully
punished then more European residents in the Shaikhdom would suffer
from his turbulence, and declared that, since he was not satisfied
with his handling of the case, he was reporting the incident to the
2German Consul at Bushire for settlement.
1 Prideaux to Wonckhaus, 28 October 1904, No. 248, L/P & S/10/81.
2 Wonckhaus to Prideaux, 30 October 1904, L/P & S/10/81. Shaikh
Isa was induced to tell the German Consul that the affair was a 
matter for the Protecting Power: see Shaikh Isa to German Consul,
Bushire, 7 November 1904, L/P & S/10/81.
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Unable to induce Wonckhaus to moderate his demands, Prideaux
referred the case to the Resident, The Agent gave his opinion that
flogging, the form of punishment favoured by Herr Bahnson, could not
be permitted in a country "so much affected by British influence".
He also considered that punishing Shaikh Ali or his servants would not
help law and order in Bahrain. He felt that better understanding and
more time and patience were the solution to the problem. Prideaux
realised how difficult it would be for Shaikh CIsa to curtail Ali's
power, especially over an incident concerning such an entrenched custom 
1
as sukhra. However, another incident now occurred which caused 
Prideaux to change his whole approach to the solution of the problems 
of Bahrain.
This second incident also concerned an assault by members of the
entourage of Shaikh Ali upon foreign residents, in this case Persians.
The Persian Shiite community in Bahrain numbered about 1,500, all of "'j
whom worked and lived in Manama as shopkeepers and artisans. Their
2numbers had increased with the growth of commercial opportunities. —j 
The headman of the Persian community was a man called Haji
0  m  mm 0  p, mm
Abdul Nabi Kazeruni. Abdul Nabi was employed by Shaikh Isa as 
'Hamal Baschi* or Director of the cargo-landing operations on the wharf, 
with further responsibility for cargoes in the Customs building. For
1 Prideaux to Cox, 31 October 1904, No. 252; Wonckhaus to Prideaux,
5 November 1904; Prideaux to Shaikh Isa, 7 November 1904,
No. 259; Shaikh cIsa to Prideaux, 10 November 1904; and 
Prideaux to Wonckhaus, 10 November 1904, No. 220, L/P & S/10/81.
2 1 Administration Reports1, 1901-02, 1903-04 and 1904—05; Cox to 
Sec. to Govt, of India, 17 December 1904, No. 421, L/P & S/10/81.
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this post Abdul Nabi held a contract under Shaikh Isa's wazir or
chief clerk and was considered to be a loyal, honest and hardworking
c «servant of the Shaikh. Abdul Nabi also was a dubasch for the Royal
Navy and Indian Marine, supplying their ships whenever they called
at Bahrain. In addition, he was the local agent for Gray's Paul and
Co., a British trading firm dealing in mother-of-pearl and in
1competition with Herr Wonckhaus.
In July 190** °Abdul Nabi had caught eight followers of Shaikh
Ali pilfering from cargoes which were in his charge. The thieves
were tried and sentenced to imprisonment, with the result that neither
c — 2Shaikh Ali nor his entourage had forgiven Abdul Nabi.
On the evening of 1** November, Ramazan, a Persian employed by 
CAbdul Nabi, accidentally brushed against Marzuq, a Negro servant of 
Shaikh Ali, in the Manama bazaar. A fight followed in which Marzuq
attacked other Persians who were close by. From a nearby mosque,
some Sunni Arab worshippers, instigated by two mullahs, brothers called 
Qasim and Ahmad, joined the affray on the side of Marzuq. It was well 
known in Bahrain that these two brothers were supporters of Shaikh Ali
Q .  mm
and disaffected towards Shaikh Isa. They were also antagonistic
3
towards British power in Bahrain.
1 Depositions of Haji °Abdul Nabi b. Kal Ahwaz, Persian subject, 
enclosure No. 6 in Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 17 
December 190**, No. **21, L/P & S/10/81.
2 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, 17 December 190**, No. **21, L/P &
S/10/81.
3 Prideaux to Cox, 17 November 190**, No. 270, L/P & S/10/81;
Dr. S.J. Thoms, Surgeon at the American Mission to Prideaux,
15 November 190**, L/P & S/10/81.
Shaikh Ali, whose house was nearby, witnessed the fight but took
* Q
no part in it personally. However, his cousin, Shaikh Du aij b.
Salman A1 Khalifa, who was in Ali*s house at the time, joined the 
assailants. Severed. Persians were injured in the fracas and the
M  Q  ^
father and brother of Haji Abdul Nabi, though escaping injury, were 
1
badly frightened.
Shaikh Ali, who denied any connection with the incident, informed
Prideaux that the responsibility for the prevention of such disturbances
rested with his uncle. As soon as Shaikh Isa received word of the
c «incident, he sent Abdul Nabi a promise that his wrongs would be 
righted. The ruler of Bahrain had a vested interest in the presence 
of hardworking minorities in the Shaikhdom as useful contributors of 
tax revenue.
Shaikh Isa also calculated that the incident might be used as 
an opportunity to curb the power of his nephew once and for all, but
Q m  mm
without losing the good will of the family. Shaikh Isa decided to 
have the case tried by the ShariCa court of the Chief Sunni qadi, 
mullah Qasim (who had himself been involved in the assault). This 
was quite in accordance with the law of Bahrain, which stated that, if 
a Sunni and a Shiite were involved in a dispute then the Sunni Shari a 
court would have jurisdiction in the case. By being forced to rule 
in favour of the Persians, mullah Qasim would then incur the hostility 
of the A1 Khalifa. As Prideaux remarked, Shaikh °Isa only sent cases 
to mullah Qasim for settlement when he was anxious to wash his hands of
1 Prideaux to Cox, 17 November 190^ -, No. 270, L/P & S/10/81
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all connections with them.
Prideaux’s reaction to the second incident involving Shaikh Ali's
supporters was quite different from his handling of the assault on
Bahnson. He now realised that he had underestimated the menace posed
by Shaikh Ali and his entourage. Prideaux objected that a Sunni 
•»cShari a court was not qualified to do justice to Persians especially
when the conduct of two A1 Khalifa shaikhs was seriously in question.
c- - 2Prideaux therefore urged Shaikh Isa to hold the inquiry himself.
Not surprisingly, Shaikh Isa rejected this suggestion.
Prideaux thereupon requested the despatch of a gunboat for the 
protection of the minority communities in Bahrain. Prideaux further 
suggested that Shaikh Ali should be banished from the Shaikhdom for ten 
yeans, and that those of Ali’s servants implicated in the affair be 
’’soundly flogged”, imprisoned and, if no security for their good 
behaviour was forthcoming, deported. He added that Shaikh cIsa 
should be informed that future disputes between Sunnis and Shiites 
would be decided by the Political Agent as was the custom with disputes 
between Hindus and Muslims.
Prideaux explained his motivation in taking such a strong line 
by stating that, unless Britain’s authority in Bahrain was 
’’unhesitatingly vindicated”, their prestige would be lowered not only 
in the Shaikhdom but along ’’the entire length of the Arab coast”.
1 Prideaux to Cox, 19 November 1904, No. 272, L/P & S/10/81
2 Prideaux to Cox, 1? November 1904, No. 270, L/P & S/10/81
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Apparently unaware of the threat which his proposed course of action 
posed to the political status quo in Bahrain, Prideaux gave his opinion 
that Shaikh Isa could easily be persuaded to acquiesce to his demands*
Q m m  mm
After all, he wrote to Cox, Shaikh Isa would be able to avoid
embarrassment from his family by telling them that his actions were
1
"prompted by force majeure".
The responsibility for making the next move lay with Cox* In
considering the way in which he acted it is important to bear in mind
the closeness of his attitude to Gulf affairs to that of Lord Curzon
(see Chapter 4). Cox considered that foreign commercial and
political encroachments in the Gulf were a serious threat to Britain's
position in Bahrain* He assumed that the time was now appropriate for
meeting the increasing foreign competition in the area by transforming
2Bahrain into a full British protectorate*
Cox decided that the cases involved an abrogation of the 1892 
agreement. A European trader, for whose safety, he felt, the British 
Government was morally responsible, had been assaulted. Cox was also 
immediately aware of the possible wider repercussions of the incidents. 
He noticed that not only had Herr Wonckhaus referred the Bahnson case 
to the German Consul in Bushire, but also that the second case had been 
referred to the Mushire-ud-Dowleh (Secretary for Foreign Affairs) of 
the Persian Government* Those foreign powers which were intent on 
promoting their interests in the Gulf would, Cox believed, "gain an
1 Prideaux to Cox, 19 November 1904, No* 272, L/P & S/10/81.
2 This point is expanded and documented in Chapter 6.
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opening for assailing our regime, if they could show that we could not,
1or did not, give their subjects effective protection”.
The gunboat HMS Redbreast and Cox himself in RIMS Laurence 
arrived at Bahrain by 30 November. Believing that Shaikh Ali's 
implication in the Bahnson case was "not open to any doubt”, Cox 
decided to proceed first with the settlement of the grievances of the 
German traders. He asked Shaikh Isa to comply with Gaskin's original
Qa M
demands. The ruler of Bahrain demurred. Apparently Shaikh Isa 
had been engaged in negotiations with the other members of his family 
in order to arrive at a solution to the problem of Shaikh Ali which
Qa. mm
would be acceptable to all concerned. Isa repeatedly attempted to 
convince Cox that the whole affair was a simple family dispute. The 
Shaikh expressed the opinion that Shaikh Ali would be "effectively 
subdued” by Cox giving him a severe talking to in the presence of his
Q a  mm
uncle and Captain Prideaux. Shaikh Isa assured Cox that he had no
fear of Shaikh Ali's machinations during his lifetime, but only after 
2
his death.
Anxious to demonstrate to foreign powers that Bahrain was under 
firm British control, Cox insisted that the compensation should be paid, 
the ringleaders of the disturbances flogged and expelled, and that Ali 
should leave Bahrain pending the receipt of Government approval.
1 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 17 December 1904, Nos. 420 
and 421, L/P & S/10/81. See also Herr von Mutius, German Consul, 
Bushire, to Shaikh °Isa, 19 October 1904, Shaikh CIsa to von Mutius, 
7 November 1904, Mushir-ud-Dowleh to the Persian community in 
Bahrain (tel.), translation, n.d., Trevor to Evelyn Grant-Duff,
H.M. Charge d'Affaires, Tehran, 23 November 1904 (tel.), and 
Grant-Duff to Trevor, 24 November 1904 (tel.), L/P & S/10/81.
2 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 17 December 1904, No. 420,
L/P & S/10/81.
2¥t
0W M
Shaikh Isa was obliged to comply. The compensation of 
Rs. 1,000 was paid to the Agency. The ringleaders were identified 
and flogged by a British seaman in the public street outside the Agency. 
Shaikh CIsa also offered to display a public notice prohibiting the 
application of sukhra to coolies employed by Europeans.
On 5 December 1905 Cox took up the second case, that of the
molested Persians. Once again he was determined to take a strong
line. The position of the ’♦infinitesimal1* Persian community of
Bahrain, he believed, was similar to that of the British Indian traders.
If it were not for the existence of the Pax Britannica, such minorities
'♦could hardly trade of reside in complete security in such surroundings
2
even at ordinary times*’. Horeove, if justice in this case was done
to the aggrieved Persians, this fact would greatly strengthen the hands
of the British Legation in Tehran in their dealings with the Persian 
3
Government.
On the afternoon of k December, the day when Cox was preparing 
to take the Persian case in hand, however, Shaikh cIsa handed him an 
*Istishhad (testimony) executed by his chief Sunni qadl. This 
document claimed that it was the Arab subjects who had been beaten and 
not vice versa. Cox refused to acknowledge the validity of an 
^stishhad which, he asserted, could not be accepted by any British 
Court or official. He avowed his intention to cross-examine all
1 Cox does not seem to have been aware that the Persian community 
of Bahrain was-as large as it in fact was (see above, p. 238 ).
2 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 17 December 190*f, No. ^21,
L/P & S/10/81.
3 Ibid.
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Q. mm
persons concerned in the case. Shaikh Isa realised the dangers of 
putting his Arab subjects in a British court of law faced with Shiite 
witnesses. However, he made a show of agreeing to Cox’s demands, 
without having any intention of conforming to them because of the danger 
that such a procedure would establish a precedent.
On 5 December Cox interviewed the Persian witnesses and came to
the conclusion that their injuries supported their claim that they were
1 c -  -the ones attacked. The next day Cox visited Shaikh Isa with the
object of securing his consent to the examination of the Arab witnesses.
Q m m  m
The Shaikh explained to Cox how damaging to Isa’s position in Bahrain 
Cox’s proceedings were sure to be. Cox, whilst declaring his
Q m  mm
appreciation of Shaikh Isa's difficulties, also stressed how important 
it was that justice should be seen to be done. A compromise was 
reached when Shaikh Isa agreed to produce some of his subjects, at 
the same time making it clear that they would not be those actually 
involved in the incident.
On 7 December, at a court conducted by himself at the Agency,
Cox interviewed the Arab witnesses. Shaikh Hamad was present. It
was the claim of the Arab witnesses that the Persians had attacked
first. Cox, after hearing the evidence, had to admit that he was
unable to determine who had struck the first blow. However, he noted
that two perfectly harmless Persians, one na decrepit octogenarian”,
were both nearly killed and seven more severely injured in the course 
2
of the incident. Cox demanded the punishment of the Arabs concerned
1 Ibid., and statements of Persian witnesses accompanying it.
2 Ibid., and the accompanying statements of the Arab witnesses.
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and also insisted on the deportation of Shaikh Ali* Isa was not to
«c \
be allowed to refer to the case in his Shari a court* Cox reasoned |
l
i
that "an exceedingly small community of Persians” would never dare to 
mount an attack ”upon Arabs in an Arab town of some thousands of 
inhabitants”. The Arabs were therefore the attackers and had 
committed a serious offence. He called upon Shaikh Isa "as a ruler, 
to set aside his religious prejudices and have adequate justice meted 
out” . 1
However, Shaikh Isa was now fighting for something other than
religious or national prejudices. His own rights of jurisdiction as
ruler of Bahrain seemed to be threatened. He retorted that he had
"one answer to give, namely that I will do nothing in this case except
2
after trial by my own Shariat or Urf Court". Even so, Cox was not 
going to be defied. He argued that this was a case for British justice 
and not for a Shari a court, especially one which would be constituted 
by the two Sunni mullahs who were already involved in the affray.
He pointed out that neither the Persian nor the British Governments
.0 ,3 , « . . .  . . .  *  .  , .  . . .  I
mullahs. In addition, Cox claimed, no Muslims could be compelled
I
to go to a Shari a court, and the Persians had already refused to go.
mm
As for an Urf court, Cox bluntly told Isa that he did not think that 
there were in Bahrain any "suitable persons ...upon whose integrity 
and intention to do justice any confidence could be placed". Cox 
went on to make the rather odd claim that trial by a British court did
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid. An Urf court is a civil court.
2k7
not mean "taking the Persians out of ^ /shaikh cIsa's7 jurisdiction
altogether’1. Finally, the Resident called on Shaikh Isa to come to
a compromise rather than to force the British Government to interpret
1
his stand as an act of insubordination.
Isa, however, obstinately rejected Cox's threat. He still 
maintained that the only acceptable compromise could come after the 
case had been referred to his Shari a court. Fully aware of the 
legal limitations on British power in Bahrain laid down by past 
treaties, he informed Cox that "If Government wish to seize Bahrain 
... their arm is long and they can do it; but I will under no 
circumstances consent to the trial of these Persians by any tribunal ' 
but my own Courts".^ For the first time since 1869 a British
m m
Resident had reached an impasse with Shaikh Isa.
Cox did not believe that the question of the jurisdiction of
Q a  mm
Shaikh Isa was a reel obstacle to a settlement. He therefore
suspected that the influence of anti-British advisers, such as Shaikh
cAli, the Sunni mullahs and the Ottoman subject Muhammad b. Abdul Wahab
w C« M
was behind Shaikh Isa's obstinacy. Cox warned that Shaikh Isa's 
rejection of his advice had a "sinister significance" and that his ten 
days "enforced sojourn" in Bahrain had brought him to the conclusion 
that the state of things was very unsatisfactory. The ruler was not 
only old and weak, he was also apparently ignorant of the fact that he 
owed his position entirely to British support. The British
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid., See also Prideaux to Cox, 19 November 19C&, No. 272,
l/p & s/10/81.
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Government had consented to the succession of Shaikh Hamad who was 
"an overbearingly ignorant young man" and gave no appearance of being
mm
a promising successor, Bahrain, under Isa or Hamad, was hardly any 
credit to Britain as a principality over which the British Government 
had for long exercised a virtual protectorate.
Therefore, if the Government decided to use coercion, then 
Shaikh cIsa should be deposed, his son rejected and one of the sons 
of Muhammad b. Khalifa (see genealogical table) installed as ruler.
This course of action would be simple and the new ruler could be given 
a new binding treaty with the British Government, The first major 
show of resistance to British wishes by a ruler of Bahrain since 1869 
had resulted in proposals for British action for the deposition of a 
Bahrain shaikh, action reminiscent of that of Colonel Pelly in 1869,
However, Cox presented alternative proposals. If India chose
Q m m  mm
not to take such a course, then Isa should be forced to accept the
demands of the British Government. The British should also "include
the Customs questions and have done with it, seeing it has been
troubling us so long". Finally, Cox insisted that the means of
c- - 1coercion should be available before any demands were made on Isa,
The Government of India cabled Cox on 6 January 1905* His 
analysis of the Bahrain crisis was accepted and his proposed settlement 
of the German case approved. In regard to the Persian case, India was 
prepared to agree to the punishments suggested by Cox. They informed
1 Ibid.
2k9
him that a naval force could be sent to Bahrain by 2 February, If, in
Q m m  m
face of such a show of force, Shaikh Isa still declined to comply
with British demands, the Government of India wished to know if Cox
1would advise a threat to seize the Customs House.
As far as the proposal to remove Shaikh CIsa was concerned, 
however, the Government of India was not convinced that it would be 
advisable. Such a move would entail the risk of the resumption of 
the old family feuds among the A1 Khalifa. These could be most ( 
damaging to British trade in the area.
Cox quickly cabled his reply. A threat to seize the Customs 
would be insufficient. Instead, he recommended that a threat to 
bombard Muharraq, if Shaikh Isa refused to comply with British demands,
Q m m  mm
would be more effective. If Shaikh Isa did comply, Cox claimed,
the Government could still warn him that "any further rejection of
their advice in important matters” would not be tolerated. Such a
warning, Cox hoped, might be effective in bringing the Shaikh to
accept the advice of the Assistant Political Agent regarding the
Customs when pressure was next applied on this issue. Meanwhile,
the Resident was anxious to know whether the Government had arrived
at a decision regarding the general question of British jurisdiction
2
over the Persians in Bahrain.
1 Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Cox, 6 January 1905* tel.
No. 8^-E.B., "L/P & S/7/173f register No. 323*
2 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 10 January 1905 (tel.), 
L/P & S/7/173* See also Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 
15 January 1905 (tel.), L/P 8c S/7/17^i register No. 5^5*
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The Government of India was prepared to adopt the recommendations
of the Resident, Indeed, as far as Curzon was concerned, the coercion
qm m
of Shaikh Isa would be "a petty incident” of a kind which had 
"happened over and over again before, and would in former times have 
been carried out by the Government of India without any reference to 
the authorities at home”. Even so, Curzon was well aware that 
changing circumstances, in the form of increasing pressure by great 
European powers on Britain*s predominance in the Gulf, had made 
Viceregal action there now subject to the close and critical scrutiny 
of the Home Government,
The Viceroy telegraphed London endorsing Cox*s proposals,
Curzon noted that the appeals for British protection made by the German
and Persian subjects would "make the present opportunity specially
favourable for asserting our protectorate" and would also minimize
2objections "of an international character",
Curzon*s proposals were considered by the Council of India which 
the Viceroy was later to accuse of wishing "to thwart and hamper" his 
work,^ The Council, whilst totally rejecting the seizure of the 
Customs House or administration, endorsed most of the measures proposed 
by the Government of India, Regarding the seizure of the Customs,
Sir Denis Fitzpatrick warned Secretary of State Brodrick about the 
dangers of taking such a course. It would be asked what connection
1 Curzon to Brodrick (private), 16 February 1905* No. 19* Curzon 
Papers, F. 111/164.
2 Viceroy to Sec. of State for India, 21 January 1905* tel. No, 
P. 306-E.B., L/P & S/7/174, register No. 545.
3 Ronaldshay, op. cit., II, 237*
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there was between the riots in Bahrain and the Customs. It would also
be assumed that the riots were merely a pretext for British intervention,
the real object of which was the acquisition of the Customs
administration "after which we have been hankering for some time past".
Therefore, Fitzpatrick suggested to the Secretary of State, he should
not agree to a course of action (the seizure of the Customs) which
would bring discredit on the British Government. If the action was
permitted, other native rulers would tend to regard British friendship
1
and protection "as anything but an unmixed blessing”•
The rest of the members of the Council of India endorsed these
recommendations of Fitzpatrick. The proposal for flogging the
ringleaders should be dropped as there were "obvious objections”•
Expulsion or imprisonment would be more suitable punishment for these
offenders. However, the constitution of the court was to be left to
the discretion of the Government of India. As far as the question
of the occupation of the Customs House was concerned, the connection
between Shaikh Ali’s lawlessness, his uncle’s incompetence and the
Customs difficulties was so remote that the Home Government considered
the proposal for the seizure ”inexpedient”. The Government of India
was further cautioned that adequate force should be employed for any
2necessary coercion.
Cox returned to Bahrain on 23 February 1905 aboard HMS Redbreast.
1 Commentary by Fitzpatrick, 25 January 1905* L/P & S/10/81.
2 Sec. of State for India to Viceroy, 15 February 1905 (tel.), 
Curzon Papers, F.111/175*
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HMS Sphinx and HMS Fox, under the command of Captain J.B. Eustace, 
were already there. Not until the morning of 25 February was Shaikh
Q m  mm
Isa summoned to attend the British Agency to receive an important
1
message from the Government of India. Captain Eustace needed time
to deploy his ships in a way which frustrated any possible retaliation
by Shaikh Isa. Cox wanted time for the power of the assembled
British force to impress itself on Shaikh Isa and so weaken any spirit
of resistance. A further reason for the delay was the need to make
provision for the safety of the small European community as well as of
the Persians and British Indians resident in Manama. For the safety
of these foreign residents, Captain Eustace ordered all marines from
HMS Sphinx to co-operate with the Resident's guard in order to give
2
the necessary protection.
Under Shaikh CIsa's command on Muharraq island were 540 men armed 
with Martini rifles. The joint forces of Shaikh Ali and his uncle
mm a 0
Khalid, the Governor of Rifa , amounted to about 500 riflemen. In 
addition a large number of Arabs armed with native weapons were ready
7  mm
to aid both forces. Even so, Shaikh Isa had no intention of 
taking the suicidal course of opposing British power. On the other 
hand, he was certainly prepared to use the presence of the British 
naval force to weaken the influence of Shaikh Ali and his followers in 
Bahrain while himself avoiding open hostility towards Ali. On 
24 February, whilst Shaikh Isa was paying his respects to Cox at the
1 Cox to Officiating Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 4 March 1905*
No. 1191 k/P & S/7/176, register No. 770; Eustace to Atkinson-
Willes, 2 March 1905, L/P & S/3/227, register No. 2813.
2 Eustace to Atkinson-Willes, 1 0  March 1905i L/P & S/3/227*
3 Ibid.
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Agency, the latter had warned him that Shaikh Ali had better prepare
1for an early departure since that was the decision of the Government.
The ruler of Bahrain in fact secretly encouraged his nephew to abscond,
calculating that this would incriminate Shaikh Ali further in the eyes
of Cox, whilst he, Isa, retained his nephew’s confidence. However,
0M M
Shaikh Isa’s cunning was of no use to him when he was faced with the 
ultimatum of the British Government which Cox presented him with on the 
morning of the 25 February.
The Resident made the following demands:-
1 That all ringleaders involved in the two incidents of September- 
November 1904 should be expelled from Bahrain.
2 That the Persian victims of the second assault should be 
compensated with Rs. 2,000.
C_ M
5 That a guard of Shaikh Isa's trusted men should be established
to maintain law and order in Manama.
4 That Shaikh Ali should be deported from Bahrain for a period
of five years.
5 That a notification prohibiting the application of sukhra to
coolies employed by Europeans in Bahrain should be issued.
6 That Shaikh Isa should understand that the Government would no
longer tolerate any further rejection of its advice in important 
matters.
Shaikh °Isa realised that to be seen to bow in the face of such
1 Cox to Officiating Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 4 March 1905* 
No. 119, L/P & S/7/176, register No. 770; Cox to Sec. to Govt, 
of India, 24 December 1904, No. 427, L/P 8c S/10/81; Prideaux to 
Cox, 18 December 1904, No. 296, L/P 8c S/10/81.
2^k
an ultimatum would be a shattering blow to his prestige among his 
family and the people of Bahrain. He tried to persuade Cox that such 
a humiliation would be in the interests neither of himself nor of the
mm
British protecting power. Shaikh Isa therefore asked for an extension 
of the deadline which had been given him for complying with the 
ultimatum. Cox, however, was now a firm believer in the bad faith 
of Shaikh Isa and declined to have any part in the ’’polite fiction” 
proposed by the ruler of Bahrain.
Even in this difficult situation, Shaikh Isa found room for
c •manoeuvring. He sent his youngest son, Abdallah, to inform Shaikh
Ali that he would shortly be attempting to arrest him at his home.
Shaikh Isa also told Abdallah that he was to see Prideaux and tell
him that he had visited Shaikh Ali and that he feared that Ali was
likely to abscond during the night.
Q m m  mm
Shaikh Isa's manoeuvrings seem to have met with some success.
The outcome of Abdallah's hint to Prideaux was that Cox instructed
cAbdallah ”to warn his father at once to take immediate steps to ensure
his nephew's presence the next morning as arranged”. Isa replied
that he intended to arrest Shaikh Ali instantly, "but to this end he
would be glad of the moral support of some representative of the
1
British Agency or of a few sepoys from the Agency guard". Cox was 
doubtful about the advisability of complying with this request. In 
the end, however, he decided that if he now refused to co-operate with 
Shaikh Isa, then the ruler of Bahrain would have been given an excuse
1 Cox to Officiating Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., k March 1905» 
No. 119, L/P & S/10/81.
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for not complying with the part of the British ultimatum relating to 
the expulsion of Shaikh Ali. Accordingly, Cox ordered Captain 
Prideaux, with a small party of sepoys under a British lieutenant,
0 H  mm
to accompany Shaikh Isa*s men in the operation. The raid met with no 
success, however. Earlier that day, 25 February, Ali had absconded
Q
on receiving Shaikh Abdallah*s warning.
On the morning of 26 February, at the expiry of the deadline of 
the ultimatum, Shaikh Isa arrived at the Agency. He paid the 
Rs. 2,000 compensation for the Persians, declared that the guard to 
patrol Manama was ready for inspection and presented Cox with the 
public notification prohibiting sukhra for the employees of Europeans 
in Bahrain. However, concerning Shaikh Ali and the ringleaders, 
Shaikh °Isa disavowed any knowledge of their whereabouts. Cox was
0 H  mm
annoyed by the escape of Ali and clearly held Shaikh Isa responsible. 
Under the influence of Eustace*s views on the subject and after 
consulting with Prideaux, Cox decided to take stern action against 
Shaikh °Isa. He demanded that Shaikh Ali*s house, furniture, boats 
and animals should be confiscated. Shaikh Hamad, the successor- 
designate to the Shaikhdom, must be surrendered to him as a hostage
Q m m  M  Q «  mm
and as a sign of Isa*s good faith. Shaikh Isa*s residence must
immediately be transferred from Muharraq to Manama during the stay of
1
the Resident m  Bahrain.
Q m m  «
It was only with reluctance that Shaikh Isa agreed to the
Q m m  mm
confiscation of Ali*s property. Isa had hoped to give Ali*s house
1 Ibid
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to Shaikh Hamad as a means of curtailing his nephew*s power and
1 '
influence for the benefit of his own eldest son. On the other two
demands, Shaikh Isa refused to comply. He argued that he still
considered himself a loyal friend of the British Government and that he
had complied with its demands to the best of his ability. However
Cox insisted and threatened to open fire on the three forts of Bahrain
2
within one hour unless Shaikh Hamad surrendered himself voluntarily.
In the face of this threat, Shaikh Hamad surrendered at noon 
on 26 February and was despatched to HMS Sphinx. Cox then seized Ali*s 
house and had it put under a sepoy guard from the Agency. Shaikh
C «  M
Isa, overawed by the show of strength, merely reminded Cox that the 
house was not Shaikh Ali's absolute property, but rather that of the 
A1 Khalifa family and was known as the *Govemment House* of Manama.^
In his drive to put Bahraini affairs in order, Cox, in agreement 
with Prideaux, warned the two Sunni mullahs to "conduct themselves in
future with more circumspection1’ and to refrain from meddling in
4 Ca —non-religious matters. Cox also, finding that Shaikh Isa*s
attitude had become "much more satisfactory and submissive", asked
Q n  mm
him to send both mullahs to the Agency to see him. Shaikh Isa, 
eager to subdue the followers of Ali, readily passed on the message.
1 In fact, on Cox*s suggestion, Ali*s house was given to Hamad two 
years later. Resident to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 17 
September 1906 (tel.), L/P & S/7/193» register No. 1736; Sec. to 
Govt, of India, F.D., to Cox, 23 September 1906 (tel.), L/P & 
S/7/193.
2 Eustace to Atkinson-Willes, 2 March 1903» L/P & S/3/227, register 
No. 2813.
3 Cox to Officiating Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 4 March 1905*
No. 119, L/P & S/10/81.
4 Ibid.
The outcome was that mullah Ahmad fled and mullah Qasim had to give 
himself up as a hostage to Cox in order to save his brother*s house 
and property from confiscation.
Cox was triumphant over the way in which mullah Qasim had been
delivered into his hands. He felt that the detention of "so venerable
a Minister and one who had hitherto considered himself too important a
personage, even to call upon the British representative11, would have
the effect of impressing the extent of British power upon the native 
1
mind* Shortly afterwards mullah Ahmad returned to Bahrain from 
Qatar, and mullah Qasim was released.
With the settlement of the case of the two mullahs on 2 March,
Cox considered his mission completed and returned to Bushire. In
his report to the Government of India, Cox had to confess that he had 
only been partially successful and that he had failed to effect the 
capture of Shaikh Ali. Even so, Cox argued that Ali*s flight to the 
mainland was possibly a better outcome than one "which would have
entailed our watching him and perhaps maintaining him for some years
2 c« -to come". Concerning Shaikh Isa, Cox claimed that the measures
taken had brought him to heel without any loss of life or local 
upheaval.
Before leaving Bahrain, Cox released Shaikh Hamad. The 
Resident considered that the detention of Hamad and the seriousness with 
which British concern for Bahrain had been demonstrated, would have
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"imbued him with some sense of his own impotence" • It would also 
have been brought home to him the "futility of imagining that he and 
his father could continue with impunity to flout the wishes of the 
British Government to whom indeed they owed everything".
In fact, before Cox left Bahrain, Shaikh Isa, hoping to 
demonstrate his loyalty to the British Government, had presented the 
Resident with the title-deed of a plot of land, adjacent to the Agency, 
on which Cox wished to build quarters for the infantry guard. Further, 
Isa had attempted to reassure Cox that he was entirely submissive to 
the Government and had no-one else to look to in times of difficulty. 
Cox had replied that he hoped Isa would "give proof of his assurance
in future and would look upon his political Agent as his best friend
2and adviser".
The Government of India approved of Cox's efforts as being
3
"satisfactory on the whole". In fact, Curzon was in reality well 
pleased with the results of the coercion of Shaikh cIsa. On 16 March j
i
he had claimed, in a private letter to Sir Arthur Godley, that Cox's 
action had "effected in six hours what he had not been able to secure \
k 'in six months".
The main outstanding problem was that of Shaikh Ali. However,
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Cox, 21 March 1905f tel. No.
P. 1192-E.B., I/P & S/10/81, register No. 770. See also Viceroy 
to Sec. of State for India, 21 March 1905 (tel.), L/P & S/7/175* 
register No. 591.
k Curzon to Godley (private), 16 March 1905* No. 26, Curzon Papers, 
F.111/164.
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only three weeks after his flight to Qatar, Ali wrote to Prideaux*
g
He told the Assistant Political Agent that when Shaikh Abdallah had 
warned him of the Government's intention to arrest and deport him, he 
had panicked* Now, having learnt that his house had been confiscated
and his property burned, he was anxious that the Government should see
1 c- -justice done to him* Ali claimed, in a petition to Shaikh Isa
of 24 March 1905* that he had been unjustly dealt with. He said he 
had fulfilled the agreement of 6 December 1904 by leaving Bahrain for 
three weeks.^
Prideaux wanted to have Shaikh Ali's surrender effected by his 
uncle. With the approval of Cox for his line of action, he told Shaikh
gM M
Isa that, until Shaikh Ali was brought in, his ’’reputation for good
3 CM »faith” would always be ’’under a cloud”. However, Shaikh Isa,
pleading that Ali would, in the light of past circumstances, be unlikely 
to obey any orders he gave, asked Prideaux to write personally to his 
nephew. The Political Agent agreed. He informed All that, as 
the Government could not reduce his sentence, it would be well to 
’’submit to the inevitable”.^  Shaikh Ali finally surrendered to his 
uncle in Bahrain on 18 July.^ In September 1905 he was taken into
1 Petition of Ali b. Ahmad to Prideaux (translation), 24 March 1905, 
L/P & S/10/81.
2 Ibid.
5 Prideaux to Shaikh cIsa, 11 April 1905* No. 120, L/P 8c S/10/81.
4 Prideaux to Cox, 15 July 1905, No. 237, L/P 8c S/10/81.
5 Prideaux to Ali b. Ahmad, 7 July 1905, No. 224, L/P 8c S/10/81.
6 Ali b. Ahmad to Prideaux, 12 July 1905 and Prideaux to Cox,
22 July 1905, No. 241, L/P 8c S /1 0 /8 1 .
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exile from Bushire to Bombay.
The disturbances of 1904- in Bahrain occurred because the 
Shaikhdom was still, in that year, sin unreformed oriental principality. 
Among the ruling family, the A1 Khalifa, power was still exercised in 
a personal and arbitrary way. Even a decade before this would not 
have mattered very much to Britain, the protecting power. However, 
from the mid-l890s, Britain’s commercial and political supremacy in 
the Gulf had been threatened by other Powers. Moreover, the increasing 
importance and value of the trade conducted at Manama and other Bahraini 
ports had made urgent the question of reforming the way in which the 
internal, affairs of the Shaikhdom were conducted. Increasing 
commercial, activity had also brought more foreign traders to the ■
islsmds. These commercial interests found that the A1 Khalifa’s 
conduct of the intemsil administration was an obstacle to trade.
It was certain that, sooner or later, a crisis would occur in the 
relations between the A1 Khalifa and the foreign traders. It seems 
no coincidence that, when the crisis did occur, it first involved traders 
of a nationality (the Germans) which was least likely to tolerate 
oriental arbitrariness. However, it was not over the Bahnson incident
Q «  M
that Shaikh Isa proved to be the most obstinate. Some compromise in 
the traditions of the A1 Khalifa could easily be permitted in the case
1 Sec. to Govt, of Bombay, Political Dept, to Sec. to Govt, of India, 
F.D., 2 September 1905* tel. No. 176P, L/P & S/10/81.
Ali’s period of exile lasted nearly three years, see A.P. Trevor, 
First Asst, to the Resident to Sec. to Govt, of India,
2 September 1908, L/P & S/7/222, register No. 1903*
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of such powerful strangers as the Germans. It was rather different
in the case of the Shiite Persian minority. The A1 Khalifa had for
long been accustomed to lord it over the conquered native Bahraini
1 c- -population who were Shiite. Shaikh Isa therefore would have found 
it hard to accept British demands that Persian Shiites should not go
»c
before the Shari a court. It was the ruler’s refusal to give way 
on what he considered to be a traditional right of his family which 
brought the crushing British intervention of February 1905« This 
intervention had the effect of demonstrating to the Shaikh how limited 
his powers were if the British chose to exert their own power.
The victory of the British Government after the surrender of 
Shaikh Ali seemed to be complete. However, although the British felt 
they had demonstrated to the world that, basically, they were the 
masters in Bahrain and were capable of redressing the grievances of 
foreign nationals in the Shaikhdom, all this was achieved only at a
Q m m  m
certain cost. Shaikh Isa had come to heel in the face of an 
overwhelming show of strength, but he had also had his suspicions of 
British intentions strengthened. This was not likely to make the 
achievement of Britain's long-term objective of reforming the internal 
affairs of Bahrain, and especially the Customs, an easy task. The 
way forward for the reform of Bahrain was still an open question.
1 Lorimer, IIA, 207-08
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CHAPTER 6
THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE STATUS OF BAHRAIN
Major Cox returned to Bushire in March 1905 by no means satisfied
with the outcome of the confrontation with Shaikh Isa, Cox was an
imperialist of the same mould as Curzon, As Political Agent in
Muscat a few years earlier, he had considerable success in inducing the
Sultan to reform his affairs. Like the Shaikh of Bahrain, the ruler
of Muscat had been in the habit of leasing the management of his Customs
to a syndicate of Indian merchants, Cox had induced him to take over
1
the management of the Customs himself, Cox was less likely than 
another Resident to be satisfied with only partial victory in Bahrain.
Within days of arriving back in Bushire, Cox presented a series 
of new proposals for further action on Bahrain. The recent action
Qw M
over the ultimatum had certainly brought Shaikh Isa to a better under­
standing of his obligations towards the Government of India. However, 
Cox did not feel that this was enough. The Bahrain crisis had raised 
the question of whether Shaikh CIsa was a fit person to have 
responsibility for the Government of a place of such growing importance. 
The increasing intrusion of rival European Powers in the Gulf area would
be even more difficult to meet if Shaikh °Isa*s regime in Bahrain was
2
given a "new lease of life". To meet this threat effectively the
1 ’Administration Reports* for the years 1900-05. See also Busch, 
op. cit., p. 158, note 12. The Sultan's takeover of the Customs 
did not prevent British efforts to bring about further reforms
in Customs management, see below, p. 282.
2 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 11 March 1905* No. 125,
L/P & S/10/81.
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Shaikhdom might be made into a "convenient centre of British influence"• 
Cox pointed out that a "suitable tract of territory" under "effective 
occupation" had been the vision of every British Resident in the Gulf 
since the time of Colonel Pelly in the 1860s, and Bahrain was 
strategically placed only a few miles from Qatar, Hasa and the Trucial 
Coast.^
The Resident regretted that "the exigencies of imperial politics"
did not admit the British making their "moral protectorate" over Bahrain
into "an open and effective one", especially since the events of the
past months had provided the British with "such manifest and cogent
2
grounds" for taking such a step.
Cox outlined a scheme for the legal transfer of local government 
in Bahrain into British hands. Shaikh Isa should be told that 
recent events had proved his incompetence. Shaikh Ali b. Ahmad was 
still a fugitive in Qatar. Shaikh CIsa*s own successor-designate, 
Shaikh Hamad, had also failed to show that he was aware of the
Q m m  mm
"responsibilities" of his position. Isa should be informed that, as 
the British Government held itself morally responsible for trade, 
security and the well-being of Europeans in the Shaikhdom, the 
Government of India could no longer allow him responsibility for the 
control of local government in Bahrain.^
Q m m  mm
Cox recommended that Shaikh Isa should be demoted to the position
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
of a figurehead ruler of Muharraq island, Manama should be governed 
by a wazir selected by the Government of India and ’’under the immediate 
guidance” of the Assistant Political Agent. A suitable wazir might
Q m m  mm
be Sayyid Muhammad b. Sa id, the son of the late wazir of the Sultan
of Muscat. A police force of fifty men, either locally enlisted or
brought in from outside, under a subordinate police officer of the
Government of India, should be recruited to assist the Assistant
Political Agent and the wazir in governing the Shaikhdom, Shaikh
Hamad should be warned that "ultimate acquiescence in his succession”
•
would depend entirely on his future behaviour. The Assistant Political 
Agent should "prevail upon" Shaikh CIsa to allow his grandson Khalifa 
to go to India for "education and training" in case a new successor 
was needed.^
The Government of India replied to Cox’s proposals on 17 May 1905* 
They agreed with Cox about Shaikh Isa*s lack of "vigour and natural 
qualifications". Shaikh Isa should certainly be required to reform 
his administration, and British control over the administration of Bahrain 
should be increased. It was also a good idea to exploit the favourable 
situation created by the overawing of Shaikh °Isa in February 1905* 
However, the Government of India could not agree with Cox’s idea of 
declaring an open protectorate. It was pointless to discuss, or even 
to contemplate, a matter "so distasteful to the views of his Majesty’s 
Government, and so foreign to the policy which they sire pursuing" in 
the Gulf.^
1 Ibid.
2 Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Cox, 17 May 1905» No. 1873-E.B., 
L/P & S/10/81.
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The Government of India, if left to themselves, might well have
given support to a scheme something like that proposed by Cox, For
London, however, it was important that shows of force should be kept
to a minimum, India was prepared to sanction Cox*s suggestion for
cautioning Shaikh Hamad and for sending Shaikh Khalifa to India for 
•  "
education. However, the removal of Shaikh CIsa from power in Manama
could not be contemplated for the time being. The appointment of a
wazir ’’would doubtless have the most far-reaching results on the
Government of Bahrein”. However, such a step, and the introduction of
an efficient policing system, would entail "additional expense and must
render fiscal reform the more pressing". It would, of course, be
incumbent on such a new wazir to introduce the changes in the Customs
administration of Bahrain for which the British had long been pressing.
However, Shaikh Isa was hardly likely to accept a British nominee to
superintend his entire administration when he was so adamant in opposing
-|
a British candidate to supervise a single department (the Customs).
Reform, the Government of India still insisted, should begin with 
the Customs. In April 1904 they had indicated to the Home 
Government that Customs reform was the first priority to which the newly 
appointed Political Agent, Prideaux (see Chapter 5)» should address 
himself. However, Prideaux had not yet had either the time or the 
opportunity to establish the necessary "moral influence" over the Shaikh. 
Once this was established, the combined influence of Prideaux and Cox 
"ought to suffice ... unaided ... without the necessity for tendering 
advice in the formal manner". New proposals for reform should, when 
the time was ripe, be "so framed and so presented to the Chief as to
1 Ibid.
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obviate the necessity for another intervention and further threatened 
1bombardment1'.
Cox was therefore asked to submit new proposals for reforming the 
Bahrain Customs. The Resident should explain the relation of the 
Customs question to the appointment of a wazir, the probable reaction
Q. M
of Shaikh Isa to proposals for reform, how far he was likely to prove
amenable to advice, and in what manner Cox would propose to apply
c- - 2pressure on Isa should it be required.
In his reply of k June 1905^1 Cox apologised for failing to
appreciate adquately "the width of the gulf which diplomacy places 
between the interpretation of the expression ‘under the protection of* 
and ‘under the protectorate of*'.'. Cox had not raised the Customs 
issue simply because, after London*s rejection of his suggestion that 
the Customs should be taken over at the time of the February ultimatum, 
he had assumed that the fixed policy in respect of the Customs
administration was not to try to influence Isa by means of pressure
from Prideaux.
The Resident also pointed out that, regarding the appointment 
of a wazir, he had been influenced by certain administrative considerations 
in addition to the political ones he had communicated to the Government 
of India. He felt that Captain Prideaux had lacked the necessary
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, k June 1905» No. 2Vf, L/P & 
S/10/8'1.
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"colloquial proficiency in Arabic" to handle the demanding duties of 
1his position. The old munshi of the Agency, apart from being a 
Shiite, was persona non grata with Shaikh °Isa; the newly appointed 
young munshi, needed more time to become thoroughly versed in his work. 
Further, the fact that the Political Agent had once already, in 1899i
C  mm M
been deputed to Bahrain to put pressure on Shaikh Isa regarding 
certain issues, seemed to Cox to be "hardly the best recommendation" 
for Prideaux now to gain the confidence of the ruler of Bahrain.
Finally, Cox agreed that Shaikh Isa would not welcome the idea of 
a wazir. However, he affirmed that the proposal had been tendered 
"on the supposition that Sheikh Esa would be compelled to accept him, 
and his appointment was not associated in any way with the question of 
Customs control". In fact, this was not really true. Cox went 
on to say that he had proposed the idea of a wazir because this 
recommendation was not open to the objection London had raised to 
seizing the Customs in February - i.e. that it had little connection 
with Shaikh Ali's lawlessness and Isa*s inability to control him.
In other words, forcing °Isa to accept a wazir would not arouse the 
doubts about British disinterestedness that the seizure of the Customs 
would. However, if a wazir was once appointed and °isa made a figure­
head, it is obvious that the reform of the Customs would have been a 
simple matter. The appointment of a wazir certainly was connected 
with the Customs issue. It is fair to assume that one reason why Cox
1 Knowledge of colloquial Arabic was a prerequisite for the job and 
Prideaux*s lack of proficiency in this respect had made him the 
second choice. Captain Vere de Vere Hunt was preferred by 
the Government of India but declined the offer for personal 
reasons. See Sec. of State for India to Viceroy, 31 August 190^ - 
(tel.), L/P & S/7/16 8, register No. 1506.
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was making his proposal for a wazir was because it was a means of 
settling the Customs issue once and for all* Cox ended his report by 
saying that he would not make any further proposals before he visited 
Bahrain once more.
At this point, an examination of the views of the Assistant
Political Agent on the question of reform in Bahrain may be in place*
Nine month’s service had developed Captain Prideaux's understanding of
the intricate affairs of the Shaikhdom. When the decisive reform of
Bahrain's affairs later occurred, in the form of the Order in Council
for the Shaikhdom, it was based on proposals put forward by Prideaux.
Prideaux's views were outlined in a letter of 2b June 1905 to the
1
Resident at Bushire. Prideaux felt that ending the local tyranny
practised in Bahrain was the direction immediate reform should take,
rather than taking possession of the Customs. Shaikh Isa was
determined to resist the reform of the Customs "to the utmost of his
capability". Many influential people in Bahrain, including the Shaikh's
"advisers and associates", profited considerably from the existing
system of farming the Customs. The "special concessions" these
influential persons extorted from the farmers of the Customs would be
inconceivable under a "state-managed Department". Vehement
opposition would therefore always exist to the system of Customs
2
administration the British were pressing for.
Prideaux favoured an alternative approach of making Shaikh Isa's 
financial position weaker. If the Government succeeded in placing
1 Prideaux to Cox, 2b June 1905» No. 20^ -, L/P & S/10/81
2 Ibid.
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Q m m  mm
a British officer in charge of the Customs, Shaikh Isa's income would
increase annually by Rs. 150,000 without any conditions being placed
on the disbursement of the increased income, which would simply increase
oppression and corruption# The Political Agent calculated that, at
the termination of the farming contract in 1908, Shaikh Isa would
become heavily in debt and would find himself ’’compelled to turn to
Government for pecuniary assistance”. The Government could then
dictate terms for whatever reform of affairs in Bahrain they considered 
1necessary.
The Customs issue, Prideaux argued, should be allowed to ’’subside
into the background”. Two other issues of ’’immeasurably greater
importance” should be given priority. These were, firstly, the
’’cruelties” inflicted upon the ruler*s subjects by members of the
A1 Khalifa; the practice of sukhra which still operated despite its
official banning by the Shaikh, the corruption of the Judicial and Land
Revenue officials, and the corruption of the qadis in succession cases.
Secondly, the Shaikh*s practice of welcoming to the island every summer
groups of bedouins from the mainland should be stopped. This practice
was a great drain on Bahrain's resources as well as a menace to law
and order, since the bedouin 'guests' committed a variety of crimes and
2harassed the townspeople of Manama without any check.
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid. Prideaux had also recently recommended measures to stop the 
import of new slaves into Bahrain, which continued in complete 
disregard of long-standing agreements with the British: Prideaux 
to Cox, 26 May 1905, No. 173, L/P & S/7/180, register No. 1^90.
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To combat these abuses Prideaux asked for powers similar to 
those of Political Agents in the Native States of India. In these
States all persons had the privilege of appealing to the local Political 
Officer against acts of oppression. Cases of injustice were 
constantly being brought to his door, Prideaux claimed. However, 
since, sis things stood, he was "more on the pattern of a consular 
officer in Persia than of an Indian Political Officer", he could take 
no action to dispense justice to the complainants.
The practical measures Prideaux advocated to achieve this
increase in his powers of jurisdiction were cautious. Confident
that ultimately he would gain Shaikh CIsa,s trust, Prideaux suggested
that, for the moment, the Government should "leave undiminished the
internal sovereign rights of the Chief where they do not involve the
Government of India in dishonour". However, Shaikh °Isa should be
informed that the Political Agent had been instructed to take notice
of all cases of injustice committed in Bahrain and to press for the
punishment of the offender. This policy, Prideaux assured the
0 M  _
Government, was the only remaining way of regaining Isa’s faith in 
British bona fides. Any more pressure on other aspects of reform 
which the British could not claim to be entitled to "on explicit (i.e.
2treaty) grounds" would make the Political Agent’s task more difficult.
Cox, whilst agreeing with Prideaux as far as a number of his 
reforming objectives were concerned, was clearly far more appreciative 
than his subordinate what the Government of India would or would not
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
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allow in the way of methods. This was apparent from Cox*s 
comments on Prideauxfs letter of 2k June 1905- The Resident declined 
to approve Prideaux*s priorities of reform before the Government of 
India had clearly defined the status of Bahrain. He agreed with 
Prideaux that it was necessary for him to acquire more influence over 
the Shaikh before any attempt was made to apply pressure on him on such 
proposals as the appointment of a wazir and a police force. However,
Cox would not sanction Prideaux*s request to take cases of injustice 
submitted by the Shaikh*s subjects into his own hands. Cox believed
Qw M
that Shaikh Isa would oppose such a measure as much as he opposed the 
Customs reform plan. The Resident stated his opinion that Prideaux*s 
’’zeal for reform” had a tendency to carry him ’’too fast and too far”.
Even so, the Political Agent*s proposals were of a kind which was only 
compatible with ”a declared and effective British Protectorate”.
The Government did not, Cox believed, have any middle course open to it.
It either had to treat Bahrain as a protectorate, or leave it as an 
independent principality. Cox remained in favour of a British 
protectorate with the control of the Customs as his most urgent 
priority.^
Cox insisted that British commercial and political interests 
required the establishment of a reasonably efficient fiscal administration 
through which the Government would be able to exercise some control 
over the Shaikh*s finances. As far as the bedouin scourge was 
concerned, Cox argued that it would not be got rid of overnight no matter 
how strong the rule of law became in Bahrain. The British would be
1 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 16 July 1905* No. 331» L/P 
& S/10/81 and Cox*s memorandum on details of Political Agent’s 
letter No. 20^, 2k June 1905* enclosure in Cox*s letter of 
16 July 1905.
272
challenging an ingrained custom. Finally, Cox reiterated his loss of
Q m m  mm
confidence in Shaikh Isa and declared that he still hoped the Government 
of India had not completely ruled out further coercive measures against 
the Shaikh.
In a draft reply to Cox, which they sent to London for comments,
the Government of India rejected his suggestion that there was no
middle course between treating Bahrain as a full British protectorate
2and as an independent principality. Moreover, even if Bahrain were 
to be formally declared a British protectorate, there was no authority 
for supposing that Britain would necessarily possess the right to 
intervene in the island*s internal affairs, especially to the extent 
contemplated by Prideaux. This misconception was due to the assumption
Q m m  mm
which had been made that the alternative to regarding Shaikh Isa as an 
independent sovereign was to treat him "like a petty Indian Raja".
The British in India were "sovereign", whereas in Bahrain they were 
merely the "protecting power". The reciprocal rights and obligations 
which had emerged between the Government and the Indian Native States
had "as yet ... not exact counterpart in the relations of Great Britain
3
to Bahrein".
What powers Britain possessed to influence the internal affairs 
of Bahrain rested on the following principles. Since the British 
Government was given the authority by treaty to control the foreign
1 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 16 July 1905» No. 331,
L/P 8c S/10/81.
2 Draft of a proposed letter from Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to 
Cox, Appendix A, attached to No. 178, from Govt, of India, F.D., 
to Sec. of State for India, 14 September 1905j Summary of the 
Principal Events and Measures of the Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon 
in the Foreign Department, Vol. IV, Persia and the Persian Gulf 
(Confidential), Curzon papers, F.111/531-
3 Ibid.
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relations of Bahrain, it also undertook to protect foreigners resident 
in the Shaikhdom. Consequently, British influence and authority 
were, and must remain, paramount in Bahrain. This influence, being 
primarily political, both in character and origin, gave the British 
Government the right to insist that their advice in matters of 
importance be adopted. Acquiescence was demanded in return for the 
advantages which British protection conferred on Bahrain. These 
points had been explicitly stated in the ultimatum presented to Shaikh 
Isa on 25 February 1905• Action in contravention of such advice would 
not be tolerated and the Protecting Power would be the judge of the 
penalty for such a violation.
Moreover, Britain*s special political position in Bahrain gave 
her not merely an interest but a recognised right of interference in 
the question of succession to the Shaikhship. The Government had 
recognised Shaikh Hamad as heir-apparent in compliance with the ruler's 
wishes. They therefore retained their right to withdraw their 
recognition, should the need arise, and to nominate another successor. 
The exercise of such a right was undoubtedly inconsistent with 
independent sovereignty and involved direct interference in the internal 
affairs of the Shaikhdom. The admission of such a right by Shaikh 
°Isa was the most explicit evidence yet supplied of the dimensions which 
the protectorate, which Britain in fact exercised over Bahrain, had 
already assumed.^
Finally, the Government of India proposed to ask Cox to advise 
it as to the manner in which, and the moment when, Shaikh CIsa could
1 Ibid.
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be informed that his dependence on the British Government was
inconsistent with his complete neglect of their repeated advice in the
matter of the control of the Customs, a subject which certainly could
not be shelved. Prideaux was to be told to limit himself to the
business of gaining the confidence of the ruler rather than applying
pressure to force him to adopt premature reforms. The Political
Agent*s task should be eventually to build up a position which would
enable him to tender advice for the gradual amelioration of the
1
internal administration of the islands.
The Political Committee at the India Office approached the 
problems of the Shaikhdom more cautiously than did India. The Committee 
strongly suspected that the Government of India was trying to force 
the Home Government into taking more responsibility for the Shaikhdom, 
as they had successfully done in 1899 over Kuwait. Moreover, any 
forcible takeover of the Customs would revive the controversy concerning 
sovereignty over Bahrain, which was still claimed by Turkey and Persia. 
This was undesirable as far as the Political Committee was concerned, 
especially at a time when the British Government was experiencing 
difficulty in establishing its right to protect Bahraini subjects in 
Turkish and Persian territory. Finally, the Committee queried whether 
or not Shaikh CIsa*s continued allegiance could be relied on were he to 
be forced to hand over the Customs administration to a British-appointed 
officer.^
1 Ibid.
2 Busch, op. cit., pp. 9k-'] 13; Ravinder Kumar, India and the Persian 
Gulf Region, lB58-1907» p« 138; J.B. Kelly, •Salisbury, Curzon 
and the Kuwait Agreement of 1899*» Studies in International 
History (London, 1967), PP» 2^9-89.
3 William Lee-Warner, commentary of 10 October 1905* on India's draft 
letter to Cox, L/P & S/10/81.
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On 10 November 1905» the Home Government declared that the time 
had not yet come to define "in strict terms" the position of the Shaikh 
of Bahrain towards the protecting British power. Moreover, the 
Government of India*s account of the "attributes of sovereignty" of 
Indian Native States and the Shaikhdom of Bahrain could not unreservedly 
be accepted as correct. It would, therefore, suffice if the British 
authorities in the Gulf acted "steadily and, as far as possible 
unobtrusively" to increase their influence and the confidence of the
Shaikh in their advice. The Customs issue would receive the Government’s
1
full consideration on receipt of any specific recommendations.
Whilst these consultations about the future of Bahrain were being 
conducted between the various British authorities responsible for the 
formation of policy, Shaikh Isa himself was reacting to the events 
of February 1905* Ever since 1899 he had suspected the British of 
wanting to take control of Bahrain’s internal affairs. However, the 
demonstration of naval force in February 1905 represented a drastic 
change in Anglo-Bahraini relations which could not be justified by 
reference to any treaty made with the British Government. The result 
of the British action of February 1905 seems to have been to prompt 
Shaikh °Isa to take measures to try to prevent any further erosion of 
his authority, especially over the Customs. The fact that Shaikh
M  Q
Mubarak of Kuwait and Shaikh Khaz al of Muhammara had both refused to 
hand over their Customs to a British-appointed officer encouraged Shaikh
CM w 2Isa. The ruler of Bahrain must also have been encouraged by the 
fact that Cox, in February 1905i had failed to occupy his Customs House.
1 Sec. of State for India to Viceroy, 10 November 1905» Secret No.
3^ , L/P & S/10/81.
2 Busch, op. cit., p. 2^ -2.
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C —  w
Daring May 1905 Prideaux came to suspect that Shaikh Isa was
negotiating with foreign agents with a view to exchanging British
1
protection for that of smother Power. It was suspected that a
journey to Baghdad which Shaikh Ali b. Muhammad, a cousin of Shaikh
°Isa, had undertaken, had had such a purpose. In addition, two
characters in Bahrain were viewed with suspicion by Prideaux. One
was a Frenchman called Gaston Peronne who posed as a pearl merchant,
and who had been closely watched by the British authorities since his
2
arrival in the Gulf. A rumour (which Prideaux was unable to credit)
was circulating in Bahrain that Peronne had been invited by Shaikh Isa
"to fly the French flag" there. The other suspect was Muhammad b. 
c «—
Abdul Wahab, considered by Prideaux to be the "unofficially recognised
c •*mouth-piece of the Turks" in Bahrain. Muhammad b. Abdul Wahab kept
3
m  close touch with all the foreign consuls m  Bushire.
British suspicions were also developing about the character of
C*“ MShaikh Hamad. Prideaux, whilst doubting whether Shaikh Isa would be
foolish enough to try to break the ties binding him to the British
Government, was convinced that Shaikh Hamad would use all his power and
•
influence to bring about such an end.
C m  m  #
The extent to which Shaikh Isa had become estranged from his
1 Prideaux to Resident, 19 May 1905, No. 162, enclosure in A.P.
Trevor, First Asst. Resident to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D.,
27 May 1905, No. 236, L/P & S/10/81.
2 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 10 June 1905, No. 25^, L/P 
& S/10/81.
3 Prideaux to Cox, 27 May 1905, No. 175, L/P & S/10/81.
k Prideaux to Resident, Bushire, 19 May 1905, No. 162, L/P &
s/10/81.
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British protectors was shown in a letter he sent to Prideaux on 30 May
Q m m  »
1905• Shaikh Isa warned Prideaux that, according to the treaties he
had signed with the British, he was an independent Arab ruler.
He hoped the Government would appreciate this fact and remedy the
lowering of his prestige which had been caused by the recent naval
demonstration. Shaikh Isa claimed he had always accepted the advice
of the Government except in cases he thought would be injurious to his
interests, such as the Customs administration. He would no longer
tolerate any interference in Bahrain*s internal affairs. Shaikh °Isa
also said that he would not feel at rest until he had got the
administration of the Customs into his own hands. He proposed that
the Government should help pay off the banians so that the periodic
farming-out of the Customs could be ended. Finally he warned
Prideaux that if he did not shortly receive a reply, he would feel
2obliged to communicate directly with the Government of India.
On receiving notification of the Shaikh*s letter, Cox decided 
that cIsa would never have dared to write in such a manner without an 
’’astute prompter at his elbow”. He proposed that an informal
memorandum should be communicated to the Shaikh by Prideaux, refuting
c- - 3Isa’s claims and reminding him of his treaty obligations. The
Government of India was prepared to approve this course of action 
since, although evidence of Shaikh Isa’s intrigues with foreign powers 
was not strong enough to justify a remonstrance, it was necessary to
1 The British did not consider that Shaikh CIsa could really have 
meant to be taken seriously on this proposal. Cox pointed out that 
it really amounted to asking that the Government of India should 
pay off Shaikh Isa’s debts without any compensating advantage. Cox 
to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 25 February 1906, No. 73» L/P & 
S/10/81.
2 Shaikh °Isa to Prideaux, 30 May 1905? L/P & S/10/81.
3 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 11 June 1905* No. 259? L/P 
& S/10/81.
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let him know unofficially that his proceedings were being watched.
C m  mm
In the memorandum, Shaikh Isa was told that it was in his best 
interests that he should adopt the Government’s advice and not listen 
to the words of nevil wishers”• Regarding the cancellation of the 
banians’ contract to farm the Customs, if the Government were to lend 
CIsa the money necessary to pay off the banians, adequate safeguards 
and assurances would be needed for the proper management of the Customs. 
The only possible way would be for an Indian official to be appointed
C  M  M
to control the Customs. Shaikh Isa was reminded that the Sultan of
Muscat had benefited from higher revenues after he had agreed to employ
2
"trained men from India” to manage his Customs.
The Shaikh was most annoyed that his complaints had been rejected.
To add to Shaikh Isa’s dissatisfaction, Prideaux delivered to Shaikh
Hamad the Government’s warning that its ultimate acquiescence in his 
•
succession would depend on his future behaviour being satisfactory.^
' Q m m  mm
Shaikh Isa’s response was to prepare a petition, which he sent 
to the Secretary of State for India through the agent of Kynoch Limited, 
an arms firm. The focus of the ruler’s complaints was the appointment
Q m m  M
of Prideaux as Political Agent, an appointment which Shaikh Isa 
shrewdly connected with the determination of India to take over his 
Customs.^
1 Asst. Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Cox, 12 July 1905?
No. 2659 E.B., L/P & S/10/81.
2 Cox to Prideaux, containing the memorandum from Cox to Shaikh CIsa,
7 June 1905, No. 781, L/P & S/10/81.
3 Prideaux to Cox, 2k June 1905* No* 20A, L/P & S/10/81.
k See Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 17 December 190^ ,
No. k21, L/P 8c S/10/81.
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Anglo-Bahraini relations, Shaikh Isa claimed, were no longer 
based on trust and mutual respect. Since 1899 the "perfect quietness" 
that he had previously enjoyed with the Native Agent had disappeared.
The new Political Agent was an Englishman who was ignorant of the 
religious law and customs of Muslims. Moreover, this new Agent had 
immediately begun to interfere in local affairs. As a result he, 
the Shaikh, had been obliged to place an interdict on the arms traffic 
of Bahrain even though freedom of trade in this commodity prevailed 
all along the Arabian coast. His flagstaff, the sign of his rank, 
had been thrown down by the British representative. Finally, Shaikh 
cIsa complained, he had not yet received any satisfaction over his 
grievances and he hoped that the British Government would soon restore 
him to his "previous quietness and contentment".
The petition did in fact make some impact at the India Office.
Frank Huxham, the Secretary and Manager of Kynoch’s who was responsible
for the delivery of the petition, stressed that the Shaikh was "a friend
of the English and supports us in preference to foreign competitors"
at a time when it was difficult to counteract the influence of foreign
2
diplomacy in commercial matters. Secretary of State Brodrick 
forwarded a copy of the petition to India and asked for any observations
on the fact that Shaikh °Isa had employed the agent of a commercial firm
for the purposes of a political communication. He further requested 
that he might be informed of any action that might be taken in the
1 Shaikh CIsa to Sec. of State for India, 2 October 1905, register
No. 3591, L/P 8c S/10/81.
2 Huxham to India Office, 1*f November 1905, L/P 8c S/10/81, Register 
No. 3591*
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matter. 1
The Government of India, in turn, asked Cox to report on Shaikh
Isa*s grievances. They were also anxious to discover the real author
of the petition, because they could not believe that the Shaikh had
2personally taken such a step.
Prideaux thought it reasonable to believe that Shaikh CIsa had 
carried out his threat simply because the Government had-not sent a 
definite reply to his grievances. He also considered that Muhammad
c — 7
b. Abdul Wahab had been involved in the affair. Later, Cox
discovered from the ’Return of Arms and Administrations* shipped by 
S.S. Baluchistan during January 1906 that Monsieur Goguyer was a client 
of Kynoch Limited. From this, and from other circumstantial evidence, 
Cox drew the conclusion that Goguyer had been largely responsible for 
the writing of the petition. He had also presumably been responsible 
for the method of communicating it to the India Office, since Shaikh
c— —
Isa himself had no direct dealings with Kynochs.
On 14 February Major Cox went personally to Bahrain to interview
1 Sec. of State for India to Govt, of India, 24 November 1905* Secret 
No. 39, L/P & S/10/81.
2 Deputy Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Cox, 6 December 1905,
No. 4472-E.B., register No. 1054, and Asst. Sec. to Govt, of India, 
F.D., to Cox, 19 December 1905, L/P & S/10/81.
3 Prideaux to Cox, 13 January 1906, No. 24, L/P & S/10/81.
4 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 21 January 1906, No. 27;
Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 2 February 1906, No. 46;
Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 22 February 1906, No. 59,
and Prideaux: to Cox, 27 January 1906, No. 50, L/P & S/10/81.
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Shaikh CIsa. The crux of the ensuing discussion concerned the
Q m m  ■
Shaikh*s authority over the internal affairs of the Shaikhdom. Isa 
remained adamant regarding his independence, which he declared to mean 
the exclusion of any interference on the part of the British 
authorities in his internal affairs. He would be the judge of what 
Government advice he would accept, just as had been the case prior to
1899.
C —  M
Shaikh Isa also took the opportunity to raise a series of 
grievances which had built up over the past years. The ruler
complained about the failure of the British to obtain reparation on
M  C
his behalf for the murder of his kinsman Shaikh Salman b. Du aij in 
1900 (see Chapter k), or to stop piratical raids on Bahraini shipping 
of his cousin Ahmad b. Salman. >CIsa had been complaining to the 
Government about these attacks since 1880 but had failed to get 
satisfaction. Cox could only say that the British would continue to 
do their utmost to resolve these problems.
Q m m  «
As fan as Shaikh Isa*s grievance over the flagstaff issue was 
concerned, Cox claimed that the post concerned had not been thrown 
down under the orders of Prideaux but had been simply blown down by the 
wind. Regarding Shaikh Ali*s house, Cox denied any intention by the 
Government to confiscate it outright. He added that it had been 
decided to return the house when assurances were given that affairs in 
Manama were in a more settled state. In fact it is clear that the 
house was being retained as a bargaining counter. Cox said he would 
ask the Government for permission for the house to be returned 
immediately provided Shaikh °Isa ’’showed himself amenable to advice 
in other ways”. CIsa agreed to the proposal.
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Cox then raised the question of the petition. The Shaikh 
emphasised that he had written it since he had failed to receive any 
favourable answer to his requests. He felt aggrieved about the 
prohibition of the arms traffic, partly because the agreement had been 
’’taken from him arbitrarily”, and also because prohibition had meant 
a great loss of Customs revenue for him. Apart from all this, the 
arms traffic was still going on in other places along the Arab coast 
such as Kuwait and Muscat.
Finally, Cox raised what was for the British the most vital 
issue in Anglo-Bahraini relations, that of the Customs administration. 
Cox was determined that the Government should take charge whatever 
objection Shaikh Isa raised. But Isa remained as obstinate as
C «  mm
before. When Cox finally threatened Shaikh Isa with another
ultimatum, the ruler merely repeated the reply he had given over the 
question of the trial, of Persians in his own Shari a court: *If
Government wish to do so against my wishes it is of course within their 
power, but it will not be done with my consent*.
On 25 February 1906 Cox wrote to the Government of India about 
the outcome of his meeting with Shaikh Isa. The ruler, he reported, 
was exaggerating his grievances in order to extract more freedom of 
action vis-a-vis the Government. Cox said he believed that the 
Shaikh was really expecting the Government to take control of the 
Customs, but in a way that would enable him to satisfy his ’’ignorant
0 mm mm
1 Cox*s memorandum on his interview with Shaikh Isa, enclosure 
in Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 25 February 1906, No. 
L/P & S/10/81.
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entourage" that it was beyond his power to prevent it. Once the
Government was in control of the Customs, CIsa would soon "settle down
quietly to the inevitable" and, in fact, would in the end be thankful
to Britain for having carried out the measure. Cox therefore
suggested that the Government should take over the Customs as soon sis
it could conveniently be arranged. He admitted that any bold measure
taken by the Government was bound to evoke hostile criticism in the
Gulf. However, he warned, the longer action was delayed over such
important issues, the more criticism the Government would eventually
have to face. Moreover, the assumption of the Bahrain Customs would
favourably affect the British position in Muscat where the Sultan was
also under pressure to accept British control of his Customs
arrangements. In addition, such a step would fall within the limits
prescribed by the policy of the Home Government, a policy which demanded
early steps to "publicly strengthen and affirm our authority over
Bahrein". Early measures would not only frustrate the revival of
the Persian claim to Bahrain , but also thwart the attempts of
European merchants to claim extra-territoriality (being outside the
jurisdiction of Bahrain) and Consular intervention in regard to their 
2
affairs.
These recommendations of Cox were forwarded to London by the 
Government of India without any comments. Since India had expressed 
. no opinion, the Political Committee at the India Office did not deem it
1 For details see L/P & S/10/83.
2 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 23 February 1906, No.
L/P & S/10/81.
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necessary at that stage to take any further action.
mm
The Government of India*s answer to Shaikh Isa*s petition 
rejected his complaints over the arms traffic. It was not true that 
the prohibition on this trade was not being enforced in Muscat, Kuwait, 
and the Trucial Coast. Moreover, °Isa himself had acted more than 
once in the past to ban or control arms imports as a means of preventing 
arms falling into the hands of his enemies on the mainland.
Q m m  mm
Concerning Isa*s grievances about Prideaux, the Government 
refused to be moved. The appointment of an English representative 
after the death of the previous Muslim one was necessitated by the 
considerable change in ’’political and commercial conditions” in 
Bahrain whereby a more efficient representative was needed. The 
Government could not admit any grounds for grievance in the matter.
Q m  mm
The English representative was eminently suitable as Shaikh Isa would 
now be able to rely on his advice with confidence. Whatever increase 
of trade had been enjoyed by the merchants of Bahrain in recent years 
was largely due to the presence of a British officer there.
On the case of Shaikh Ali, the Government of India refused to 
discuss the issue any further. He had been punished for rebelling 
against Shaikh CIsa*s orders and for setting at nought the commands 
of the British Government. The Government did not believe that Isa 
was ’’actuated by serious motives" when he complained about the fall
1 Commentary regarding Shaikh CIsa*s memorial, L/P & S/10/81, 
register No. 105^*
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of his flagstaff. Finally, the Government of India pointed out to
Q m m  mm
Isa that he had no right to communicate with them through any other
1
channel except that of the British officer in Bahrain.
/  At this point Cox decided that a more conciliatory approach to
Shaikh °Isa might prove to be more fruitful. Cox asked permission
to approach the Shaikh informally with a proposition that he lease
his Customs farm to the Indian Government for Rs. 350*000 annually
with an advance of Rs. 150,000 to relieve him from his financial 
2
difficulties. The Government of India saw no objection to the
proposal, provided the Home Government approved the terms of the lease 
and on the understanding that they were prepared to lease the entire 
Customs but not a mere portion of it."^
c   Zf
However, Shaikh Isa refused to entertain even this proposal.
Thereupon the Government of India decided against further action in
the matter for the time being. Nevertheless, Cox was asked
to be vigilant. If trade became hampered by the Shaikh’s
management of the Customs, or if the farm were leased to ’’subjects of
foreign powers”, then such circumstances would afford a suitable
1 Asst. Sec. to Govt, of India to Cox, 22 May 1906, No. 2211-E.B.,
L/P 8c S/10/81, register No. 105*U
2 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 2 July 1906, L/P 8c S/10/81,
register No. 1775«
3 Sec. to Govt, of India to Cox, 14 August 1906, No. 3363-E.B.,
L/P & S/10/81, register No. 1775-
k Cox to §ec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 1 September 1906; Cox to
Shaikh Isa, 1*f August 1906; Shaikh CIsa to Cox, 23 August 1906,
and Prideaux to Cox, 2b August 1906, L/P 8c S/10/81.
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opportunity for interfering effectively in the Customs administration.
At about this time Cox received information on gun-running in
the Gulf from the Belgian Director-General of Customs at Bushire,
M, Heynssens, which threw much light on the reasons for Shaikh CIsa*s
stubborn refusal to accept British control of his Customs arrangements,'
It was clear, Cox told the Government of India in December 1906, that
Shaikh Isa, in spite of all his complaints about having had to ban the
arms trade at Bahrain, had allowed Manama to become ”an organised base
for the contraband distribution of arms and ammunition11. This,
indeed, suggested ,fa cogent reason, though doubtless not the only one,
for ^ the Shaikh1^  persistent refusal to entertain our proposals,
however lucrative and tempting on their merits, for the better
administration of his Customs”. However, continued Cox, since the
Home Government had ruled out any question of coercion over the
question of Customs reform, no quick solution to the problem could be 
3
expected.
The Customs issue was not, in fact, resolved for some time.
On the expiry of the banians1 lease in January 190S, Shaikh Isa 
appointed some of his officials to manage the Customs, Ironically, 
the revenue from the Customs improved and the possibility of the 
British forcing any change over the issue became more remote. The
1 Sec, to Govt, of India to Cox, F.D,, 2 October 1906, No, 3903-E.B,, 
L/P 8c S/10/81.
2 Heynssens to Cox, 17 October 1906, No. *f533» L/P 8c S/7/198.
3 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 2 December 1906, No, 279$,
L/P 8c S/7/198.
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manoeuvrings of the British to secure more control in Bahrain by taking 
control of the Customs had reached sin impasse. However, the overall 
British objective still remained the same. If it was impossible 
to increase their control over Beihrain through the Customs issue, 
then some alternative road to the same objective had to be tried.
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CHAPTER 7
DIPLOMATIC ARRANGEMENTS AND REGIONAL EVENTS AFFECTING BAHRAIN 1905-15
There was little agreement in 1905-06 among British officials 
in Manama, Bushire, Simla and London on how to progress towards the ■ 
reform of the internal affairs of Bahrain, whilst insulating the 
British position in the Shaikhdom from outside interference at the 
same time. To take more control quickly would require coercion, but 
such action might be seized upon by other powers and produce undesirable 
effects elsewhere in the Gulf. Lord Lansdowne and Lord Curzon had 
demonstrated in 1903 that Britain*s hard-won position in the Gulf 
would be maintained against the encroachments of Britain’s imperial 
rivals. As part of this, the British reaction to the disturbances 
of 190*f-05 in Bahrain showed also that their proteges would be kept in 
order. Yet the disturbances had provided an obvious reason for 
direct intervention. A new coercion would have no immediate pretext. 
The period 1905-06 began a search by the different British authorities
for indirect methods which could best achieve reform.
\
In the following period, 1907-1915i the Bahrain problem was 
largely resolved, although the process was incomplete before the 
outbreak of the First World War, which drastically changed political 
conditions in the Gulf region. The indirect method which the British 
used was to include the various Bahrain issues in a comprehensive 
re-negotiation of Britain*s political position in the Gulf in relation 
to those of her rivals. This re-negotiation produced diplomatic 
arrangements - of varying stability - with France, Russia, the Ottoman 
Empire and Germany. An unsuccessful attempt at a settlement of the
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Persian claim was also made, and Britain began to reconsider its 
attitude towards the Wahhabi power, which reappeared on the Hasa coast 
in 1913. As far as Bahrain itself was concerned in the context of 
these larger developments, the British formulated a unilateral document, 
an Order in Council , on which the British intended to rest their 
legal relationship with the Shaikhdom.
The development of a strengthened British position in the Gulf
was not, however, affected merely by political and economic events in
the region itself. During the period of the disturbances in Bahrain
and the discussions about its future which followed, a gradual
revolution in Britain*s place in the political alignments of the world
powers was already in progress. Larger considerations of imperial
and European politics frequently altered the details or delayed the
formulation of British Gulf policy. There was at this time, moreover,
a shift in the influence of the various authorities responsible for
British policy in Asia, Curzon had felt the increasing tendency for
the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the Committee of Imperial Defence
2
to dominate the direction of Indian foreign affairs. The decline 
in the weight of the views of the Government of India was not halted by 
Curzon*s resignation, nor by the advent of the Liberal Government at 
the end of 1905- Lansdowne and the Conservatives had concluded the 
Japanese alliance in 1902 and the Entente with Framce in 190*f with
1 Orders in Council are instruments issued on behalf of the British 
Crown *by auid with the advice of H,M,*s Privy Council*, Orders 
in Council may be legislative, executive or judicial in effect. 
They are usually issued under powers conferred by statute and 
"may provide for auiything from a colonial Constitution to the 
setting up of a government department". Norman Wilding and 
Philip Laundy, An Encyclopaedia of Parliament (London, 1958),
pp. ^58-59.
2 See for example, Curzon to Brodrick, 2 March and 20 April 1905* 
Nos, 21 auid 35, Curzon Papers, F, 111/l6*f.
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imperial strategy in mind. The emphasis was on reducing colonial 
tension and imperial responsibilities. The serious weakening of 
Russia, as a result of defeat in the war against Japan in 1905 and 
the revolution which followed, made a settlement of imperial differences 
between Britain and Russia more feasible. Anglo-French co-operation 
during the Moroccan crisis of 1905 also encouraged some form of Anglo- 
Russian accord.
The policies of Sir Edward Grey, the new Liberal Imperialist
Foreign Secretary, were tending in the same directions as those of
Lord Lansdowne, but with a different emphasis. Grey*s views on
worldwide relations between the Powers were more concerned with
aspects of the balance of power in Europe* particularly in restraining
2
the ambitions of Germany. Germany competed vigorously with all 
her rivals in diplomacy and trade, but to British statesmen the growth 
of the German navy at the same time seemed particularly to threaten 
Britain alone.
Thus Grey’s ’’chief motive in seeking a Russian entente was to 
change the balance of forces in Europe and in particular to create a 
counterpoise to Germany”.^ Although the issues to be resolved were 
all Asian, the Viceroy, Lord Minto, and the Indian government were so
1 Monger, op. cit., Chapters 7 and 8; Lowe and Dockrill, op. cit.,
I, 5-15.
2 The anti-German feelings of influential and able officials in the 
Foreign Office, led by Charles Hardinge (later Viceroy of India, 
1910-16), reinforced this emphasis. Monger, op. cit.,
pp.' 264-66; Zara S. Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign 
Policy 1893-1914 (Cambridge, 1969)1 pp. 86-117.
3 Monger, op. cit.t p. 281.
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opposed to am accord which would depend upon Russian promises that
the Secretary of State for India, John Morley, had frequently to
over-ride their views during the negotiations, from April 1906 to
July 1907* Indeed, Charles Hardinge, the Permanent Under-Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, declared in July 1907 that "recently
we have left the Government of India entirely out of our account, and
the questions which have arisen have been treated directly between us
1
and the India Office, ...".
The agreement with Russia covered Tibet, Afghanistan, and Persia, 
but not the Gulf. The division of Persia into Russian, neutral, and 
British zones of influence were designed in part to keep Russia away 
from the Gulf physically. However, the subject of the status quo in 
the Gulf itself was not introduced into the negotiations until fairly 
late, in May 1907* The Russians objected because other powers would 
have to be consulted, and because they feared that a specific Russian 
affirmation of British special interests in the Gulf against other 
powers could only refer to Germany, which would take offence. The 
Russian refusal was so strong that the Liberals decided to make no 
mention of the Gulf directly in the Convention, which was signed on 
31 August 1907* A parliamentary statement was published with the 
Convention, however, reaffirming the Lansdowne Declaration of 1903 and 
stating that the British government had no reason to believe that 
British special interests in the Gulf would give rise to difficulties 
between Britain and Russia.
1 Quoted Ibid., p. 292. Morley felt that a settlement with Russia
would relieve Indian finances. The War Office wanted a settlement
partly because it could not provide sufficient reinforcements to 
India in a war with Russia.
2 Busch, op. cit., pp. 357-69; Monger, op. cit., pp. 283-95;
Rose L. Greaves, 'Some Aspects of the Anglo-Russian Convention and
its Workings in Persia, 1907-1914', Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies, Vol. 31 (19^8), pt. 1* pp. 69-91*
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Although Russian activities in Persia continued to cause friction,
Russian rivalry in the Gulf faded into the background with the signing
of the Convention. This made the rising challenge of Germany even
more apparent. The prospect of the Baghdad railway was a continuing
worry, and in 1906 German commercial competition produced a more
immediate threat. In that year the Hamburg-Amerika steamship line
began a regular service from Europe to the Gulf, with Wonckhaus’s
firm as its local agents. German rates were so low that British
shipping companies suspected a government subsidy, but the German line
was also somewhat more efficient and enterprising. Bahrain, for
example, was not a regular port of call for British ocean steamers.
The German line took advantage of this by making Bahrain a scheduled
stop for their service. Combined with considerable activity by
German consular officials in the region, the progress of German trade
was so alarming that by 1909 Cox urged "the reality of the menace,
which the prospect of permanent competition, commercial'and political,
by Germany in the Gulf signifies, and the vital importance to us of
1
killing it in its infancy if it be possible, ...".
These developments in Britain’s position worldwide and in the 
Gulf formed the background to the consideration of the British position 
in Bahrain in 1905-06, and the origin of the Order in Council which was 
proposed to clarify it. The question had first been raised on a minor 
matter in 1902. The Resident at the time, C.A. Kemball, had requested 
that Gaskin, the Assistant Political Agent at Bahrain, be given the
1 Cox to Grey, 12 May 1909* enclosing a Report on German Shipping 
and Trade in the Persian Gulf Region, by Vice-Consul H.G. Chick, 
L/P & S/10/109, register No. 1489* For the political activities 
of German officials, see Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D.,
6 June 1908, I/P & S/7/217, register No. 1318.
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power to perform the functions of a notary public. This could only
be done by investing the Assistant Political Agent with consular powers,
which would require the issue of a separate Order in Council for Bahrain
and the southern shores of the Persian Gulf similar to the Persian
Coasts smd Islands Order for the Bushire residency. Kemball and the
Government of India agreed, however, that the extension of full
consular* powers was undesirable merely to provide for notarial 
\
functions.
The issue arose again in October 1905* in regard to a more
important subject, the administration of justice in Bahrain in cases
in which European foreigners were concerned. The recently-appointed
German Consul at Bushire, Dr. Listemann, approached Cox informally about
the position of German subjects in Bahrain. The German Consul first
sounded Cox on the foreign relations of Shaikh Isa by asking if the
British would object to a direct German approach to the Shaikh on
behalf of a German subject in Bahrain. He was informed that this could
not be accepted. According to the agreements of 1880 said 1892, the
foreign relations of Bahrain were in British hsuids. In that case,
Dr. Listemann asked, how much protection would the British give German
2
subjects who were trading in Bahrain?
Dr. Listemann, whether he realised it or not, was probing at a 
point of great sensitivity to the British. This had been shown in
1 KembsG.1 to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 16 Jsmuary 1902; Under 
Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Kemball, 6 May 1902; smd Kemball 
to .Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 2 July 1902, L/P & S/10/28, 
register No. 2053.
2 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 25 February 1906, L/P & 
S/10/28, register No. 2053.
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1901 at the time when Wonckhaus had established himself in Bahrain.
Officials in India had noted Britain's weak legal position in Bahrain
regarding jurisdiction over foreign subjects. On the one hand,
Shaikh Isa was bound by the agreements he had entered into riot to
admit the Consular agencies of other nations without the approval of
the British Government. On the other hand, the British Agent at
Manama did not claim jurisdiction in cases of disputes arising between
Bahrainis and non-British foreigners. Such cases fell within the
jurisdiction of the native Bahraini authorities. Foreign governments,
and their subjects resident in Bahrain, were not likely to rate very
highly the chances of receiving satisfaction from Bahraini courts in
such cases. The Wonckhaus case of 1904- had already shown that these
Governments would have an excellent pretext for causing embarrassment
to the British over this issue. In fact, reported Cox, Dr. Listemann
seemed to have the idea that "the interests of European merchants
might be prejudiced by being submitted to the arbitration of a purely 
1
native tribunal".
In May 1901 the Government of India had tried to solve this 
problem by declaring that the Assistant Political Agent in Bahrain 
should, "as a matter of courtesy", extend his good offices to European
2
foreigners in any disputes between them and the subjects of the Shaikh. 
In 1906 Cox was able to use the same formula in an attempt to satisfy 
Dr. Listemann. He was also able to refer to the action taken by the
1 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 25 February 1906, L/P & 
S/10/28, register No. 2053.
2 Under-Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Resident, 4 May 1901, 
L/P & S/7/133, register No. 614.
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British authorities over the disturbance of September 190*f in Bahrain 
involving German subjects* If necessary, European foreigners in the 
Shaikhdora "should receive the same amount of protection as if they were 
British subjects, as had Mr* Bahnson at the time of the attack on him".
Even so, Cox’s reassurances to Dr, Listemann were not wholly
satisfactory* This was especially so over the arrangements existing
in Bahrain for the settlement of commercial disputes. There existed
for this purpose a majlis or permanent committee of native merchants*
This institution had developed in the days when non-Europeans acted as
Agents for the British in Bahrain. The majlis dated back to 1857 and
was a Court of Arbitration. It functioned from the start with the
assent of the Shaikh. Moreover, he was sometimes responsible for the
selection of the members of this Court. If the circumstances of the
case demanded, then the Assistant Political Agent would, either alone
or in consultation with the Shaikh, choose the members of the Court
himself. In fact, the Assistant Political Agent acted as convenor
and supervisor of the majlis, which normally conducted its business at
the Agency itself. In 1906 the position of the Agent vis-a-vis the
Court was described as "more analogous to that of a Judge Advocate
2
than a Court of Appeal".
1 Cox to Sec. to Govt* of India, F.D., 25 February 1906, L/P & 
S/10/28t register No. 2053*
2 ’Memorandum regarding the Bahrein majlis or permanent Native 
Court of Arbitration*, 25 February 190^, enclosure in Cox to Sec. 
to Govt, of India, F.D*, 25 February 1906* No. 76, L/P &
S/10/28, register No. 2053* A Judge Advocate is a person 
appointed to sit on a Court Martial as legal adviser. His duties 
are to advise the Court on all points of law and procedure, to 
keep the record of the proceedings and to sum up.
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Even this degree of British involvement with the majlis,
however, was not likely to satisfy foreign nationals in Bahrain. The
British themselves were obliged to admit that "where none of the
litigants were British subjects entitled to British protection’1, the 
Assistant Political Agent had ’’really no locus standi”. Moreover, 
the representatives of Wonckhaus*s firm in Bahrain had never given up 
their claim to extra-territoriality in the Shaikhdom (i.e. to be not 
subject to Bahrain courts). The Political Agent, Captain Prideaux, 
considered that these merchants would certainly refuse to go before 
the Shaikh*s tribunals. Moreover, if the British were to say that 
the majlis was a Territorial Court, the German merchants would perhaps 
object even to that. The alternative course of declaring that the 
majlis was a Court which the Protecting Power, in consultation with the 
Shaikh, had evolved for the settlement of disputes in which British 
subjects, or Europeans claiming British good offices, were concerned, 
would give the Germans an opening to ask the British to define their 
position in Bahrain more precisely.^
As a temporary measure Cox, on 1*f February 1906, in an interview 
with Shaikh Isa, asked the ruler informally to agree that, in the 
event of a European foreigner not being satisfied with a settlement 
made by the majlis, its finding should be subject to modification by 
the Political Agent in consultation with himself, Shaikh CIsa. To 
this, the ruler of Bahrain agreed."^
1 Ibid.
2 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 25 February 1906, No. 7 6, 
L/P & S/10/28, register No. 2053*
3 Ibid.
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European foreigners in Bahrain, however, were not the only
concern in regard to jurisdiction at this time. In January 1906 a
Persian subject committed a criminal offence, theft, on board a
British ship in the harbour of Bahrain. As the subject of a power
with claims to Bahrain, the Persian offender had declared himself to
c- - 1be outside the jurisdiction of Shaikh Isa's courts. On receiving
notification of the problem from Prideaux, Cox decided it would be 
advisable to contact the Government of India regarding the broader 
issues raised by the case.
It seemed to Cox that three courses were possible in disposing
of the Persian's case. The first possibility was that Shaikh Isa
might be left to deal with it. In this event, however, the reaction
of the Persian community in Bahrain would no doubt be similar to that
of the German traders if threatened with the Shaikh's jurisdiction.
They would appeal to their own Government, just as they had when, in
November 190^, the assault on Persian residents in Manama by Shaikh
2
All's men had occurred.
The second possibility was that the Assistant Political Agent 
could send the offender to the Bushire Residency for the disposal of 
his case. As Cox pointed out, however, such a proceeding would be 
"an indirect pronouncement to the effect that Persians were withdrawn 
altogether from the jurisdiction of the Sheikh of Bahrein, and were 
also not justiceable in criminal matters by the British representative".
1 Prideaux to Cox, 26 January 1906, L/P & S/10/28, register No. 2053*
2 See Chapter P» 2^2.
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Moreover, ’’such a ruling would embrace the case of all foreigners in 
1
Bahrein”.
The third possible course of action would be for the Political 
Agent to ask the prisoner if he consented to submitting to his 
jurisdiction and, if he did, he might be sentenced and punished under 
the Agent*s supervision. This was the course favoured by Cox.
Even he admitted, however, that his suggestion was by no means wholly 
satisfactory. The fact that it was proposed to ask for the consent 
of the offender to the jurisdiction of the Assistant Political Agent 
would naturally suggest that there was some doubt as to the right of 
Britain's representative in Manama to deal with such cases.
It had become clear to Cox, from the case of the Persian 
offender and the enquiries of the Germans over Bahrain, that it was 
necessary to put the powers of the Political Agent on a more satisfactory 
basis. In his letter of 25 February 1906 he therefore recommended 
that the question of the issue of an Order in Council for Bahrain 
should be reconsidered.
2
Cox clearly felt that "the gradual influx of Europeans” into
the Shaikhdom had created a new situation for the British in Bahrain.
In the past the disposal of cases like that of the Persian offender 
had presented little practical difficulty. By 1906, however,
1 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., k March 1906, L/P 8c 
S/10/28, register No. 2053.
2 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 25 February 1906, No. 7 8,
L/P 8c S/10/28, register No. 2053.
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"the critical vigilance of foreigners and agents of foreign 
representatives" made it advisable "to shape our procedure as far as 
possible on lines which will pass hostile criticism should any be 
offered".^
Cox was not alone in his concern about the •critical vigilance
of foreigners* regarding the case of the Persian offender. In
February E. Grant-Duff, Britain's representative in Tehran, informed
the Foreign Office that it was "undesirable to raise the question of
jurisdiction here". Grant-Duff also requested instructions as to
2
how the offender should be dealt with. The reason why it was
undesirable for the question of the powers of the Political Agent in
Bahrain to be raised was that the British did not want to admit that
they were unable to point to any written agreement giving their Agent
such rights in the Shaikhdom. Thus, on 6 April 1906, the Political
Committee of the India Office noted that, if the Political Agent were
to claim the right to deal with the case of the Persian, it would be
less open to question if he did so by reference to authority delegated
by Shaikh Isa rather than on the basis of being the representative
3
of the protecting power.
The Foreign Office pointed out that, whilst it might be true 
that no objections would be raised in Bahrain to the Persian offender 
being tried by the Political Agent, there was the possibility that the
1 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., k March 1906, L/P & S/10/28, 
register No. 2053*
2 Grant-Duff to Foreign Office, 20 February 1906 (tel.), L/P & 
S/3/^20, register No. 268k.
3 Comment by Political Committee, 6 April 1906, L/P & S/7/186, 
register No. 677*
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Persian Government might object. It was true that that Government was
well aware of British protection of Bahrain which, in fact, had been
brought to the attention of Persia as recently as the previous 
1
February. It seemed undesirable, however, to raise at that moment 
a question of jurisdiction which might involve "discussion and 
controversy". The Foreign Office therefore suggested that the 
Government of India should be asked to give further information about 
the case with a view to seeing whether it might be dealt with "in some 
more convenient manner" . 2
The India Office agreed to this proposal^, but the Government of
India reported on 22 May 1906 that the stolen property had been
restored. In view of this, and of the two months' imprisonment
already suffered by the offender, it was proposed that the bail bond
kshould be cancelled and no further action taken in the matter.
The Foreign Office and the India Office were quick to agree.^
At about this time, however, further cases arose which raised 
the question of British intervention in the conduct of affairs in 
Bahrain. In April 1906 Prideaux reported his opinion that Shaikh 
Isa, if allowed his own way, would soon drive the small Jewish
1 See Grant-Duff to Mushir-ed-Dowleh, 19 February 1906, L/P & 
S/3/^ -20, register No. 26^8.
2 Foreign Office to India Office, 27 April 1906, L/P & S/3/^22, 
register No. 295^•
3 Sec. of State for India, to Viceroy, 1 May 1906 (tel.), L/P 
& S/3A22.
Viceroy to Sec. of State for India, 22 May 1906 (tel.),
L/P 8 c S/7/188, register No. 926.
5 Foreign Office to India Office, 8 June 1906, and Sec. of State for 
India to Viceroy, 13 June 1906 (tel.), L/P & S/3A23, 
register No. 3120.
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community out of Manama by the extortions to which he was resorting 
as a result of "his present unhappy pecuniary condition11.
C m  m
Shaikh Isa had complained to Prideaux that the Jews had refused to pay
their taxes, had declared themselves not to be Bahrain subjects and
had been disregarding a local edict prohibiting the making, drinking
1
and selling of wine*
Later, Shaikh Isa had informed Prideaux that he claimed the 
right, along with the other "rulers of the world", to impose special 
taxes on the Jews and to expel them from the island should they refuse 
to pay them. Prideaux, after investigating the matter, believed 
that Shaikh Isa's allegations against the Jews were very largely, if 
not wholly, without foundation. Moreover, his harassment of the 
community was of "considerable importance from an international point 
of view". The Bahrain Jews had considerable business dealings with 
the European, Hindu and other local merchants, so that their expulsion 
from Bahrain might well cause considerable inconvenience to the 
mercantile community. Further, all the adult Jews were foreigners by 
birth, mostly Turks and Persians, and informed Prideaux that they had 
no intention of settling permanently in Bahrain. The Turkish and 
Persian governments would have strong grounds for objecting to their 
Jewish subjects in Bahrain "being treated as badly as are the subjects 
of the Chief himself". Prideaux therefore recommended that all 
foreign Jews be considered entitled to the protection of the British 
Agency and exempt from the jurisdiction of the qadis. This was 
necessary because the latter were not permitted by their religious
1 Prideaux to Cox, 20 April 1906* No. 29, L/P & S/7/190,
register No. 1351.
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code to accept the testimony of a Jew against that of a Muslim.
The Shaikh should also be told that all domiciled Jews were similarly 
exempt from the jurisdiction of the qadis, and would be granted British 
good offices even though their cases would not be tried in the Agency
Q m m  mm
but by the secular officials of Shaikh Isa alone. Prideaux also 
stated that it was his personal opinion that the Bahrain Jews would 
make things easier and more secure for themselves if they paid "some 
form of tribute annually to the Chief". If this principle was 
conceded, however, Prideaux felt obliged to warn that similar claims 
would be made against "the Persians and other foreigners, including j 
British subjects, who are annually flocking to Bahrein in growing j 
numbers" . 1
Cox himself arrived in the Shaikhdom on 27 April and spoke to
the ruler. The line taken by Shaikh Isa on the status of the
Bahrain Jews, reported Cox, was that they were "as a race subjected to
special taxation and treatment by civilized Governments" such as those
of the Turkish Sultan and by the Russian Tsar. For guidance in his
affairs, Cox replied, it was the Shaikh*s duty to look not "in the
directions quoted by him" but to the wishes and policy of the
Government of India. Under the administration of that Government,
Jews were on exactly the same footing as other communities and were
2subject to no special impositions.
Cox took the opportunity to link the issue of the Jews with the 
more general one of the right of the British Government to intervene
1 Prideaux to Cox, 20 April 1906, L/P & S/7/190, register No. 1351*
2 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 30 April 1906, L/P & S/7/190, 
register No. 1351*
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in the internal affairs of Bahrain. The Resident claimed that the 
position of the native Christians in Bahrain was analogous to that of 
the Jews. In both cases, he suggested, the British might perhaps 
give the same degree of protection as that extended to Persians, the 
nature of which was still under the consideration of the Government.
Q m m  mm
Since the crisis of the previous year, Shaikh Isa had not taken
exception to the disposal by Prideaux, in communication with the Shaikh's
officials, of cases in which Persians were concerned. Finally, Cox
warned, inconvenient issues like the present case were "the inevitable
corollary of the enhancement of the status of our representative at
Bahrain"• Such issues made clearer "the inconveniences resulting
from the undefined position at present occupied by the British
Government in relation to the Shaikh and the administration of the 
1
islands".
The Government of India approved Prideaux's proposals that Shaikh
Isa should be told that foreign Jews in Bahrain were entitled to
British protection and that both they, and all domiciled Jews, were
 2
exempt from the jurisdiction of the qadis.
It is important to note that the Government of India were more 
willing to support their servants in the Gulf in their intervention 
in the internal affairs of Bahrain when foreign nationals, rather than 
subjects of Shaikh CIsa, were involved. In fact, in April 1906, 
another case of what Cox and Prideaux regarded as a matter for British
1 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 30 April 1906,
L/P  & S/7/190, register No. 1351.
2 Under-Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Cox, 17 July 1906,
L/P  8c S/7/190, register No. 1351.
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intervention in Bahraini affairs occurred* Since the case involved
a Bahraini subject, however, the reaction of the Government of India
was not what it had been in the affair of the harassment of the Jews*
A Bahraini convict had died as a result of the execution of a sentence
of mutilation passed by Shaikh Isa* On 17 April 1906 Cox had
reported to the Government of India that Prideaux had recommended that
the Shaikh be informed that this type of punishment should cease if
he wished "to be considered worthy of our protection11* Cox
considered that, whatever might be the case elsewhere in the Gulf area,
at Bahrain, where there was ITan increasing European population",
Prideaux should inform Shaikh CIsa that "now that Manama /was7 becoming
a civilised port" it was time that "the more primitive features of
1Arab Government were modified".
The Government of India were prepared to allow the Political
Agent to communicate informally with Shaikh Isa with a view to his
"gradually adopting more humane methods of governing his people"*
It was considered, however, that it was essential not to go "too fast
in imposing reforms on semi-civilised states" since "the necessities
of their administration" were completely different from those of
2British government.
It was not until Ik November 1907 that the Government of India 
presented their recommendations on the subject of the judicial powers
1 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 27 April 1906, No* 958,
L/P & S/7/190, register No. 1236.
2 Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Cox, 25 June 1906, L/P &
S/7/190, register No. 1236.
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exercised by the Political Agent in Bahrain. The Government of India
began by reviewing the extent of these powers. The Agent had the
powers of a magistrate in respect of offences committed by British
Indian subjects in Bahrain and the Arab coast of the Gulf. As a
result of a decision by the India Office of 21 June 1901 , he also
extended his good offices to European foreigners in any disputes
between them and the Shaikh of Bahrain or his subjects. In cases in
which the accused was a Bahraini subject or a foreigner preferring not
to make use of British good offices and in which the other party was a
British or foreign subject who did so, the Agent held a court composed
of himself and a representative of the Shaikh. Finally, he controlled
a local court of arbitration for the adjustment of civil dispute
between British subjects and proteges on the one hand, and Bahrainis
or persons of any other nationality on the other. Though, strictly
speaking, he had no legal authority to do so, the Agent also
occasionally issued bills of health, signed marine protests and
2
legalised signatures on behalf of British Indian subjects.
The Government of India requested the issue of an Order in 
Council for Bahrain. This would be a means of defining and 
regularising the powers exercised over British subjects by the Agent 
since, by an Order in Council, Bahrain could be declared to be a 
territory in which such jurisdiction was exercised on behalf of the 
King by the Government of India. This was not, however, the only 
reason why that Government wanted an Order in Council for Bahrain.
1 See Chapter *f, p. 21*f.
2 Govt, of India, to Sec. of State for India, 1*f November 19071 
Secret No. 188, L/P & S/10/28, register No. 2053-
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Foreign shipping and foreign interest generally in the Gulf were
increasing, there had been established in Bahrain foreign firms and
missions. All this had, for some time, been causing the Government
of India what they described as "practical difficulties". It
therefore seemed desirable to them that, "in maintenance of the
status quo in the Gulf", provision should be made in the Order in
Council for the exercise by the Political Agent of jurisdiction over
foreigners in Bahrain, "before foreign interests have so largely
developed as to render the assumption of the legal duties of a
protecting power a matter of greater intricacy and difficulty involving
perhaps ... diplomatic representations to foreign powers". In the
opinion of the Government of India, the "treaty" with Bahrain of 1880
constituted "a sort of protectorate, which has perhaps been ripened
into maturity by the open and regular* exercise of protectorate powers",
especially in the cases of the attacks on Persian and German subjects
in the Shaikhdom in 1904. Furthermore, France, Germany and America
had all received informal, notice of the existence of "a British
protectorate over Baihrain", whilst Persia end Turkey had been told
formally. The despatch ended with a request that the proposed Order
in Council should be framed so as to enable the Political Agent to
1
perform the functions of a notary public.
When the proposal reached London, S.G. Saile, the Legal Adviser 
at the India Office, commented that he could see no objection to an 
Order in Council providing for the exercise of jurisdiction over 
British subjects by the Political Agent and for his performing the
1 Ibid.
307
functions of a Notary Public, The question whether the proposed Order
in Council should also provide for the exercise of jurisdiction over
foreign subjects was, however, more difficult and seemed to depend on
political considerations. It could only be done, the Legal Adviser
considered, by the consent, expressed or implied, of the Powers over
1
whose subjects it was proposed to extend this jurisdiction.
The Secretary of State for India agreed with Sale that the
difficulty was the question of jurisdiction over foreigners. In a
letter of 18 January 1908 to the Foreign Secretary communicating the
recommendations of the Government of India, he stated that he assumed
that British protection over Bahrain was a fact and that it was
’’desirable to publish it in due course by taking such public action as
w^as]7 suggested” by the Government of India, The question was whether
the present opportunity was favourable to the adoption of this course
and whether it was not preferable to "continue action on the above
assumption until a long usage had been established”. The latter had
2
been the view taken by the India Office in November 1905* It was 
possible, however, that the Foreign Office might consider that 
"recent developments of the situation in the Gulf" required a "definite 
public notification of the rights that His Majesty’s Government possess 
and intend to exercise as the protecting Power in Bahrein", Regarding 
the notifications which had been made to foreign powers about British 
protection over Bahrain to which the Government of India had referred, 
the India Office noted that the Turks had never accepted "the
1 Note of S,G, Sale, Legal Adviser at the India Office, 9 December 
1907, L/P & S/10/28, register No. 2053.
2 See Chapter 6 , p. 275.
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declaration of our Protectorate” which had been repeatedly made to them*
Further, the Persians had not formally recognised the right of the
Resident at Bushire to use his good offices on behalf of the subjects
1
of the Shaikh of Bahrain,
The reply of the Foreign Office accepted the principle of a
provision in the proposed Order in Council for jurisdiction by the
Political Agent over British subjects. As fax as the question of
jurisdiction over foreigners and the regularisation of ’’the British
Protectorate over Bahrein” were concerned, the Foreign Secretary was
’’disposed to take any well-considered steps with regard to the
consolidation of our protectorate”. It was suggested, however, that
no action should be taken in the matter until there had been formulated
the recommendations of a committee which it had been proposed to set
2up to consider British policy on the Gulf, The India Office agreed.
The purposes for calling the committee were German determination 
to push forward their exclusive scheme for the Baghdad railway without 
any recognition of British interest in controlling the southern 
portions of the line in Mesopotamia, and the increasing threat of 
vigorous German economic competition in the Gulf*, The conclusion 
of the Anglo-Russian Convention in August 190? had left Germany as 
Britain’s most formidable rival in the Middle East, and at the same time 
had cleared the way for consideration of British negotiations with
1 India Office to Foreign Office, 18 January 1908 (draft as approved
by Political Committee), L/P & S/10/28, register No, 2053*
2 Foreign Office to India Office, b February 1908, No. 2218,
L/P & S/10/28, register No, 2?81.
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Germany, Turkey and the other Powers over the railway question. 
Therefore a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence was 
convened to consider developments in the region, and British attitudes 
towards them. It consisted of representatives from the Board of 
Trade, War Office, and Admiralty as well as the Foreign Office and 
India Office. John Morley, the Secretary of State for India, was its 
chairman. Its seven meetings were held in March 1908.
2The terms of reference of the Gulf Sub-Committee were:
To consider the effect that the completion of the Baghdad 
Railway may have on the situation - strategical, political 
and commercial - in Southern Persia and the Persian Gulf, 
and the measures that it may be necessary to take in 
advance for the maintenance of British interests in those 
regions, either immediately or after the railway has 
reached Baghdad,
Before the Sub-Committee was a memorandum on the Gulf which 
had been prepared by the Foreign Office in February 1908.^  It reviewed 
British political interests and economic conditions in the geographical 
areas around the Gulf and Muscat. The relationship of the British 
Government with those Arab tribes along the southern and western coasts 
of the Gulf which had signed formal agreements with that government 
was described by the memorandum as "a sort of veiled Protectorate",
1 For a detailed analysis on the context of British policy toward
Mesopotamia and the railway, see Stuart A, Cohen, British Policy 
in Mesopotamia 1903-191^ (London, 1976), Chapters 2 and 3* From 
January to October the British Political Agent at Kuwait, Major 
S,G. Knox, had negotiated a lease from Shaikh Mubarak of the land 
which could be used as a terminus if the railway should proceed as
far as Kuwait: Busch, op. cit., pp. 308-10.
2 Report and Proceedings of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of
Imperial Defence on the Baghdad Railwayi Southern Persia, and the 
Persian Gulf, secret, 26 January 1909* Cab 16/10 (hereafter 
"Gulf Sub-Committee Report"), p. vi.
3 The Memorandum was printed as Appendix 2 to the Gulf Sub-Committee 
Report.
Foreign Office Memorandum, 12 February 1908, Appendix 2, Gulf 
Sub-Committee Report, p. 127.
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As far as Bahrain itself was concerned, however, it was stated that it 
had become a matter for serious consideration whether the time had not 
arrived "to regularize the position1* there "by a more definite 
assertion of British predominance". The Government of India in its 
despatch of November 1907 had, the memorandum pointed out, set 
forth the arguments in favour of the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
Political Agent over foreigners. It was a question for consideration, 
however, "whether it would not be more practicable and be less likely 
to evoke hostile comment if the assumption of these duties (which 
would probably necessitate a notification to foreign Powers) were 
accompanied by various administrative reforms'*. These, if carried 
out under British control, should encourage trade, check the arms
Q m m  mm
traffic and help to put Shaikh Isa's finances on a better footing.
It was regrettable that the replacement of the Native Agent, Agha
Muhammad Rahim, by a British Agent in 1900 had produced "no substantial 
• •
improvement" as far as these desirable reforms were concerned. This 
failure was even more unsatisfactory since the state of the internal 
affairs of a Shaikhdom known to be under British protection had 
attracted the adverse comment of the subjects of foreign Powers.
It is clear that, as far as the drafters of the Foreign Office 
memorandum were concerned, the greater control over Bahrain which the 
Government of India had proposed would be more acceptable to foreign 
Powers if it could first be shown more clearly that British protection 
over the Shaikhdom had been beneficial to commerce in general. The 
future growth of trade in Bahrain depended on the undertaking of 
public works such as providing harbour accommodation and a pier.
1 Large vessels unloading at Bahrain had to anchor some two miles 
from the shore and there discharge into lighters. Report by 
C.E. Akers to Board of Trade, March 1909* L/P & S/3/^9» 
register No. 3283.
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For such undertakings to be practicable it was necessary for the 
finances of the Shaikh to be reformed. Nothing had so far come of 
the negotiations for the control of the Customs of Bahrain and it was
Q m m  w
a matter for consideration whether Shaikh Isa should be offered a
large subsidy in return for British control of the Customs. It would
greatly promote the commercial interests of the Shaikhdom, the
memorandum stated, if a free port under the control of a British
1
commissioner could be established there.
The questions about the future of Bahrain were placed by the
memorandum in the wider context of the defence of British ascendancy
in the Gulf as a whole against Germany. The attempts of the
Germans to push their interests in the Gulf area had been so vigorous
that there was reason to fear a decline in British influence, "first
commercial., but eventually political". This process would be
accelerated if the Baghdad Railway was completed under German auspices
alone. It seemed, accordingly, that the time had come for the
substitution of "a policy of constructive action" for one which was
defensive in character and limited to a declaration that the British
Government would forcibly resist any attempt to establish a fortified 
2
base in the Gulf. It was considered practically certain that the 
Germans would not attempt to challenge Britain directly in this way.
A policy of "gradual commercial absorption" was far more likely. It 
would not give scope for legitimate protests by the British Government. 
At the same time, the history of the Gulf had demonstrated that
1 Foreign Office Memorandum, 12 February 1908, Gulf Sub-Committee 
Report, pp. /\li6-k7*
2 Foreign Office Memorandum, 12 February 1908, Gulf Sub-Committee 
Report, p. 187*
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"commercial prosperity inevitably leads to political hegemony”• It 
was therefore a matter of "grave consideration" whether, on political 
grounds, "exceptional measures" should be taken to encourage British 
trade in the Gulf and to thwart the attempt to undermine Britain*s 
commercial ascendancy there.
The concern of the Gulf Sub-Committee about the penetration 
of German commerce was reflected in the detailed tables of statistics 
on the share of different countries in the trade of the Gulf which 
were appended to the report of the Sub-Committee. Between 1895 and 
1906, the value of goods imported into the Gulf from Germany had grown 
from £66,000 to £179*000. It is true that, even by 1906, imports 
from Germany were dwarfed by those from the United Kingdom, India 
and other British possessions, which totalled, £3,^21,000* Even so, 
the rate of increase of German imports, approaching 200 per cent in 
eleven years, was ominous. In the same period, imports from the 
United Kingdom said the Empire had grown by only about ten per cent. 
Moreover, other statistics indicated that the ssume tendency ws^ at 
work. From 1895 to 1906, the tonnage of Germsin shipping entering the 
principal ports of the Gulf rose from 6,^97 to 83,767* whilst for 
British shipping the figures were 702,158 and 1,68^,785 respectively.
At the first meeting of the Gulf Sub-Committee, on 2 March 1908,
1 ‘Trade suid Shipping of the Persian Gulf*, Annex (a), Section (C), 
Appendix 8 of Gulf Sub-Committee Report, p. 252.
2 ‘Shipping in the Persian Gulf‘, Section (C), Appendix 8 of Gulf 
Sub-Committee Report, p. 258. These figures were compiled 
from Consular reports.
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the question of Bahrain was raised during the evidence of Sir Richmond 
Ritchie, the Secretary of the Political and Secret Department of the 
India Office. Ritchie stated his opinion that the provisions of the 
agreements which the Shaikh of Bahrain had in the past signed with 
the British Government constituted "a quasi-Protectorate". Ritchie 
described how, at the time of the assaults on Persian and German 
subjects in Bahrain in 190*f, the British had "walked in and restored 
law and order". The Germans had not protested over it. Further, 
Ritchie said, the Persians had actually invoked British assistance. 
That, and the British action at Zubara in 1895* in the opinion of 
Lloyd-George, "look^ed^ like effective jurisdiction".
The real question was not, however, whether the British had 
effective jurisdiction in practice. As Ritchie pointed out, what was 
under consideration was the proposal of the Government of India that 
legally defensible jurisdiction over foreigners should be obtained by 
means of the issue of an Order in Council. Such a measure would, 
thought Ritchie, entail making "a communication" to the foreign 
Powers concerned. It was precisely this consideration which had made 
the India Office hesitant about accepting the recommendations made in 
the Government of India’s despatch. At this point in the Sub­
committee’s cross-examination of Ritchie, Morley made clean: his doubts 
about the wisdom of accepting those recommendations. He now asked 
what would be the "precise gain" of passing am Order in Council 
providing for jurisdiction over foreigners. He had never felt, he 
declared, that the Government of India had shown what the precise
1 Cross-examination of Ritchie, 2 March 1908, Gulf Sub-Committee 
Report, p. 10.
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gain would be.^
Ritchie was prepared to tell him. The measure would be greatly 
2
to Britain*s advantage:
At present in every step we take at Bahrein we are haunted 
by the dread: What will Turkey say? what will Persia say?
and Germany? what will Mr. Wonckhaus say? and what will the 
pearl-dealers say? They all have the right of direct access 
to the Sheikh to get him to settle their difficulties, 
and our Political Officer does not always necessarily know 
what passes between the Sheikh and these foreigners. He 
has to find out before he can give effective advice to the 
Sheikh - that is, effective in the sense of British interests.
In reply to the queries of Grey and Lloyd-George about the
Q .  mm
likelihood of Shaikh Isa being willing to give up his right to
jurisdiction over foreigners, Ritchie stated that he understood that
this would be less of a problem than "the intimation to the foreign
Powers"• Until such an intimation was made "we have not", considered
Ritchie, "really got a Protectorate in the sense that we desire a
Protectorate, that is to say, the first thing we do may be challenged".
If such a challenge wan made, would the Government be in a position to
say, "we have done this because of the Protectorate which we informed
you we were exercising; or are we to wait until we are challenged and
3
then say, Ohil yes, but we have a Protectorate?11
Ritchie seemed to consider that the latter alternative was out 
of the question. Grey, however, was of a different opinion. He 
considered it "rather a provocative business to send a Circular to
1 Cross-examination of Ritchie, 2 March 1908, Gulf Sub-Committee 
Report, p. 11.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p. 13.
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other Powers saying we have got a Protectorate over Bahrain11 • British
claims to a protectorate would have to be based on the agreements of
1880 and 1892. In that case, on receipt of the circular, the Powers
would demand to know why the British Government had not proclaimed the
protectorate earlier. They would, thought Grey, say ’’"Why have you,
a propos of nothing, suddenly told us you have got a Protectorate over
Bahrein, which you say you have had for twenty eight years?"". It was
far better to let the issue arise through their challenging some
British action and then to reply, ""This Treaty has been in existence
for twenty-eight years, and it has been known to everybody, and we
1
cannot possibly think of discussing it,n.
As far as the issue of an Order in Council itself was concerned,
Grey seemed to have no objections, provided that the Shaikh would make
no trouble about giving up his jurisdiction over foreigners. On this
point Grey"s counsel seems to have been accepted by the rest of the
Sub-Committee. Their examination of Ritchie on Bahrain was more or
less ended when Grey stated that he
should have thought it was that we agree that the Treaties 
we have got with Bahrein would support the action which 
the Government of India desire to take as against any 
foreign objections, but that they do not appear to give us 
the right to do this without the consent of the Sheikh, and 
it would be necessary for the Government of India first to 
arrange matters with the Sheikh before any Order in Council 
is issued.^
When, on 17 March 1908, Sir Louis Dane, the Secretary of the 
Foreign Department of the Government of India, was cross-examined by
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid., p. 17.
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the Sub-Committee, Morley asked Dane whether the Government of India 
had "proposed to make our position stronger by establishing a British 
jurisdiction over foreigners". Dane had replied that the Government 
of India "would rather put it by bringing to the notice of foreigners 
the fact that we do exercise a jurisdiction". It was hoped that an 
Order in Council would be issued to make the matter perfectly clear.
The Government of India were "proceeding in the informal sort of way 
that we generally do", but the time had now come "to put ourselves on
Q m m  mm
a more legal footing". Shaikh Isa, Dane informed the Sub-Committee, 
was prepared to allow the Political Agent to deal with all cases 
involving foreigners. There was no problem whatever about the Shaikh 
yielding his right to such jurisdiction. What the Government of India 
was afraid of was that their jurisdiction might very easily be 
challenged, thus causing "a very awkward conflict". If the Order in 
Council could be issued before any serious case occurred, however, the 
Government of India would be in a stronger position to meet any objection. 
Dane added that he considered that Britain*s position in Bahrain was, 
in fact, a very strong one, "thanks to the Germans and Persians them­
selves".^
When Grey took over the questioning of Dane from Morley, he asked 
directly whether the Political Agent actually exercised jurisdiction 
over foreigners in Bahrain. Dane informed him that, as far as civil 
cases were concerned, practically all of them were dealt with by the 
Political Agent. In recent years nearly every criminal case had been 
made over to the Agent by Shaikh CIsa. At Grey*s prompting, Dane
1 Cross-examination of Dane, 17 March 1908, Gulf Sub-Committee 
Report, p. 61.
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agreed that the problem was to discover the best way to let other
Powers know that the British Political Agent in Bahrain already
exercised this jurisdiction there. The objective was to achieve this
"before there was any conflict". When Grey asked why the Government
of India wanted an Order in Council, Dane told him that they were
"afraid that our position may be challenged, and it would look worse
to assert it by an Order in Council after the dispute had arisen than
1
it would beforehand".
The final report of the Sub-Committee stated that the British 
Government exercised "a virtual Protectorate" over Bahrain, The 
British position in the Shaikhdom would be strengthened, however, and 
the "risks of interference by foreign Powers other than Turkey or 
Persia" removed if jurisdiction over foreigners in Bahrain were placed
Q  W  B
in British hands. The Sub-Committee recommended that Shaikh Isa
should be asked to make a request to be relieved of the responsibility
of exercising jurisdiction over foreigners. If this approach to the
Shaikh proved successful, an Order in Council should be drawn up. The
Sub-Committee did not consider, however, that it was expedient to make
the Order in Council "a medium of formally declaring a Protectorate"•
Neither Turkey nor Persia had formally abandoned its claims to Bahrain
and the Persian Government had not even recognized Britain’s right to
2protect Bahrainis in Persian territory. Considering "the present 
political conditions of Turkey and Persia" it was advisable that the 
British Government "should scrupulously avoid any action that could 
be represented as an attempt to utilize their difficulties for selfish
1 Ibid., p. 62.
2 An instance of this refusal had occurred at the time when, in March 
1908, the Sub-Committee had been conducting its deliberations.
See Marling to Grey, 16 March 1908 (tel.), L/P & S/10/82, 
register No. 29^-*
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purposes"• There was also the risk that, if a Protectorate were 
formally declared, this might be considered by Powers other than Turkey 
and Persia as a challenge. They might therefore "raise the question 
of our rights in a provocative form".
The report of the Gulf Sub-Committee was endorsed by the Committee
of Imperial Defence at its 101st meeting on 25 February 1909« The
India Office then prepared a despatch to the Government of India which
2
followed the recommendations of the Gulf Sub-Committee. The 
despatch was sent on 21 May 1909* Quoting the report, it pointed out 
that the British Government had concluded that, since the foundation 
of British political ascendancy in the Gulf was commercial predominance, 
purely political action, not having the aim of developing Britain’s 
commercial interests, should be avoided. Such action would be likely 
to arouse the suspicions of other Powers. The proposals which the 
Government of India had made for the extension of the jurisdiction of 
the Political Agent at Bahrain, however, fell "within the lines of 
policy approved by His Majesty's Government". The adoption of these 
proposals would be one more stage in the development of Britain's 
"virtual protectorate" over the Shaikhdom. The despatch then repeated 
the reasons why the recommendation of an Order in Council was accepted 
and why it was not considered expedient to make the Order in Council a 
means of formally declaring a protectorate. The Government of India 
was asked to have the Shaikh approached for a request to be relieved 
of responsibility for jurisdiction over foreigners. To provide for
1 Gulf Sub-Committee Report, 26 January 1909* pp» ix-x.
2 India Office to Foreign Office, 28 April 1909i L/P & S/10/28, 
register No. 3227*
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"any local peculiarities that may require consideration", the first 
draft of the Order in Council should be prepared by the Government of 
India.^
On 31 July 1909 Cox informed the Government of India that
Q a  mm
Prideaux had secured from Shaikh Isa the necessary request that he
should be relieved of responsibility for exercising jurisdiction over 
2
foreigners. The Shaikh had, however, insisted on adding a
reservation. He asked that the British authorities should exercise
authority in cases in which foreigners only were concerned. In
cases occurring between foreigners and Bahraini subjects, it was
necessary, said Shaikh Isa, that they should be settled by himself and
3
the Political Agent jointly. The effect of the reservation, m
Cox's opinion, was simply to put foreigners on the same footing as
British subjects who had disputes with Bahraini subjects. No
if
exception need be taken to. it.
The political condition of Turkey referred to in the Gulf Sub­
committee^ report had undergone several developments in the course of 
the year between the Sub-Committee's meetings and the endorsement of 
the report by the Committee of Imperial Defence. These developments 
were to have a considerable influence on the course of the Baghdad 
railway negotiations, on the politics of the Hasa coast region and
1 Sec. of State for India to Viceroy, 21 May 1909» No. 11,
L/P & S/10/28, register No. 3377.
2 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 31 July 1909» L/P & S/10/28,
register No. 131^«
3 Shaikh °Isa to Captain C.F. Mackenzie, Political Agent, Bahrain,
16 July 1909, L/P & S/10/28.
Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 31 July 1909i L/P & S/10/28.
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Bahrain itself, and on the timing of the Order in Council for Bahrain,
The "Young Turks" revolution of July 1908 began with a phase of Liberal
spirit which seemed favourable to British interests over Mesopotamian
issues, because of a corresponding decline in the influence of Germany,
the supporter of the Sultan, at Constantinople, However, the
deposition of Abdul Hamid in April 1909 brought a strongly nationalistic
group of young Turks to the fore. They recognised that the railway
could assist in pushing a policy of "Ottomanisation" and pan-Turkish
nationalism into the Arab portions of their empire. While Germany
was willing to meet British objections by granting Britain a share in
the lower portion of the railway, the new Turkish government was less
willing to see Britain control such a vital part of Turkish
communications, Britain pressed its position further by presenting an
alternative Mesopotamian railway proposal with far-reaching economic
implications, and held over the nearly bankrupt Turks the threat of
refusing to approve an increase in Turkish customs unless the
concession was granted. British objectives in defending their
position in the region thus remained constant, but the Turks responded
with new moves to assert their pretensions in the Gulf, which fitted
in with aggressive pan-Islamic and pan-Turkish activities elsewhere in
1
the Ottoman Empire,
In March 1909 the Turkish mudir of cUqair landed with some 
soldiers on Zakhnuniyya, an unproductive island about ten miles south-
C Meast of Uqair, and hoisted the Turkish flag, Dawasir tribesmen,
1 Edward Mead Earle, Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Baghdad
Railway (New York, 1923* reprinted 1966), pp. 217-2^; J.B, Wolf,
The Diplomatic History of the Baghdad Railroad (Missouri, 1936, 
reprinted, New York, 1973), pp. 5^-60; Cohen, op. cit., 
pp, 97-101; Busch, op. cit., pp. 313-16.
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subjects of the Shaikh of Bahrain, were in the habit of visiting the 
island during the winter months, and Shaikh Ali, Shaikh CIsa's father, 
had built a fort on it fifty years before* The Turkish official tried 
to persuade the Dawasir to raise the flag daily, but they declined.
Q m m  M
Shaikh Isa protested the Turkish action, and Cox recommended that the 
Shaikh be allowed to fly his flag on Zakhnuniyya during the winter, 
and that a protest should be lodged at Constantinople* The India 
Office observed that the action of the mudir raised two questions, the 
limits of Turkish jurisdiction on the coast which the British did not
Q
recognise south of Uqair, and the British protectorate over Bahrain*
It urged that the latter issue not be raised in the protest, and
recognised that it was not a convenient time for making any
representations to the Porte. Since the guards were withdrawn, the
Political Agent at Bahrain was instructed in October 1909 not to allow
Shaikh Isa to fly his flag on Zakhnuniyya, which would needlessly
2disturb the status quo.
The Turkish guards returned, however, in March 1910* The 
Political Agent at Bahrain, Captain C.F. Mackenzie, discovered on a 
visit to Zakhnuniyya that the Dawasir, in an awkward position, were 
flying either the Bahrain or Turkish flags, sis the situation demanded. 
Reliefs for the guards continued to visit the island, and the Turkish 
flag was flown on Fridays.^
1 Prideaux to Cox, k April 1909; Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India,
F.D., 2 May 1909; Major A.P. Trevor, First Assistant Resident,
to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 28 November 1909» L/P & S/10/162, 
register No. 3267; Viceroy to Sec. of State for India, 23 May 
1909 (tel.), L/P & S/10/162, register No. 350^.
2 India Office to Foreign Office, 26 May 1909; Govt, of India,
F.D., to Resident, 7 June 1909 (tel.), R/15/2/25*
3 Capt. C.F. Mackenzie to Cox, /£  May 19107 R/15/2/25; Mackenzie
to Cox, 17 June 1910, L/P & s7lO/l62, register No. 3267.
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The British Ambassador at Constantinople, Sir Gerald Lowther, 
linked this continued defiance of British protests with a larger 
pattern of Turkish aggression. He reviewed the harassment of British 
diplomatic establishments in Turkish Arabia, the appointment of a new
W  C
mu dir for Udaid, activity in the Balkans, suid the general tone of
Young Turk aspirations and revival of Ottoman power. He urged a
comprehensive treatment of the outstanding Anglo-Turkish disputes in
the Gulf region. Turkish officials in Basra soon put pressure on the
Shaikh of Kuwait over properties owned near Fao, and bombSLrded a town
belonging to the Shaikh of Muhammara. It was further reported that
mudirs had been named for Wakra and Zubara. By December, Cox was
urging either comprehensive settlement, or else coercive mesisures to
c «remove Turkish military posts at Bida , Bubiyan said Umm Qasr near
•
Kuwait, and Zakhnuniyya.
The Foreign Office cautioned that it would be futile to remove
the signs of Turkish authority on land, for they would simply put them
back, said that Britain’s diplomatic position wsts possibly not strong
enough now to force the Turks to a settlement of Gulf issues. They
recommended waiting until the Ottorasui government would be forced to
renew its request for a custom increase. The Foreign and India
Offices agreed that the Committee of Imperial Defence should decide
2on a plan of military and naval action in case of need.
1 Lowther to Grey, 22 August 1910; Grey to Lowther, 17 October 19^0; 
Grey to Lowther, 21 October 1910 (tel.); Viceroy to Sec. of 
State for India, 1 December 1910 (tel.), L/P & s/10/162, 
register No. 3267.
2 Foreign Office to India Office, 16 Jsuiuary 1911* and India Office
to Foreign Office, 26 January 1911* L/P & S/10/162, register No. 3267. 
On 1 May 1911* the General Staff pointed out that local action in 
the Gulf would probably not apply pressure in any useful manner, 
and might lead to Turkish pressure on Egypt, or to full-scale war 
with Turkey: Ibid. See also Cohen, op. cit., pp. 20*f-09.
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By early 1911 Britain's bargaining position was not as strong
as in the previous year, and it was not wise to push the Ottomans
without extreme provocation. The Potsdam Agreement of 1910 had
removed Russian opposition to the Germans' Baghdad Railway, undermining
the solidarity of Britain's Entente partners on the issue. When the
Turks presented a new international plan for the Gulf section of the
railway in March 1911* Britain above all considered what political
terms would best safeguard her position in the Gulf, including items 
0
on Kuwait, Uqair as the southern limit of Turkish jurisdiction, and
1
renunciation of Turkish claims to Bahrain, Qatar and Zakhnuniyya.
Just as the general negotiations with the Turks became serious, 
one more instance of Turkish intransigence showed the necessity of 
securing a definitive statement on Bahrain and British rights. In 
March 1911 three Bahrainis in Basra were ordered by the wall to take 
out Ottoman passports. When they refused they were arrested. On 
being approached by the British Consul, the wall replied that the 
Turkish Government did not admit the right of the British Government 
to protect the natives of Bahrain. Sir Gerald Lowther, the 
Ambassador at Constantinople, suggested that, in view of the current 
negotiations between Britain and Turkey concerning the Baghdad Railway 
and other affairs, advantage should be taken of the action of the wall 
of Basra to secure a definite solution of the Bahrain question. In 
reply the British Government instructed Lowther to inform the Turks 
that the wall's attempt to assert Turkish claims in Bahrain, and to 
deny British protection, constituted a flagrant disturbance of the
1 Earle, op. cit., pp. 227-28, 2391 252; Busch, op. cit., 
pp. 322-25; Wolf, op. cit., pp. 62-63 & 89-90*
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status quo. Such violations would impede the negotiations for a 
settlement of Gulf questions and compel action to protect British 
rights. The Turkish Foreign Minister pleaded ignorance of the 
incident and of the general question of the status of Bahrain, which 
he promised to Lowther that he would study. Lowther was to inform 
the Turkish Foreign Minister that no delay in settling the question 
could be admitted. The prisoners must be released immediately and 
their passports accepted. It was discovered by the British Consul at 
Basra that the Bahrainis were, in fact, released early in April 1911.
Before the news was received in London that the Turks had given 
way in the face of British demands, correspondence with a most important 
bearing on British policy towards Bahrain had passed between the India 
Office and the Foreign Office concerning the incident. On 9 May 1911* 
the India Office stated that, in their opinion, if the Porte issued 
to the wali of Basra the instructions which the British had demanded, 
this would constitute a recognition of ’’our protectorate”, the formal 
declaration of which might, in that case, ”be made part of the general 
settlement in the Gulf to be proposed later”. If, on the other hand, 
the Porte should, as the India Office expected, reject British demands 
over the arrest of the Bahrainis, it would be necessary to take 
immediate action in support of those demands. The India Office 
suggested that this should take the form of a declaration by the British 
Government of a protectorate over Bahrain and the seizure and detention 
of Turkish vessels in the Shatt-al-Arab and Gulf until compensation was
1 Memorandum of information received during the month of April 1911, 
regarding affairs in Arabia, the North-East Frontier and Burma,
27 May 1911* L/P & S/7/2^8, register No. 911* p. 10.
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paid# Moreover, the Turkish Government should not be allowed "to 
delay their reply unreasonably" before action was taken.
The India Office were not unduly concerned about the effect
which a formal declaration of a British protectorate would have on the
negotiations with Turkey. It was the impression of Lord Morley, the
Secretary of State for India, that, whatever the British did, they
would continue to have to reckon with "the persistent hostility of the
Young Turk party, whether under a constitutional regime or a military
dictatorship". As far as British relations with Persia were concerned,
a declaration of a protectorate over Bahrain would, no doubt, be
unwelcome to the Persian Government. Britain, however, had little to
lose by offending the Persians who had "not themselves shown any
particular desire to conciliate His Majesty*s Government". They might
therefore, in the opinion of the India Office, be disregarded as far as
2the making of contingency plans in the present case was concerned.
The Foreign Office were not impressed with these arguments.
Sir Edward Grey was not in favour of the "modification of the status 
quo" which a formal proclamation of a protectorate over Bahrain would 
involve. The British Government was proposing to insist, as one of 
the conditions for British participation in the construction of the 
southern section of the Baghdad Railway, on the Turkish Government 
recognising their right to protect Bahrainis in the Ottoman Empire.
The unilateral proclamation of a protectorate would have an unfavourable
1 India Office to Foreign Office, 9 May '\$'\'\, No. 57* F.O. *f2*f:
Turkey: Confidential Prints, No. 99&7, p. 76.
2 Ibid., p. 67.
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effect on the negotiations in progress. A decision on the next step 
to be taken in the affair of the arrested Bahrainis should be postponed 
until the Turkish government had replied to the British demands. Since 
the Turks gave way, no further action became necessary. The incident 
did show, however, that, whilst the European aspects of Gulf policy 
dominated the thinking of Grey, the Indian authorities still wished 
for clear-cut solutions to local problems, even if they proved 
disruptive for larger designs.
At the time when, in May 1911* the Foreign Office was warning
the India Office of the adverse effects on negotiations with the Turks
which the proclamation of a protectorate over Bahrain would have, the
question of Anglo-Ottoman relations in the Gulf area was the subject
for consideration by the Standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of
Imperial Defence. This sub-committee was chaired by Lord Morley and
included Grey as one of its members. Its terms of reference were to
consider the situation in the Gulf and to what extent Turkish claims
2
there might be recognised without damaging British interests* Of
the three questions on which the Sub-Committee was asked to advise,
3
one had a direct bearing on Bahrain:
What are the utmost limits to an extension of Turkish 
sovereignty in the Shat-al-Arab and the shores of the Gulf 
to which we can agree?
1 Foreign Office to India Office, 23 May 1911, F.O. ^2^/99^7, p. 95- 
See also Viceroy (Hardinge) to India Office, 12 October 1911* 
(tel.), L/P & S/10/188.
2 Report and Proceedings of the Standing Sub-Committee of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence on the Persian Gulf, 1 November 1911* 
Secret (hereafter fStanding Sub-Committee Report*), Cab 16/15*
V770, p. iv. The other questions were the location of the 
railway terminus, and seaward navigation to Basra.
3 Ibid., p. 1.
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On 30 March, a meeting at the Foreign Office had drawn up, as
part of the Anglo-Turkish negotiations, a general memorandum* Among
its many provisions, it proposed that Bahrainis in Turkish territory
should "enjoy British consular protection"• The southernmost limit
of Turkish jurisdiction on the Gulf coast should be Uqair. It was
suggested that the Ottoman Government should renounce all claim to
supremacy over any point on the coast south of Uqair and to the islands
1
of Bahrain, Muharraq, Zakhnuniyyah "or adjacent islands"*
As far as the recommendation about the southern limits of 
Turkish jurisdiction was concerned, Grey stated that he was "anxious 
to give Turkey all that we reasonably could" and suggested that 
concessions might be considered. He thought that, whilst the 
recommendations of the memorandum of 30 March on this question could be 
put to the Turks as they stood, "more as regards the El Katr peninsula"
might be conceded, though stipulations about certain matters such as
c— a 2Shaikh Isa's grazing rights there would have to be made.
At the second, and final, meeting of the Sub-Committee, on 15 
June 1911, Grey once more made it clear that, as long as a definite 
limit to Turkish sovereignty on the Gulf coast could be agreed on, and 
as long as any claim by that power to Bahrain or the Trucial Coast was 
ruled out, he was prepared to be flexible about what could be conceded 
by the British Government. Grey stated that, whilst Turkey had never 
made any claim to the Trucial Coast, she had been "pushing forward
1 Memorandum drawn up by a meeting at the Foreign Office, 30 March 
1911, enclosure 3» Appendix VII, Standing Sub-Committee Report,
p. 68.
2 Minutes of first meeting, 2k May 1911* Standing Sub-Committee 
Report, p. 5.
328
lately down towards El Katr, Zakhnuniyah, and so forth” • What the 
British Government wanted was "to get her once and for all to put her 
hand to limits of sovereignty on her part in the region of the Persian 
Gulf, which will exclude from her sovereignty places in which we sire 
particularly interested"* Britain wanted "really to know how much we 
can give her". One of the places there was no question about, however, 
was Bahrain, "which we must have a protectorate over". Whatever 
limits Turkey assigned "must be subject to excluding Bahrain from her 
jurisdiction". It was for the British to decide "what limit to the 
south is the extreme limit which we can concede to her".
Despite Grey's talk of concessions, the final recommendations of 
the Standing Sub-Committee, formulated on 1*f July 1911* gave no hint of 
them. The Sub-Committee did not consider it prudent to agree to any 
extension of Turkish sovereignty. The southernmost limit should be
Q
Uqair. It was not thought expedient "to make any concession to
C"* mTurkey in regard to the El Katr Peninsula" since Shaikh Isa had
"grazing and other rights there" and the peninsula had a strategic
importance with regard to the pearl fisheries. It would be desirable
if Turkey could be induced to withdraw her military post from Bida
c 2and to renounce sill claims to Bahrain or any point south of Uqair.
The Turks opened conversations in London in July 1911 on the 
various issues impeding the settlement of the railway question. Grey 
began to negotiate on the basis of the Sub-Committee's recommendations.
1 Minutes of meeting of 15 June 1911, Standing Sub-Committee Report, 
p. 9*
2 Standing Sub-Committee Report, p. 2.
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The talks were soon interrupted, however, by the Agadir crisis, 
involving Britain and Germany, and by the Tripolitan War between Turkey 
and Italy, although Britain and Germany made some parallel progress 
over the railway early m  1912.
The proposed Order in Council for Bahrain had meanwhile been 
subject already to many more delays. After the Gulf authorities had
mm
secured Shaikh Isa's request to give up jurisdiction over foreigners
in July 1909* the Government of India in November prepared a draft and
2
sent it to the Resident for comments and alterations. Then, largely
because of the absence on leave of Colonel Cox, that officer did not
return the revised draft until a year later.^ The Government of
k
India did not submit the draft to London until June 1911* There was 
a further delay from July 1911 to April 1912, whilst suggestions for an 
Order in Council - modelled on the draft Bahrain order - to cover the
whole area of the Persian Gulf Residency, including Kuwait, Bahrain,
5
Bushire, Persian and Trucial Coasts, was considered.
One important amendment was made in the course of 1912 at the
C m  m
request of Shaikh Isa. He had claimed that, when he had ceded 
jurisdiction over 'foreigners' in July 1909* he had only intended the
1 Earle, op. cit., pp. 253-5^*
2 Deputy Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Major A.P. Trevor, in 
charge of the Residency, Bushire, 16 November 1909* L/P & S/10/2^ f8, 
register No. 951*
3 Cox to officiating Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 27 November 1910, 
Ibid.
k Govt, of India, F.D., to Sec. of State for India, 8 June 1911,
Secret No. 67, L/P & S/10/2^8, register No. 951*
5 'Judicial: Proposed Trucial Order in Council', R/15/1/295*
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word to cover subjects of ’’recognised Powers” and not the dependents
of petty Arab potentates in the Gulf, with some of whom he claimed to
have special arrangements providing for reciprocal acceptance of each
1 c -  -other’s direct jurisdiction. Shaikh Isa had always shown himself to 
be far more sensitive about losing his jurisdiction over those residents 
in Bahrain who were members of communities which had traditionally 
inhabited the Gulf area than over those who were Europeans. This had 
been demonstrated very clearly at the time of the disturbances of 
September and November 1904. The fact that, in 19^2, he was still 
prepared to press for the right to exercise jurisdiction over the 
dependants of Arab Shaikhdoms in the Gulf indicated how anxious he was 
to cling to as many of his traditional prerogatives as possible. It 
also showed that, despite the fact that he had been coerced by the 
British in February 1905* Shaikh Isa still had enough spirit left to 
attempt to retain his remaining rights of jurisdiction.
In fact there was no objection on the part of the British 
authorities to conceding this particular right to Shaikh cTsa. Whilst 
the treatment of the subjects of powers of consequence on a world scale 
was likely to lead to embarrassment for British ascendancy in the 
Gulf, this was less likely to be the case with dependants of the petty 
Arah potentates of the area. In any case, even when the Shaikh’s 
request had been granted, it would still be possible for the British 
”’to intervene ultimately if appealed to on account of flagrant denial
1 Resident, Bushire,to Govt, of India, F.D., quoted in Viceroy to 
India Office, 6 July 19^2 (tel.), L/P & s/10/248, register No. 
2636.
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of justice111. The proposed Order in Council was amended so that
the Shaikh*s wishes could be accommodated.
After that the Order in Council awaited the general settlement
of Middle East issues among the Powers. The Foreign Office were by-
now concentrating upon the European elements of the negotiations, and,
locally encouraging the Turks - and the Government of India - to
accept Britain*s proposals on the Gulf by moderating British demands
2
on Mesopotamia and the railway. The outbreak of the Balkan War
in October 1912 again delayed the Turkish response. Finally, the
Ottoman Grand Vizier, Hakki Pasha, arrived in London in February 1913
with instructions to make every effort to come to an agreement with 
3
Britain. For several months the problems of the Middle East
generally were under discussion, including those connected with the
status of Bahrain. On 7 April 1913* the India Office telegraphed the
Government of India that the Turks were willing to withdraw from Qatar
entirely on condition that it remained autonomous and was not annexed
by Bahrain. On the other hand, they were pressing for recognition
of their right to jurisdiction over Zakhnuniyya and the Hasa coast" “1 •
if
as far south as a point opposite the island. The Government of 
India replied that the Turkish proposals appeared generally acceptable 
subject to certain provisos. Firstly, the autonomy of Qatar should 
imply "complete renunciation of all claims to suzerainty on the part
1 Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., quoted in Viceroy to Sec. of 
State for India, 6 July 1912 (tel.), L/P 8c S/lO/2*f8, register No.
2636.
2 Cohen, op. cit., pp. 227, 229-35; Busch, op. cit., pp. 330-36; 
Wolf, op. cit., pp. 90-91*
3 Earle, op. cit., pp. 25^-55*
k Sec. of State for India to Viceroy, Foreign Dept., 7 April 1913
(tel.), L/P 8e S/11/46, register No. l^ f^ fO.
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of Turkey”, but the door should be left open for the British Government 
to come to "such agreements or understandings with the El Katr people 
as may be necessary to secure maritime peace or suppression of illicit
C «  M
arms traffic"; secondly, that Shaikh Isa should be given monetary 
compensation for waiving his claims to Zakhnuniyya; and thirdly, that 
the Bahraini fishermen who wintered on Zakhnuniyya should be allowed
1
to continue to do so without interference or levy of dues of any kind.
The India Office informed the Foreign Office that they feared
that the recognition of Turkish jurisdiction over Zakhnuniyya and the
coast between the island and Uqair might lead to "some friction in
the future". Even so, they were prepared to agree to this concession
to the Turks on the conditions recommended by the Government of India
and provided that "a thoroughly satisfactory agreement" was reached
2
with the Ottoman Government "on all other points",
A joint Foreign Office-India Office report of 3 May 19^3 on the 
negotiations with Hakki Pasha included a summary of the results of the 
talks as far as they concerned Bahrain and Qatar. The Turks were to 
give up their claims to Bahrain and Qatar and the latter was to be 
evacuated by them. In exchange they were to receive Zakhnuniyya and 
the strip of coast between the island and Uqair, The safeguards 
required by the Government of India were secured and the Turks were to
Q m  mm
pay Shaikh Isa £1,000 for Zakhnuniyya. The British undertook not to
1 Viceroy to Sec. of State for India, 14- April 19^3 (tel.),
L/P & S/11A6.
2 India Office to Foreign Office, 17 April 19^3» i/P & S/11/**6, 
register No. 11^ *0.
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annex Bahrain, though not, as Hakki Pasha had wanted, to abstain from
altering the nature of their relations with the Shaikhdonu Finally,
the British undertook to ensure that Shaikh CIsa would not attempt 
1
to annex Qatar, These provisions were incorporated into the terms
2of an Anglo-Ottoman settlement which was signed on 29 July 1913»
As far as Qatar was concerned, Article 11 of the Convention stated that 
the peninsula would be governed "as in the past” by Shaikh Qasim b. 
Than! and his successors. The British Government undertook "not to 
allow the interference of the shaykh of Bahrayn in the internal 
affairs of al-Qatar, his endangering the autonomy of that area or his
3
annexing it". By Article 15 of the Convention the British secured
Turkish agreement to a right which had been disputed for decades.
The subjects of the Shaikh of Bahrain were to be considered as 
foreigners in Ottoman territories and would be protected by British 
consuls. **
The implications of the Anglo-Turkish Convention for Bahrain and 
its neighbours was of immediate interest to British local officials 
and to Shaikh Isa himself.
1 Secret report, ‘Baghdad Railway and the Persian Gulf: The 
Negotiations with Hakki Pasha1, 6 May 1913* signed by Louis Mallet, 
and Arthur Hirtzel, Sec. of Political and Secret Dept., India 
Office, Cab 37/115 (No. 31), 4676, p. 2.
2 See articles 11-15 of Anglo-Ottoman Draft Convention on the Persian 
Gulf Area, 29 July 1913, J.C. Hurewitz, op. cit., I, 271-72.
This text is an English translation of the French original which 
Hurewitz took from Gooch and Temperley, op. cit., X (ii), 190-94-• 
For the agreements as they were initialled on 6 May 1913 see 
Cab 42/23, 4676, pp. 9-14-.
3 Anglo-Ottoman Draft Convention, 29 July 1913, J*C. Hurewitz, 
o£i_ciit., I, 271.
4 Ibid
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Q m m  »
In May 1913 Shaikh Isa, seeing that it was possible that the
c
Turkish garrison would soon be driven out of Bida , considered reviving 
his claim to levy tribute in the peninsula. The Shaikh also asked the 
Political Agent to remind the Resident of the Agreement of 1868 by which 
Shaikh Muhammad b. Thani had promised to maintain his traditional 
relations with the A1 Khalifa Shaikhs of Bahrain.^ At the India Office 
it was noted that, although the A1 Than! rulers of Qatar had, in 1868, 
bound themselves to pay tribute to the Shaikh of Bahrain, this had been 
paid for two years only, after which the Turks had established their
C Cm  ««garrison at Bida . Shaikh Isa's contemplated move was "contrary to 
the spirit of our understanding to Turkey" not to allow the Shaikh of
Bahrain to interfere in the internal affairs of Qatar, even if it had
2
been defensible on other grounds. The Foreign Office agreed.
They advised that Cox should be instructed to oppose any such
3
interference should it be attempted and, on 31 July 1913» this was
Zf
done. In the event, when, in June 1913» the general purport of 
the terms of the Anglo-Ottoman Convention, as far as they affected
Bahrain, was conveyed to Shaikh Isa, he was reported to be "pleased on
5
the whole". He even accepted the loss of Zakhnuniyya as natural.
1 Resident, Bushire, to Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., 17 May 1913 
(tel.), L/P & S/11/56, register No. 2261.
2 Unsigned minute of 22 May 1913» L/P 8c S/11/56, register No. 2261.
3 Foreign Office to India Office, 3 July 1913? L/P 8e S/11/56, 
register No. 2*f65«
Deputy Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Cox, 31 July 1913? L/P 
8c S/11/56, register No. 3589* See also Trevor's 25 January 191^ 
minute thereon, 1^ /15/2/30.
5  Cox to Sec. to Govt, of India, k June 1913 (tel.), L/P 8c S/11/56, 
register No. 2213*
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British political officers in the Gulf had been somewhat
inconvenienced by the delays in the Anglo-Turkish negotiations, which
had held up the handling of several matters, not merely the protection
of Bahrainis and other Trucial Arabs when in the Ottoman territory,,
They particularly wanted to stop Shaikh CIsa!s insistence upon
corresponding with Turkish officials on political matters which were,
1
to the British, obviously the province of the Political Agent. They 
hoped to solve the problem from the Turkish side once the Convention 
went into effect. This proved a disappointment, however, because their 
superiors would not allow it. In the question of the British relation­
ship with Bahrain, there still remained a considerable difference 
between the British and the Ottoman Governments. Whilst Britain had 
simply pledged not to annex Bahrain, the Turks had wanted the British 
to undertake to abstain from altering the nature of their relations 
with the Shaikhdom. This, of course, the British had not been willing 
to do. Such an undertaking would run counter to their whole strategy 
of issuing an Order in Council for Bahrain. Even so, the fact that
the Turks were sensitive to any alteration in the nature of the British 
relationship with Bahrain made the question of when to bring the 
Order in Council into operation a matter of careful consideration.
In March 1913, when the long process of discussion of and
amendment to the Order in Council was drawing to a close, it had been
the opinion of both the India Office and the Foreign Office that it
2
should be promulgated "with the legist possible delay". The Order
1 See for example L/P & S/10/38A-, register No. ^520; L/P & S/11/28; 
Residency files R/15/2/10 and R/15/1/319, passim.
2 Foreign Office to India Office, 5 March 1913, No. 8066, L/P & 
S/10/2^ -8. See also India Office to Foreign Office, 11 March 1913,
No. P850, L/P & s/10/2^8.
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in Council was in fact approved by the King in Council on 12 August 1913.
Three days later it was published in the London Gazette. This was
due to a misunderstanding at the Foreign Office since it had been
considered "undesirable on diplomatic grounds, in view of pending
negotiations with Turkey and other Powers interested in the Persian Gulf,
to proceed further for the present with the promulgation of the Bahrain 
1
Order1’. The reason why no further steps were taken to bring the 
Order in Council into operation was because it had been thought 
desirable, in deference to Turkish susceptibilities, to avoid any action 
even remotely suggesting a 'forward policy' in the Gulf until some time 
had elapsed after the conclusion of all the negotiations with the 
Ottomans.
Although the Anglo-Ottoman Convention was signed on 29 July 19^3*
it still awaited ratification on the outbreak of the First World War
2
and was, in fact never ratified. The negotiations between the
British and the Turkish Governments were never completed. However,
the fact that the Ottomans were, from late 1914-, adversaries of Britain
removed the necessity for considering Turkish susceptibilities over
Bahrain. On 12 December 1914- the Foreign Office decided that there
could be no objection to bringing the Order in Council into operation
4-
without further delay and to its publication in the Gazette of India.
1 India Office to Foreign Office, 17 November 19^3* No. P4-560,
L/P & S/10/24B.
2 Laithwaite, 'Historical Memorandum', p. 3^«
3 Unsigned minute relating to letter from India Office to Foreign
Office, 8 December 1914-, L/P & S/10/2*f8, register No. 4-720.
4- Foreign Office to India Office, 12 December 1914-, L/*P &
S/10/24B.
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The Government of India was informed of this decision by telegram on 
1
12 January 1915» In fact, the Order in Council was not brought into 
operation till 1919 since, during the First World War, there was little 
need for such legal niceties.
By the time the Anglo-Turkish Convention came to be signed, the 
attention of the British authorities responsible for Gulf affairs had 
been increasingly drawn to events on the mainland coasts of both 
Persia and Hasa, The developments in these areas early in 1913 
affected British relations with Bahrain to a certain extent.
From 1905 to 1913* Britain’s local relations with Persia
concerning Bahrain were somewhat similar to Anglo-Turkish relations
before the signing of the Convention of 1913* There was even an
unsuccessful attempt to secure a definitive renunciation of the Persian
claim to Bahrain, Persian officials in the Gulf ports continually
harassed Bahraini subjects, and denied British representations on the
grounds that Bahrain was a Persian possession, as recognised by Captain
Bruce in 1822, The British continued to reject the Persian claim, but
Persian resentment at England’s part in the Anglo-Russian Convention
made the Persians more intransigent over the protection issue following 
2
the revolution. In Bahrain itself, the Persian merchant
1 Sec, of State for India to Viceroy, F,D, (tel,), L/P & S/10/248.
See also Sec, of State for India to Viceroy, 15 January 1915* 
Political No. 7, L/P & S/10/248.
2 Grey to E. Grant-Duff, (Tehran), 9 February 1906 (tel.), L/P & 
S/10/82, register No. 2652/07* See also register Nos. 2958/07, 
3698/0 7, and 2944/08, L/P & s/10/82. In April 1908 the British 
representative at Tehran suggested the temporary occupation of Qais 
or Hormuz to enforce Britain’s views about Bahrain: Marling to Grey,
11 April 1908 (tel.), L/P & s/10/82, register No. 3060/08, For the 
effect of the Anglo-Russian Convention on British prestige in Persia, 
see C.G. Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 (Cambridge, 
1910), pp. 172-95* and Kazemzadeh, op. cit., pp. 501-04.
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Haji Abdul Nabi issued passes to Bahrainis going to Persia as if they 
were travelling from one Persian port to another. For this and
Q  mm
Abdul Nabi*s urging of the Persian claim in the vernacular press, Cox
tried from 1910 to 1913 to have him expelled from Bahrain. Shaikh CIsa
was reluctant to alienate the Persian community by such a move, and
the measure was put off repeatedly pending the long-delayed issuing
1
of the Order in Council in Bahrain.
In 1913 increasing disruption and lawlessness in the provinces
forced the Persian government to turn once again to Russia and Britain
for financial assistance. Cox saw that a proposed emergency loan from
Britain to organise the Swedish-led gendarmerie for the province of
Fars might provide an opportunity to settle the Bahrain claim. He
suggested seven undertakings affecting British standing in Persia which
the Persians ought to accept in order to get the loan. One was the
’’Abandonment of empty claims to sovereignty over Bahrein and recognition
of our protective rights over those islands and Trucial Coast and our
2
title to protect their subjects in Persia”. The British Minister 
at Tehran, Townley, mentioned the desiderata semi-officially to the 
Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who rejected two of the conditions, 
the lighting and buoying of the Gulf waters of Persia, and the 
abandonment of the claim to Bahrain. Townley repeatedly pressed the 
matter from March to May without success. Both governments retained
1 ’Persian Pretensions to Bahrain*, I^ /15/2/2, pp. 68-75* 98-115*
2 Cox to Grey, 19 January 1913 (tel.), L/P & S/11/47, register No. 
908. For conditions in Fars, and the strains placed on the 
1907 Convention by Russian activities in Persia, particularly from 
1912, see Greaves, ’Some Aspects of the Anglo-Russian Convention 
and its Workings in Persia*, loc. cit., pt. 2, pp. 290-308.
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their previous views, with Britain trusting that the rights of its 
consular officers to protect Bahrainis in Persia would not be disputed 
in practice.^
M M ^ r C
The expulsion of the Turks from Hasa by the Wahhabi Amir Abdul
C M c**Aziz b. Sa ud in May 1913 was of greater immediate and future 
significance for British Gulf policy and for Bahrain.
Bahrain figured in the circumstances surrounding the withdrawal
of the Turks from the coast in May 1913* As Amir cAbdul CAziz had
defeated his Rashidi rivals and consolidated his power in Najd after
1902, he had contemplated regaining the former Sa udi coastal
possessions occupied by the Ottomans. He had recognised, however, that
Hasa was vulnerable to a counter-attack by sea, and so sought the •
backing of the British to prevent this. His overtures were declined 
in 1903 and 1911. 2
On *f-5 May 1913 Sacudi forces swiftly attacked and captured
Hufuf. The Sa udi Amir occupied Uqair and Qatif by 15 May, and
expelled the Turkish garrison and officials on the steamship "John
3
O'Scott", which arrived at Bahrain on the 18th. At Basra a Turkish 
officer and a small party of soldiers escorting a large consignment of
1 'Loans to Persia, 1913*» L/P & S/10/353* register Nos. 7^7, 865, 
935 and 13^8.
2 Gary Troeller, The Birth of Sacudi Arabia (London, 197&), PP* 21, 
V l-2 .
5 Cox to Grey, 13 and 15 May 1913 (tels.), register No. 1921;
Consul Crow, Basra, to Lowther, 23 May 1913» register No. 28*f4; 
Capt. Shakespear, Kuwait, to Resident, Bushire, 20 May 1913»
L/P & S/10/38^ -, register No. 2558. Troeller, op. cit., pp. 3^-^ «
H. St. John Philby, Sa°udi Arabia (London, 1955)» PP» 267-68.
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ammunition embarked on 20 May on a mail steamer calling at Bushire and
Bahrain* To Cox this indicated a Turkish counter-attack to be
launched from Bahrain. He telegraphed for instructions, pointing
out the importance of maintaining Shaikh CIsa's neutrality, the
statement of 1893 that Britain would not permit the trans-shipment of
Turkish troops in Bahrain waters, and the delicate state of the Anglo-
1
Turkish negotiations*
The Foreign Office instructed Cox to take no action* If
2
necessary a protest could be made ex post facto* The India Office
3
was not entirely pleased about this:
F*0* did not consult us about this* Their decision may be 
right in the circumstances but when once the negotiations 
are over and the Turks have disinterested themselves in 
Bahrain it will not be possible to allow the Turks to use 
it as a taking-off ground for their military operations on 
the mainland*
The local complications which Hirtzel seemed to anticipate did
in fact occur. The commander of the expelled troops at Bahrain,
Major Nuris Bey, and the officer from Basra, Colonel Abdul Jabar, kept
the John O^cott at Bahrain on various pretexts, and brought over some
men and guns from the garrison at Bida on 25 May. The next day
Major Nuris Bey with 110 men returned in native boats to Uqair.
They captured a tower, but part of his force refused to fight on, so
he re-embarked, leaving the men in the tower to surrender. Amir 
c c —Abdul Aziz sent them back to Bahrain. Although reports from Fao
1 Cox to Townley, 20 May 1913 (tel., urgent), register No. 2010; 
Lowther to Grey, 21 May 1913 (tel.), L/P 8e S/10/384, register No. 
2020. For the 1893 statement, see Nicolson to Rosebery, 2 July 
1893, L/P & S/3/327« P* 1153* and previous correspondence,
pp. 257, 259, $61, 1149, Ibid.
2 Foreign Office to Cox, 21 May 1913 (tel.), L/P 8c S/10/384, 
register No. 2020.
3 Minute on above by A. Hirtzel, Political Secretary, India Office, 
22 May 1913, Ibid.
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indicated that the Turks at Bahrain had orders to delay until two 
gunboats could be summoned from Aden and Bombay, the force returned 
to Basra on b June in the John O'Scott. The Political Agent at 
Bahrain noted that these activities had been objectionable and
Q m m  mm
embarrassing to Shaikh Isa, and calculated to drag him into the dispute. 
The Agent suggested that a protest be made to Constantinople, stating 
that any further operations must be carried out direct from Basra to 
the mainland without touching Bahrain# When the protest was made, 
the Grand Vizier replied that the troops went involuntarily to Bahrain, 
and would not do so in future.
The Wahhabi Amir complained that the British had assisted the
Turkish troops in Bahrain to return and attack him, despite his own
desire to maintain traditional friendly relations with Britain# Cox
explained that Major Trevor had not given facilities to the Turks, and
2that Britain was staying strictly neutral# In the discussions during
the following year between the Foreign Office, India Office and
Government of India on the policy to be pursued toward the Sa udi power,
the prohibition of Bahrain waters to the Turks was the only practical
assurance which officers in the Gulf could point to in the way of
3preventing an invasion of Hasa by sea. The Foreign Office's
inability in the prevailing circumstances of world diplomacy to support
1 Crow to Lowther, 23 May 19^3* register No# 28¥f, Cox to Viceroy,
30 May and 3 June 19^3 (tels#), register No. 3725; Crow to Lowther, 
6 June 19^3 (tel#), register No. 2286; Lowther to Grey, 9 June 
1913, L/P & S/10/384, register No. 2301.
2 CAbdul °Aziz b. Sa°ud to Cox, 13 June 19^3* and Cox to cAbdul CAziz 
b. Sacud, 9 July 1913* L/P 8e S/10/38^ f, register Nos. 3^1 & 3Wf.
3 Troeller, op. cit., pp. *f8 , 5b, 55 & 59« An invasion direct from 
Basra in native boats was barely possible in good weather, so the 
denial of Bahrain was not a complete safeguard: Trevor to Knox,
21 March 191^, L/P 8e S/IO/3 85, register No. 1603.
3^2
Amir contrasted with the new political realities of the western coasts 
of the Gulf* Indian officials were soon concerned by the possibility 
of the reassertion of Wahhabi pretensions to Qatar, the Trucial 
Shaikhdoms, and even Oman* After a long series of wartime negotiations,
Q m m
the Anglo-Sa udi Treaty of 26 December 1915 included an article, inspired 
by Gulf officials and the Government of India, by which the Amir pledged 
not to interfere with Bahrain, Kuwait, the Trucial Shaikhdoms, and 
Qatar.
c «
One minor matter of Bahrain-Sa udi relations persisted throughout
the First World Welt. In July 1913 the Wahhabi Amir authorised Shaikh
CIsa to exercise jurisdiction over inhabitants of Najd and Hasa resident
in Bahrain the same as if they were his own subjects* This was in
accord with Shaikh CIsa's reservation of 1912 to the proposed Order in
Council* The Political Agent, Major Trevor, foresaw trouble, els Hasawls
were at least nominally Turkish subjects, and thus "foreigners’1, under
jurisdiction of the Political Agent. Shaikh cIsa felt that the issue
touched his dignity, suid continually refused to give in on the issue.
In 1917 the Political Agent at the time recommended admitting the
Shaikh’s contention, in order to induce him to accept the Order in
Council without trouble, and to prove to Bahrainis that the Order was not
intended to infringe on the Shaikh's authority. This view wels accepted
2by the time the Order in Council came into force in February 1919*
1 Troeller, op. cit., pp. 83-89.
2 Shaikh CAbdul CAziz b. Sacud to Shaikh CIsa, I^July 1913* L/P & 
S/11/68, register No. V771; Knox to Shaikh cIsa, 28 May 191^t 
L/P 8e S/11/68, register No. 2725; Capt. Loch, Political Agent, 
Bahrain, 7 Maty 1917» L/P & S/11/68, register No. 121/19* See also 
R/15/1/319i 'Bahrain: Relations of Chief with Other Foreign Powers,
1913-1922'.
3^3
The year 1913 saw the signing of the last agreement between the 
British Government and the Shaikh of Bahrain before the war. It 
proved to be a document of enormous significance for the economic future 
of the Shaikhdom.
With the conversion of the British fleet from coal to oil, the
Admiralty became increasingly concerned to secure adequate supplies of
petroleum at reasonable prices. Part of its programme was to buy a
controlling interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, whose fields in
south-western Persia had been producing in commercial quantities since
1908, An Admiralty commission under Rear-Admiral Sir Edmond Slade
was sent to the Gulf from October 1913 to January 1914- to examine the
1
geology of the oilfields, with a view to justifying the purchase.
Although the commission was principally concerned with Persia, Sir
Edward Grey suggested to the Admiralty and India Office that Slade
should investigate Kuwait and Bahrain as well, and that the Political
Resident should secure oil concessions from the shaikhs if the ground 
2
looked promising. In October Cox obtained an assurance from Shaikh 
Mubarak of Kuwait not to grant a concession to anyone not nominated by 
the British Government, In Bahrain in November the commission found
Q  M  M
a yery likely area at Ain-al-Ghar, south-west of Jabal Dujchan,
Admiral Slade recommended the conclusion of a similar agreement at once. 
He urged that it exclude undesirable British subjects as well as
1 Marian Kent, Oil and Empire: British Policy & Mesopotamian Oil,
1900-1920 (London, 1976), p. 48.
2 Admiralty to Foreign Office, October 1913* and Foreign Office 
to India Office, 8 October 1913, L/P & S/10/339, register No, 
4152.
foreigners, a condition not covered by the 1892 Agreement* On
20 February 191*f Shaikh Isa gave such a verbal assurance to the
Political Agent, Major Trevor, who observed that "in fact his manner
rather made me think that his own preference would lie in the direction
of never giving any concession to any body at all11* The Shaikh*s
written promise, however, stated only that he would consult the Political
Agent if he wished to get the oil worked. This was insufficient, but,
as the Shaikh was in a suspicious frame of mind, Trevor suggested not
2
pressing the matter further for the time being. The Government of 
India then ordered Trevor to secure a written undertaking from Shaikh
C «  M
Isa to consult the Political Agent before entertaining any overtures 
or exploiting oil himself. After two more tries, this was done in 
May
When the fighting began in Europe in August 191^, Britain’s 
position in the Persian Gulf was as strong as it had ever been, although 
the various diplomatic arrangements designed to assure this were not 
quite completed. The war came to the Persian Gulf with some degree 
of uncertainty, but Britain was able to demonstrate that its military 
power was still supreme in the region. Indian Expeditionary Force *D* 
proceeded to the Gulf on 15 October. On the 18th an officer joined
1 Trevor to Cox, 30 November 1913; Cox to Govt, of India, F.D., 19
December 1913 (tel.), 1^15/2/13* For the geologist’s report on
Bahrain, see L/P & S/10/Vl0. In 1911 Shaikh CIsa had indicated his
willingness to grant a concession to a British company to work 
asphalt deposits at Ain-al-Ghar, which had been known since 1901. 
See Cox'to Govt, of India, F.D., 13 April 1911, IV^5/2/13* Slade 
wished to exclude Sir Marcus Samuel’s company, Shell, whose Dutch 
connections were suspected of being under German control.
2 Trevor to Cox, 21 February 191^, R/15/2/13*
3 Deputy Sec. to Govt, of India, F.D., to Political Resident,
16 April 191^ ; Trevor to Knox, 16 May 191^ , R/15/2/13*
3^5
the Political Agent at Bahrain, Captain T.H. Keyes, in order to prepare
for a landing by the Force on the island until it received further
orders, Keyes informed Shaikh Isa on 22 October of the intended
arrival of the Force the next day. The Shaikh was co-operative,
and delegated his son to point out the best camping sites. The
transports arrived, but orders were received not to land the troops.
After learning of the Turkish bombardment of Odessa, the Force left
1
for the Shatt al-Arab on 2 November,
During the days that the troopships were in the roadstead, the 
people of Bahrain became increasingly uneasy, fearing that the British 
would occupy the island permanently. The Political Agent observed 
that public opinion in Bahrain was in general strongly against the 
Allies:^
• •• these people, though they dislike both Turk and German, 
can never forget that the Russians ... bombarded the shrine 
of Imam Reza ••• The chief of the Dawasir told me that if 
Russia attacked Stamboul not an able bodied man would be 
left in Bahrein,
,,. They ask why the British who have taken Egypt, Cyprus, 
and Aden and have joined Russia, pose as the friends of 
Turkey. The feeling against us is now strong and almost 
universal. With the exception of certain of the A1 Khalifa 
and Shaikh Isa*s secretaries we have no open sympathisers,
British power was of course too strong to be challenged, but such 
feelings provided one reason why it was simpler not to introduce the 
Order in Council for Bahrain, the new legal basis of the British position 
in the island, during the course of the war,
1 Capt. Keyes to Knox, November 191^, L/P & S/11/86, register No.
A293* Cohen, op. cit., pp. 299 & 301.
2 Cohen, op. cit., pp. 299 & 301. The lone German in Bahrain, the
manager of Wonckhaus!s business, was arrested on 28 October.
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION
Throughout the period of Gulf history dealt with in this work, 
there was a tendency for Residents to be more willing than their 
superiors in India or in London to take bold action in defence of 
British interests. The Resident at Bushire was not so likely as his 
superiors to take a broad view of the international implications of 
his actions in the Gulf. Residents were naturally inclined to take 
into consideration British interests in the Gulf only. It was 
incumbent on the Government of India, on the other hand, to frame their 
policy decisions regarding Gulf affairs in such a way as to further 
the broader interests of British India, particularly so far as security 
and commerce were concerned. For the Home Government in general, and 
the Foreign Office in particular, Gulf affairs formed only a small 
section of the broad sweep of global interests of Britain and the Empire. 
Where a Resident at Bushire might see a clear-cut necessity for decisive 
action in defence of Britain's Gulf interests, the Government of India, 
and even more so, the Home Government, would be likely to detect a 
number of reasons for proceeding much more cautiously.
I
This was a major factor in the history of the change in Anglo-
Bahraini relations from 1869 to In general it can be said that ]
I
the restraining influence of the higher authorities, those in Britain 
in particular, increased as the Gulf area became of greater importance 
in international diplomacy from the mid-l890s onwards. Before about 
1895 the Residents in the Gulf had more freedom to take initiatives 
in Anglo-Bahraini relations than they had later. The signing of both
3^7
the 1880 and the 1892 Agreements owed very much to the initiative of 
Residents Ross and Talbot respectively. In particular, the 1880 
Agreement, which, for many years to come, formed the legal basis of
Britain's position as protector of Bahrain, was drawn up and signed by ;
j
Ross without any kind of special instructions from his superiors.
Whilst the Government of India had to point out that, as a general rule, 
such action was inexpedient, both they and the Home Government agreed 
to ratify the Agreement, In later years, for example in November 
1907 at the time of the recommendation to the India Office of an 
Order in Council for Bahrain, the Government of India were only too 
glad to refer to the 1880 Agreement as the basis of Britain's 
'protectorate' over Bahrain,
From the later 1890s onwards the initiatives of Residents were 
subject to more critical scrutiny and closer control than in the 
earlier period. It is in the context of the increased importance of 
the Gulf in international diplomacy that Lord George Hamilton's 
criticism in 1899 of Colonel Meade's alleged tendency to exceed his 
instructions should be seen. Meade was not really more adventurous
than predecessors like Ross, The fact was, however, that times had
changed: a move which would be considered no more than bold in 1880
would have been regarded as utterly reckless in 1899«
It is true that, under Meade, such British officials at Bushire 
as Gaskin and Prideaux, had a tendency to want to interfere in the 
internal affairs of Bahrain to an unprecedented extent. This was 
especially so in the case of Gaskin who would have been only too
C «  mm
pleased to have curbed Shaikh Isa's oppressive behaviour towards his 
own subjects. At the same time, such reforming zeal stood hardly
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any chance of sanction from either the Government of India or the 
authorities in London, neither of which at this time had any such 
interest in Bahrain, It is of course true that both the Home 
Government and the Government of India wished to see a reform of 
Shaikh Isa's Customs arrangements. This was, however, not because 
the basic objective of these Governments was to interfere in Bahrain's 
internal affairs. What lay at the root of British anxiety for Customs 
reform in Bahrain was the desire to secure better political 
representation there, at the least possible cost to Indian revenues, 
at a time when Britain's whole position in the Gulf was under increasing 
pressure.
The tendency from the mid-l890s to transfer policy initiatives 
regarding Bahrain from the sphere of the Resident to those of the 
Governments of India and the United Kingdom made the next step in the 
development of the legal basis of Anglo-Bahraini relations particularly 
difficult. The signing of the 1880 and 1892 Agreements had, sub the 
Government of India had noted in November 1907* made Bahrain in practice 
a kind of protectorate. It is, in fact, significant that British 
officials in the 1890s and 1900s quite freely used the word 
'protectorate' in relation to Bahrain in their correspondence, though 
only when such documents were not to be made public. The problem was 
that, no doubt partly because of the way in which the 1880 and 1892 
Agreements had come to be signed, they had not been made the occasion 
for proclaiming the British protectorate to the world. Before the 
mid-l890s it suited British purposes to exercise their influence in j 
Bahrain informally. After this time, when it became necessary to 
assert Britain's position in relation to the Shaikhdom, the fact that 
a protectorate had never been formally announced proved to be an 
embarrassment. The problem was that such an announcement required a
3^9
suitable occasion if Britain's rivals in the Gulf were not to respond 
to it with diplomatic challenges. On the other hand, as long as no 
such announcement was made, the way was open for foreign powers to 
embarrass Britain by other means.
This issue came to a head over the question of jurisdiction over 
foreigners in Bahrain. Although the British Agent in Bahrain in 
practice saw to it that such foreigners received justice, he had no 
de jure basis for the exercise of such powers. The fact that this  ^
left it open to foreign powers to claim extra-territoriality was the 
chief reason for the preparation of an Order in Council for Bahrain.
Even so, fears of the diplomatic consequences helped to delay the 
emergence of the Order in Council for nearly a decade after the 
Government of India's proposal for the drawing up of such an Order was 
presented to the India Office in November 1907* Less directly, the 
British position in Bahrain was nevertheless bolstered by the 
arrangements concluded in the course of Britain's European and imperial 
diplomacy before the First World War. The ententes with France and 
Russia, and the Convention with Turkey safeguarded British standing in 
the Shaikhdom through the device of having the rivals renounce their 
pretensions. The Persians still clung to their ineffectual claim. 
Germain political and commercial competition might still cause 
difficulties, despite German endorsement of the Anglo-Turkish settlement. 
Relations with the renewed Saudi power were uncertain until the 19^5 
agreement. The coming of the First World War altered all of these j
I
circumstances, and provided a^ well the occasion for promulgating in ' 
19^5 the Bahrain Order in Council which placed relations with Bahrain 
on a secure legal basis.
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It may be suggested here that the British imperial position in 
the Gulf is a fair more complex phenomenon for historians to interpret 
than the British position in the directly ruled colonies. In areas 
of indirect control such as the Gulf, the British frequently sought 
power and control without wishing to admit, for fear of challenge by 
other Powers, that they exercised it. This meant that a gulf 
developed between what the British would admit in public and what they 
knew to be the case in private. With the promulgation of the Order 
in Council for Bahrain in 1915» this gulf was considerably narrowed; 
and, to this extent, the British relationship with Bahrain moved a 
step away from indirect control towards colonial rule.
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IV ARABIC SOURCES
Unfortunately no manuscripts have yet been found that are 
contemporary to the period under study. The very few that exist have 
been used by A.M. Abu Hakima in his History of Eastern Arabia and they 
deal with the eighteenth century and early part of the nineteenth.
, C —
Nevertheless, the manuscript of Uthman b. Sanad al-Basri, Saba'ik al- 
°asjad fi Akhbar Ahmad Najl Rizaq^  al-AsCad does throw light on the 
origin of the A1 Khalifa and their establishment at Zubara in 1766.
The only significant contemporary source on Bahrain is that of 
Muhammad b. Khalifa al-Nabhani, al-Tuhfa al-Nabhaniyya fi Tarikh 
al-Jazira al-CArabiyya, 2nd ed., Cairo, 192*1-, 12 Vols.
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the period of A1 Khalifa. After consulting the family records of
Par al-Asfar, and conducting interviews with the ruler, other members
of the A1 Khalifa and notable merchants the manuscript was completed
and published in 191*+ in Baghdad. The book was called al-Nabdha
al-Latifa fi al-Hukkam min A1 Khalifa. The author had also intended
to write more volumes on the relations of the A1 Khalifa with their
neighbours such as the A1-Rashid, the Al-Sa°ud and the A1-Sabah.
• •
He was, however, persuaded by a friend named Ahmad Jawdat Bey b. Ali 
Qazim Bey, the owner of al-Munir newspaper of Basra, to expand his work 
and make it comprehensive of all the Arab peninsula. Thereupon the 
name of the work changed into the above mentioned title. The
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volume on Bahrain, however, became so popular that the British 
Government asked the Chief of Police at Manama, Mr Hasan Sadiq, to 
translate it into English. The task was completed after the end of 
the war, but, as of yet, there has been no sign of the translation 
in the India Office Library.
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Banian
Dubasch
Durbar
’ Istishhad 
Kran
Majlis
Mudir
Munshi
Mutasarrif
QadI
Qa'im raaqam
Shari°a
Sukhra
CUrf
Wall
Wilayat
Wazir
Zakat
GLOSSARY
A Hindu trader
An interpreter (F. Steingass, Persian-English 
Dictionary)
A reception or audience chamber of a prince, 
Viceroy, etc.
A testimony
A silver coin worth between a third and half a 
rupee
A court, council or audience chamber
The administrative head of a Nahlya (sub-Qada')
A letter-writer or clerk
The administrative head of a Liwa (sub-province) 
A Muslim judge
The administrative head of a Qada 
Islamic law
An obligation to perform gratuitous labour; 
corvee.
Traditional usages and customs
The Governor of a province under the Ottomans
The province governed by a wali
A personal secretary or adviser
Alms tax
GENEALOGICAL TABLE OF THE AL KHALIFA FAMILY OF BAHRAIN*
Khalifa b. Muframmad b. Faysal
He is the first known father of the A1 Khalifa 
whose ancestors belonged to the A1 Fadil clan 
of the Utub tribe of wadi al-Dawasir. In 1766 
the A1 Fadil and other Arab clans arrived in 
Qatar, from Kuwait and built the forts of 
al-Murair and Zubara. Here the A1 Kjjallfa flourished 
and in 1783 invaded Bahrain.
Afrmad b. Khalifa
He bacame the first A1 Khalifa ruler of Bahrain 
subsequent to its conquest in 1783 with the help of 
a conglomeration of various other Arab tribes 
from Qatar. He died in 1796.
Salman
He succeeded his father to the 
Shaikhship in 1796, but ruled 
co-jointly with his brother Ahmad 
as his subordinate. In 1820 both 
Shaikhs signed the General Treaty of 
Peace with the British Government. He 
died in 1825 and his descendents became 
known as the A1 Salman
fAbdallah
He ruled co-jointly with 
his elder brother Salman 
and lived at Manama. Upon the 
death of Salman,in 1825, Abdallah 
moved to Muharraq and usurped 
the executive power leaving 
his nephew Khalifa b. Salman 
to succeed only to half the 
revenues. After the death of 
Khalifa, in May 1834, ‘Abdallah 
allowed his grand nephew Muhammad to 
his father's share of the revenues but 
retained the executive power.
In 1843 fAbdallah lost Bahrain to 
his two grandnephews Muhammad 
and Ali and became a fugitive.
In 1849 “Abdallah died in
Muscat and his descendents became known as 
the A1 ‘Abdallah.
Khalifa Mubarak Muframmad
He only succeeded to half the 
revenues with his uncle 
‘Abdallah and nominally held 
power. He died on 21 May 1834 
leaving his two sons Muhammad and 
. ‘Ali to tangle for power with their 
Grand-Uncle ‘Abdallah.
Muhammad
He was also only nominally 
admitted to power with 
his Grand Uncle though he 
succeeded to half the 
revenues. Upon show­
ing signs of 
discontent ‘Abdallah 
assigned him to Qatar 
as Governor. In 1843, 
Muhammad with the help 
of his brother ‘Ali 
and,possibly that of 
the Wahhabi Amir of 
Naja, succeeded in 
assuming the Shaikhship 
of Bahrain and throw­
ing ‘Abdallah out. In 
1861, he signed the 
famous convention with 
the British Government 
which had incorporated 
Bahrain into the 
Trucial System.
Ali
After 1843 ‘Ali ruled 
co-jointly with Muhammad 
and was more
appreciated by the people of 
Bahrain. While Muhammad 
was mis-governing ‘Ali 
was patching up the 
government. In 1868, the 
British Resident confirmed 
‘Ali in power and forbade 
him to allow his brother back 
in Bahrain. During the 
invasion of Bahrain led 
by Muhammad, ‘Ali was slain 
in battle, only several 
months as the sole ruler of the 
islands.
He ruled from 1869 to 1923
when he abdicated in favour of
his son yamad but lived until 1933.
He governed Dammam for 
his father 1843-44 after 
they both fled Bahrain.
Napir
He was born in 1848 
to the daughter 
of the headman of the 
Bani Hajir tribe.
In 1869 he was 
among the leaders 
of the invasion of 
Bahrain, but later 
escaped the British 
blockade of the 
islands and fled to 
Hasa. He became an 
Ottoman protege 
in the area and 
engineered several 
abortive attempts for 
the occupation of Bahrain
He was made a 
Governor of Dammam1 ln 
1852 by the Wahhabis. 
Until 1861 he was 
a menace to the trade 
of Bahrain and a threat 
to Shaikh Muhammad b. 
Khalifa. In the same 
year a British naval 
force expelled him from 
Dammam. During the 
invasion of Bahrain, he 
betrayed his cousin, 
Muhammad b. Khalifa, 
jailed him and became 
sole ruler of the island 
for a period of six 
months. In 1869, 
however, he was captured 
by the British Resident's 
naval force and 
deported to India 
where he died in 1877.
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